











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
The Isle of Eigg: 
Land Reform, People, and Power. 
By 
Daniel Rhys Morgan 
PhD 
The University of Edinburgh 
1998 
Abstract 
An historiographical analysis of the present political debates regarding land 
reform in Scotland provides the point of departure for a case study of the Isle ofEigg 
and the 1997 purchase of the island by the Isle ofEigg Heritage Trust. The case study 
details the island community's historical development and researches the building 
pressures that culminated in two successive campaigns for community ownership in 
1992 and 1996-7. Through interviews, focus groups, and 3 years of regular visits to 
the island a comprehensive social history of Eigg is consequently compiled and 
analysed, within which, particular attention is given to the role of island proprietors 
and their problematic relationships with the resident community. Using a highly 
participative methodology of research, the author took an active role in the facilitation 
and promotion of the islanders' ideas for community ownership. This is detailed 
together with the participative management plan that resulted from planning 
workshops and exhaustive interviews with island households. The process of 
community empowerment is traced through the workshops, the drafting of the 
management plan and the unique partnership that was eventually formed between the 
islanders, the Highland Council, and the Scottish Wildlife Trust. This is followed by 
an 'insider's view' ofthe Isle ofEigg Appeal, which had as much impact on the 
island as it did in the national media. The most successful public appeal in the 
Highlands and Islands to date is also examined from a marketing perspective, that 
explains how indeed, 64 islanders managed to raise £1.6 m in just 8 months without 
mains electricity nor Lottery backing. Finally, the central lessons of the community's 
success are used to highlight the importance of community development in any future 
policies of land reform in Scotland. The conclusion thereby emphasises the 
importance of integrated planning, community participation, and appropriate packages 
of support in establishing similar community trust models of ownership. 
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To the islanders of Eigg, to my parents 
Philip and Eileen Morgan, and to Claire. 
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Introduction 
Though Eigg is but a small island off the West Coast of Scotland, it has 
certainly achieved a distinct notoriety over the past few years. Thumbing through the 
numerous media cuttings some might remember the bob-sledding owner whose Rolls 
Royce burst into flames, or the mystical German artist with his dubious academic 
titles, or even the operatic star who proposed to import 3000 Italian musicians. The 
eccentric cast of characters that have turned up to ponder or assume its lairdship have 
been colourful to say the least, and their erratic behaviour towards the island and its 
people have become infamous throughout Scotland. Public unease towards the 
situation was exemplified by the success of the appeal launched in 1996 by the 64 
island residents to gain ownership of the island themselves. Forming a unique 
partnership with conservation and local government interests, the residents' appeal 
raised 1.6 million pounds in just over eight months. After much behind the scenes 
work, bids and counter-bids, threatened bankruptcy, and at last a forced sale, the 
partnership finally succeeded in purchasing the island on the 4th of April 1997. All the 
major national media covered the jubilation on the island, and an exuberant Maggie 
Fyffe, Secretary to the Isle ofEigg Heritage Trust (IEHT), was repeatedly quoted in 
affirming the importance of their success, not only for Eigg, but for the rest of 
Scotland: 
"This is a great day not only for Eigg but for all communities who live 
under a landlord's whim. It shows that people in the Highlands and 
Islands are no longer prepared to be bought and sold like cutlery for their 
master's table. Over the past few months we have had everything thrown 
into this plot from opera stars to international companies promising the 
earth. Nobody would have believed the script if Alastair Maclean had 
written it. But we all stood firm together and won through. We now have 
security of tenure and can control our own destinies" .1 
For the uninitiated it would appear that such publicly sponsored rural revo It is 
a tale worthy of Hollywood proportions; or at least for those with a fondness for the 
old Ealing comedies, a script worthy ofCompton McKenzie merits. Here were an 
archetypal bunch of wily islanders, succeeding in the defeat of their traditional and 
financial superiors, with cunning, tenacity, and a large helping of Hebridean 
conviviality. There is also what American producers and British tabloid editors alike 
would label- the Braveheart angle. For not only did the Eigg victory somehow 
1 Dutter, Barbie. "Islanders Triumph in Battle to Buy Eigg", The Daily Telegraph. April 51h, 1997. p. 9 
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symbolise a new resurgence of confidence amongst Scotland's rural communities, but 
as such, it exemplified a national cultural and political renaissance as well. After years 
of turmoil and publicity, the islanders finally succeeded in their appeal just 4 weeks 
before the landslide Labour victory in the 1997 General Election, and just a few 
months away from a sweeping Devolution Referendum. They were consequently very 
much associated with the overturning of Conservative opinion and patronage in 
Scotland. Of course, in particular the Eigg story highlighted the age-old highland 
debate of landownership, with the islanders providing a very human and articulate 
face to an often dour and archaic political cause. Indeed, without doubt, this is what 
made the Eigg appeal so attractive to the media and public in general, for here was the 
wonderful sight of stereotypical caricatures battling out the politics of what most 
believe to be a bygone era. It was a bit of the forgotten soldier mentality, not quite 
understanding the war is over, but renewed and revamped with heated issues such as 
social justice, nationalism, and Scottish identity; all of which were liberally doused 
with 'Whisky Galore'. A concoction, which as Keith Schellenberg, the Eigg 
community's previous owner and arch nemesis, would point out is highly incendiary 
to be sure. 
In trying to handle and distil this vola tile mixture into an academic framework, 
one must first understand the enormous significance land itself has played in the 
Highlands and Islands. Not only that, but the degree to which the Highlands and 
Islands themselves have figured in the make-up and understanding of Scottish identity 
itsel£ This is amply demonstrated by the preponderance of feelings for land in Scots 
and Gaelic songs, stories, and poetry? It is also embodied in the manner in which 
highland images and culture, and the emotive Gaelic feelings towards land have been 
popularised since the Victorian era into a veritable industry of heritage and culture. 3 
The aspiring needs of lowland Scotland for a sense of national identity, especially in 
relation to the powerful southern neighbour, has encouraged a veneration of highland 
scenery and an adoption of its more colourful aspects of culture. Anglified and 
2 Shaw, M.F. Folksongs and Folklore of South Uist. University Press, Aberdeen. 1986; Meek, D.E. ed. 
Tuath is Tigheama: Tenants and Landlords: An Anthology of Gaelic Poetry of Social and Political 
Protest From the Clearances to the Land Agitation (1800- I 990). Gaelic Texts Society, Scottish 
Academic Press. 1995; Heany, S. The God in the Tree: Early Irish Nature Poetry. Faber & Faber, 
London. 1980. pp.l8l-l89. 
3 McCrone, David & Morris, Angela. "Lords & Heritages: the Transformation of the Great Lairds of 
Scotland", in: Devine, T.M. ed. Scottish Elites, John Donald, Edinburgh. 1994. 
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sanitised to varying degrees, the eulogising ofthe Highlands and Islands has 
nevertheless taken the region to the centre of Scotland's cultural cannon. 4 
Consequently, though Eigg remains the remotest of islands, in a region that 
historically has been one of the most marginalised in Europe, its story has touched the 
most urban and modern of Scottish people. 
Of course, the heated issue of land ownership and its management in the 
Highlands and Islands has also been fanned by constant and very deep feelings of 
unfinished business. Not only do the historical grievances of the Clearances loom 
large on the horizon, but the continued practice of feudal land law and estate 
ownership rings resoundingly out of place in the modem world. Unbelievably, 
Scotland still retains a feudal land law based on precedents set in the Eleventh 
Century. This has resulted in the maintenance of the most concentrated pattern of land 
ownership in the Western world. Presently 1411 owners hold 11,015,405 acres, and 
just 608 of these own over 50o/o of the Scottish land mass alone. 5 Obviously, 
individual properties have changed hands over time, and different historical 
circumstances have favoured differing types of owner, but the basic pattern of 
ownership has remained constant for centuries. Fewer than 1500 private estates have 
owned the majority of Scotland's land for over nine hundred years.6 With the effect 
being most pronounced in rural areas, the legacy of such concentrated forms of 
ownership has had many detrimental affects upon local communities and their 
surrounding environments. This is especially marked when realising the power of 
feudal law in protecting the interests of proprietors over tenants. Aptly described by 
one commentator as "lucrative legalised blackmail", Feudal Superiors continue to 
exercise enormous influence over local communities and tenants with various powers 
of pre-emption and the ability to veto proposed developments and economic activity. 7 
This has both engendered a general highhandedness amongst the land-owning elite, as 
well as seen to the steady and continued bouts of controversy between landlords, 
tenants, and other interested parties. Problems, which have been notably highlighted 
by the increasing preponderance of absentee and foreign owners who have taken 
4 Macrone, David. Understanding Scotland: The Sociology of a Stateless Nation, Routledge, London. 
1992. p.l7 
5 Wightman, Andy. Who Owns Scotland, Cannongate, Edinburgh. 1996. p.l42 
6 Callander, Robin. A Pattern of Land Ownership in Scotland, Haughend Publications, Finzean. 1887. 
p. 10 
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advantage of Scotland's free market in large chunks of land. The bottom of line of 
which leaves little if any considerations for the resident communities, culture, or 
economy. 
The ingrained indifference towards the cultural and social heritage historically 
shown by the Highland land market has been augmented by a corresponding lack of 
concern for the region's natural heritage. Not only has the market been unregulated in 
terms of what land one can buy in Scotland, but planning laws and statutory concerns 
are markedly lax in controlling what one can do with the land once purchased. Hence 
forestry and agricultural development are left to the discretion of the owner, whose 
priorities and motivations for ownership can often be far removed from wider public 
interests of preserving and protecting the natural heritage. This has been perhaps the 
most prevailing cause for concern regarding landownership in the Highlands and 
Islands in recent times. More specifically, the growing global awareness of 
envirorunental issues has led the British public to focus concern on their own 
backdoor. Most invariably attention has come to bare upon the 'traditional' sporting 
estates, where raptor persecution remains a continued problem, and where deer 
numbers have continued to increase and ravage the region's last vestiges of native 
Caledonian pine. Sheep farming and commercial forestry have hardly escaped 
criticism either, since both are heavily subsidised by the State, and often have even 
more disastrous impacts upon the region's native flora and fauna. 8 
Combined with the importance of land to Scottish culture in general, the rise 
in environmental concern for the Highlands and Islands has precipitated a rejuvenated 
interest in land reform; an interest that has been accentuated by the realisation that 
'"our common inheritance is not common at all, but is in fact privately owned".9 
Whenever a new foreign owner or insurance company acquires property, or public 
access is denied to a particular piece of land, or a community such as Assynt or Eigg 
makes a forceful stand, the call for reform of Scotland's present land laws is 
7 Nicoll. ibid. 
8 Cramb, Auslan. Who Owns Scotland Now?, Mainstream, Publishing. 1996. 11-25; More detailed 
review and citations in Chapter 2. 
9 Wightman. p.l 
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demanded by indignant politicians and critical editorials alike. 10 This has manifested 
the remarkable situation of land reform, a topic that one generally associates with 
developing countries, being high on the political agenda of all major Scottish parties. 
A fact, which especially in the lead up to a new Scottish Parliament encourages most 
leading commentators to conclude that some measure of reform is near at hand. 
Unfortunately, it does not also mean that everyone understands exactly what land 
reform entails, nor what the most appropriate package of reform could be for 
Scotland. Indeed, just like the attractiveness of the Eigg story itself, the popularity of 
Scottish land reform lies in its ability to be almost all things to all people. The topic 
has a certain prism-like quality which allows people to view exactly what they want to 
see, and above all allows a variety of competing interests to declare that land reform 
per se can both answer their own particular concerns, as well solve the age old 
"Highland problem". 11 
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, however, despite the fervour of contrasting 
opinions and the various packages of land reform presently being discussed, three 
pivotal elen1ents of reform do have a consensus of support. Firstly, that a proper 
register of land ownership needs to be comoiled. so that anvone can look at a man anrl 
.£ , "' "' - --- - -·-- -- - -- -·- -· ----r _ ...... _ 
know exactly who owns what. Secondly, that Feudal Land Law itself must be 
abolished, if only for reasons of simplifying the legal complexities of land ownership 
and management. And thirdly, that future land ownership in Scotland, and in the 
Highlands and Islands in particular, must be more overtly controlled in terms of the 
sociaL economic, and environmental impacts of land use and land ownership 
decisions. Obviously, of the three points, this last one is by far the most complex, not 
only in terms of how far the State should actually intervene, but also what exact 
interests and requirements should be deemed the most pressing. Nevertheless, as 
Chapter 2 reviews,. recent events and political discussion have provided one essential 
element to precipitating a consensus. That is the growing belief in community trust 
1nanagen1ent of Highland resources, and the devolving of land management down to a 
local level. A process that could be achieved through a variety of mechanisms~ not 
10 There are numerous examples: ""Need for Land Refonn", The Herald. February 24th 1997; 
.. Scotland's Property Laws'', The Herald. February 27th 1997; Nicoll, Ruardh. ""Villains in an Arcane 
Game". Scotland on Sunday. July 91h 1995; or in relation to Eigg, "'Eigg's victory against the odds", 




only involving the redistribution of direct ownership, but also including more diffuse 
devices such as partnerships, management agreements, and the revamping and 
strengthening of local planning laws. In essence, the land reform agenda has moved 
on from the simple public vs. private ownership debates ofthe 1970's and moderated 
its rhetoric into line with the wider democratic principles of Scottish devolution. 
As an example of how local residents have taken over the management of their 
local resources, Eigg has therefore provided a perfect contemporary example of how 
well this can work; how a community can readily turn over a history of bad 
management and inappropriate owners, and take control of the very environment their 
culture and economy is predicated upon. Unlike the other precedents of community 
ownership set by Assynt and other crofting communities, the Eigg buy-out has also 
demonstrated the strength of a partnership in purchasing and managing an estate. 
Teaming up with the Scottish Wildlife Trust (SWT) and the Highland Council (HC), 
the Eigg islanders have shown how a partnership of interest has secured the island's 
long term economic future as well as protecting and promoting the island' natural 
heritage. Understandably, as the heavy media coverage attests, the resulting Isle of 
Eigg Heritage Trust (IEHT) has elicited profound interest and comment, and provided 
a sound indication of how a modernised land reform programme in Scotland could be 
manifested on the ground. 
Of course media attention and public concern hardly mean a clear 
comprehension of what exactly happened on Eigg, nor why of all places, such a small 
Hebridean island should provide a possible lead in the land reform debate. In true 
fashion, media coverage has both popularised the island saga, as well as simplified the 
social, economic, and environmental conditions that initiated the island's problems 
and the eventual buy-out. As many articles and commentators have shown, it is all too 
easy to be caught up with personalities and stereotypes, especially when the 
characters involved are so lively and unique as those associated with Eigg. 
Consequently, this study has sought to uncover an accurate history of how and why 
events were precipitated on Eigg, and from that to decide what policy lessons can be 
properly drawn on a national level. This has involved a highly participative 
11 Wightman. 216-7 
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methodology of research on the island, and one that has stridently attempted to map 
out the complexities and reality of community development and management at 
ground level. Four years of constant visits and work on the island have entailed a deep 
and personal involvement in the planning, implementation, and promotion of the 
IEHT. The results of which have produced an inside view of how the community 
organised itself, formed the partnership, and then sold their plans for the future to the 
general public. 
In undertaking this course of study, I freely admit to having had a personal 
bias during the course of my research. From the very beginning of my involvement on 
the island in March 1995, I took a highly active role in assisting and facilitating the 
islanders' ideas of community management. As such my studies were indeed a form 
of action research, that involved a clearly stated objective of assisting the community 
in their plans of alternative ownership. At times this entailed myself actively 
encouraging activity when there was notable apathy, and other times my involvement 
represented little more than being a glorified secretary. However, as detailed in 
Chapter 4, throughout my research and activities on the island, I conducted myself 
within a methodological framework that was bound within precedents of established 
participative development theory. Nevertheless, in the strictest terms of academic 
objectivity my close association and connections with the islanders and the IEHT 
project leave the resulting research open to criticisms of subjectivity; especially in 
terms detailing the recent history and political context of the community and buy-out. 
Admittedly during the course of my studies I formed close friendships on the island, 
and my level of involvement in the campaign for ownership was in many ways 
unrelated to my academic objectives. Yet this level of personal association with the 
island and the IEHT, I believe actually strengthens the point of the research, and that 
was always to detai] what community management and ownership actually involve at 
local level- i.e. the sharp end of any future land reform policy. To gain the required 
insights, this could only be done through a hands-on and participatory manner, and 
above all by demonstrating a personal commitment to the community and the 
partnership's eventual buy-out. As for researching the island's social history, the 
friendships I gained on the island proved more than invaluable in understanding the 
historical situation. In particular, the confidence the islanders placed in me over the 
course of my activities allowed me to interview them with candour about the more 
15 
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sensitive aspects of the recent past. Most notably this related to the community's 
development under the proprietorship ofKeith Schellenberg, which considering his 
fondness for litigation would have proved impossible to uncover otherwise. 
Another essential aspect of the research is that it is specifically 
interdisciplinary in nature. As Frank Fraser Darling amply demonstrated in his West 
Highland Survey in 1954, one cannot fully understand the region's varied and related 
problems within a strict disciplinary approach. 12 Subtitled an Essay in Human 
Ecology, his survey of the Highlands and Islands became renowned as the first 
analysis to identify and examine the region's crisis in upland ecology. 
Simultaneously, however, he also provided a succinct historical, social, and economic 
dissection of how that crisis was created and related to the region's problems over the 
preceding 200 years. A masterfly work, it clearly identified what in modern parlance 
is termed a problematique; a series of related issues and problems that could only be 
understood and tackled through an amalgamation of disciplines- not through just 
one. Though very different in nature, the region some half century later can still be 
identified as possessing a problematique in terms of its land ownership, land use, and 
rural policy. A situation that any land reform package would hopefully attempt to 
resolve in its implementation, and one that can still be only understood and tackled 
through an interdisciplinary approach. Obviously, this study does not attempt to 
produce an examination of the scale of Darling's- time and resources have been more 
than limited. Also the nature of the analysis at hand has induced a more fundamental 
leaning towards the social sciences of history, politics, and anthropology than 
Darling's preference and training in the physical sciences. Nonetheless, this 
examination ofEigg as a case study of community development in the Highlands and 
Islands has sought to utilise a similar interdisciplinary approach and methodology. 
Darling's West Highland Survey begins with a thorough grounding in the 
historical and political development of Highland landownership and rural policy. This 
study likewise begins with the specific setting ofthe case study in its social and 
historical perspective, by focusing on the development of landholding and land 
management practice on the island, and the wider Highland region. This is then 
12 Darling, Frank Fraser. West Highland Survey; An Essay in Human Ecology, Oxford University 
Press, London. 1955. 
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followed by a breakdown of land reform historiography in Scotland, which examines 
how indeed the notion of community trusts have become so compelling a vehicle that 
they are presently being favoured by all political shades. Chapter 3 then assesses the 
particular relationship that developed and then so spectacularly broke down between 
the island community and Keith Schellenberg; a process that involved the drastic 
reshaping ofthe island's population with a large influx of newcomers brought in to 
work on the island. The importance of Schellenberg in shaping the future events on 
Eigg is considered as being the primary reason for the strong media publicity that was 
to surround the island, as well as to precipitate the involvement of the initial Isle of 
Eigg Trust (lET) in 1992. As previously mentioned much of this research was 
dependent on the close relationships that I established on the island through working 
with the community in preparing plans for a partnership buy-out. The resulting Eigg 
Development Study that I compiled is detailed and discussed in Chapter 4, which 
analyses the strength ofparticipative planning in the formation of the community's 
objectives and the eventual partnership of the IEHT. Chapter 5 then seeks to 
understand how those plans and the partnership itself were successfully marketed to 
the general public in the Eigg Appeal. A publicity campaign that proved to have as 
much impact on the island as it did in the media. Finally, the study concludes with an 
examination of how the Eigg story can contribute to a successful land reform policy 
for Scotland, and one that hopefully comes to terms with the practical realities of 
community ownership and management of resources. 
17 
Chapter 1 
From the Lord of the Isles to the Laird of Eigg: 
Ownership of a Scottish Island 
1.1 Introduction: Setting the Case Study 
The Isle ofEigg's prominence in the land ownership debate has only been a 
relatively recent phenomenon. It was not until the arrival of the Schellenbergs in the 
mid 1970's that the island gained any national media attention. A highly self-publicising 
and eccentric 'laird' however, combined with a re-awakening awareness of land 
ownership in the 1970's provided sound material, and a fond media attachment was 
born. From then on the relationship with the media blossomed, with Keith 
Schellenberg and the island's residents becoming a regular feature in the Sunday 
papers and Scottish media throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's. After the 
burning ofMr Schellenberg's Rolls Royce in 1992, this was indeed amplified to such 
an extent that both residents and owner were taken as personifying the Scottish land 
debate.' 
Although it is easy to criticise the tendency of media to condense long and 
complicated issues into caricature, their use of Eigg as a prime example of the 
Scottish land debate was very successful in widening its popularity. People were able 
to put a face and a voice to an otherwise far removed issue. The fact that the owner's 
manner was very much of the English aristocracy, and the islanders appeared the 
archetypal bunch of hardy misfits, made the debate just that little more accessible. 
However, accessible story lines and caricatures hardly encourage a detailed knowledge 
of the story at hand, and certainly only the briefest of understandings for the historical 
relevance. Chapters One and Two therefore seek to provide a thorough review of 
landownership and land reform in Scotland, and in particular to set the case study of 
Eigg in its social and political perspective. In doing this, the broad question faced, is 
just how exactly does Eigg' s historical experience relate to the rest of Scotland or the 
Highlands and Islands region? Does the island's history really provide an exemplum 
of the problems associated with landownership in Scotland? 
1 Hennessey, Stewart. "Schellenberg gets his Eigg", Scotland on Sunday, 12'h July, 1992. 
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Certainly Eigg's comparatively small size corresponds to a modest amount of 
academic research on the island's history. There are only four principle works that 
focus on the island, of which Camille Dressier's Eigg: The Story of an Island stands 
out by far, as a superior revision of previous accounts.2 An inhabitant ofEigg for some 
15 years, Dressier represents part of the present islanders' reclaiming of culture and 
history. As such her work historiographically leans towards a community emphasis, 
and in opposition to the other more touristic appraisals and their mostly sympathetic 
approach to the island's owners, Dressier provides a far more critical and academic 
line. Her detailed social history therefore forms much of the narrative for this Chapter; 
a chapter that reviews why the Highlands and Islands have remained historically 
distinct from the rest of Britain, and how Eigg indeed provides a relatively common 
example of a Scottish West Coast estate. 
Lying on the western most fringes of Britain, Eigg's ecology and history have 
been shaped by the physical and cultural boundaries that have separated it from the 
mainland. These boundaries, however, have not only consisted of its natural isolation 
as an island, but more significantly, have been determined by the island's part in a 
wider regional separateness from the rest of Britain. Beginning with a review of the 
island's geography, climate and ecology, the Chapter outlines how the social history of 
the Highlands and Islands, and Eigg in particular, have been shaped by regional 
distinctions of culture and economy. Most importantly, emphasis is placed upon the 
idiosyncratic forms of landholding and ownership that developed in the area, and how 
over the course oftime they were assimilated into the laws and traditions of the 
mainland British State. A process that had profound social consequences as first the 
introduction of feudal land law, and then the commercialisation of property broke the 
historical independence of the region. 
2 Banks, Noel. Six Inner Hebrides. David & Charles, London, 1977; Dressier, Camille. Eigg: The 
Story of an Island, Polygon, Edinburgh. 1998; Urqhart, J. & Ellington, E . .fugg. Cannongate, 





Fig: 1.1 The Isle of Eigg3 
3 Line drawing from: Banks. p.l4 








Fig 2.1 Tlte Small Isles. J 
Eigg (pronounced Egg) is a kidney shaped island approximately 5 miles by 3, 
laying some 7 miles from Rhu point Arisaig and somel5 miles from the fishing port of 
MaUaig. One of a group of four islands known as the Small Isles, Eigg is also included 
with the Small Isles in a larger chain of islands known as the Inner Hebrides. Over 400 
miles north of London. and yet still westward of Lands End, it remains one of the most 
geographically isolated islands in Europe. Closer to the Faroes than London. Eigg's 
geographical isolation is compounded by the geological features that make up the 
Western Highlands. Intense volcanic activity. combined with platectoruc movements 
and glaciation, carved a legacy of physical barriers across the Northwest half of 
Scut land. Rugged landscapes of mountain and sea loch have ensured that though 
geologically connected to mainland Europe. the region has developed in a unique and 
very separate manner. 
In geological terms the islands of the Inner Hebrides are relative newcomers to 
the region. Over sixty miJJion years after the creation of the Outer Hebrides. molten 
~ No.2635 Scotland The West Coast. Admiralty Charts and Publications. 1995 
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lava spilled over the I lcbridean region and solidified. Contracting and contorting with 
earthquakes and srufts in the earth's crust, great gaps were forged in the solidified lava 
and then filled with seawater. Once the islands had formed, a final series of volcanic 
surges then deluged the islands with first a layer of basalt lava, and secondly with a 
layer of pitchstone. Erosion by weather, sea. and glaciation finaUy reduced and 
contoured the islands into the shapes now recognised.5 The contrasting rock 
formations and exemplary geological features produced make the region a veritable 
Mecca for geological studies.6 The area has consequently been of distinct interest to 
palaeontologists, with the famed Hugh Miller making some of his most historic finds 
on the island itself in the mid 19'h century. 7 
Fig 1.2 A 1111 Sgurr viewed f rom Gtllmisda/e 
Possessing the "most memorable landmark in the Hebridean Seas'', Eigg's 
pro file and very name are testament to the significance of geology in the region. 8 A 
mile long ridge of black. pitchstone. O"Verla) ing a conglomerate la) er of basalt abruptl) 
ends at a 391-m cliff face known as An Sgurr. With a central moorland depression 
separating the SK'-1rr from the northern plateau of Beinne Bhuidhe. the island has a 
characteristic --v·· shaped notch when viewed from sea. This has given the island its 
~ Banlo..s. pp.25-43 
6 1 \amples include: Bowes D.R. ··Geological Framework of the Inner Hebrides". Proceedings ofthe 
Royal Society of Edinburgh. 83 B. 1983. Pp.25-29; Craig G. Y. ed. Geology of Scotland. Scottish 
Academic Press, Cdinburgh, 1983. 
7 Bray E. The Discovery of the Hebrides. Coli ins, London.l986. pp.222-238 
8 Boyd J.M.& Boyd I.L. The Hebrides. Collins. London. 1990. p.l3 
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name, Hilean Eige, Island of the Notch, with recorded references dating back to the 
early 7th Century.9 
The 304m northerly plateau of Beinne Bhuidhe and wet southern moorland is 
structurally of basalt. Combined with shell-sand, the basalt-derived soils form a very 
fertile mixture, especially around the harbour and Kildonnan. Sedimentary rocks 
underlie the basalt layers, and the northerly and easterly rising cliffs expose rich fossil-
bearing Lower Estuarine shales. The sedimentary layer also gives rise to the sandy 
beaches at either side of the central depression. 10 
1.3 Climate and EcoiOg)' 
The Hebrides lay on a formidable storm shelf that stretches along the western 
coast oflreland and Scotland and reaches up into Scandinavia. Caught between the dry 
continental air to the east and the moist oceanic air to the west, this storm belt is fed by 
continuous interaction between the two air masses. Anyone who has lived or ventured 
into the region will have tales of experiencing such weather, and indeed the renowned 
regional climate must be considered a profound characteristic in the divide between 
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Fig 1.3 J\lontft(l' average of the number of days with gale force winds and over1 
<> ibid. 
10 for more involved discussion of Eigg's Geology see: Boyd. pp. 25-43; Banks. pp.12-20; Urqhart. 
pp. 6-12. 
" Boyd & Boyd. p.58; taken from Meteorological Office. Scotland's Climate ome facts and 
figures. Meteorologica l Office, Edinburgh. 1989. 
There can often be warm bright periods in the Hebrides when continental fronts 
bring almost Mediterranean-like weather during the summer. and dry, frosty periods 
during the winter. The bright and clear spells from these eastern weather patterns, 
however, are not what generally characterise the region. Due to the swiftness of low-
pressure systems moving in from the Atlantic, the region is perhaps best knov.-11 for the 
speed at which conditions can change. and the severity of storms the damp oceanic 
fronts bring. With a low depression passing to north, the general pattern of weather 
brings high winds, or gales sweeping in from the Atlantic. The often-severe winds arc 
initially southerly or south-westerly as the warm front approaches, then south-westerly 
in the warm sector, and lastly westerly or north-westerly behind the cold front. 12 Hard, 
driving rain combining with the gale force winds produces formidable conditions on 
















Fig 1.4 Average montltly rainfall in Highlands, Islands. aiiCI Lowlands. 1 • 
The charts pro\ ide a basic comparison between mainland and Hebridean 
climates. Clearly indicating the harshness of island. and West Coast weather patterns, 
they also emphasis the variability of conditions within the region generaUy. Analysis of 
pollen sampled from peat bogs from the region confirms this. as well as showing that 
there has been a succession of climatic changes over time. After the Arctic conditions 
eased around I 0.000 years ago, a Boreal climate ensued with two warm periods that 
took place around 5.000 and 1.000 BC. Since then a cooler wetter Sub Atlantic 
pattern has prevailed, which itself has had minor fluctuations. Between 1.000 and 
12 Boyd & Boyd. pp. 44-45 
11 ibid p. 54; also taken from, Scotland·s Climate 
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1,200 AD the climate was 2 degrees Centigrade warmer, bringing considerably clement 
weather to the Viking occupation of the region. For the past I 000 years, however, the 
Sub-Atlantic conditions have remained relatively constant. 14 
The cool damp conditions, as well as the gale force winds and salt spray, have 
obviously played a fundamental role in shaping the island's ecology. Plants and animals 
have had not only to colonise the island first, but then also adapt to the extremes of 
weather conditions. The mean monthly temperature is relatively mild at 9°C, yet the 
combined effect of the elements on the island makes conditions severe on plant and 
animal growth. 15 Tree growth is limited to all but the most sheltered of areas, and 
though soils are reasonably fertile general vegetation is hampered by the slow drying 
out of soils and the summer's relatively short growing season. In the waters around the 
island however, the extremes of weather make little impact on the abundant marine 
life. Rich in kelp, fish, and shellfish the seas provide food for a large diversity of bird 
life on the island. Bird life, which until the introduction of the rat had complete 
freedom from terrestrial predators. Rats of course, like the many other species 
introduced with human settlement profoundly changed the island's ecology. Indeed, as 
human occupation became permanent on the island around 3500 BC, the island's 
ecosystem was to be shaped and altered by the succeeding waves of settlers who 
arrived. The resulting present day ecology ofEigg is detailed further in Chapter 4, as 
well as in the Appendix. 
1.4 The Rise of Clan Society on Eigg : 1600 BC- 1600 AD 
The geological and climatic features that separate the Western Highlands and 
Islands from Lowland Scotland, have been compounded upon by human history to 
establish definitive social and economic characteristics in the region. Beginning with 
the colonisation ofthe area by Celtic settlers from 1600 BC onwards, the Highlands 
and Islands have been very much identified by Celtic language and culture. Bearers of 
what is known in archaeological terms as La Tene culture, the Celts established firm 
social and economic foundations in the area, that were to evolve under Norse 
14 ibid. p.59 
15 ibid.p.46 
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occupation into the complex and very distinctive clan society of the Western 
Highlands. In contrast to Lowland Scotland, which experienced much Anglo-Saxon 
and Norman influence, the region retained this vigorous kin-based society until the mid 
18th century, which indeed proved to be the last such kin-based society in Europe. 
Typical of the region, Eigg was occupied by a single clan for over 400 years, the 
Clanranalds of Macdonald. A clan, who not only held a considerable territory, but 
were also very much at the centre of attempts to maintain regional independence. 
The Celts' culture and language came to dominate the Highlands and Islands. 16 
Coming in two distinct waves, the Picts and then the Scots, the successful colonisation 
of the Inner and Outer Hebrides demonstrated the Celts were firstly a very notable 
maritime people. 17 These technological skills of navigation and boat building were also 
matched by a very resilient and powerful kin-based society. Though little is known in 
detail of their society, archaeological evidence shows that their semi-nomadic pattern 
of cattle production was predicated upon a distinctly flexible form of land holding. 18 
Levying tributes for membership of the group, rather than for the changing patterns of 
occupied territory; chiefs governed a society that was dependent on the communal 
working and defence of land. The kinship system was particularly efficient in holding 
only as much land as could readily be worked and defended, as well as being able to 
carry allegiances over difficult and hostile terrain. 19 Eigg like most places in the 
Highlands and Islands, probably changed hands many times as different chiefdoms rose 
and fell, but by the 5th and 6th centuries however, the island came under the influence of 
the Scots' kingdom ofDariadia, and was firmly influenced by the coming of 
Christianity to the region. 
From religious centres in Whithorn and Iona, adventurous missionaries 
travelled throughout the Western Highlands and Islands converting both Scots and 
Picts to a uniquely Celtic form of Christianity. The resulting Celtic Church provided a 
16 Dodgshon RA. "Modelling chiefdoms in the Scottish Highlands and Islands prior to the '45", 
Arnold B. & Blair Gibson D. eds. Celtic chiefdom, Celtic state: The evolution of complex social 
systems in prehistoric Europe. Cambridge Press, Cambridge. 1995 pp.99-1 09. p.1 00 
17 Ritchie A. Viking Scotland. Bratsford Ltd/ Historic Scotland, London 1993. p.24 
18 Dodgson RA. "Strategies of farming in the western highlands and islands prior to crofting and the 
clearances", Economic History Review 46: pp.679-70 1. p.680 
19 Dodgshon. "Modelling chiefdoms" pp.1 00-101 
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focus for an out-pouring of Celtic art and culture, as well as producing some of the 
earliest written records of the region's history and people. Eigg is well documented in 
surviving religious annals principally because it was the scene of one of the worst 
martyrdoms in the Christian mission to Pictland. On April the 17'h 617 AD, a monk by 
the name of Donnan was killed together with 52 of his followers. In naming a Pictish 
Queen of Moirdart as the chief who ordered his demise, the annals provide the first 
indication ofhow the island was held and farmed. Ruled by a matriarchal tribe ofPicts 
from the mainland, the island was apparently kept as a pasture for sheep and cattle. On 
hearing that Donnan was converting the islanders, the Queen is said to have shouted "I 
am keeping herdsmen to herd my milking cattle on the face of Corraveine, not to be 
herded themselves by a monk". 20 When the herdsmen refused her command to remove 
Donnan and his monks, the annals record she sent a troop of warrior women, of 
Amazonian proportions, to rid her of the troublesome priest. 21 
The Pictish Queen's murder of Donnan actually intensified the Christian 
interest in the island itself Canonised as a martyr St. Donnan soon initiated more 
interest in Eigg with his death than he did in his life. The island became an important 
site of pilgrimage, as Kildonnan- the church of Donnan- contained the holy relics of 
the Saint's ashes and bones. A monastery was swiftly re-established, and records have 
preserved a list of Eigg Abbots throughout the 7th and early 8th centuries. Judging by 
the recovered remains and numerous Celtic crosses that are scattered around the 
island, the monastery was obviously quite wealthy.22 As part of the flowering Celtic 
Church, this ensured Eigg a relatively cosmopolitan life with a steady flow of people 
and tradable goods passing through the island. By the 81h century, however the Celtic 
Church and the flowering of Celtic culture and society were assailed on two fronts. 
Firstly, appalled at the lack of religious control and organisation in Britain, the Roman 
Church forced the Celtic Church to conform to Catholic doctrines. Secondly and much 
20 Urquart. p. 15 
21 The story does not end there, however, for the legend continues:" ..... at midnight, lights appeared 
where the bodies had lain, and unearthly voices were heard chanting Donnan's death croon, 
bewitching the warrior women. Finding themselves compelled to follow the lights, they were each led 
up to the loch below the Sgurr, where one by one they entered the dark water. ... From then on the 
islanders would use the name Eilean nam Ban Mora, the Island of the Big Women as their sea-
kenning for the island". Dressier. p. 7 
22 Dressier. p.8: Urquhart p.16 
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more dramatically, by 794 raiders from Scandinavia had begun to attack the coasts of 
Britain, initiating a period of some 400 years of Viking rule in the Western Highlands 
and Islands. 23 
Population pressures that found little out-let in Scandinavia precipitated first a 
series of raids, and then a slow and steady expansion of Norse colonies along the 
British coasts. The Hebrides came under Norse rule from 850 to 1263, and though 
technically governed by Norway, the Norse colonies soon functioned as an 
independent territory.24 Norse culture and society obviously permeated the region, and 
on Eigg, the linguistic signs of influence abound in the numerous Viking place names. 25 
Since over two thirds of the island's place names are ofNorse origin, it is safe to 
assume that the colonists dominated the resident Celtic population. They certainly took 
over the existing settlements on the island at Laig and Kildonnan, leaving ample 
archaeological evidence oftheir occupation. They also imposed their own form of land 
tenure, a system in which each homestead (or farm) paid a 'penny' levy to the Norse 
overlords for protection and the right of occupation.26 Surviving or resident Celts often 
adapted to the new levies, and as incoming chieftains and warriors tended to marry 
freely with the local Celtic aristocracy, a reverse process of gaelicisation of the Norse 
began to take place mid way through the Viking domination. 27 This produced a mixed 
race ofCelto-Norse, the Gall Gaigheal (foreign gales), who combined a heady mixture 
of both the Norse appreciation for independence and the Celtic aspirations to regain 
the kingdom of Dalriada. Somerled was one such chief, who in 1156 led a successful 
challenge against Norse rule and defeated Godred King of Man. From the 12th century 
onwards Eigg found itself included in the land of Gamoran, territory held by 
Somerled's sons. A century later and the Battle ofLargs in 1263, saw Norse rule 
finally ended in Scotland. The removal of one external ruler, however, was soon 
replaced by the growing interests of another closer to home: the Scottish Crown. Eigg 
23 The first recorded Viking raid on the Northwest coast was on Skye in 794, though there is little 
doubt there had already been many unrecorded raids along the coast well before. 
24 Ritchie. pp.26-35; Urquhart. p.25 
25 Examples include: Laig- the bay of the surf; Sandavore- the sandy place; Galmisdale- the pasture 
of the roaring surf; Grulin -the rocky place. For more see, Dressier. p.8. 
26 The crofters' common grazing on Eigg is still called Cuig Peighinean, Five Pennies. 
27 Ritchie. p.38 
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passed into Macleod hands in I 282, with the politics of mainland Scotland increasingly 
effecting the island's history. 28 
Strongly influenced by the Norman experiences of land holding and its exercise 
of power, the early Scottish kings had successfully applied Feudal law to most of 
mainland Scotland by the end ofthe 131h century.29 With the Norse defeated, it was 
therefore slowly introduced into the Highlands and Islands by applying the same ties of 
feudal vassalage to the region's chiefdoms. Embroiled in the wars for Scottish 
independence, Robert the Bruce made much use of the feudal system in solidifying his 
kingdom, especially in regards to his "dangerously capable allies" from the Western 
Isles.
3° For their loyalty and support at the Battle ofBannockburn in 1314, the Bruce 
granted the Clan Macdonald the first feudal charters for Eigg and Rh urn. 31 Charters 
that though meshing with the Celtic and Norse traditions of landholding, officially cited 
the clan chief as the occupier of the land- and not the clan itself This was a profound 
break from traditional practice. For although the clan chief gave an oath of loyalty on 
behalf of his kinsmen, and he still collected levies for membership of clan, over the 
course of time the prestige and power of the chief gradually came to be determined 
more by his direct relationship to the land, than to his kinsfolk. Nevertheless, the 
independent nature of chiefs, and their need to maintain a loyal kinsfolk ensured that 
Highland feudalism often did not pay much attention to the wishes of the Crown. 32 
Combined with the rest of the Macdonald territories in Gamoran, the Uists, 
Harris~ and Lewis, the islands ofEigg and Rhum were included in a sizeable territory. 
So much so, that by 1354 the Clan Chief, John Macdonald was able to declare himself 
Dominus Insularum, Lord of the Isles. Profoundly Scots Gaelic in culture and society, 
the Lordship of the Isles was in many ways a reborn Dalriadian kingdom. Though 
bound by feudal charter to the Scottish Crown, it mostly operated as an autonomous 
state. One in which laws and new feudal charters were freely issued, and regular 
28 Dressier. p. 1 0 
29 Callander R. A Pattern of Landownership in Scotland. Haughend Publications, Finzean. 1987. p.l6 
30 ibid. 
31 Dressier. p.12; Urquart. p.30; Wade Martins. p.l6 
32 Callander. pp.14-16 
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trading was undertaken with England, Ireland and France.33 Eigg became of central 
importance to the Lordship due to its geographical convenience of being between the 
Macdonald properties on the mainland and the islands. Kildonnan was chosen as the 
place for the naming and celebrating of new lords, and in 1386 when John Macdonald 
died, his eldest son Ranald (himself an ageing man), gathered the "gentlemen of the 
isles and his brothers" to Kildonnan for the inauguration. Deciding to pass over the 
title, Ranald gave ''the wand of Lordship" to his younger brother Donald, "with the 
consent ofhis brethren and nobles of the islands". 34 Thus Donald became the new Lord 
of the Isles, with Ranald and the others pledging their support. Since Ranald still 
retained his mother's possessions, which included the Isle ofEigg, the ownership of 
the island remained within his own side of the family. In so doing, he established a 
new clan, the Clanranalds of Macdonald who were to remain the legal occupiers of 
Eigg for the next 400 years. 35 
The system of landholding that Donald, the 2nd Lord of the Isles presided over 
was a fusion of Celtic and Norse tradition that had become steadily codified by feudal 
land law.36 Like the Celtic high king of the 8th century he was at the top of the social 
structure. He was Buachaille nam Eilean, the herdsman of the isles, the protector of 
the people. Below him were the chiefs and senior members of the clans, like his brother 
Ranald, who already had, or were given "a feu" of land. A form of permanent land 
tenure, the feu consisted of a territory that required the paying of yearly feu duties in 
kind and military service to the superior, in this case the Lord of the Isles. The chiefs 
then subdivided these feus into different portions known as ''tacks" which they then 
sublet to their kinsmen. These tenants, or ''tacksmen" were the equivalent middle class 
in the system, normally renowned for their loyalty and military achievements. They 
would retain a portion of the tack for themselves, which they would have worked for 
them, and then in turn sublet or "subfeu" the remaining land to subtenants. The 
subtenants would work these patches of land themselves, and at times also sublet 
parcels of land to cottars in exchange for labour. The cottars, or landless labourers, 
were the poorest and lowest in the clan society and would normally work for the 
33 Urquhart. pp.30-42 
34 Wade Martins. p.l6 
35 ibid; Dressier. p.ll 
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tacksmen either seasonally or permanently. Obviously, duties would be collected at 
every level of the system, and these would represent approximately 20 to 30 percent of 
the tenants' produce.37 Payment was nearly always in kind, very occasionally in cash, 
and always in the promise of military service. The feu duties for Eigg for example 
included the provision of a 26 man boat ifthe Crown was in need. 38 
Since the Scottish Crown was developing feudalism in Scotland when it was 
already on the decline elsewhere, the Scots practice of feudalism became notably 
idiosyncratic. 39 This was readily apparent in the Highlands and Islands where several 
key aspects of Celtic culture characterised the system with its own regional flavour. 
Most prominent ofthese was the persistence ofthe Celtic traditions for communal land 
holding. Most of the smaller holdings, or tacks, were in effect held by a collection of 
kinsfolk who held the land in common and collectively paid duiies direct to the chief. 
Just like the tacksmen's farms they divided the land into rough grazings on the hills, 
and into outfields and infields on land closer to their homes. Cattle were reared on the 
rough grazings during the summer, and the outfields and infields were used for the 
production of cereals and a few vegetables. To ensure the equitable distribution of land 
within these divisions, each tenant was allocated strips from the various fields to work 
for a season. After which they were then rotated to make certain that everyone had an 
equal chance at good quality soil. Known as the run-rig system, this provided a very 
sound and sustainable method of allocation. 40 
Another key characteristic of the social structure unique to the Highlands and 
Islands was the practice known as sorning.41 At all levels ofthe feudal hierarchy, 
duties were also paid for by hospitality to the superior. In the case of chiefs, they 
would be expected at anytirne to provide food, lodging and entertainment to the Lord 
of the Isles and his retinue. The code ofhospitality was not restricted to upper 
hierarchy only, for in such a harsh and often unforgiving climate, it was part of the 
36 Dogshon. p.l 02: Dressier. pp.19-20 
37 Dodgshon. "Modelling Chiefdoms" p.l 04 
38 Urquhart. p.32 
39 Oogshon. p.l 03; Callander. p.3 
40 Dressier. p.20 
41 ibid; Smout, T.C. A History ofthe Scottish People, 1560-1830, Fontana, London. 1985. pp.312-
1315 
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social code to automatically provide a meal or a bed for anyone who called at the door. 
In wider terms this not only incorporated the chief and superiors looking after their 
kinsfolk in times of bad harvests and famine, but also involved superiors maintaining a 
large retinue of followers such as servants, poets, and entertainers.42 
There was little redundancy in the clan system, which incorporated both a 
social structure of land holding and governance with a formidable fighting machine. 
The ties of kinship entailed a large military force that could be called upon at any time, 
bonded together by a chain of command that stretched from the chief downwards. 43 
Considering what was happening politically, this was an asset that was very much 
needed. Especially since the power of the Lordship of the Isles, and rising ambitions of 
its ruling elite were marked by an unfortunate lack of political acumen. Involved in a 
series of unprofitable raids and failed insurrections, the Clan Donald had severely 
antagonised the Scottish Crown. This reached a head in 1493 when the last Lord ofthe 
Isles was forced to resign all of his titles as well as those of his chiefs. 
New feudal overlords were then swiftly appointed by James IV to properly 
administer the region, but these were flatly rejected by the Isles. A period of bitter 
internecine feuds then began amongst the clans, as the Crown continued to try to 
assert some form of control over the region. In real terms, however, the Crown could 
not afford to administer the region overtly for the simple reasons, that it was far too 
rugged, and there was too little money to be made from the territory in any case.44 
Consequently, during the 15th and 16th centuries, the Crown fell into allowing, and at 
times encouraging the clan feuds in order to distract the chiefs from any aspirations of 
regional independence. Eigg suffered particularly harsh experiences during the 
successive raids and reprisals that characterised the period, with the feud between Clan 
Donald and Clan Leod proving to be one of the longest and most bloodthirsty. It 
resulted in the entire population of Eigg being all but wiped-out on two separate 
• 45 occasiOns. 
42 ibid. 
43 Hunter J. The Making of the Crofting Community, John Donald Publishers Ltd. Edinburgh. 1976. 
pp.6-7; Dodgshon. "Modeling chiefdoms" p.l 04 
44 Smout. p.3 15 
45 Dressier. pp.18-19; Urquhart. p.34: Wade Martins. p.16 
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The first and most famous of the massacres involved all but one of the islanders 
being suffocated to death in a cave on the south shore in the early 161h century. The 
massacre of Uamh Fhraing, as it became known as, was then followed some 40 years 
later by another slaughter ofthe island's population in 1588. Since the attacking clan 
also included a hundred shipwrecked Spaniards from the Armada, more detailed 
reports confirmed the massacre. 46 The register of the Privy Council recorded that, 
"The like barbarous and shameful cruelty has seldom been seen among Christians of 
any kingdom or age". 47 Repopulated once more, the minefield of 16th century life 
hardly afforded the island a peaceable or stable existence. When there was not raiding 
or retribution there was the occasional face of hunger appearing. During the second 
halfofthe 16th century, 24 years out of 50 were marked by high food prices in the 
Highlands and Islands, a notable sign of scarcity.48 
1.5 The Fall of Clan Society on Eigg: 1600-1827 
The continued feuding amongst the clans certainly restricted any regional 
solidarity, but then this instability also restricted the Crown from extending any of the 
profitable aspects of governance. Consequently, lames VI took a more proactive role 
in 1609 with the enforced the signing of all highland chiefs to the Statutes of Iona. 
Contrived in rather a devious form, the signing of the Statutes represented a landmark 
in Highland history that marked the beginning of the taming of the clans. 49 The taking 
of hostages and the swearing of oaths of loyalty forced clan chiefs into a program of 
demilitarisation, Anglicisation and religious orthodoxy. New feu duties were drawn up, 
which together with stiff financial penalties for the breaking of Statutes anchored the 
independently minded chiefs with a sizeable monetary burden. As the screw of 
centralised authority was applied to the chiefs, their relationship with their clans began 
to be determined more by economic considerations than the previous ties of kinship. 
The Jacobite Rebellions were partly the final insurrection against the new feudal order, 
46 Dressier. pp.l3-l8; Urqhart p.39; Wade Martins. p.l9 
47 Wade Martins. p.l9. 
48 ibid. 
49 Dressier. p.l8-21 
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and their defeats were swiftly followed by the complete subjugation of the region to 
the mainland Scottish economy and society. On the ground in places such as Eigg 
these changes were reflected in a total revision of the land holding system, with 
"improvement" and the new management of"estates" replicating the same 
centralisation that was occurring politically. 
Strongly influenced by the Reformation, the Statutes of 1609 not only enforced 
a military and financial subservience to the State, but tried to remove the aspects of 
clan life that were most at odds with mainstream Lowland society. 5° Hosts of wide 
sweeping social reforms were initiated to undermine the independence of the Highland 
clans. Beginning with tight restrictions on alcohol, the banning of all imported liquors 
was combined with an abolition of the practice of sorning. The enforced education of 
chiefs sons in Lowland English- speaking schools also represented another 
determining break between the clan chiefs and their kinsmen, not surprisingly 
resentment towards the Statutes led to another attempt at resurrecting the Lordship of 
the Isles. In 1615 Sir James MacDonald raised an army, including 60 men from Eigg, 
and began plotting rebellion over disputes with the Crown and the much-despised 
Argylls. 51 The enterprise eventually proved disastrous with a large defeat in Kintyre 
scuttling the revolt, and the leading chiefs escaping into exile. The enforced peace, 
together with a tactical marriage between the chief of Clanranald and the daughter of 
Rory MacLeod, finally brought an end to the feuding and attempts at reinstating the 
ancient Celtic kingdom. The consequent stability, which ensued, brought an era of 
relative prosperity and growth in the region. The beginnings of a market economy soon 
emerged with cattle increasingly being produced in surplus. Traders began to visit the 
islands, appearing at regular intervals to trade with corn, meal, and assorted luxuries. 
52 
Due to the ban on imported liquor, the other native produce whiskey had also soared 
in production. Considering that average consumption was now estimated at a quarter 
of a pint per person per day, this must have represented a highly valued industry. 5
3 
50 ibid; Urquhart. pp.42-43 
51 Dressier. p.I9; Urquhart. p.44-45; Wade Martins. pp.I6-I7 
52 Dressier. pp.I2-28; Urquhart. pp.42-50 
53 Dressier. pp.I9-22 
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Although the Reformation had enormous impacts on the South and East of 
Scotland, the Western Highlands and Islands remained predominantly Catholic. 54 The 
Statutes of Iona had therefore taken specific action to rectify this and bring the region 
into line with the Protestant beliefs of mainland Scotland. Combined with the 
commitment to educate their sons in English speaking Protestant schools, the clan 
chiefs were also pledged to bring the Reformation to their far-flung territories and 
peoples. The difficulties ofterrain, and the abstinence of the chiefs still allowed their 
predominantly Catholic kinsfolk to practice their religion freely. Well known as a 
"popish island", the chiefofClanranald was often held to account for Eigg's 
persistence in retaining Catholicism. 55 Providing yet another bone of contention with 
the Scottish Crown, Clanranald's stern defence of his islander's beliefs was in part out 
of protection, but also out of political opportunism. In 1626, he sent a letter to Pope 
Urban VIII proposing that Clan Donald could readily return the whole of Scotland to 
Catholicism if they were properly equipped and supported: they only needed 4 ships 
and enough weapons for their 7000 kinsmen. Stressing "his clan's warlike spirit", he 
declared that" .... all the Gaelic speaking Scots and the greater part of the Irish 
chieftains were ready to begin war each in their district for the glory of God". 56 Even 
though the letter would have sent quivers down the collective spines of Scottish 
Protestants, the Pope was not won over to supporting this Gaelic crusade. Instead, 
Clanranald was forced into becoming a nominal Protestant with a third of the island's 
teinds being handed over to the presbytery. Catholic priests still moved freely around 
the Clanranald territories, however, and on Eigg clandestine services would be held in 
a large cave on the south side of the island, known as Uamh na Chrabhaidh, the Cave 
of Worship (re-named Cathedral Cave by Victorian visitors). 57 
Just as the chiefs were caught between competing religious codes of 
Catholicism and Protestantism, they were similarly caught between the differing codes 
of Highland and mainland of landholding. Though feudalism had successfully been 
adapted to the kin-based chiefdoms in legal terms, the clan chiefs still operated within a 
society that was profoundly shaped by Celtic traditions. Wealth and power were still 
54 Smout. History of the Scottish People. p.312; Dressier. pp.22-24; Urquhart. pp.42-27 
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constituted in terms of control over land and people, and not in the surplus production 
that could be generated by the economy. The consequent effects of this social system 
entailed the maintenance of a high population, which although was beginning to 
produce a small surplus, was fundamentally structured on a subsistence basis. 58 The 
imposition of taxes, or stiff financial burdens upon the chiefs, put clan leaders in an 
impossible situation. The burgeoning market economy had over the course of a 
hundred years extended well into the furthest reaches of the Western Highlands and 
Islands, with the expanding trade in black cattle and whiskey bringing new levels of 
prosperity. Still there was very little in the way of actual money circulating, since 
principally this trade was carried out through barter and bills of exchange between 
drovers and merchants. This gave the clan chiefs more than ample problems when 
paying the heavy dues to Scottish Crown: the dues were expected in cash, yet the 
chiefs received their own payments principally in kind. They were soon to find 
themselves in serious debt, and very much out of favour with the mainland 
government. 59 
Combined with this were the warrior ethic and the codes of military honour 
that were fundamental to the clan society. Unable to demonstrate their prowess in the 
traditional practice of raiding, clan chiefs, as well as their loyal and trusted tacksmen 
were increasingly frustrated with the restrictions placed upon them by the Scottish 
Crown. The political upheavals of the English Revolution and Glorious Revolution 
hardly eased matters either, especially since the Clanranalds supported the defeated 
sides on all occasions and encumbered even further financial penalties and debts in the 
process. The Union ofParliaments in 1707 was perhaps the final straw, and the 
building resentment towards the power of Lowland elite and the mainland government 
erupted into two rebellions, in 1715 and 1745. Both ofwhich were doomed to failure 
since a much more powerful and coercive British State was now reinforcing their 
traditional Lowland opposition, the Scottish Crown. 
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The Clanranalds were highly active in both campaigns, and their kinsmen 
proved more than capable allies in both revolts.60 In the '45, it was the young 
Clanranald (i.e. son of the chief) who raised the standard at Glenfinnan, and was Prince 
Charlie's right hand man throughout the campaign. Under the leadership of the Laig 
tacksman, a force of 40 islanders supported him. Surprisingly few were to perish in the 
rebellion, and most of them were to return to the island after Culloden. Indeed, even 
the young Clanranald was to end up hiding on the island for a while, with a cave being 
named after him in the process. Like the rest of the Highlands, however, it was the 
reprisals after Culloden that had the most impact on the island. When the English naval 
ships visited the island in search of both Clanranald and Prince Charlie they took 38 
prisoners, including all the principle tacksmen and tenants. Transported first to 
London, and then Jamaica none were to return. 61 Part of a program of suppression, the 
removal of the island's middle class of tenantry was combined v;itn a careful 
eradication of clan independence. Together with the banning of tartans and bagpipes, 
the goal of 'civilising' the Highlands involved the systematic dismantling of the clan 
structure, and the comprehensive subjection of the region's culture and economy to 
mainstream British society.62 Unlike the other Jacobite strongholds, however, the Isle 
of Eigg escaped from direct forfeiture due to a fortunate legal mistake. It was therefore 
saved from the immediate excesses of clearance and eviction that occurred in the 
estates which the Government had removed from clan ownership. Nonetheless, the 
massive debts incurred by Clanranald during the revolt still led to the island being 
heavily mortgaged to Rory MacLeod ofTalisker, with the forces of the economy soon 
having a dramatic an effect on the island's social and economic order. 
Like the other surviving clan chiefs, although Clanranald was to retain 
possession of property he had been removed of all his military and traditional powers 
of inheritable jurisdiction. He was now a simple landowner, and the Lowland codes of 
civil society allowed only one avenue of demonstrating social prestige, conspicuous 
consumption, and that required considerable revenue from a landholding system still 
predicated on subsistence. A 1718 survey ofEigg reveals the degree to which 
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landholding on the island had remained relatively unchanged for nearly 400 years. 
There were eight tacks registered: Grulin, Galmisdale, Kildonnan, Laig, Cleadale, and 
Howlin, with one independent farm at Knockeiltach. Of these eight tacks, only 
Kildonnan, Laig, Cleadale and Grulin were held by tacksmen, the rest were held in 
joint tenancies and run as collective farms. A certain degree of change had occurred, 
since feu duties that had traditionally been paid in kind and military service had been 
partially converted into rents paid for in cash - which in I 718 constituted an annual 
total of 1155 merks.63 This was far from enough for the chief, especially with the costs 
of rebellion, and between the wars there was a recorded doubling of rents. Considering 
that the island had not increased its production of cattle during this period, and was to 
lose all its principal tenants and tacksmen as well, the impact on the ground most have 
been substantial. 
In association with the renting of tacks on more commercial lines, the 
Clanranalds also attempted various schemes of agricultural improvement. Subsistence 
farming was unprofitable to say the least, and although some cattle were being 
produced for sale and the raising of much needed cash, the basic agricultural practices 
were hardly comparable to the modernised farms of the south. Dressier provides a very 
detailed overview of the lengths to which islanders were forced, in order to escape the 
seasonal fluctuations of weather and produce. With famine often knocking on the 
door, everything that was at all edible was included on the meal table, from wild plants 
and shellfish, to seaweed and nesting birds. 64 The first and most dramatic improvement 
on this situation was the introduction of the potato. The 15th chief ofClanranald is 
credited with planting the first potato in the Hebrides in 1739, and its success 
precipitated the swift application of cultivation growing throughout the region. 
65 
Whilst this had the immediate effect of stabilising farming practice, it also encouraged 
the expansion of population on more than marginal soils. Where beforehand there was 
a tacit balance between population levels and ecological diversity, there was now an 
increasing population based on a single produce; an imbalance that was soon to have 
disastrous effects. 
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With the enforced exile after Culloden, the chief of Clanranald became an 
"absentee landlord" and in 1749 he handed over the control of his territories to a paid 
factor, David Bruce. This was an absolute turn around in clan society, not only in 
regards to the position of its chief, but in the intrinsic relationship of the clan to its 
land. Obviously the seeds of this transformation had been sown with the imposition of 
feudal law and slowly germinated by the steady and continued influence of the market 
economies ofthe south. Nevertheless, the employment of an external and 'improving' 
factor necessitated a psychological turn around in the view of land: rather than an 
integral aspect of clan identity to be defended at all costs, it was now an asset that 
needed to be managed to its maximum profit. With this crucial break in clan society 
came strains on all levels of the clan structure eventually leading to the complete 
disintegration of the kin-based society.66 
As the Clanranald estates were now being organised along more aggressively 
commercial lines, the tenantry soon felt the changes ofDavid Bruce's management. He 
was particularly hostile towards the tacksmen, whom he felt were a severe hindrance 
to progress as "tied to their caste, they were usually more concerned to keep up a host 
of unproductive servants and retainers than to cultivate habits of husbandry and 
thrift".67 The reorganisation of leases naturally removed the now redundant ties of 
military service, and translated them into higher rents. Leases beginning in I 7 65 were 
also drawn on short terms, allowing for the swift and easy increase of rents as well as 
the ability to quickly remove any troublesome tenants who challenged the factor's 
n1ethods. This proved often to be the case, especially with the tacksmen who believing 
they had an inheritable right to their land, fiercely resented the intrusions of the factor. 
This related not only to the drawing of leases, but perhaps more importantly to the 
growing interference of the factor in the day to day running of their farms. Proud and 
independent, the tacksmen had run their farms along traditional lines without ever 
having the clan chief walking around the property telling them what to do. In order to 
improve the productivity of the farms, however, and so increase the value of rental 
income, the factor was doing just this; and his ideas of improvement almost always 
66 Hunter. The Making. pp.ll-12 
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cost the tenant, whilst increasing the power and returns to the estate. A prime example 
of this was the new corn mill enterprise begun in 1763, which involved the enforced 
milling of all corn by the estate's mill. Until all the island's home quems were 
destroyed by the factor, it was common practice for each tenant to collect and mill his 
own corn, with the communal farms grinding their corn together. With the 
"improvement", however, this now changed, and the estate was soon earning a 
substantial income for the charges levied on milling the tenant's com.68 
Other improvements were also brought about with the new leases of 1765, 
which again caused resentment. To begin with the leases named only the principal 
tenants and a few of the subtenants, with the vast majority of the population being left 
out ofthe legal documentation.69 The vast retinue of minor subtenants, cottars and 
landless labourers were therefore defined as having no legal entitlement to inhabiting 
the island. In immediate terms this was only a minor point compared to the 
inconveniences that were involved in the application of the new leases. To begin with, 
the reorganisation of landholding in commercial terms obviously found payments of 
rent in kind anathema, but nevertheless since tenants were always cash poor other 
arrangements had to be made. Using this as an opportunity to gain greater involvement 
in farm management, the factor took labour in kind as a form of payment and 
organised the building of dykes and drainage channels. 70 The construction of these was 
not only to bring greater areas under production, but was also fundamental to the 
greater rationalisation of the landholding and agricultural production. With cattle now 
restricted in their movements, less labour was required for their upkeep and greater 
emphasis could placed on other cash crops like flax, as well as more effort directed 
towards the production of vegetables and cereals. Again like the middle class 
tacksmen, tenants and subtenants found themselves under much greater direction than 
they had ever experienced before; traditional practices and methods were being swiftly 
set aside for the expediencies of greater cash crop production, and greater financial 
returns for the estate. 71 
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Unsurprisingly, and much to the factors delight, there were many who could 
not take the onslaught of changes wrought by the new syste E · t. m. nugra Ion overseas 
seemed a much more attractive situation, especially since the wide availability of land 
in the Americas was so stark a contrast to the situation at home. The growing 
dependence on the potato had encouraged a rapid rise in population, and with over 
500 now living on Eigg fields and farms were becoming increasingly subdivided and 
crowded. It was easy therefore for John MacDonald IV of Laig, the principal 
Clanranald tacksman, to organise a large group of followers in 1765 to accompany him 
across the waters to Nova Scotia. 72 
By the 1770's the introduction of alternative tacksmen and tenants were 
increasing the pace of change on the island. Unencumbered by close reh:tionships with 
their subtenants, they were much more willing to adapt to new systems of production 
and new structures of landholding. Ironically, it was a traditional Eigg tacksman Angus 
MacDonald of Laig, however, who initiated the most dramatic change on the island to 
date. In order to provide a modern productive farm for his newly wedded daughter, in 
1788 he decided to clear the township and joint farm of Cleadale. Since the joint 
tenants paid their dues to him, rather than directly to the factor, he was well within his 
rights to force their eviction. Loaded on to a boat at Kildonnan, they therefore became 
the island's first victims of clearance. Although Angus MacDonald's motives were not 
monetary, he probably would not have contemplated the move if conditions had not so 
readily have changed under the new style of management. Nevertheless, he was 
despised and cursed by his departing kinsmen. Curses, which if believed, came true 
since his son-in-law refused the new farm, his brother-in-law was soon poisoned, his 
sister went mad, and he ended up shooting himself. 
73 
For chiefs still in debt and desperate for greater returns from their estates, the 
harvesting of kelp was a cash crop godsend. If there was one thing that the wind-swept 
and rains-soaked islands afforded, it was vast amounts of seaweed. Consequently when 
cheap supplies of alkali from the continent began to be hindered by hostilities with 
72 ibid. pp.39 
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France, their factors were quick to take up the demand b d · lk 1· fr y pro ucmg an a a 1 om 
burnt kelp. In fact the process had been underway by the 1765 1 · h k eases, wtt tac smen 
organising production and the estate taking a hefty percentage; ten shillings for every 
ton produced, and ten shillings for the transport of each ton. As demand and prices 
increased in the 1790's, however, the manufacture of alkali was written into the leases 
with the effect of trebling rents. 
74 
Obviously proving a little unpopular among 
tacksmen and tenants, the rent increases were hardly welcomed, neither was the work 
being offered. Extremely arduous, cold, and often dangerous, tenants much preferred 
their life on the farms to the long hours spent in waist high water. 
Even though there were high profits to be made for the estate, therefore, the 
factor found that labour was in short supply. Indeed not only was it in short supply, but 
as whiff of better lives overseas came back to the island, the labour poo 1 was dropping 
with every ship bound for Nova Scotia. Swift action was needed, and clan chiefs 
lobbied hard in London to restrain their clansmen from emigrating. After the Passenger 
Vessels Act was passed in 1803 to prevent their workforce leaving, the chiefs and 
factors then set about the drastic restructuring of the farms to enforce tenants into 
waged labour. 75 Of course in order to structure things in the most appropriate manner, 
there needed to be a careful taking of stock and a sound evaluation of the agricultural 
resources at hand. Proper management needed proper maps. 
Mapping was a fast growing industry in the Highlands, and strongly reflected 
the impetus for control and knowledge of the region. Developed first by the military in 
their defeats of the Jacobite rebellions, it was then later amplified in the occupation of 
forfeited estates. As they scoured the islands in pursuit of Prince Charlie after 
Culloden, the British military machine had been more than hampered by the lack of 
detailed information of the region, and swiftly learnt the need for accurate maps. In an 
area renowned for its complex marine and geological hazards this proved a formidable 
undertaking, but new methods of triangulation and dedicated cartographers began to 
tame the region's geography. In the process they set notable precedents in the practice 
73 ibid. pp.54-56 
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of cartography, as well as beginning the now famous Ordnance Survey of Great 
• • 76 
Bntam. 
The first surveys ofEigg were in fact carried out when the Clanranald estates 
were occupied in 1715, and again in 1746. But at the turn of the 19th century these 
were considered rather crude and far from useful for the factor's purpose. So in 1806, 
a skilled surveyor by the name of William Bald was employed to produce a detailed 
survey of the island's landholding and relevant acreage. Measuring 1.5m x 1.2rn, the 
map was drawn to a very high standard, showing each individual building on the island 
as well as the intricate and idiosyncratic strips which constituted the run-rig system. 
Acreage Acreage Acreage Acreage 
Townships of Arable of Pasture of Lochs of Moor 
Upper Grulin 59 16 6 402 
Lower Grulin 54 3 14 601 
Galmisdale 128 42 407 
Sandavore 69 23 165 
Sandaveg 23 359 
Glebe 27 
Kildonnan 197 369 406 
Laig 79 100 806 
Cleadale 194 209 397 
Five Pennies 66 103 
Howl in 67 200 102 
Total 1013 1002 20 3649 
Fig: 1.5 Townships recorded in/806 
76 Bray, E. The Discovery of the Hebrides, Collins, Glasgow. 1986. pp.60-65 
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ISLE of EIGG 
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Fig 2.6 Towns/tips and cultivated areas in 1806. 77 
There is more than a distinct amount or irony in the fact that the map, which 
was drawn up to oversee the eradication of the communal farms, has provided the best 
account of their layout and existence. Confirming how densely populated the island 
was, the map shows almost every available part of the island, including Castle Island, 
used for agricultural production, with over 1000 acres in cultivation, another 1 000 
under pasture, and a further 3600 used for moorland grazing. Ten townships are 
depicted, each consisting of I 0 to 15 houses and surrounded by their run-rig strips. 
77 Wade Martins. p.27 
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Predominantly planted with potatoes th 1 ey were a I dug and tended by hand with those 
closest to the buildings used and fertilised h . ' 
eac year, whilst the others located further 
afield were reverted to pasture for several be 
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Fig 2. 7 The townships of Five Pennies, How/in, 1/taig, and Cleadale before reorganisation 79 
Unfortunately the buildings are not indicated as residences or byres, but 
nevertheless it is easy to see how they were grouped together constituted a township. 
They were closely knit communities, which in the very layout and structure of their 
farms required communal working practices to tend and harvest their crops. Each 
711 'b'd I 1 • p.28 
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settlement was very similar in nature with only Kildonnan st d' t d'ffi · , an mg ou as 1 erent: 
one house stood on the peninsula, with the mill located close by near the shore. 
Farmed by the minister's son, Donald Macaskill, it was the most substantial farm on 
the island, and instead of a township of people surrounding the house, labour was 
drafted in from the township ofBrae. Since Macaskill was both highly educated, a 
doctor by training, and not a traditional Clanranald tacksman, it was he that the 20th 
chief of Clanranald chose to reorganise the communal townships.80 
The system chosen to replace the communal townships had successfully been 
tried on Muck, an island the 19th chief ofClanranald had acquired in lieu of debts 
owed to him by Lachlean MacLean. Although Muck exported reasonable amounts of 
barley and oats, the higher returns from kelp ensured that the island's 24 tacks were 
subdivided into 4 7 individual plots for kelping families. In 1810, a year later, Donald 
Macaskill repeated the same process in Cleadale, replacing the townships of Cleadale 
and Knockeiltach with 28 crofts. 81 Each croft was carefully drawn to provide only 
partial support for the occupying tenants, thereby forcing them into the waged labour 
of the kelp beds. The same process was repeated on the communal farms of 
Galmisdale and Grulin, though the rigid lines of the crofts in Cleadale could not be 
replicated due to the awkward terrain. It was a complete change of landscape, tenure, 
and economy, which certainly assisted in generating large profits for Clanranald who 
cleared some £42,000 from the kelp production between 1808-1810 alone.
82 
For his 
kinsfolk, however, the complete subjugation to market economy was to bring little 
reward. They saw none of the princely profits; and instead, as one contemporary 
Hebridean traveller noted, their conditions had now become attuned more to a state of 
slavery.R3 
By 1 815 cheaper supplies of alkali became available again, and so the vast 
kelping estates were soon plunged into massive recession. Though Eigg was still 
producing 17 tons of alkali a year, the price had dropped so dramatically that 
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Clanranald soon found himself subsidising the island rather than profiting. 84 The 
crofters were thrown into immense poverty and all were far behind in their rents. As a 
follower of the Royal Court, and a personal friend ofthe Prince Regent, Clanranald's 
lifestyle could hardly afford to pay for starving tenants. Selling off his estates was the 
only option left; and so in 1824 Eigg was advertised for sale as perfect pasture for the 
new cash crop of wool: 
There is no spot in the west better adapted to the rearing of stock. Black 
cattle and sheep might be reared under peculiar advantages, and by the 
introduction of Cheviot sheep and some consequent slight alterations in 
the management of the farms on Eigg, the value of the land might be 
greatly increased. The pasture of the island is of the best quality while the 
arable land is not only of an extent sufficient to support the inhabitants of 
the island, but well adapted for the produce of turnip crops for the 
feeding of stock. Part of the island is of a limestone bottom of superior 
quality and the grouse shooting upon the moorish part of the island is of 
the best kind .... A good deal of kelp is manufactured on the island of Eigg 
and Canna and is of superior quality and there is good reason to suppose 
that the quality might be considerably increased, and in the last place, it 
may be observed that the occupiers of the land have had such 
employment and considerable profits from the herring and other fishing 
and which consequently may thus be assumed as a local advantage adding 
considerably to the value of the farm.85 
As the saying goes - "never trust a sales brochure" - for this was a highly 
optimistic survey of the island at best. With severe rental arrears, appalling levels of 
poverty and a booming population this was hardly a self-supporting island. Indeed, 
even the basic sales pitch for sheep rearing was misinformed since there had only been 
minimal experience of sheep on the island, all of which had been disastrous. The 
alterations in management that were needed were obviously far from "slight", and 
could only entail one thing- the mass eviction of unwanted tenants. As the impacts of 
kelp recession hit home, clearances were taking place all over the Highland region in 
order to accommodate the production of wool and mutton. In 1826 Rhum was cleared 
84 ibid. p.66 
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of most of its inhabitants, with the same happening on Canna in 1827. Although Eigg 
was initially saved from this by its sale in 1827, it was only a matter oftime before the 
island was eventually to succumb to the same fate. 
As for the islanders' ancestral leader, the 20th chief ended the 400 years of 
Clanranald proprietorship and parted from his kinsmen and property for the sum of 
£15,000. Like most ofthe clan chiefs he was shedding the expenses ofhis inheritance 
and leading a thoroughly Anglophile life, far removed from the traditions of his kins-
men's society. Feudalism had achieved its final victory of establishing centralised 
authority and control over the region. In the process, the kin-based patterns of land 
holding had been replaced by a comprehensive legal structure, and land ownership had 
become defined in the commercial terms of British society. What remained however, 
was the basic division of the Highlands and Islands into large parcels of land. The 
estates of the clan chiefs remained relatively intact, and though many were to be 
broken up like Clanranalds in the sales, the basic pattern of ownership was far more 
concentrated than in the rest of Britain. Indeed, the general trend in Scotland during 
the 18th and early 19th centuries was a reduction of the number of landowners as more 
and more land became consolidated into vast estates. When Eigg was thrown onto the 
Highland land market for the first time, the vast majority of Scotland was divided into 
approximately 1,500 estates and the total number of landowners just 7,500.86 
1.6 A Sporting Estate with Private Owners 1827- 1925 
Hugh MacPhearson, Professor of Hebrew and Greek at Kings College 
Aberdeen had purchased the island just as the emerging Highland land market was 
beginning a notable rise in transactions. Not only had the end of the Napoleonic wars 
knocked the bottom out of kelp prices, but the agricultural depression which followed 
had caused severe declines in the profits from cattle and sheep.87 Clan chiefs 
throughout the Highlands and Islands were selling their land at an awesome pace in 
favour of the more immediate returns of hard cash. The class of proprietors that 
86 Callander. pp.1 0-11 
87 Hunter. The Making. p.37 
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followed in their wake were obviously in possession of the cash, but were lacking the 
prestige and position that came with ownership of land. In Scotland this prestige was 
amplified by the feudal powers that conveyed ownership and by a distinctly 
romanticised image of the Highland landowner. Whilst a new agricultural boom in the 
mid 19th century provided handsome returns on sheep farming, sport and recreation 
were to become the chief pursuits of the new owners. Land was now fundamentally 
concerned with the private interests of the new owners whose pursuits had little 
connection with the large populations that still remained on the ground. Eigg, like 
estates throughout the region was to see immense changes as the island's now 
redundant inhabitants were shipped to North America. 
Considering the state of the island's population it is more than surprising that 
MacPhearson did not start clearing them immediately. As the 1831 Statistical Account 
emphasises the island was in rough shape. With a population of 452, and a structure of 
landholding that only barely supported them, the islanders were suffering horrendous 
levels of poverty. Cleadale was the most congested with 24 households residing on just 
18 crofts, and Upper and Lower Grulin with their 9 crofts each had practically doubled 
in size over two generations. Those who were not contained within the island's 41 
crofts were strictly landless, and dependent upon the tacksmen of Laig, Howlin, 
Kildonnan and the new factor who now held Sandaveg as his own farm. 88 The degree 
to which the surviving tacksmen still retained a large list of dependants is illustrated in 
the household of John MacDonald who had replaced Macaskill as the tacksman of 
Kildonnan. Married with 6 children, his family also included his mother, an old aunt, 
two granddaughters and an orphan boy. Also living in the house, and employed by him, 
were a teacher, two local nurses, two house servants, a cook, a poultry woman, a 
spinner, two herdsmen, a dairy maid, a farm servant, and on top of that, he also took in 
the odd lodger! On the 143 acre farm he employed at least another dozen labourers as 
well to work land. At the other end of the scale overcrowding was possibly even 
worse, since the two room blackhouses had to contend with at the very least half a 
dozen inhabitants not to mention the over-wintering animals that were also kept in the 
88 Maclean, Rev D. in The Statistical Account of Scotland, 1794-5. Vol.xx. p.231 
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house. 
89 
MacPhearson and his factor did not act on remedying these problems of 
overpopulation and instead took their aim at the island's wildlife. To improve the game 
all hooded crows, ravens, and Eagles were shot, with islanders compelled to destroy 
their dogs. 90 
Whilst the island's bird life was swiftly reducing in numbers, the number of 
people was rapidly increasing. The predominance of the potato had allowed islanders 
to eke out a miserable but nevertheless sustaining existence and by 1841 the population 
had grown to 546.
91 
The productivity of the magical potato was to prove short-lived, 
though, since following on from Ireland and southern Scotland, potato blight hit the 
West Coast in 1846 and ruined all but the entire crop.92 Just like Ireland the impact 
was devastating and severe famines were experienced throughout the Highlands and 
Islands. Eigg was relatively fortunate at first because the blight did not have too bad an 
impact, and unlike most other landlords, MacPhearson was initially speedy and 
compassionate by supplying food on credit and waiving the smaller tenants' rents. The 
Free Church also handed out supplies, and where the factor was negligent in supplying 
MacPhearson's subsidised meal, they quickly circumvented starvation. Thereby 
ensuring strong support both on Eigg and around the region. Nevertheless, the impacts 
of the famine weakened the islanders, and although relatively few were to succumb to 
its direct effects, they were easy victims for the wave of typhoid that soon followed. 
Whole families perished in the overcrowded households, and many of the island's 
children were to end up as orphans on the steadily increasing paupers' role.
93 
Dismay at conditions in the Highlands and Islands had forced the British 
Government into action. Having already had direct experience of famine relief in 
Ireland, meal depots were first established in Tobermory and Portree. Unlike Ireland 
however, the famine relief was administered not directly from London but rather 
through Scottish agencies and administrations. For instance incentives were made to 
encourage reluctant landlords into employing their starving tenants on agricultural and 
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On Eigg MacPhearson grudgingly accepted these funds and 
organised the building of a road across the island, together with drainage schemes and 
the construction of a new pier. Since poor-relief work was to be made as unpalatable 
as possible, the islanders were onJy paid the lowest of wages. Though this provided for 
basic subsistence, it hardly alleviated matters since their fields were left unattended and 
the improvement schemes only benefited the landlord.95 Unsurprisingly conditions 
remained severe, and by 1851 the universal conclusion to the "I fighland problem" was 
taken to be mass cmigration.96 With the legal restrictions on emigration not onJy lifted 
but also now sponsored, MacPhearson evicted the tenants of Upper and Lower Grulin, 
dispatching them on a ship bound for Nova Scotia in 1853. The land was then turned 
over to an incoming shepherd whose sheep found the well tilled pasture so fertile that 
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I he forced evictions also went band in hand with more pervasive voluntary 
emigration and the continued recruitment for the navy and Highland regiments, which 
had begun back in the 1770's. Migratory workers also left the island to seek 
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employment in the Lowland urban centres, as well as working in the fishing industry on 
the East Coast. More than often they left never to return. In just ten years, therefore, 
the 1861 census showed that the island's population had been reduced by a fifth. The 
townships ofBrae, Five Pennies, and Howlin had gradually disappeared, and the farms 
at Laig and Kildonnan had lost most of their traditional host of servants. This was only 
the beginning a pattern of depopulation that was to continue for over a hundred years. 
Considering that MacPhearson, was interested only in the production of sheep and the 
shooting of game, this was a decided advantage. It was an advantage he was to see 
little of, however, since illness had prevented him from visiting the island from 1841 
onwards, and in 1854 he died leaving the island to his family. 99 
The push for removing redundant tenants and improving the agricultural 
returns from estates was impelled by another rise in the agricultural sector in Britain. 
The profitability of Highland land ownership had steadily risen from the 1820's to 
boom once again between the 1850's and 1870's. Though there were hiccups in the 
trend, the financial climate propelled estate owners to improve on their agricultural 
methods. Since money could be borrowed at 6.5% and recouped from tenants at 8%, it 
was a rare owner indeed who did not take advantage of the considerable profits to be 
made. 100 Of course having said this, most landowners were far removed from the 
actual mechanics of estate management. Apart from one member of the family who 
was to reside on the island for over 50 years, 101 the MacPhearsons like most owners 
and were only occasional visitors to the estate. The actual business of running the 
island was conducted by their factor, who enjoyed not only sound financial backing but 
an excess supply of cheap labour. Like typical Victorian landowners they instead 
enjoyed the simple prestige of land, and following in the fashions set by the Royal 
family, the seasonal joys of shooting the abundant wildlife. 
The fashionable appeal of owning land in the Highlands was encouraged by the 
relatively cheap prices for land in the region, and the ability to own vast stretches of 
rugged real estate that was unheard of in the rest of mainland Britain. Combined with 
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this was also the exceptional power that came with owning land under feudal law.· 
Landlords not only had the absolute power of forfeiture, but were still actively 
encouraged and sponsored by the State to remodel and "civilise" the region's 
backward society. In most circumstances this entailed the complete assault upon the 
indigenous language, culture, and religion; either by coercive education and forced 
compliance to Protestant, Lowland society, or by the more common wholesale 
removal of populations. 
By the 1880's Britain's agricultural boom had been broken by cheaper imports 
from the New World. Wool prices collapsed, and throughout the Highlands the vast 
sheep runs were swiftly changed over to deer forests, which were seen as the only 
viable economy left. A new wave of evictions ensued, whose severity and brutality 
initiated a co-ordinated movement among the Highland communities. As will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, this led to the Napier Commission of enquiry, 
and eventually the Crofters Act of 1896. Since conditions on Eigg were comparatively 
better than most, the Royal Commission did not actually visit the island, and instead 
the inhabitants let their newly elected crofting MP, Fraser Macintosh, represent their 
grievances. 102 Though 28 crofts were registered on the island, shared between 
Cleadale and Galmisdale, land hunger was still very much an issue, and the 1881 
census showed that hardly anyone under the age of 40 held a croft. 103 
The 1886 Crofters Act did not aim at regaining land that had already been lost, 
but instead focussed on the needs of consolidating and enlarging the existing 
holdings. 104 Consequently, in order to break the rampant congestion, security of tenure 
was only given to the larger crofts. Nevertheless, due to the enthused scholarship of 
Skene and Carmichael, the Napier Commission and subsequent Crofters Act did look 
towards re-establishing the old system of communal farms. Rights were therefore given 
to crofters to acquire neighbouring land for enlargement of common grazings, if at 
least 5 crofters applied and the landlord consented. 105 Unlike other more intransigent 
landowners, the MacPhearsons did allow this to take place, and the crofters at 
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103 Dressier. p.l 09 
104 Hunter. The Making. p.l62 
54 
Ch:mtcr (m.· 
Cleadale gained a little more land at the expense of Kildonnan and Howlin farms with 
two more crofts being created in the process; 106 a small, but nonetheless significant 
victory that must have been greatly enjoyed by the island's remaining tenantry. 
Though the Crofters Act finally halted the most coercive aspects of landlords' 
power over crofters, their influence was still very strong over resident populations and 
regional policy.
107 
This was notably so on a small island where the owner and factor 
had enormous control over the local economy. Those tenants who were not fortunate 
enough to have gained the rights of crofters were still at the mercy of summary 
eviction. Notwithstanding their legal protection, the crofters were also considerably 
under the whim of the landlord since their crofts were very small by comparison, and 
like most crofters they were still dependent upon waged labour to support themselves. 
On an island with limited opportunities, this meant that members of the family were 
continually forced into finding work on the mainland, which obviously continued the 
steady trickle of depopulation. 108 
With lacking interests and profits in the island the MacPhearson family sold 
Eigg in 1896 to an eccentric arms dealer by the name ofRobert Lawrence Thompson 
MacEwen. Far from being a now traditional absentee landlord, he not only lived on the 
island full time, but actively took an integral part in its management. His reasons for 
doing so are unclear to say the least, and rumours abounded on the island that his 
change of name (he dropped his first and last names) and bizarre habits were to avoid 
assassins from previous exploits in the Far East. 109 Nevertheless, Thompson's 
proprietorship brought some welcome improvements to the island including regular 
post, a telegraph, a new pier and a motorised launch. Perhaps most important of all, his 
sizeable wealth brought the first stable and well-paid employment on the island. 
Establishing a precedent of the benign landlord, he gave loans and assistance for 
housing and provided funds for a resident doctor and improvements to the school. 110 
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The new crofting laws, however, had in part conditioned his magnanimity, for 
originally he had intended to clear the island completely and move the people to his 
neighbouring properties of Muck and Strathaird. Thereby leaving the island as his own 
private residence.
111 
Since this action was now forbidden under law, he was only able 
to clear an area around Galmisdale if he was able to gain the crofters' acceptance. This 
was achieved by establishing new and larger crofts at Chuagach (south ofCleadale) 
and constructing new houses upon them. In doing so he was responsible for the last 
clearance on the island, albeit a quite peaceable affair, and for the collection of all the 
crofters into one location. In the cleared area at Galmisdale a fancy new lodge was 
constructed, with its boundary walls being built from the stones of the deserted crofts. 
From this building, as a sick old man in 1913, he supervised the construction ofhis 
own mausoleum on Castle Island, in which he was buried the same year. 112 
Eigg then passed to his brother John MacEwen who had little interest in the 
island and simply let the shooting to a Danish shipping magnate, William Peterson, 
who was to later buy the island at the height of the First World War. The war of 
course had large impacts on the island, with 20 men enlisting into the ranks of 
Highland regiments and heading off to the trenches. As Dressier notes it was more 
than curious that, considering the island's population of 160 was evenly split between 
Catholic and Protestant, all of the servicemen were Catholic. Tradition has it that the 
Protestant factor played a significant hand in choosing who went by allocating 
agricultural jobs only to Protestants. 113 Whatever the case, only ten were to survive 
and return. Although this loss represented a significant portion of the island's working 
males~ a greater impact was felt from the Asian flu epidemic, which reached the island 
at the end of the war. 114 
Apart from depleting the Highlands and Islands of yet more people, the war 
and its aftermath heralded significant impacts upon land holding in the region. Both 
shortly before and after the war, many of the great sporting estates were sold off and 
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like Thompson's, broken up in their sale. Actively encouraged by the Land Settlement 
Act of 1919, this process led to a general shrinkage in the average size of estates, and a 
proportional rise in the number of small owner-occupier farms. 115 On Eigg the 
returning ex-servicemen used the Act's provisions not to purchase land, but like other 
crofters, to extend their common grazings. They made applications as early as 1919, 
but the new proprietor was a forceful character who had little interest in their requests. 
Extremely wealthy, Peterson was an archetypal absentee landlord, who owned the 
island, like his luxury yacht, for reasons of simple ostentation and social standing. 
Tenants, rents, and the estate meant little to him, since the island was only a holiday 
home for the pleasures of shooting and the hosting of lavish parties. It therefore took 
the crofters over three years to acquire the 100 acre extension. 116 Unfortunately, the 
extra land did little to alleviate matters when the depression of the 1920's and early 
30's hit; cattle prices plummeted, and both crofters and small farmers throughout the 
Highlands began to struggle in the nation-wide slump. Soon emigration was being 
advertised again, and strong media campaigns tempted many to give up their hard-won 
holdings. On the island the population fell from 150 in 1921, and to 138 in 1931. 117 
Since many estates were like Eigg, and run in a loss-making fashion, landowners felt 
the pinch too, with the sales of estates rising significantly as many wealthy families 
began liquidating their assets. Following the trend Peterson ended up selling the island 
in 1925 to Sir Waiter Runciman, a wealthy and successful politician. 
1.7 Runciman Family Values: 1925-1975 
Though WW1 and its subsequent economic depression precipitated a wave of 
estate sales and an increase in the number of landowners, there was still enough wealth 
around to maintain the underlying pattern of large-scale estate ownership in the 
Highlands and Islands. This was boosted not only by the economic up-swing of the 
1930's, but was forcefully shored-up by the growing presence of the Government as a 
principle land owner. 118 With crofting seen as increasingly uneconomic and backward, 
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this pattern of ownership remained predicated upon an economy of sporting estates, 
large hill farms, and forestry. The corresponding ideology was of course highly 
paternalistic, and surviving local communities grew strongly dependent on the notions 
of the benign landlord for their survival. On Eigg this was amply reinforced by the 
arrival of the Runcimans, a family who were to own the island for over 40 years. 
Although their active and personal management was to in many ways cushion the 
island's inhabitants from the region's general economic decline, they continued a 
tradition of land ownership that was not only uneconomic, but that continued to 
marginalise the position of the resident community. 
If you ask the older generation of islanders today about the Runcimans, you 
will often hear their proprietorship described as the "Golden Age". Not only did they 
heavily invest in the island, but they were also a kind and considerate family who often 
assisted and helped the island's dwindling community. Taking a direct interest in the 
estate's management, they initiated a vigorous period of improving the island's 
infrastructure. Holding self-sufficiency as the abiding ethic, they planted large sections 
of mixed forestry, undertook drainage schemes and built a state of the art dairy. 
Constructed at Sandavore, the dairy was part of model farm that encompassed the 
holdings of Galmisdale and was run by Lady Runciman herself On the sporting side, 
the lochs were stocked with trout and gamekeepers were employed to raise and tend 
the birds through the year. Other improvements included new buildings at the pier that 
matched an elaborate new lodge. Although not exactly appropriate for the climate, the 
lodge was designed by Balfour Paul and had a distinct Mediterranean flair with a flat 
ltalianate roof and, rather unbelievably a palm tree lined drive. A new hydroelectric 
scheme was also constructed, which brought the first electricity to the island, and 
powered both the lodge and surrounding buildings. One of which was a new 
community hall. 119 
With all this construction and activity, the Runcimans brought steady and stable 
employment to most of the island's households. As remarkably benevolent landlords 
this included the notable perks of :free milk, wood, and coal for all estate workers. 
119 Dressier. p.l22 
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Living conditions naturally rose as more money circulated on the island, and during the 
1930's especially, house improvements were matched by a healthy social and cultural 
life. This has been particularly well recorded by Dressier, who provides much detail of 
the crofting community's daily life. 120 Tightly bound in its organisation, the crofters did 
much of their farming in common and directed themselves through a strong Grazings 
Committee of crofting elders. A hard but nevertheless productive life, the whole 
community was involved in the seasonal activities of tending cattle, cutting peat, and 
the gathering-in of harvests. This was combined with regular social events and the 
traditional celidhs which were held in people's houses and the community hall. 121 
The Runcimans generosity certainly proffered some protection on the 
community from the effects of the depression, and indeed induced an era of 
unprecedented prosperity during the 1930's. Nevertheless, the general pattern of 
regional decline and depopulation had impacts on the island, and after the Second 
World War this was to drastically increase. Outward migration of the young had 
always been a problem, but it was especially so for women on the island. Unable to 
find employment in anything but domestic service and the dairy farm, there was a 
distinct trend of girls leaving the island and settling where they found work. With 
children being educated in mainland schools from 1950's onwards, this was only 
increased as more islanders became educated in the luxuries of the mainland, and 
increasingly far removed from the character of crofting life. Gaelic was in precipitous 
decline, and from the 1940's onwards so was the crofting community. 122 By the early 
1960's the island's population had halved in a matter of20 years. 123 
As will be further discussed in Chapter 2, the post-war decline in crofting was 
precipitated by the limited size of tenancies and by the lack of external work to 
subsidise a land holding system that never was designed in the first place to be 
agriculturally viable. Whilst on estates such as Eigg, wealthy owners provided basic 
employment and sustained the crofting system, in other areas there was a complete 
lack of opportunity to find alternative forms of income. Central to this was the degree 
120 ibid. pp.l21-130 
121 ibid. p.l29 
122 ibid. p.l52 
59 
of power that landowners had over the available resources and the course of their 
development. Even though crofters had security of tenure, they were still relatively 
cash poor and always tightly bound by crofting law and feudal restrictions in what they 
could do on, and with their land. Combined with this, and in many ways because of it, 
there was a profound apathy and lack of self-confidence within Highland communities 
in general. The systematic repression and denigration of Gaelic culture had had its 
impacts over the centuries, and the resulting communities of the Highlands and Islands 
were washed by a now common deference to land owners. Due to its natural isolation, 
and the degree to which the Runcimans directly controlled the estate's management 
and available employment this was no doubt more strongly felt on Eigg than in some 
mainland estates. Though they were benevolent, the Runcimans still maintained their 
hobby farm and holiday retreat primarily for its peace and tranquillity. In managing this 
they retained the foremost control over the island's economy. All of the island's farms 
were now combined into one operation, with islanders either living on crofls and 
dependent on part-time estate work for additional income, or living in tied houses and 
employed full time. It was a management style, which hardly gave the islanders much 
opportunity to advance or become independent, nor to enjoy the higher standards of 
living now afforded in the mainland urban centres. 
The post-war declines of population and the region's ailing economy attracted 
gradual interest in the plight of the ailing crofting communities. In terms of 
Government policy, the Taylor Commission and subsequent Crofter's Commission 
attempted to redefine the crofters as full time agriculturists by loo king at the 
amalgamation of small holdings into to more economic units. This only encouraged a 
defensive reaction from the crofters, which redirected the search for structural 
solutions into the more diffuse supports of the Crofters Agricultural Grant Scheme. 124 
It did nevertheless show an interest in preserving the communities on the land, and this 
was echoed by a group of writers who moved into the region in search of a lifestyle 
that many believed to be on the way to extinction. Like Alastair Maclean and Gavin 
Maxwell, George Scott Moncrief was one of a growing number of people who not 
123 Banks. p.l 05 
124 Hunter. The Making. pp.207-215; see also Hunter, J. The Claim of Crofting, Mainstream, 
Edinburgh, 1991. 
60 
only saw benefits in the crofting way of life, but even valued it above the prevailing 
trends of modern society. Spending much time on Eigg he was very much struck by 
characters who lived there and the contemplative nature of their world: "Islesfolk may 
not be a pack of saints, they share the universal ills, but remoteness and the inevitability 
of being often alone and quiet, do give them a chance, too rare in the predominantly 
urban population to live with their eyes beyond the world. They may seldom be able to 
put to words what they see, but it is immanent in their capacity to act intuitively". 125 
Of course the appeal of the island's contemplative merits had also been the 
reason for Sir Waiter Runciman's purchase of the island in the first place, but in 
financial terms it was far too much for his children to afford by the mid 1960's. 
Advertised as the "perfectly secluded island of the Old World", the "very beautiful Isle 
ofEigg" was put up for sale in 1966. "It had provided the family a holiday home" they 
said, "but there is no reason it might not be made a profitable thing. If somebody was 
prepared to live there full time they could probably do quite alright". 126 This prospect 
particularly excited an island relative ofMoncriefs, by the name ofNeil Usher, as well 
as an hotelier Angus MacDonald, who also had relations on Eigg. Usher began the first 
of three attempts in the next decade to launch some alternative to the now traditional 
sporting estate model of ownership and management on the island. 127 The Isle ofEigg 
had certainly kindled an interest in its visitors, in part by its natural beauty but in the 
main by its enigmatic inhabitants. Particular among these was Hugh MacKinnon, Clerk 
of the crofters Grazing Committee for 40 years, and the last of the island's famed 
storytellers and poets. Recounting his tales and songs, MacKinnon had not only 
enamoured Moncrief and Usher, but was recorded by Edinburgh University's School 
of Scottish studies, which preserved much of the island's rich oral history. Working 
with Hugh and other crofters, Usher drew up plans for a new stock club to work a 
sheep run and rejuvenate the crofting community. By dividing the island back into 
separate farms they sought to devolve the island's management into three smallholder 
farms at Kildonnan, Laig, and Galmisdale. With Mallaig being served by a regular 
train service by 1960, they also thought of capitalising on the small stream of tourists 
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who were beginning to make their way up the coast by turning the lodge into a hotel. 
Unfortunately the co-operative bid of £56,000, financed by Usher and Moncrief, was 
beaten by one of £71,000 from a Welsh farmer, Captain Robert Evans. 128 
An o Id man when he bought the island, Evans attempted to turn the ailing 
sporting estate into a principally agricultural enterprise. Employing an energetic factor 
who imported a large number of Hereford cattle swelling the island's herd he looked 
towards a predominantly cattle-based enterprise. Unfortunately with rail services 
ending their stock transport services, access to markets produced severe economic 
burdens on the farms' management. More of an impact however came when the new 
cattle succumbed to red water fever, caused from bracken and damp conditions. 
Having bought the island on notion of making a profit from farming, Evans decided to 
sell after just five years. 129 On hearing the island was up for sale again, Neil Usher and 
George's nephew Gavin decided to mount another bid. A development plan, which 
encapsulated all the ideas Hugh MacKinnon and Usher had worked on before, was 
again prepared, but this time apart from Hugh, there was little interest expressed by the 
other crofters. "They had grown too used to doing things on their own", recalls his son 
Angus MacK.innon, and "they were never that interested in sheep in any case". 130 
Nevertheless, the partners went ahead with their plans of trying to turn the loss-making 
estate into something that could generate better employment and opportunity. The 
main problem they faced, however, was finding enough funds to purchase and invest in 
a seemingly over-valued property. Gaining the support of the highly active resident 
Small Isles GP, Hector MacLean, and District Councillor, Fergus Gowans, they 
decided to send their proposals to the newly established Highlands and Islands 
Development Board (HIDB) in the hope offinding backing. 131 
The HIDB had been discussing the merits of the public purchase of estates 
since its inception, principally as method for tackling the region's underlying economic 
problems in a structural manner. The hopes for it taking a lead in challenging the 
problems of land holding and the stagnant economy of sporting estates were, however, 
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limited by its lack of political will and an artificially inflated value ofland. 132 With the 
State steadily increasing its direct ownership of land through the Forestry Commission, 
the economic decline in sporting estates had not led to corresponding decline in their 
market value. Indeed, the market had attracted new types of owners from foreign and 
corporate backgrounds who were to maintain a strong, and over the next two decades 
increasing demand for estates. 
133 
This meant their prices remained buoyant, and as 
Evan's sale of the island was to demonstrate there were considerable profits to be 
made on the simple speculation in the market. Consequently, there was little chance of 
the HIDB being able to match the price of market conditions if was to merely offer an 
economic value for the island. In any case, shying away from setting a precedent so 
early in their commission, the HIDB reportedly ignored Usher and Moncriefs 
proposals and repeated misplaced the paperwork. Highly frustrated the partners could 
only table a bid that was rejected as too low, and instead the island was sold to an 
English charity, the Anglyn Trust for £120,000. Netting Evans a substantiai profit of 
some £49,000. 134 
Although Eigg had had a relatively common experience as an estate, it was 
notably different in that it had attracted two bids for ownership outside the circles of 
the wealthy elite and speculative investors that were purchasing estates in the early 
1970's. Moncrief and Usher had actually worked with the crofters and devised 
mechanisms to break down the centralised nature of the island's management. What 
they believed to be essential if the estate was to find alternative incomes and generate 
employment. 135 The chief problem that they encountered, however, was that the 
centralised nature of the estate was directly what was so attractive to other buyers. No 
matter the degenerated condition, it nonetheless allowed a complete reign over what 
was in essence a small kingdom. 136 The perceptions ofwhich were only magnified by 
the fact that the estate was enclosed upon a particularly beautiful and historic island. 
To purchase Eigg was to acquire the legal status of a feudal laird, and have command 
over an estate and sitting tenants that was unparalleled in the Western world. It was 
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the kind of property that was always going to catch someone's imagination, and it was 
just a question of who would appear with the money. In regards to The Anglyn Trust, 
a registered charity for the care and education of handicapped children, it was a 
"Commander" Bernard Farnham Smith. 
Very much the self-made man with a thick cockney accent, Farnham Smith was 
certainly one of the more interesting characters to have a go at turning the estate 
around.
137 
Although he had little knowledge of farming or island life, he certainly had a 
charisma about him, and with an open door at the lodge he charmed the islanders with 
an easy manner and countless stories from his navy days in China. Declaring his wish 
to develop the island, and encourage people to return, his first move was to appoint 
Angus Mac.Kinnon as farm manager. After his five year plan had been approved, 
Angus began to oversee the acquisition of cattle. Ideas of pony trekking, tearooms, 
and workshops were discussed to accelerate the increasing number tourists now 
visiting the island. Galmisdale House was let to a new arrival who turned it into a 
B&B, which with a table license swiftly returned the house to its former use as an inn 
and island pub. Since the school role was now down to one child, islanders greatly 
welcomed the prospect of new, younger people being enticed onto the island. A 
variety of people appeared, and stayed for a while, but mostly they didn't settle. Like 
the rest of the islanders, however, the few that did stay, soon saw that like many 
speculative investors in the Highland land market, Farnham Smith's management was 
under-financed and badly planned. The purchase of a highly inappropriate 75ft 
schooner as a ferry boat highlighted his lack of practical understanding of the island's 
circumstances; especially when it dragged its anchor in the first southerly gale of the 
season and ended up on the rocks. The lack of funds was also made apparent when 
Angus MacKinnon's cattle purchases were soon halted. Likewise the traditional perks 
of free coal and milk for estate workers were similarly ended. 138 
Considering the growing problems of organisation and money, it was hardly 
surprising that Farnham Smith was unable to gain any support from the IDDB. The 
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school for mentally handicapped, which was supposed to be the mainstay of the 
island's new enterprise seemed flawed from his very arrival, especially when none of 
the boys who appeared seemed to have any handicap whatsoever. After a while it was 
understood that the school was to be for wayward sons of the upper class who had 
been thrown out of boarding schools. Few if any appeared, and those who did received 
no education whatsoever, and talked of cold dips in the lodge dam and canings with a 
broom handle at night. Other misrepresentations soon became apparent as well, most 
notably his self-styled title was in fact only related to a position in the voluntary fire-
brigade, and that he had never been in the navy at all. Finally when the islanders were 
feeding hungry boys, and the Campbell family was evicted to make way for an elderly 
retiree, Dr Mac Lean forcibly challenged the proprietor with the islanders' misgivings. 
A veteran ofNormandy and Africa campaigns, the Doctor was an incomer to Eigg, 
and one of the few who felt comfortable actually confronting the landlord. Farnham 
Smith's response was to put the island on the market once more. This time at an 
asking price of £200,000, almost double the amount he had paid for it. 139 
The severe decline of the island finally precipitated the IDDB into action. This 
time however there were few participants from Eigg involved in the bid. Indeed, apart 
from Dr MacLean and Peggy Kirk the IDDB's interest in the island elicited a notable 
apathy amongst the remaining population. Not only did Farnham Smith refuse to 
accept the notion ofEigg going into public ownership, but residents themselves had 
distinct misgivings of direct government ownership. Apart from minor grants for 
caravans and a new shop, the HIDB like all preceding government bodies before, had 
showed little constructive support for the islanders. Most importantly there had been 
no recognition by the HIDB of the problems caused by mounting freight costs. 
Renovation of the pier and new ferries had been at the top of the region's list of 
priorities since the early 1950's, but nothing had ever happened. With a population 
now down to just 39, and an estate in severe decline, the return of a benevolent and 
wealthy private owner in the style of tl)~ RJJ»~imans was perceived by the vast majority 
of islanders to be the only viable solution. 140 
139 ibid. pp. I 53- I 55 
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Another firmly against the notion of public ownership was Keith Schellenberg, 
a wealthy entrepreneur from Whitby in Yorkshire. Thinking Eigg was "a prime 
challenge for his middle years",
141 
he and his wife Margaret decided to put in an offer 
for the island. Finding himself locked in his aristocratic wife's castle at Udny, 
however, the story goes that the sports-obsessed Schellenberg had to absail down from 
the turrets in order to table his bid in time. However, the bid itself was lower than that 
already tabled by the HIDB, and Schellenberg finally had to top his bid up to 
£250,000.
142 
How he exactly found this out is unknown, though either Farnham-Smith 
or the agents must have surely tipped him off. Nevertheless, once re-tabled 
Schellenberg's amended offer was accepted in August of 1976, giving the Voluntary 
Fire Commander a handsome profit of over £120,000, and thereby scuppering the 
HID B 's attempt at rectifying the island's pattern of decay. 
Eigg had started to elicit some minor public attention because of the island's 
dire economic circumstance and because ofFarnham Smith's multifarious activities. 
This was relatively minor, for albeit a pretty island estate it remained just one of many 
estates in the 1970's suffering from inappropriate owners and a decaying 
infrastructure. The arrival of Keith Schellenberg, however, made it somewhat different. 
Hailing the spirit of free enterprise, he was a grand self-publicist who propelled the 
island into the spotlight of media attention. An absolute apologist for private 
ownership, he held up the merits of free enterprise as the solution for crumbling estates 
like Eigg. This included the marked development of the tourist trade and a 
reinvigorated farming economy. Recruiting more people to live and work on the 
island's craft shops, holiday cottages, and assorted tourist ventures Schellenberg 
attracted notable funding from the HIDB. He was a new type of owner that seemed to 
combine the old traditions of a benevolent estate owner with the new Thatcherite 
ideals of the market economy. Naturally flamboyant and mildly eccentric, he took the 
title of laird to heart and gloried in the joys of the 1920's era with vintage sports cars 
and antique motor launches. Yet, nevertheless he still professed the ethic of self-
sufficiency and the abiding need for the island to support itself economically. In his 
140 ibid. 
141 Urquhart. p.152 
142 Bryden, John. Comments on PhD Thesis March 1999 
66 
drive to pursue these ideas, Mr Schellenberg utilised the structure of management he 
inherited, and with a hands on approach he frrmly controlled the entire island 
enterprise. 
1.8 Conclusions 
In many ways therefore Schellenberg marked a return to the processes of 
commercialisation that had begun back in the 171h and 18th centuries. Though he owned 
an estate, and enjoyed the social- veritably Victorian- privilege that that entailed, he 
nevertheless intended to run the island as a business enterprise, and take the region 
forward into the new and overtly Thatherite market economy. By the turn of the 
1980's therefore Eigg stood out from other estates and was increasingly in the media's 
lens. Though it had a new and self-styled owner who was leading the way in catering 
to the rising tourist economy, the island was still nonetheless firmly placed in the 
traditions of Highland landownership. As part of the prevailing pattern of estates, it 
retained strong and centralised methods of management that marginalised the resident 
community. 
The result of a steady process of enclosure that occurred throughout the 
Highlands and Islands, the island's inhabitants remained utterly dependent on the 
whims and motivations of the owner. When this entailed the complete dedication to 
profit in the 18th century the islanders were tightly restricted and compelled into crofts 
and the waged labour of the kelp beds. When the profits were to come from wool and 
mutton, they were then replaced by sheep runs and either actively evicted or 
encouraged to leave through lack of opportunity. And finally when sport and pleasure 
directed the motivations of ownership, the few islanders that were left became a mere 
feature of the estate's character. Part of a quaint and contemplative charm, which 
coloured the scenery and added a certain melancholy to the atmosphere. Indeed under 
Schellenberg you could even say they were marketed as a tourist attraction. At each 
stage of this process of enclosure, the grip upon the resident community and its 
livelihood had strengthened. Slowly one by one, each of the independent farms of 
Kildonnan, Galmisdale, and Sandavore fell into direct estate management. Independent 
traders and craftsmen soon became a rarity, and finally by the 201h century, apart from 
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a scant few posts funded by the State, 'estate' work became the only possible 
employment on the island. 
This was a common process throughout the Highlands and Islands, as a once 
fiercely independent region became subsumed into the mainland British State. Land 
management and ownership patterns simply reflected the political processes at hand, 
which sought first to remove any potential threat, and then to seek greater economic 
returns from the region's economy. Just as the chiefs and political leaders of the 17th 
and 18th century were finally brought under control, so were the kin-based communal 
occupations of land brought into line with direct ownership and the market economy. 
Though an island, which tended to exacerbate aspects of isolation and the degree of 
change felt, Eigg nonetheless shared the experience of most estates in the Western 
Highlands and Islands. Only the beauty of its island location and the number of owners 
perhaps gave it any historical distinction as an estate. 
As Chapter 3 examines, however, what did mark the Eigg estate out as 
different was primarily the proprietorship of Keith Schellenberg. He arrived bringing 
three key components of change with him. Firstly he brought an invigorated approach 
to the new market in tourism, and secondly he brought the attention of the popular 
press. More importantly, however, he also brought the key agent of change, new in-
coming residents that were to catalyse the surviving community and profoundly clash 
with the established powers and rights of the presiding landowner. Little did he know 
it. but in his own unique fashion, Schellenberg laid the seeds for radical change and the 
over turning of centuries of centralised power on the island. His style of ownership and 
high profile nature also brought him face to face with the contemporary flowering of 
critique and challenge to the Highland structure of estate ownership. Rediscovering 
and calling upon a long history of opposition, academics and political activists in the 
1970's picked up the banner of land reform. A banner, that as Chapter 2 will examine, 
was coloured by ideological perspectives, and over the course of the 1980's and 
1990's, increasingly waved at estates like Eigg by the wider British public. 
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The Historiographical Outlines of Scottish Land Reform 
Chapter Two 
2.1 Introduction 
The laws, traditions, and practices governing land ownership are no small 
matter. Indeed, they are not only fundamental determinants of how and where we live, 
but as such, they effect how are our very economy, society, and environment are 
structured. Which is why, considering the present popularity and political will for 
reforming landownership, it is remarkable that the subject remains so poorly 
understood in Scotland. 
1 
Land reform is an immense undertaking, and yet present 
commentary and knowledge of the topic often remains blatantly ignorant of Scotland's 
precedents of reform and the social history that generated them. Due to the massive 
historical restructuring of landholding and landownership styles, the Highlands and 
Islands have notably been the traditional focus of controversy and agitation for reform, 
and because of the political responses to this, the region has become legislatively 
different from the rest of the country. The region has both unique fonns of 
landholding, as well as specialised bodies and practices for their governance. Having 
previously contextualised the Isle ofEigg in terms of landownership history, therefore, 
this chapter will repeat the exercise in terms of land reform history. This is undertaken 
with particular reference to the Highlands and Islands, and with the expressed intention 
of providing an ideological background to present day debates. 
The 181h and 19th century commercial assault on rural life and landholding in the 
Highlands and Islands certainly did not go unchallenged. Indeed, the 18th century saw 
two rebellions, precipitated by clan leaders who sought to overturn the impositions of 
the British State. After the clan chiefs had themselves been assimilated into the 
dominant commercial economy, it was their kinsfolk who continued the challenge with 
revolts against the waves of clearances that swept the region in the mid to late 19th 
century. Their need for more land and protection for existing holdings saw the 
continued agitation and calls for land reform begin to characterise the region. In 
answer to the civil unrest, and in trying to solve the Highlands and Islands problems of 
landholding and economic uncertainty, the British Government therefore undertook a 
series of land reform measures over the 40-year period from 1880-1920. These land 
1 Wightman. p.l 
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reform policies were firmly bound within three competing ideological perspectives, 
which were to evolve over the course of the 201h century. 
Tracing out these three basic ideological strands of land reform is the central 
focus for this Chapter. All three were established during the forty year period between 
1880 to 1920, and all three have led to specific attempts at resolving the varied 
regional problems of the Highlands and Islands. Beginning with the impetus of civil 
unrest, land raids, and calls for social justice, what I have termed the social reformers 
were the first to espouse radical ideas of tenure reform in Scotland. Their demands for 
the redistribution of land to the Highland's impoverished communities were met with 
more moderate approaches from liberal and conservative traditions. Though the 
combination of liberal and conservative policies of reform eased the social unrest in the 
Highlands and Islands, economic and social problems typified the region for most of 
this century. The continued decline, coupled with a rising awareness of the countryside 
in general continued interest in the Highlands as a region for specific concern. This was 
invigorated by the post war demands for the establishment of National Parks, as well 
as government attempts at the amalgamation of small holdings. Concern for the 
Highland's social and environmental heritage was also greatly intensified by a form of 
Scottish cultural revival in the 1970's, which together with a dramatic rise in 
environmental awareness, succeeded in rejuvenating the debates of the 1880's. 
2.2 1880 - 1920: Three Stands of Reform 
Throughout Europe and the rest of the world, land reform has always been 
associated with agrarian unrest, revolution, and the shaping of political systems. Ideas 
of equality and birthright in land were generated by the Enlightenment figures such as 
Rousseau, Locke, and the Scottish economist Adam Smith. In countries such as 
France, Russia, Spain, and closer to home Ireland, these notions of land and land 
reform have historically shaped the political map. In Scotland however, there was no 
such revolution and though the agrarian unrest represented by the 19th century 
"Crofters War" considerably echoed what was happening in the rest of the world, there 
was no overturning of the political system. The only significant gain that arose from 
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the populist campaigns between 1880 and 1920 was the 1886 Crofters Act and the 
subsequent parliamentary concessions and adjustments of 1887, 1906, 1911, and 1919. 
Though in many ways a form of compromise, the 1886 Crofters Act did represent a 
significant victory for the crofting communities of the Highlands and Islands. Indeed 
the political movement had claim to being the first mass party in Britain, since the 
populist campaign had channeled itself directly into parliamentary representation and 
reform.
2 
For these impoverished and marginalised communities, who by the 1880's had 
already succumbed to several bouts of famine, clearance, and eviction this achievement 
was nothing short of remarkable. It required not only an immense degree of 
organisation over a wide and often inaccessible terrain, but more importantly 
necessitated a psychological turn around in attitude and behaviour. This was 
facilitated and assisted by an intellectual vanguard of activists who traveled the region, 
visiting communities and preaching what became known as the "gospel of land 
reform". 
3 
Predicating their demands for reform very much upon the social needs of the 
Highland communities, and the traditional nature of land holding in the region, these 
campaigners developed a vigorous critique and campaign against the contemporary 
patterns of land ownership and land use. 
The most notable of the early land reformers was John Murdoch, a radical 
campaigner for reform who sought the emancipation of the Highland communities 
from what he termed ''the rapacious activities oflandlords".4 Campaigning through 
personal visits, lay preaching, and the publishing of a dedicated regional newspaper 
The Highlander he attacked the system of proprietorship that had cleared ''whole 
townships and parishes from the glens for sheep and deer, and forced the population to 
dismal rocks and barren bogs". Emphasising how the kelp boom ofthe 19th century 
had simply "afforded the landlords a grounds for extracting more than the land was 
capable of yielding", he blamed the pattern of land ownership for the wide social 
disasters induced by potato dependence, unfair wages, and extortionate rents. 
"Landlords had begun by exploiting the Highlanders", he declared in 1852, " ... and 
2 Hunter. The Making. p.l54 
3 Morgan, Daniel. Land Refonn in the Highlands: The Political Roots of Green Consciousness, M Se. 
Dissertation unpublished, University of Edinburgh. 1993. pp. 13-28 
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now they had embarked on their destruction. First apply them to a degrading and · 
ruinous system; and then make their degradation and ruin an excuse for their 
extermination. This is the true statement of the case", he asserted, "Knock the poor 
man down and then kick him for falling". 5 
Strong stuff to be sure, but Murdoch's critique was far from the simple case of 
'laird-bashing'. Closely supportive of the Highland communities, he not only had a 
firm understanding of their experience and their desperate need for more land, but also 
a strong ethical motivation determined by Gaelic cultural beliefs in land holding. Like 
the communities he supported, his view of land ownership was based upon the strong 
social and religious beliefs of Gaelic society that there could be no "absolute property". 
In one of his many attacks upon landlords in The Highlander , Murdoch asserted the 
widely held notion that land was "not the creation of man" and should not be treated in 
the same way as "houses or furniture or ships or manufactures". Land was held to be a 
trust, and appealing to Gaelic tradition he emphasised that there "was found to be a 
distinct recognition of the fact that land in the Highlands communally belonged to the 
clan as such and not to the chiefs". A chieftain was "head of the clan or family, but not 
the owner ofthe great tract of land the clan occupied". Consequently, "the landlord 
class in the Highlands have been but the usurpers of the right which the people once 
possessed in the soil."6 The Gaelic tradition was also infused with profound 
theological convictions towards land, and in 1883 Murdoch published a pamphlet 
entitled "The Land Question Answered from the Bible" in which he compiled all the 
Biblical precedents into one damning polemic against landowners. The degree to 
which theological and Gaelic perspectives of landholding underpinned these radical 
calls for reform, were as Hunter points out very much recognised in the formation of 
the Highland Land League Reform Association (HLLRA). The membership card for 
the new organisation dedicated to reform carried two quotations: "The profit of the 
4 Murdoch, John. Argyleshire Herald, March, 1852; Hunter, J. ed. For the People's Cause: From the 
Writings of John Murdoch, HMSO, Edinburgh. 1986. p.20; see also, Hunter. The Making. pp.l29-
130 
s ibid. 
6 Murdoch. Argyleshire Herald, July 1852; Highlander, Mar 4th, 1876; For the People's Cause. p.21 
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earth is for all" (Eccl.5 :9), followed by the Gaelic motto "Is treise tuath na tighearna" 
(a tenantry is mightier than a lord). 7 
The HLLRA, later to be known as the Highland Land League, was founded by 
several Scottish Liberal MP' s and Gaelic academics with the intention of organising 
the mounting civil unrest in the 1880's Highlands and Islands into a coordinated 
movement. This they did with the help of radicals like Murdoch and Alexander 
MacKenzie by channeling unrest into depositions to the Napier Commission, a body of 
inquiry set up on the urging of Liberal MPs by Gladstone. After hearing thousands of 
crofters give testimony, the Commission eventually put forward a report that led to the 
Crofters Act, and together with the coordinated election of four crofting MPs the 
movement reached its peak with the 1886 Act being passed. Very much modeled on 
the Irish Land League, the HLLRA demanded "fair rents, durability of tenure, and 
compensation for improvements", and going a step further than their counterparts they 
also called for "such an apportionment of the land as to promote the welfare of the 
people throughout the Highlands".8 Whilst the Crofters Act did much for security of 
tenure, it did not however grant the reformers their request for more land. 
Consequently, though the HLLRA boasted over 5000 paid up members in 1884, and 
held large conferences in 1885 and 1886, it dissipated into factions when the 1886 Act 
did not grant room for new crofts. Urged on by the success of tying home rule to land 
redistribution in Ireland, Murdoch and other radicals pushed for home rule in Scotland 
to be the next objective. This caused the division of the organisation, and the 1886 
conference saw Fraser Macintosh lead a split of the liberal faction from the group.9 
Although one cannot take John Murdoch as entirely representative of the wider 
crofting movement, he was present at almost every key event and was very much part 
of the coordinated effort to establish land reform in the Highlands. He is certainly 
indicative of the radical style of socially inspired land reform that sought immense 
changes in the pattern and style of land ownership. Heavily influenced by the radical 
American economist Henry George the social reformers looked at plans for land 
7 Hunter. For the People's Cause. p.48 
8 Cameron, Ewen. Land For The People ? : The British Goverment and the Scottish Highlands, c. 
1880-1925, Tuckwell Press, East Lothian. 1996. p.83; Hunter. The Making. p.l43 
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nationalisation, and the more academic towards George's ideas ofLand Value 
Taxation. Hosted by the Glasgow based Land Restoration League, George gave a very 
popular lecture tour in 1884. This had effect not only upon the land reform movement, 
but also provided significant inspirations for the formation of Keir Hardie's Scottish 
Labour Party. Indeed, at the inaugural meeting of the party in 1888, it was John 
Murdoch who chaired the affair, and the second item on their resulting manifesto was 
the nationalisation and redistribution of land. 10 As the socialists began to turn to more 
urban agendas, however, these ideas of land nationalisation were to slowly fade into 
the background. Nevertheless, the legacy of the socially inspired radical land 
reformers proved to be very resilient, and their focus on the impact of land ownership 
upon social cohesion, stability, and cultural independence was to be picked up by later 
generations. 
The Liberals produced the first alternative to these radical land reforms 
advocated by Murdoch and the late 191h Century crofters movement, and indeed by 
their eventual treatment of the issue in a purely regional form defined the crofting 
counties by their legislation. Both the 1881 Irish Land Bill and 1886 Crofters Act were 
products of the Liberal ideological solution to land reform. An agenda commonly 
known as dual ownership, it was defined by increasing the rights of tenants and the 
securing of their position in relation to landowners. Involving not only the allocation of 
security of tenure and the fair adjudication of rents, the Liberal policies also recognised 
the tenants ownership of buildings and improvements; hence the term dual 
ownership. 11 This certainly did not go near the radical calls for redistribution that the 
social land reformers had in mind, and was much more a form of parliamentary inspired 
concession than any sense of overhaul. But in comparison to prevailing attitudes 
among the land owning classes, the Liberal propositions of reform entailed in the 1886 
Act were still taken to be radical for the time. Their acknowledgement of the region as 
needing special attention was notably attacked, and it was only because of the impetus 
9 ibid. p.77 
10 Stewart, W.J. Keir Hardy. Eyre & Spottiswood, London. 1921. pp.37-55. For further discussions of 
the significance of the HLLRA and the Labour party; Crowely, D.H. "The Crofter's Party 1885-1892", 
Scottish Historical Review, xxxv, 1956. p.281; Kellas, J.G. "Highland Migration to Glasgow and the 
Origins of the Scottish Labour Movement", Society for the Study ofLabour History Bulletin, xii, 
1966. pp.9-ll. 
11 Cameron. p.l93 
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of agitation and campaigners like Murdoch that it was eventually accepted. Once 
acknowledged, however, the precedent was set, and the Liberals greatest legacy in 
terms of land reform and the wider aspects of rural development was the realisation of 
the Highlands and Islands as legislatively different from the rest ofScotland. 12 
The ideological thrust of Liberal proposals and legislation obviously had 
distinct social motivations as well. Very much concerned with the plight of highland 
communities in desperate conditions, their 1886 Act was an attempt to once and for 
all, end congestion and rationalise land holding patterns in a more egalitarian manner. 13 
The emphasis upon tenants rights and legal control of the worst excesses of 
landowners was expanded to cover the whole of Scotland in the 1911 Small 
Landholders Act. All tenant farmers were handed out rights of security of tenure and 
compensation for improvements. This was part of an over-arching plan to remodel 
rural life throughout Britain, and in many ways the Highlands and Islands provided a 
significant point of departure for the wider application of these policies. Dual 
ownership was certainly taken as the universal panacea for the "Highland Problem", 
and consequently had many merits to be considered in its expansion to the lowlands 
and beyond. 14 The 1911 Act proved very contentious, however, and like the 1886 Act 
was particularly unpopular with the conservative landowning aristocracy who were not 
comfortable with more rights being given to yet more small holders. The Scottish 
Landowners Federation (SLF) was set up in 1906 precisely to lobby against the 
promotion of the Small Landholders Bill, and considering that some of the landowners 
represented were also in the Liberal Party itself, the thrust of dual ownership was to 
reach a peak in 1911 from which it was never to return. 15 In terms of quelling the calls 
for radical reform, however, and at least in diffusing the organised aspects of civil 
unrest that typified the period between 1880 and 1920 the Liberal land reforms were 
relatively successful. Sporadic unrest in the shape of land raids continued to occur, still 
motivated by congestion and the demand for more small holdings, but nonetheless 
crofters themselves began to feel more inclined towards the provisions and securities 
of the Crofters Act than in radical overhauls of the entire landowning system. By the 
12 ibid. p.204 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. p.l45 
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turn of the century, the social land reformers had essentially been defeated, and the 
next seventy years saw the establishment of a more moderate approach to land 
reform. 16 
The Liberals did not produce the only moderate approach to land reform, since 
the Conservative Party too had its own ideological solution to the region's problems. 
Civil unrest and radical demands were to be met with an extension of the principle of 
peasant proprietorship; an approach and policy that naturally did not question private 
ownership per se, but that sought to simply extend private ownership to more people. 
Again typified by minor concession rather than radical reform, this model was very 
much the only option the landowning classes within the Conservative Party could 
tolerate by way of reform. 17 This consisted essentially of establishing crofters and land-
less farmers not as tenants but as owner-occupiers. Landowners much preferred to see 
land set aside for the peasant proprietor, than to see further restrictions pla(;ed upon 
their estate management and activities with resident cottars and crofters. Notable 
interest in the rural affairs of Germany and Switzerland gave successful examples of 
how the promotion of small-scale owner occupation had developed a healthy and 
robust agricultural economy. 18 This was naturally backed up by the ideas of the 
enchantment of ownership; as one commentator noted "The magic of property turns 
sand to gold .... Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock and he will turn it 
into a garden". 19 There was also the ideological pull towards establishing a bourgeois 
class of owner-occupiers. As the Duke of Argyll aptly put it in 1895: "A measure 
which could provide facilities for the purchase of estates at low prices to be broken up 
might create a very desirable conservative middle class of proprietors". 20 The body 
that the Conservative administration in 1897 created to do this was the Congested 
Districts Board (CDB). 
IS ibid. p.161 
16 ibid. p.l99 
17 ibid. p.194 
18 Collings, Jesse. Land Reform: Occupying Ownership. Peasant Propriety and Rural Education. 
Longmans, London. 1908. p.263 
19 Young, Arthur. Cited in Collings. p.2 
20 Oban Times, 26th June, 1897. Cameron. p.83 
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The conservative approach was also very much connected to the technocratic 
solutions of development and investment in infrastructure. Another reason for the 
disintegration of the radical crofter's demands at the turn of the century was the 
success of the road building programs and construction of new communication 
services instigated by the Conservative government of 1897. The comparatively large 
capital investment in the region gave many communities hope in economic terms as the 
State began to employ labour around the region in their infrastructural projects. The 
CDB on the other, hampered by lack of finance and legal power, had only marginal 
success in persuading crofters to become owners. Not only were there limited funds to 
procure the estates in the first place, but the CDB was also unable to assist crofters in 
the purchasing of stock. Consequently, considering that most of the crofters had little 
if any capital, and that they preferred the securities of tenure to the exposures of 
ownership, the policy of furthering owner-occupation was doomed to have little 
effect. 21 As a single solution, the policy was abandoned in 1908, not to be revived for 
another sixty years. 
By the end of the 1st World War, however, the battle between the two 
moderate approaches to land reform had merged into a cross party consensus of policy 
manifested in the 1919 Land Settlement Act. The promises of land for returning ex-
servicemen, together with the guidance of a Lloyd George coalition government, 
formed an initiative that essentially combined both aspects of the conservative and 
liberal strategies. Part I of the act gave increased powers and finances for land 
purchases, and the breaking up of estates. Part II gave greater powers for the 
compulsory establishment of small holdings on privately owned estates. The new 
aspect in the reform package to allow the fusion to take place was the acceptance of 
the state as an owner and proprietor of any new crofting lands.22 This appeased 
conservatives by removing the danger of any further concessions being granted to 
existing tenants, as well as providing a greater scope for the liberal factions to continue 
the establishment of small holding tenants. This the Land Settlement Act did with the 
creation of over fifteen hundred new small holdings and the extension of over a 
21 Cameron. p. 1 93 
22 ibid. p. I 94 
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thousand existing holdings. 
23 
It also set the foundations for the state becoming the 
largest private landowner in Scotland, resulting in the present administration of over 
two million acres in crofts and assorted other holdings.24 Forestry was also 
incorporated into the state ownership structure in the same year, with the 
establishment of the Forestry Commission. This was partially due to anxieties over 
timber supplies, but also as a technocratic solution to problems of employment and 
economy. The 1919 Act therefore finally ended an era of wide-spread unrest and 
demands for land from the crofting communities. Together with years of emigration to 
the urban centers in the lowlands, and abroad, the First World War also had traumatic 
impacts upon the population structures ofHighland communities. Consequently, the 
popular civil protest that had encouraged reform dwindled, and those lucky enough to 
be granted securities of tenure stuck to the concessions that had gained. 
2.3 1920- 1970: Regional Problems 
The land reform precedents that had culminated in the 1919 Act did little to 
encourage the region economically, and indeed by establishing so many crofting small 
holders left the area highly susceptible to the economic problems of the 1930's. A 
seemingly catastrophic decline of the region's economy was precipitated by 
downswings in sheep farming; the evaporation of herring markets in Eastern Europe; 
general industrial depression; as well as the decline in fish gutting, all of which 
knocked the bottom out of the migrant labour market where young highlanders had 
traditionally found employment.25 Rather than civil unrest, therefore, it was 
depression, depopulation, and agricultural stagnation that were to characterise the 
Highlands and Islands for the next 50 years. Not at all liked by the civil servants who 
had to administer the system, crofting was seen by many over this period to generate 
more problems than it solved.26 Especially if it was viewed as purely an agricultural 
enterprise, which was typical of most of the boards of inquiry that examined the 
region's problems from the 1930's onwards. The call for land reform was consequently 
23 ibid. p.l88 
24 Wightman. p. 157 
25 Smout, T.C. pp.250-251; Leneman, Leah. Fit For Heroes ? Land Settlement in Scotland After 
World War I. Aberdeen. 1989. 
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more pervasive during this period from bodies like the Hilleary Committee ( 193 8), the 
Advisory Panel on the Highlands and Islands (1946), the Taylor Commission (1954), 
and the Crofters Commission ( 1955). All faced with tenancies that were too small to 
be agriculturally viable in their own right, the rationalisation and amalgamation of 
crofts seemed the only viable solution. Whilst the establishment of the hydro-
electricity, excavation of minerals, and the expansion of coniferous afforestation had all 
been initiated as palliatives to the region's problems, the need to address agricultural 
modernisation was all persuasive. 
Crofting was a system totally at odds with the prevailing inter and post war 
mentalities of highly productive intensive farming. Anxieties over self-sufficiency in 
food supplies generated distinct political interests and state intervention in agricultural 
policy for the most part of the mid to late Twentieth Century.27 In relation to the 
Highlands and Islands, the desire for increased yields and economic returns from the 
region's agricultural sector continued to be faced with uneconomical forms of tenancy 
and land holding. The Crofters Commission (CC) eventually took the lead in the late 
1950's by coming out against the continuance of part-time farms and economically 
nonviable farming units. Seeking a stern and ruthless reexamination of the 
amalgamation of small holdings, the CC proposed a series of measures to drastically 
rationalise land holding into agriculturally profitable units. Faced with the basic 
abolition of crofting itself, the crofting community organised itself into action once 
more and constituted the Federation of Crofters Unions (FCU) in 1962.28 Far from the 
radical demands for redistribution of land prevalent in the 1880's, however, the 
crofters' campaign this time stuck to the issues of tenure on existing crofts. The 
campaign against the CC's proposals, mounted by various crofting MP's and the FCU, 
vociferously argued for the protection of the rights of tenure enshrined in the Crofters 
Act. This they succeeded in achieving in the following year when the CC was refused 
the extra powers of compulsion needed to implement the reforms. 29 Due to failures of 
economic development, however, the momentum for land tenure change was still being 
26 Hunter. Making ofthe Crofting Community. p.l6 
27 MacKay, Donald. Scotland's Rural Land Use Agencies. Scottish Cultural Press, Aberdeen. 1995. 
p.S 
28 Hunter. The Claim of Crofting. Mainstream, Edinburgh. pp. 99-115 
29 ibid. pp.l43-148 
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generated by administrations desperate for a turn around in the regions financial 
fortunes. The formation of the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB) in 
1965 was a long awaited result of the perceived need to tackle both development and 
tenurial reform together. Unfortunately, too preoccupied with the promotion of 
capital-intensive agriculture and growth point theories of industrial development, the 
HIDB had great difficulties in creating economic prosperity and was severely 
hampered in terms of land reform. Consultation papers were drafted and proposals 
accepted, but hamstrung and unsupported the HIDB's efforts were to amount to 
nothing.30 The next legislative attempt at reform was the Crofting Reform Act of 1976 
that sought to pass on the benefits of land development to crofting communities. This 
was to be achieved through the resurrected conservative policies of peasant 
proprietorship, by allowing crofters to purchase their crofts for 15 times the annual 
rent. Filled with various loopholes and contradictions, the policy failed to inspire 
enthusiasm amongst the crofting community. The years from 1920 to the mid 1970's 
therefore did not show any significant improvements to the Highland characteristics of 
unemployment, depopulation, and general decline. Although Highland communities 
were obviously in better material condition than their predecessors a century before, 
the region was still designated very much a problem area. In terms of the debates over 
land reform, if anything there had become a hardened intransigence between the 
crofters who refused to give up their rights of security, and an establishment that was 
predicated upon the progression of modernised agriculture. 31 
Perhaps the most significant development in this era was not generated by 
economic criteria, however, but by a slow and gradual appreciation of the area's 
'wilderness' value. Obviously, appreciation of the Highlands for scenic and wildlife 
value dates back in both Gaelic and English literature. Although Gaelic poetry and 
song predates all of the English literature on the subject, it was the Victorian era that 
brought the aesthetic appreciation of both the region and nature in general into popular 
British culture. 32 Interestingly though, unlike other countries such as the United States, 
30 ibid. 
31 Cameron. pp.202-204; 
32 Smout, T.C. pp.243-247 
81 
Chapter Two 
the interest in countryside matters in Britain emerged in two distinct channels. 33 Firstly, 
the turn of the century saw the establishment of various organisations aimed at 
fostering this awareness of nature through the protection and study of endangered flora 
and fauna. The year 1891 for example, saw the "baby of a few nineteenth century 
women", the Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) being formed. 34 Focussed 
upon protection of specific species and particular aspects of the countryside's wildlife, 
the RSPB was certainly a more popular form of the many small scientifically based 
societies that grew out of 19th century amateur interests in botany, biology, and 
zoology. These organisations were typically of upper class orientation and support, 
and tended towards specific interests in individual plants and animals, and furthering 
their particular knowledge and protection. By the 1930's, however, the second channel 
of interest in rural areas was developing, and spawned by alternative middle class 
suburban aspirations of escaping industrial life, it had much more encompassing 
concerns. 35 
Desire for greater rights of entry to rural areas had already been represented in 
1843 by the establishment of the Scottish Rights of Way Society, and in 1884 had led 
James Bryce MP to propose (a total of twelve times) free access to all uncultivated hill 
ground with his Access to the Mountains Bill (Scotland). 36 These concerns for access 
were much more broad based than the narrow interests of the small nature societies, 
and with the assertion that the countryside belonged to everyone, the 1920's and 
1930's marked a significant change in popular attitude towards rural areas.37 The 
Youth Hostels Association began in 1930. Likewise the Ramblers Association was 
formed in 1935, and spurred on by the successes ofNational Parks in the United States 
they both began a determined campaign for the establishment of similar designations in 
Britain. Urged on by the post-war reconstruction era, the two channels of interest in 
the countryside also came together into a coordinated movement for the creation of 
33 MacKay. pp.90-92; Evans.pp.l-11. 
34 Darling, Frank Fraser. Wilderness and Plenty: The Reith Lectures 1969, Balentine, London, 1971. 
Cited in, Evans, David. A History of Conservation in Britain, Routledge, London. 1992. p.44 
35 MacKay. p.l43 
36 Evans. p.41 





In England and Wales the campaign succeeded in establishing 10 
National Parks, and together with the rising awareness ofthe importance of rural land 
as a resource in its own right, the post war era generated the three pillars of British 
rural policy (with their Scottish equivalents): The Agriculture Act 1947, The Town 
and Country Planning Act 1947, and The National Parks and Access to the 
Countryside Act 1949. 
Due to landowner influence, and the lack of a sizable supporting lobby for 
amenity and access, National Parks were rejected in Scotland. Partially this was due to 
the lack of any significant access problems at the time, but also because of the shear 
expanse of Scotland's rural areas there was less of a perception of threat to the general 
environment and landscape.39 The National Park campaigns, and mass trespasses such 
as the infamous one on Kinder Scout in the Peak district, were certainly focussed on 
areas south of the border. This was also reflected in the predominating English 
memberships of the voluntary organisations for both countryside recreation and 
scientific nature studies. 4° Correspondingly, though by 1948 the rest of Britain was to 
have a National Parks Commission to guard against damaging development, it was not 
until 1967 that an official countryside watchdog was created in the shape of the 
Countryside Commission for Scotland (CCS). Until then, only a handful of voluntary 
bodies with relatively small membership did anything to either champion the cause of 
conservation in Scotland, or directly protect land of particular concem.41 The National 
Trust for Scotland established 1931 was such an example, and through the generosity 
of Percy Unna, a mountaineer and president of the Scottish Mountaineering Club, it 
acquired Glencoe, Kintail, Morvich and Ben Lawers during the 1940's and 1950's.42 
Although significant in themselves, however, these were only small acquisitions, and 
the interest generated by the aesthetic and scientific appreciation of the Highlands and 
38 Accounts of the National Park Movement are widely discussed in, Cherry, G.E. Environmental 
Planning 1939-1969: Vol. 11 National Parks and Recreation in the Countryside. HMSO, London. 
1975; Smout, T.C. "The Highlands and the Roots of Green Consciousness 1750-1990". Proceedings 
ofthe British Academy, 76, 1990. PP. 237-263; Sheail, J. Nature Reserves, National Parks and Post-
War Reconstruction in Britain". Environmental Conservation, ll No I, 1984. pp.29-34. 
39 MacKay. p.l44; further detailed in, Blunden, J and Curry, N. eds. A People's Charter?: Forty 
Years ofthe National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949. HMSO, London. 1990. 
40 Smout, T.C. p.45 
41 Evans. p.l20 
42 Wightman. p.l82 
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Islands was characteristically fragmented and parochial for most of the post-war 
period. It was not until later developments in scientific understanding of the region that 
conservationist and recreational bodies were to have a pivotal role in the Scottish land 
debate. It was another change in the perception of the Highlands, however, that was 
soon to alter the situation and dramatically revise the debates over crofting, 
development, and land tenure. 
2.4 1970-1980: Cultural Revival and Environmental Concerns 
The 1970's were certainly a watershed for many things in Scotland, and 
especially for the perception of the Highlands and the resident crofting communities. 
Although the 1976 Act perhaps threatened the crofting tradition in many ways, other 
activities proved to inspire a new generation to take on the radical ideas of Murdoch 
and the socially inspired land reformers. This time the impetus for debate drew upon a 
form of cultural renewal inspired by revisionist histories of the "Crofters War" together 
with a rising awareness of contemporary ownership in the Highlands. Picking up the 
historiographically marginalised crofter, a group of academics led by James Hunter 
began to revise the understudied area of social history in the Highlands and Islands. 
Contrary to the established views of the crofting communities as backward and 
insignificant, the radical traditions of the 19th Century land reform movement were 
highlighted, as were the Gaelic cultural connections with the land. In particular, by 
examining the affiliations of the Irish land reform movement to highland history a 
renewed picture of communities in radical opposition to clearance was produced. 
Above all, the academic revisionists emphasised that these communities had a cultural 
and ethical right to exist, even in the face of a contradicting anglophile establishment. 43 
This picture was also combined with a modem understanding of land 
ownership highlighted by the increasing foreign acquisitions of highland estates. John 
McEwen's Who Owns Scotland provided the concrete information of exactly how the 
Highlands and Islands were owned and controlled, and press attention to the issue of 
land reform was significantly raised on its publication in 1977. A contemporary 
milestone in the land debate in Scotland, McEwen's work was the first of its kind since 
43 Hunter. The Making. p.206 
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Tom Johnson's studies to examine the precise pattern of land ownership in Scotland. It 
gained particular attention especially because coupled with his revealing statistics was 
reaffirmation of the arguments for land nationalisation. Since the dominating political 
ideology ofthe Labour Party was also supportive of nationalisation in general, the land 
reform debate was coming full circle and retracing the radical traditions of the previous 
century. Indeed the HIDB was actively, if not successfully, trying to acquire estates 
such as Eigg for models of development during this period, and in the same year as 
McEwen published his book the Northfield Committee was also set up to investigate 
agricultural land purchase and re-population. 
The 1970's mood of Scottish cultural resurgence and interest in the land debate 
was perhaps best represented by the 7:84 Theater Company and its performances of 
John McGrath's play, The Cheviot, the Stag and the Black Black Oil. The name of the 
company was taken from McEwen's notable statistic of0.07% of the population 
owning 84% of the land, and the play not only made much of the modem crofting 
community's debt to previous generations of activists, but accentuated the need to 
continue their battle anew. The emphasis upon the oil highlighted another facet of the 
1970's revival in the shape of the Scottish National Party (SNP). The newfound wealth 
provided an impetus for Scottish nationalists to again find hope in the possibilities of 
home rule. By 1978, 13 of the Scottish parliamentary seats were in the hands of the 
SNP, and with the promise of a Scottish Parliament looming in 1979 the potential for 
radical reform was strong. This was also reflected in the breakaway faction of the 
Labour Party in Scotland, the Scottish Labour Party (1975-1979), who not only called 
for home rule, but also broke new ground in the land debate by rejecting the traditional 
socialist appeals for outright nationalisation. Opting for more liberal ideas of reform, 
they advocated the establishment of a Land Use Commission to oversee the 
development of a more pluralist approach to land ownership together with enhanced 
roles for public and community ownership.44 Although McEwen and many others were 
strongly advocating nationalisation, by the end of the 1970's these less statist 
approaches of devolved ownership and more responsible public ownership were 
44 "A Question ofPolitics ... ",Landowning in Scotland, Issue No.247, Autumn 1996. pp.l3-15.pl4 
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favoured by radical opinion.
45 
Nonetheless, the combination of academic examination, 
together with a rising public awareness of land ownership, and the legislative 
enthusiasm for constitutional restructuring instigated another peak in the notoriety of 
land reform. Murdoch's calls for the substantial overhauling of land ownership had 
been updated and modernised, and the abolition of Feudal land law practice was 
forcefully argued. Even the nationalist appeals for some form of self-governance were 
being accommodated. The restructuring of established land ownership patterns 
therefore became a subject of great interest, and just as land owners in general began 
to feel more than a little uncomfortable, the debate began to incorporate a widening 
criticism of not only land ownership, but land use as well. 
The cultural renaissance in Scotland was paralleled by another significant 
change in modem perception of the Highlands during the 1970's. Rising global 
awareness of environmental issues during the decade began to focus popular attention 
upon the Highlands for their natural and scenic heritage. Instead of issues of amenity 
and access, however, it was the scientific strand of environmental awareness that began 
to cause concern. In Scotland, the scientific studies of nature had always had a 
distinctive approach even from their origins in the 19th Century. Founding fathers such 
Patrick Geddes, D' Arcy Thompson, and J.A. Harvie Brown ensured that nature 
studies were underpinned by a realisation of the complete cycle of ecology- making 
particular note of the role of human impact on natural environrnents.46 The study of 
ecology had consequently strong and powerful traditions in Scotland, and this was 
made particularly evident in the 1970's by the popularisation of work by Frank Fraser 
Darling. The attention upon the precarious nature of upland ecology in general had 
been recognised long before I 970, when the Department of Agriculture for Scotland 
had commissioned Darling's West Highland Survey. A pivotal work in the study of the 
human ecology of the area, it brushed aside the picture postcard images of the 
Highlands as a rugged wilderness and painted a devastating picture of the region's 
immense environmental damage: 
45 Wightman. pp.193-194 
46 Smout. pp.246-248 
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The Highlands as a geologic and geographic region are unable to 
withstand deforestation and maintain productiveness and fertility. Their 
history has been one of steadily accelerating deforestation until the great 
mass of the forest was gone, and thereafter of forms of land usage which 
prevented regeneration of tree growth and reduced the land to the crude 
values and expressions of its solid geological composition. In short the 
Highlands are a devastated countryside and that is the plain, primary 
reason why there are now few people and why there is a constant 
economic problem. Devastation has not quite reached its uttermost 
lengths, but it is quite certain that present trends in land use and 
ownership will lead to it, and then the country will be rather less 
productive than Baffin Land.47 
Written in 1955, the Department of Agriculture did not publish the work for several 
years, and it was not until the late 1960's and 1970's that studies such as Darling's 
began to ring alarm bells. 48 Increasingly attention became focussed on the over-
stocking of deer forests, the management of shooting estates and the abuse of what 
little protective legislation there was. In 1969 Darling gave the Reith Lectw·e, and 
together with other publications was instrumental in popularising a view of the 
Highland's natural heritage as being very much under threat.49 
The awareness generated by ecologists studying the region propelled some 
action within the government to alleviate matters. The creation ofthe CCS in 1967 
was the first attempt to specifically address the issues of environmental degradation 
and access to the countryside in Scotland. This, in conjunction with the nationally 
focussed NCC, provided planning powers and designations for the protection of areas 
under threat. Combined with the failures of encouraging economic development in the 
Highlands, the perceived environmental decline clearly underlined the fact that basic 
questions of sustainability of the land economy and ecology had to be addressed. This 
was done through the 1971-72 House of Commons Select Committee on Land 
Resource Use, in which most of the leading ecologists (including Darling), land 
economists, and upland specialists were asked to report. Viewing rural areas more as 
resources for productive use, rather than having intrinsic value in their own right, 
however the Committee refused to endorse the idea of any form of crisis in upland and 
47 Darling, Frank Fraser. West Highland Survey p.I92 
48 MacKay. p.I92 
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Highland ecology. 5° Consequently, though they proposed several recommendations for 
targeted grant aid and the development of multiple land use management, it was left up 
to voluntary bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGO's) to fill the gap in the 
demand for action. Enthused by the formation and activities of the new 
conservationists like Greenpeace (1971) and Friends of the Earth (1969, FoE Scotland 
1979), the established groups such as RSPB and the NT /NTS experienced enormous 
growth. During the 1970's the RSPB gained over 300,000 new members, and with the 
corresponding increase in funds doubled its ownership of reserves. 51 This pattern of 
growth was also experienced in other newly formed organisations like The Woodland 
Trust (1971), and by the 1980's the development of ''Not For Profit Ownership" 
became an established factor in the Highland land market. With media interest trebling 
over the period, and the slow accumulation of scientific studies revealing a very much 
damaged environment, by the turn of the decade the Highlands and Islands were 
popularised as an area whose natural heritage was increasingly under threat. 52 
Combined with the social and political initiatives of land reform in Scotland, the 
problems with land use and environmental damage maintained a highly critical lobby 
against established patterns of land ownership and use. As the decade turned, however, 
and the Conservatives won the 1979 election, a new and very different political climate 
came to influence the land debate; one in which the State was to have a greatly 
reduced role to play. 
2.5 1980-1992 : Conservation Values and Regional Growth 
Considering that the growth of public awareness in the environment, which 
began in the 1970's, was to flower in the 1980's and 1990's, it is no surprise that in 
Britain the 'conservative' side of conservation was accentuated. The Conservative 
ideological agenda has historically never liked the idea of compulsion being applied to 
land use issues. The individual's rights over private property are held as almost 
sacrosanct, with the opposition to the 1886 Crofter's Act being a prime example ofthe 
49 Darling, Frank Fraser. "The Ecology of Land Use", in: Thomson, D.S. and Grimble, I. eds. The 
Future ofthe Highlands. Rouledge and Kegan Paul, London. 1968. pp.29-55; MacKay. p.l92 
50 MacKay. p, 193 
51 Evans. p.l36 
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desire to maintain land use decisions on a landowners level. The growth of 
environmental awareness, however, necessitated a distinct degree of attention, which 
together with rising demands on rural areas in general, emphasised the public 
expectations of action being taken. Tourism was now rapidly expanding as an industry, 
and the growing surpluses of the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) by the early 1980's also provided another source of momentum for change in 
rural policy; this time the goals of intensification being replaced by aims of 
extensification. 53 
The 1981 Countryside Act (Scotland) recognised the problems involved with 
the changing requirements of agriculture and conservation, but firmly adhering to 
conservative ideology ensured that the mechanism for reforming land use patterns was 
set upon the voluntary rather than compulsory cooperation of land owners. The 
resulting voluntary principle provided a succession of grants and compensation 
packages to encourage landowners to manage areas under designation in 
environmentally friendly ways. The emphasis on stewardship, and acceptance of 
landowners as appropriate stewards, obviously provided landowning interests with a 
new self-confidence during the 1980's and early 1990's, especially after their fears of 
state intervention during the late 1970's. The SLF made much of the new role of 
stewardship in its promotion of Scottish landowners, and highlighting the general aims 
of sporting estate management emphasised the importance of conservation in 
protecting not only game, but wildlife as well. 54 
The enthronement of the voluntary principle was also related to a retraction of 
the State from as much direct involvement with land use issues as possible. In part this 
was typical of the general process of policy development from the post-war era 
onwards, with Governments of differing hues much preferring NDPB's and agencies to 
actual departmental control. A study of the three pivotal 1940's countryside acts 
provides a clear demonstration of how machinery outside government itself continued 
52 ibid. p.l26 
53 Mather, A.S., Thompson, K.J. "The Effects of Afforestation on Agriculture in Scotland", Journal of 
Rural Studies. Vol.ll, No.2. pp.l87-202 
54 MacKay. p.9 
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to be sought for the application and monitoring of land use policy. 55 Not only did 
Ministers tend to prefer agencies to take over work from their departments for reasons 
of efficiency, but also because of the contentious issues involved; agencies provided 
good mechanisms for diverting criticism and unwanted attention from Ministers 
themselves. 5
6 
The Conservative Government's approach, however, greatly intensified 
the process especially in the private non-governmental sector. Never liking the scale of 
State ownership of land, both the Thatcher and Major administrations looked at 
privatising the FC, and though no overall privatisation was agreed, the government 
began the sale of FC land from 1981 onwards. FC holdings were consequently 
reduced in size, with the Government in 1989 setting a target of 250,000 acres to be 
disposed of by the turn of the century. 57 Together with lucrative tax breaks and grant 
packages private forestry was also encouraged in general, and the success of these 
programs in encouraging private afforestation became one of the most significant 
features of the changing patterns of landownership in Scotland in the 1980's and 
1990's. 58 
With regards to matters of conservation, a similar emphasis upon the private 
non-governmental sector saw the voluntary sector increasing it's acreage of reserves 
by some 146% between 1980-1995.59 The encouragement ofNGO's and voluntary 
organisations in promoting the interests of conservation also witnessed the 
development of partnership agreements. Since they could not feasibly own all the 
threatened land of conservation value, groups such as the Scottish Wildlife Trust 
(SWf) became active in leasing reserves and entering into partnership agreements with 
land owners. By 1995, for instance the largest group, the RSPB not only owned 
87,491 acres, but leased 14,396 acres, and had management agreements over a further 
4393 acres.60 The escalation ofNGO's and voluntary organisations involved in 
conservation certainly increased the acreage of ground under conservation orientated 
55 ibid. p.5-9 
56 O'Riordan, T. "Institutions Affecting Environmental Policy'', Flowerdew, Red. Institutions and 
Geographical Patterns, Croom Helm, London. 1982. pp, 1 03-139; MacKay pp.5-9; Hood, C.C. 
"Government Bodies and Government Growth", Barker, A. ed. Quango's in Britain, Macmillan, 
Basingstoke. 1982. pp.44-68. 
57 Wightman. p.174 
58 ibid. 




management. Together with the many instances of small scale conservation measures 
encouraged by grants associated with the voluntary principle, this represented a 
distinct degree of success for Government policy. Conservation had risen in 
prominence, and due to the rising power of the voluntary sector, many groups like the 
RSPB, NTS, and SWT achieved notable representation in policy decisions. The 
Highland and Islands region also began to turn the corner in the decade, with tourism 
playing a large part in rejuvenating the economy. Rural enterprise schemes championed 
by the EC and belatedly by the SO also did much to contribute to non-agricultural 
employment, and together with the CAP's variable premiums for sheep production the 
region experienced both economic expansion and population growth; the first instances 
of regional resurgence for centuries. 61 
The increase in conservation ownership and representation, however, did not 
coincide with an overall improvement of the region's environment. The 1980's saw 
increased pressures placed upon the Highland's fragile upland ecology from an 18% 
increase in both sheep and deer numbers, 62 to an escalation of forestry initiatives and 
the promotion of tourism; all of which highlighted large problems with the 
Government's laissez fa ire approach to land use and ownership. The succession of 
agencies, NDPB's, and NGO's did represent a rise in awareness over countryside 
matters, yet the ad hoc development of these various boards and organisations 
revealed the lack of an overriding strategy of development. Combined with a uniquely 
British approach to the setting up of agencies, the lack of guiding strategy was also 
associated with severe problems of accountability and representation.63 If problems 
were evident in the NDPB's such as NCC and CCS, then the plethora of private 
individuals and investment firms that had entered the flourishing land market during the 
1980's produced even greater problems of accountability for land use decisions. The 
dramatic increase in foreign ownership, and particularly the off-shore investment 
companies, pension funds, and insurance companies created many problems with 
regards to local communities, environmental designations, and access. Forestry and 
sporting estates came in for special criticism due to the lack of any planning 
61 MacKay p.7 
62 MacGegor & Stockdale. p.302 
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restrictions on agricultural or afforestation projects. The Forest and Woodland Grant 
schemes had indeed promoted private conifer plantations, but often at the expense of 
local interests and ecological considerations. 64 
Similarly, whilst the SLF and various sporting estate owners prided themselves 
on benign stewardship of the land, the Highlands continued to be the scene ofraptor 
persecution and the decline of indigenous flora and fauna. Consequently, though the 
conservation organisations had ridden the wave of public concern and built up strong 
influence and property portfolios, the Government's adherence to the principles of the 
free market in land, and the rights of ownership, had fostered contradicting effects of 
land speculation, absentee ownership, and ecological damage. As the debates over 
Skiing development in the Cairngorms also demonstrated, the Government's agencies 
refused to take assertive decisions, and often problems were complicated by agencies 
with contradicting agendas and ideas. 65 The basic questions, therefore, of sustainable 
land use in the Highlands that had arisen in the 1970's had remained unanswered, and 
an almost complete vacuum had developed on the issue of an overview or guiding 
framework for natural resource management. 66 
By the end of the 1980's the contradictions in government policy had promoted 
strong critical debate and begun another slow rise in the attention to land ownership 
reform. The social reform tradition reexamined in the 1970's, found increasing 
problems at community level with the domination of external control over Highland 
resources and land use. Although crofting townships and local communities had 
received some input from local enterprise initiatives, they were still bound by complex 
feudal bonds and entanglements that ensured landowners had a large contro 1 over the 
direction of economic development. Feudal restrictions still maintained that trees 
planted on a croft were the property of the landlord not the tenant, and so crofters 
were unable to take advantage ofthe lucrative 1980's grants for forestry. Similarly, 
when a tenant sought to diversify their holding into aspects of tourism or local small 
63 Johnson, N. "Accountability, Control, and Compexity: Moving beyond Ministerial Responsibility", 
Barker~ A. ed. pp.206-208; MacKay. pp.7-9. 
64 Mather & Thompson. p.200 
65 MacKay. pp.8-9 
66 ibid. p.l93 
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scale manufacture, the landlord could expect a percentage of income, or a flat payment 
for the granting of permission. Considering that the motivations for owning a sporting 
estate are essentially recreational, traditional estate owners were therefore often 
criticised by communities for their use of feudal powers to restrain local development. 
The management styles of absentee owners also tended to become more 
authoritarian as well, especially as traditional resident factors were often replaced by 
land management companies based in Edinburgh, Glasgow, and London. 67 
Consequently, communities seemed to be increasing enclosed by outside interests and 
opinion, as a new management styles were combined with feudal privileges. The role 
of the conservation NGOs was hardly viewed as successful either, for they too were 
liable to increasing a managerial, or scientific, ethos that ignored both local issues and 
local knowledge. Since the NGO's were mostly based on middle class English 
aspirations of conservation, they were occasionally subjected to criticisms as harsh as 
foreign absentee owners. 68 The degree to which the landed aristocracy had infiltrated 
the conservation movement also gave great cause for concern, as the natural reserves 
that replaced sporting estates seemed to embody a similar disdain for local community 
concerns. The crofting communities continued to be left out of the key land use 
decisions that affected their lives the most, and as conservation appeared to overtake 
the prominence of agricultural production there seemed to be little difference in the 
manner to which they were treated. 
The combination of successive groups taking interest in the Highlands and 
Islands had given little benefits to resident communities, and the need for an effective 
lobby to support crofting communities in this new era had become as important as it 
had in the 1880's and 1960's. On the 1 oo•h aniversary year of the 1886 Crofter's Act, 
therefore, the Scottish Crofters Union was launched to promote the interests of 
crofters and rural communities in the region. Swiftly acknowledging the importance of 
local communities in managing a healthy environment, the first president of the SCU 
Frank Rennie (himself an environmental scientist), took great pains to show that the 
"great variety of wildlife in crofting areas was due in large part, to the small scale, low 
67 Evans. p. 78 
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input style of agriculture in which crofters had habitually engaged".69 Whilst the · 
desires of increased agricultural production and the policies of CAP had driven both 
people and wildlife from the countryside, the SCU emphasised that the crofting 
communities had managed to maintain a high level of both. Marion Shoard had also 
noticed the growing public dissatisfaction of countryside matters in a variety of 
publications, and especially on the impacts of intensive production upon wildlife and 
access. 
70 
In 1989 she addressed the SCU conference and declared that, "crofters need 
to develop a long term strategy for ensuring that their fellow citizens in the rest of 
Britain continue to believe that crofting is a good thing". 71 It was a declaration the 
SCU was to take to heart, and over the next decade was to impress successfully upon 
a wide variety of individuals and organisations. The crofting communities had a 
coordinated voice once more, and the traditions of social land reform were soon to 
play a large part in the resurgence of local communities in the Highlands. 
The liberal approach to land use problems was also invigorated by criticism of 
government rural policy in the Highlands and Islands. Particular attention was focussed 
on the lack of planning permission for agricultural and forestry production. Outrageous 
abuses of the forest grant schemes provided concrete examples of how the rights of 
local and public interests played a subordinate role to the financial returns of 
investment companies. Whilst the designations of areas of conservation and scenic 
value were generally welcomed, the effectiveness of their monitoring and enforcement 
was woefully lacking. The lack of accountability and representation in the NCC, CCS, 
and other NDPB's encouraged further criticism ofhow competing rights and interests 
were actually handled in land management decisions. The secrecy that surrounded 
many of the NCC's and CC's activities seemed to highlight the need to reevaluate the 
mechanisms by which these decisions were made. 72 The same was true for the 
protection and promotion of public access, and the Ramblers Association began new 
campaigns of trespassing and lobbying for greater rights of recreational access. Taken 
together with the debates over the Cairngorms, the increasing absentee ownership of 
68 Hunter. The Claim. pp.209-212 
69 ibid. p.211 
70 Shoard, Marion. This Land is Our Land, Grafton, London. 1987. 
71 The Crofier. June 1989; Hunter. The Claim. p.21 0 
72 Evans. p.178 
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estates, and the increasing demands placed upon the countryside, the reevaluation of 
multiple use management was deemed essential. Indeed the call for National Parks 
once more began a familiar cry when rights of access or environmentally sensitive areas 
were put at risk by negligent landowners. By 1992, the appeal of National Parks was 
so popular, that a SO survey showed that 90% of respondents wanted the 
establishment of National Parks in Scotland. 73 
2.6 1992-1997: Partnerships and Community 
1992 marked a profound change in not only Scottish rural policy and the 
bureaucracy that administered it, but also in the attention given to issues surrounding 
the Highlands' local communities. The building criticism of both the NCC and the 
CCS, and government policy in general had hastened a reexamination of the agency 
structure in 1990. A process that was also related to the signing of the World 
Conservation Strategy and the publishing of the White Paper This Common 
Inheritance in the same year. Returning from their 1992 election victory, therefore, the 
Conservative Government implemented a massive restructuring of the land use 
agencies. The reorganisation saw the formation of an agency responsible for almost all 
aspects of land use policy relating to Scotland: Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH). This 
was the first integrated agency to be directly involved with nature conservation issues 
specific to Scotland, and in its structure it looked towards answering many of the 
questions generated by land suffering multiple uses and demands. 
Concerning the criticisms of rural policy strategy, a new initiative was also 
launched to promote better communication between agencies and government, and to 
set an overriding rural agenda. Fundamental to agency restructuring and the 1992 
publication of Rural Framework was '1he realisation that tackling rural issues in a 
sect oral manner does not work". 74 After decades of critique from boards of inquiry, 
select committees, and proponents of reform like Frank Fraser Darling, the SO began 
setting up mechanisms of planning integrated policy. Chaired by the SO, the 1992 
Rural Focus Group brought together for the first time all the main Government 
73 Scottish Office Public Attitudes to the Environment in Scotland, Central Research Unit; 
Edinburgh.l991. p.3 
74 Scottish Office. People Prosperity and Partnership, HMSO, Edinburgh. December 1995. p.2 
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agencies, Local Authorities, and the private and voluntary sectors involved in land use 
management and rural affairs in Scotland. 75 Guided by themes which tried to avoid the 
established sectoral approaches of policy, the Rural Focus Group explored issues of 
diversity, quality, local added value, effective service delivery, networks and 
communication, Europe, sustainability, and top of the list community involvement.76 
The emphasis upon community participation in land use management finally resulted in 
the 1995 policy statement People Prosperity and Partnership, which firmly established 
the Government's commitment to implementing policy for the direct benefit of local 
rural communities. 
These structural and policy readjustments, however, did not alter the prevailing 
Government favouritism towards the conservative landowning constituency. In the 
early 1990's the prominence of landowners was still a noticeable facet of rural policy, 
management, and land use decisions. Strongly represented in Government, landowners 
displayed enormous influence especially when sensitive topics like red deer or salmon 
came up for debate. 77 Similarly, landowners were also very conspicuous in the 
conservation movement in general. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), SWT, 
RSPB, John Muir Trust (JMT), and NTS all had large representations of landowning 
interests. 78 This influence often caused strained relationships with both Government 
policy and conservation interests. The most notable example being the case of Mar 
Lodge, where a consortium of JMT, WWF, and RSPB sought to purchase a principle 
Cairngorm estate in 1992.79 Supported by senior SO staff, and visited by Ian Laing (the 
then Secretary of State), the consortium applied for funding from the Lottery-financed 
National Heritage Memorial Fund (NHMF). Another creation of the Major 
administration, the NHMF was swiftly becoming a gold-mine for conservation bodies 
in funding their land purchase, and so the consortium approached with confidence. 
75 Rural Focus Group Members: Central Scotland Countryside Trust, Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities, Forestry Commission, Highlands and Islands Enterprise, Rural Forum (voluntary and 
private sector), Scottish Agricultural College, Scottish Enterprise, Scottish Homes, Scottish Natural 
Heritage, Scottish Tourist BoarcL and SO in the chair. 
76 SO. People Prosperity and Partnership. p.2 
77 For a particularly critical view see Cramb. pp.11-26 
78 Wightman. p.183 
79 This example is taken from Wightman. pp, 184-185 
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However, landowning interests were firmly against the consortium's campaign that the 
estate was at risk from further private ownership, and through influence on the NHMF 
and other informal avenues lobbied hard against the proposed consortium's purchase. 
The newly created SNH was given particular attention, and through the Chairman 
Magnus Magnusson persuaded to back off from supporting the venture. Eventually the 
bid collapsed, and after only two years, and much behind the scenes work, the NTS 
received funding from the NHMF to acquire the estate instead. Bound by feudal 
obligations, as well as a commitment to maintain the estate as a deer forest, the NTS 
was obviously felt to be the only compromise landowning interests could tolerate. The 
"Mar Lodge debacle", as conservation groups labeled the case, clearly exemplified the 
continued contradictions implicit in the Government's approach to sensitive land use 
and ownership issues. Whilst conservation was taken to be a principle aim in rural 
policy, the adherence to the free market and influence of established landowners in 
policy and practice still produced profound contradictions. 80 
The Mar Lodge case also emphasised the need to develop strategies which 
accommodated the prevailing political climate, and this was a key aspect of the success 
ofthe Assynt crofters in purchasing their Sutherland estate in 1993. Supported by 
strong media interest and a fundraising campaign that targeted not only other Highland 
crofting communities, but overseas interests as well the Assynt crofters eventually took 
control of a 21,000 acre estate that had been subject to most ofthe uncertainties and 
problems of private ownership. Side stepping the public versus private debate, the 
crofters opted for a community trust structure, that although constituted the estate as 
being privately owned, produced a far more accountable and responsible form of 
ownership and management. Perhaps most important of all, it allowed them to not only 
own the property themselves, but also to become their own feudal superiors. Land 
management and local enterprise initiatives were thereby unhindered by the feudal 
entanglements that dogged so many other crofting estates. Championed by the SCU, 
the community trust ownership could also be held up as victory for the crofting 
movement and the social reform tradition in general; finally shaking off the burdens of 
external ownership and domination the Assynt crofters had eventually won the historic 
80 Wightman. p. 185 
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struggle to become controllers of their own land and destiny. It was a point aptly made 
by one of the crofters' leaders Alan MacRae on the 1st of February when they received 
formal ownership: "It seems we have won our land. Certainly, it is a moment to 
savour, but my immediate thoughts are that some of our forebears should have been 
here to share it. It is an historic blow for people on the land throughout the Highlands 
and Islands". 81 
The significance of the Assynt purchase was marked because the initiative for 
the campaign had not been driven by Government policy or the interventions of a 
benign landlord, but had come from the crofters themselves. 82 Together with the 
support of media interest and lobbying from the SCU, the success of the Assynt 
community had catalysed a resurgence of interest in crofting. The community ofBorve 
in Skye was soon to follow suit and instigate a similar trust venture in ownership and 
management. This confidence in crofting communities was amplified with the growing 
acceptance of the environmental benefits of crofting on the region's wildlife. 
Conservation bodies who had had a tendency to come into conflict with crofting 
communities, especially in regards to environmental designations, began to explore 
joint ventures and partnerships with local communities. In 1992 the SCU and RSPB 
published Crofting and the Environment: A New Approach, and together launched an 
integrated program for Comcrake protection through management agreements and 
compensation packages. This avenue of approach was also firmly supported by 
changing attitudes in the CAP, which began to look at the financing of smaller scale, 
less intensive forms of agriculture. In short after a century of marginalisation, the 
crofting community was beginning to be recognised as being rather than a hindrance, a 
major benefit to the region's social and environmental health. 
The new found position of crofting brought with it a renewed attention to the 
system of land tenure in Scotland, and the land debate in general. From 1992 onwards 
there was a new increased and concerted attempt by all three traditions of land reform 
to tackle the issues surrounding land ownership and use. Continuously impelled by 
examples of bad estate management, and the ongoing sagas of Mar Lodge, Knoydart, 
81 Ross, David. "The Assynt Crofters", Scottish Affairs. No.3, Spring, 1993. pp.32-33. p.32 
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and the Isle ofEigg the press fuelled debate with detailed attention. In the process the 
liberal approach to the land debate maintained a steady interest in rights and legal 
reform. 
83 
Rights of access by the general public remained a key issue, which although 
most voluntary bodies generally encouraged, remained highly problematic with 
sporting estate owners. Foreign owners were frequently highlighted for restricting 
rightful access; one notorious French owner in Calgary Bay on Mull for instance, 
received wide publicity for a putting up a sign declaring hill walkers will receive 
"rough justice", even though there was a legal right of access to his property. 84 
Combined with a weak enforcement of environmental designations, and other 
protective measures, the liberal tradition took these issues of rights into an analysis of 
the feudal land law. Where a century before moderate inclinations prevented any re-
evaluation of the feudal land law in its entirety, the contemporary problems of 
controlling land use and protecting the rights of local communities propelled a much 
more critical consensus.85 Abolition of feudal law was taken to be a prerequisite for the 
establishment of a much more active approach to the control of land use decisions. 
Since the Scottish Law Commission published its Discussion Paper 93: Property Law: 
The Abolition ofthe Feudal System in 1991, the proposals for abolition consolidated 
into an approach that gained popular backing from not only the opposition parties, but 
the media, community groups, and the "new" conservationists such as FoES and 
Greenpeace. 86 
The social traditions of land reform were of course greatly empowered by the 
Assynt success, but also firmly redirected. Whilst the Assynt campaign drew upon 
much ofthe precedents ofthe social land reform movement, the development ofthe 
community trust model soundly placed the ideas of land nationalisation in the past, and 
encouraged a much more flexible approach to alternative ownership structures. Assynt 
certainly gave a concrete example for both the SNP and the Labour Party in Scotland 
(by the mid 1990's renamed the Scottish Labour Party- SLP) to work with in forming 
potential land reform policies. The SNP instigated its own Scottish Land Committee in 
82 Wightman. p.I79 
83 Ross, John. "Land Reform: Communities Urged to Join Rights Debate", The Scotsman, lOth 
November. 1995 
84 Cramb, Auslan. p.19 
85 Ross, J. 
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1995 to investigate landownership reform, which through a series of public hearings 
and dispositions made the theme of access central to its analysis. Access to ownership, 
control, management, finance and information, were all found to be woefully lacking to 
rural communities. 
87 
The consequent proposals of feudal abolition, the creation of a 
land registers, and the active promotions of community trusts through a Land 
Commission were implemented into party policy. The SLP made steps in the same 
direction, and especially attacked the privatisation of FC land, which was felt to be 
more appropriately devolved to communities rather than private individuals. The 
degree to which the radical traditions of social reform had obviously adjusted to the 
political climate was also amply demonstrated in the McEwen Memorial Lecture 
series. Created to honour the late statesman of land reform, McEwen's radical ideas 
for land nationalisation were swiftly superceded by more subtle arguments for the 
devolution of land management and ownership. Both James Hunter and Bryan 
MacGregor provided critiques of land ownership patterns and tenure that stressed the 
importance and practical benefits of removing feudal land law, and expanding the role 
of community trusts. 88 Hunter who from the 1970's has been closely associated with 
the crofting movement, particularly associated this procedure with the creation of a 
Scots Parliament and the wider aspects of Scottish devolution. Land reform he 
asserted in 1995, can provide a distinctly tangible and real outcome of home rule; and 
one that could do much in shaping the character of a new Scots legislature. 89 This 
politically astute assertion not only took into account the strong possibilities for a 
Scots Parliament in the near future, but also its probable desire to generate radical new 
policies with potentially limited powers. Land reform could provide such a policy that 
would both answer public expectations of uniquely Scottish legislation, but also refrain 
from taxing the assembly's powers or finances too far. 
Sensing the importance and resilience of the land debate in Scottish politics, 
another politically astute figure in the shape ofMichael Forsyth, the then new 
Secretary of State for Scotland, decided to contribute to the building discourse on land 
86 FoES. Towards a Sustainable Scotland., Edinburgh. 1996. p.125 
87 Scottish Land Commission. Consultative Report: Public Policy Towards land In Scotland. 1996 
88 Hunter, James. Towards a Land Reform Agenda For a Scots Parliament, The 2nd John McEwen 
Memorial Lecture. Rural Forum: Perth. 1995; Bryden, John. Land Tenure and Rural Development in 
Scotland, The 3rd John McEwen Memorial Lecture, Rural Forum, Perth. 1996 
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reform. Directly replicating one of Hunter's specific proposals, Forsyth announced the 
proposed handing over of the Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department's 
(SOAFD) crofting estates to community trust management.9° Combined with his 
personal support of a community forestry initiative in Laggan and a much-publicised 
visit to Assynt, this represented a profound change of government policy. Firmly 
breaking from the Scottish conservative traditions of favouring the landed aristocracy, 
Forsyth clearly supported the devolution of estate management to community groups. 
Occasionally criticised as crude electioneering, Forsyth's avocation of community trust 
ownership nevertheless blended well with the established conservative traditions of 
encouraging owner-occupation. Indeed, the Assynt and SOAFD estates' restructuring 
into community trust holdings were often likened to privatisation.91 Obviously, the 
SCU did not agree with this interpretation, and instead welcomed the handing over of 
SOAFD estates to crofters as a validation of their role in deciding the region's future. 
The 1995 SCU annual conference exhibited an enormous degree of confidence and 
optimism in the crofting movement. Frank Rennie, the former president of the SCU, 
emphasised the need to not only take advantage ofForsyth's offer, but for the first 
time in over a century to look towards a greater expansion of crofting.92 This was 
further enhanced by the concluding remarks of the present president Alastair Maclver: 
We have, I believe, an opportunity unlikely to be repeated, to seize the 
initiative, to take responsibility for our future and perhaps, more 
importantly, the future of those who come after us. They will not thank us 
if we fail to take advantage of the tide of support which is flowing for 
crofters and crofting •... Be assured that if we are seen to be unable or 
unwilling to utilise this tide of support, it will quickly ebb and our chance 
will be lost - perhaps forever. The challenge is there. Lets take it up ! 93 
As will be detailed in the following chapters, Maclver's remarks were to be 
applied not only to crofting communities, but to Highland communities in general. For 
just as the success of the Assynt story was to subside, and the hand-over ofSOAFD 
89 Hunter. Towards a Land Reform Agenda. pp.20-22 
90 Breen, S. "Forsyth Offers Land Deal to Highland Crofters", The Scotsman, 20th October 1995. 
91 ibid.; Ross, John. "Land Reform: Communities Urged to Join Rights Debate", The Scotsman, lOth 
November. 1995. 
92 Rennie, F. "Expansion of a Crofting Community: What does it involve?". SCU Conference Papers, 
SCU: Broadford, Isle of Skye. 1995. p.2 
93 Maclver, Alastair. "Presidential Address to the 9th Annual Conference of the SCU''. ibid. p.4 
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estates was to become reality, events on Eigg were soon to propel the public and· 
media interest in Highland community issues one step further. By the summer of 1996 
incidents on the small island off the coast of Arisaig had thrown the problems 
associated with foreign and absentee ownership into the spotlight of public attention. 
The SOAFD had actually been a very good landlord in comparison to many private 
owners, and especially owners like the mysterious "Professor Maruma" who had 
purchased Eigg in 1995 for the simple reasons of land speculation. Having changed 
hands nine times since 1838, Eigg provided an extreme case of how the vagaries of the 
land market, absentee owners, and F eudalland law had benefited everyone except the 
island's community and natural environment. Since the crofting community on the 
island represented only about half of the island's residents, and only 20% of the land 
mass, attention therefore became fixed upon the tenants and land that did not receive 
the protection of crofting tenure. 
The plight of the Eigg community was followed with intense media attention, 
and the late summer and autumn of 1996 saw a series of articles in the Scottish media 
analysising the land debate. This was added to by the publication of Auslan Cramb's 
Who Owns Scotland Now, which was serialised in The Herald, and also in a sequel to 
McEwen's investigations, Andy Wightman published an updated version of Who Owns 
Scotland. Wightman in particular provided a very straightforward and revealing 
breakdown of ownership patterns, which not only affirmed the fears of increasing 
foreign and absentee ownership, but critiqued dominance of landowners over issues of 
policy development and conservation. This was combined with an outlined policy of 
land reform, which unlike his predecessor's pleas for nationalisation, reflected the 
substantial support for community trust initiatives. Beginning with an abolition of 
Feudal Law and the development of a cadastral map-based register of landownership, 
he advocated the now growing consensus for the creation of a Land Commission to 
oversee policies to control the misuse of land, and end the laissezfaire market of land 
speculation. In maintaining a radical stance, and echoing the traditions of the social 
reformers of the Nineteenth Century, he also proposed an implementation of Henry 
George's ideas ofLand Value Taxation.94 Much like McEwen, Wightman's revealing 
94 Wightman. pp.204-215 
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statistics and adherence to a program of land reform, provided staunch academic · 
backing as well as maintaining a high profile for the issues surrounding land in the 
popular media. 
2. 7 Conclusions 
The radical demands ofMurdoch and the socially inspired land reformers at the 
turn of the 19th Century, therefore, had in many ways become the leading edge of 
contemporary thought on Highland land issues. After a century, that had seen the 
predominant marginalisation of crofting and Highland communities in favour of 
continued external control and ownership, this was without doubt a significant 
development. The rising public awareness for issues regarding conservation and access 
certainly played a key part in fostering a keen interest in the Highlands' natural 
heritage. Although this had often led to clashes over the years between conservation 
and local community interests, initiatives in the early 1990's by the SO and bodies like 
the RSPB and SWT encouraged a partnership approach that was inclusive, rather than 
exclusive, of local issues and interests. The importance of reclaiming the cultural as 
well as the natural heritage was also a marked development in this process. 
Demonstrated in a resurgence of the region's local communities, and the large public 
support for community trust initiatives in Assynt, Borve, and Laggan, the importance 
of local communities to the region's social, environmental and economical health was 
now recognised as fundamental. Widely seen as the most appropriate stewards of the 
Highlands' prestigious heritage, the calls for land reform were consequently coming 
not from the radical extreme, but from all the leading political parties. On the eve of 
the 1997 General Election, that was characterised by the seeming political similarity of 
the contesting parties, it was hardly surprising that a broad consensus was reached 
over the need for land reform in Scotland. Obviously, the issues of devolution and 
independence remained a defining factor, and each approached the land issue from 
their own ideological perspective, but the four main Scottish parties all vigorously 
waived the flag of land reform at problematic estates like Eigg. 
Beginning with the SNP, they had of course maintained a steadfast approach 
that complemented their program of independence. In many ways therefore, they 
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replicated the 19th century social reform traditions more closely with their program for 
land reform being integrated into direct national sovereignty. However, in being the 
first of the left wing parties to reject land nationalisation per se, they led the way for 
other parties to investigate alternatives which favoured mechanisms like community 
trusts. The importance of actually knowing who owned Scotland was emphasised with 
their proposals for the creation of a land register, and a moratorium on FC land sales 
to prevent further abuses of land speculation. Just like the other opposition parties, 
they also advocated the creation of a Land Commission to oversee the abolition of 
Feudalism, the handing over of State-owned land to local communities, and the 
strengthening of environmental designations. Firmly supporting the role of crofting, 
they wished to develop a Crofting Development Body as well, to extend crofting style 
tenancies throughout Scotland and promote a sustainable integrated economy. 95 
The importance for land reform in the foundation of future rural development 
in Scotland was also central to both the Labour and Liberal 1997 rural manifestoes. 
Both parties aimed to again establish a Land Commission to oversee the abolition of 
Feudalism, and the devolution of State-owned land to local community and partnership 
groups. Emphasising the role of a new Scottish Parliament to draft and implement 
legislation to carry out this process, they too echoed the connection between 
independence and land reform. Since they were actually preparing for government, 
however, Labour was more tentative in describing the exact path reform would take, 
and instead committed themselves to only instigating a formal investigation of land 
ownership reform rather than any precise details.96 Nevertheless, they did give 
wholehearted support to the community trust initiatives, and pledged an integrated 
approach to environmental management and rural development that would favour the 
interest of local communities.97 
The Liberals were more forthright in their declarations of support for land 
reform, and pulling on their previous traditions of dual ownership reform expressly 
95 Gibson, Rob. "A Question of Politics". pp.l3-15; Scottish National Party. Programme for 
Government, 1997. pp.37-39 
96 MacLeod, Catherine. "Labour Plan for Radical Land Reform", The Herald, 22nd February, 1997. 
p.8 
97 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto: new Labour because Scotland deserves better, 1997. p.28-30 
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committed themselves to a similar extension of crofting like the SNP. As well as · 
pruning the powers of the Crown Estate Conunission, they pledged to give crofting 
tenants on both Crown and private land the first option of purchase in the event of 
sale. This was to be facilitated and partially funded by Local Enterprise Companies 
(LECs). Like the Labour Party, the Liberals also accentuated the rights of access to 
open ground by the public, which again drew on previous precedents in the land 
debate. Although not expressly acknowledging the end of the voluntary principle, they 
likewise indicated a much more proactive state in controlling land management 
decisions. 98 
With the Scottish Law Commission announcing that it would draft legislation 
to abolish Feudal Law by the year 2000, the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 
surprised critics when they cautiously welcomed the proposals. 99 As part of the 
process of reviewing rural policy begun by Michael Forsyth, this represented a further 
indication of the changes in Conservative focus. Far from defending the status quo in 
landownership and land use, the Conservative Party indicated sweeping changes in 
ownership policy. Not only was the bill for the handing over ofSOAFD crofting 
estates rushed through Parliament, but Forsyth at the last Scottish Grand Committee 
asked Jim Hunter to investigate methods by which badly managed private crofting 
estates could be transferred to community trust holdings. This was particularly 
revealing since any future progress on this front would include substantial State 
intervention in the private concerns of ownership. Something that the conservative 
traditions in the land debate had firmly and historically rejected. Indeed, it was also 
highly significant that the voluntary principle was markedly absent from the Party's 
manifestos. With the SO providing consultative support for community trust ventures 
through the Crofting Trust Advisory Service (CT AS), and the Rural Partnership 
program supporting similar ventures in other aspects of rural development, the 
98 Wallace, Jim. "A Question of Politics". pp.l3-15; Scottish Liberal Democrat Manifesto: Make The 
Difference, 1997. pp.29-31; Chisholm, Malcolm. "A Question ofPolitics". pp.13-15; Scottish Labour 
Party Manifesto. pp.28-30. 
99 Robertson, Rob. "Archaic feudal law to be axed", The Herald, February 27th, 1997. 
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groundswell of political support for local communities in the Highlands and Islands 
was securely reflected in Conservative Party Policy. 100 
At the very time the party manifestoes were being written the Isle ofEigg was 
hardly out of the headlines, and as later detailed their campaign for community trust 
ownership received support from all the leading political parties. As such the island's 
story was very much associated with the formation and debate of land reform policy in 
the long and drawn out build up to the 1997 Election. Consequently, their eventual 
success just one month before ballot day, proved to be an affirmation of the new found 
consensus regarding community trusts. Eigg, like Assynt, seemed to many observers to 
be a spontaneous outpouring of community empowerment, and had the effect of 
implying that all communities in the Highlands and Islands were in a similar position. 
Unfortunately, as experience on the SOAFD estates preparing for hand-over began to 
show, this was certainly misleading. In the North Sutherland Estates around Armadale 
and Strathy, splits had already emerged in the communities over the feasibility studies 
being undertaken by CTAS. In a process that was notably top-down in its approach, 
consultants had placed their plans for estate devolution in front of the communities 
only to be rejected and to encourage notable animosity amongst the crofters. 101 These 
estates were apparently not like Eigg. 
100 Earl ofLindsay. "A Question ofPolitics ... " pp.13-15; The Scottish Conservative and Unionist 
Manifesto: Fighting for Scotland, 1997. pp.23-25 
101 "Misgivings over moves towards crofting buy-out", The Caithness Courier, 15th January, 1997. 
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The Schellenberg Years : Laird, Community, and Trust 
Chapter Three 
3.1 Introduction 
Turning from the previous regional and contextual examinations, this chapter will 
now come to focus on the specifics of the case study at hand. It will examine the 
Schellenberg proprietorship ofEigg, and in so doing, docwnent the evolution of 
relations between the owner and residents on the island. This remains a highly 
contentious and legally precipitous area of Scottish social history, for although Keith 
Schellenberg relinquished ownership of the island in March 1995, to this day he 
remains ever vigilant in protecting his own side of the island story. Not only does he 
own most of the island's estate records from the sale in 1826 onwards, including the 
William Bald map of 1806, but he has repeatedly resorted to legal action to defend his 
own versions of events and opinion. The docwnentary team from Granada's Man 
Alive were the first to feel the wrath of his litigation when they broadcast an 
investigation into his employment practices on the island in 1977. Since then 
Schellenberg has hardly flinched from issuing writs and lawyers letters against all 
forms of medi~ broadcasters and journalists. His propensity for legal action was made 
particularly apparent when the media covered the hand-over celebrations on the 12th 
of June 1997. A series of articles tackled the history of troubles between the Eigg 
residents and Schellenberg, and gave brief summaries of the islanders' success in 
gaining ownership. Incensed, Schellenberg responded by issuing writs for libel 
against The GuardiiD1, The London Evening Standard, Professor Aubrey Manning, 
former Chairman of the SWT, and the journalist Leslie Riddoch. 
"A fundamental, and I say deliberate part of their campaign, conducted by 
advertisement and through the media, was to claim that due to the 
irresponsible neglect of previous owners, including myself, towards both the 
inhabitants and wildlife, the estate must never again be allowed to fall into 
the bands of private ownership .... in their desire to succeed, truth became a 
casualty and I am taking legal action to clear my name and to ensure the 
public are made aware of the falsehoods ... At my stage of life, I have no wish 
to embark on a long and expensive exercise. But the truth is a prerequisite of 
democracy and freedom and the 'thin red line' of the rule of law is ultimately 
its only guardian". 1 
Although most of these actions are being contested at the time of writing, in 
seeking to clear his name through legal action, Schellenberg has like most libel 
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litigants succeeded in the immediate dampening down of further reporting about 
himself. Both journalists and islanders now prefer not to comment on anything to do 
with Keith Schellenberg and his 20 year period of ownership. A man who will even 
take legal action against an innocuous Radio 4 holiday program such as Breakaway, is 
a man to be generally avoided.2 If people do disagree with his versions of past events. 
they are naturally cautious about confronting him even some twenty years later. 
Schellenberg has had a long experience of civil litigation, and his casual ease for 
referring both business and personal matters alike to 'the thin red line' of law has 
made one islander quip, "He's the poor man's Bob Maxwell". 
Figure 3.1: Keilh Schellenherg launches 
his legal writs in 1997 3 
The problem ofMr Schellenberg's pursuit of the truth within the legal framework 
is that it greatly inhibits those who can participate in the evaluation of his legacy on 
Eigg. Certainly the media has resources to fight lengthy legal battles, if the story is 
worth it, but the islanders themselves do not and are naturally wary of him. As 
spokespersons have repeatedly stated on the Trust's behalf, the IEHT has no intention 
of going over the past history of events, and instead wishes to now focus on the 
future. 4 This is perhaps understandable since Schellenberg appears to be legally 
protective of both the island's future as well as it's past. He still retains two properties 
on the island. and has already used them to object through the planning process to 
1 Citygate Scotland. Schellenberg Takes Legal Action. Press Release. 1997 p.l 
2 Broadcast 19111 April 1997. Schellcnberg initiated legal action 21 51 August 1997. 
1 Morgan, Daniel. 
4 Dalto"' Alastair. "Schellenberg sues over claims about Eigg lairds," The Scotsman. 1997 
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initial developments on the island. Though the Trust may have ownership of the 
island, Mr Schellenberg still has a foot in the door and is not intending to leave 
quietly. 
This Chapter therefore seeks to revise this history and answer the key questions of 
how and why the relationship between owner and residents eventually broke down to 
such a dramatic degree on Eigg. Unfortunately Mr Schellenberg has declined to be 
interviewed for this study, and denied any access to his estate records.5 It has 
therefore been difficult to accumulate documentary evidence, especially anything to 
do with employment records, estate turnovers, or perhaps more importantly, his direct 
intentions or motivations regarding estate management. Nevertheless, despite this and 
his frequent legal proceedings, Schellenberg has always remained exceptionally 
talkative to the press. Consequently there is manifold secondary source material 
regarding his opinions and feelings over the course of his 20-year proprietorship. 
There is also Camille Dressier's social history of the island, which although hampered 
by the same problems of research, as well as legal constraints in publishing, provides 
a sound narrative to events. I have also conducted 18 formal and numerous informal 
interviews with islanders throughout my two and a half years of fieldwork, and these 
provide a sound account from the residents' perspective. 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that whilst this study examines the roles of 
Schellenberg, the Eigg residents, and the Isle ofEigg Trust in shaping events on the 
island, this is somewhat different to Mr Schellenberg's search for "the truth". This is 
because the truth is not that simple to unpack from so many competing perspectives. 
Especially when the truth being sought is so profoundly wrapped in soured 
relationships, bad feeling, and personal emotion. It is not that events did not happen, 
but that crucial to understanding how these events impacted is how the individuals 
and groups involved interpreted them. This applies particularly to understanding the 
changing social dynamics on Eigg regarding the role of 'incomers'. As Charles Jedrej 
and Mark Nuttall's study White Settlers eloquently affirms, one must approach the 
5 I have written to Keith Schellenberg twice: June 20th 1995; August 2"d 1995. Both letters were neither 
acknowledged nor answered. I telephoned him on November 2"d 1995, and I was told that it would be 
"inappropriate for [me] to view any ofthe estate records". This was because he had already heard I was 
involved with Isle ofEigg Trust, and that "anything [he] said would be turned and manipulated". 
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analysis of events like these with an appropriate understanding of the language and 
labels being used: 
" .... Recognise that while representations such as 'locals', 'incomers', 
'lairds', 'crofters', 'white settlers', 'the English', 'absentee property 
holders', 'Highland culture', and so on, are agreed upon, the reality to 
which they refer to is elusive and contested. Everyone agrees that there 
are 'locals' and 'incomers', but it is not easy to find a consensus about 
who they are or what is 'Highland culture', and the 'ancient way of life' 
that incomers threaten. There are some relatively stable points, but crude 
reality alone cannot underwrite the significance of the representations. 
There are sociological and cultural processes at work which amplify some 
features and mute others, thereby endowing what may be called 'key 
concepts' with a salient and compelling quality".6 
Suffice to say, being neither anthropologist nor sociologist by training, it is not my 
intention to delve too much deeper into social theory. But the point is taken that the 
purpose of this Chapter is to document the clashes of perspective and feeling between 
the island's owner, residents, and other interested parties. In doing so, it will make 
much use oftenns such as "laird", "incomer", "islander" and "community", but only 
with flrm the acknowledgement that they are the crudest of labels. 
3.2 A Changing Island Community 
Until the arrival of the Schellenbergs in 1975, it is not surprising to fmd that the 
islanders on Eigg represented a small and fragile, yet cohesive community. They were 
an integrated group with a distinct sense of continuity and a powerful shared history 
and identity.7 With the majority ofthe 39 islanders situated in the remaining adjoining 
townships of Cuagach and Cleadale, crofting played an integral part in structuring the 
community's life. As well as providing the formal aspects of the Grazings Committee 
to organise agricultural matters, crofting also engendered a relatively common 
outlook on the world amongst the islanders. 8 Since the successful running of crofts 
often entailed islanders working together day after day, this notably emphasised the 
Perhaps this is somewhat understandable since he knows me only through my active work for the IEHT 
and its public campaigning. In hindsight, I obviously should have talked to him first. 
6 Jedrej, Charles and Nuttall, Mark. White Settlers: The Impact of Rural Repopulation in Scotland. 
Harwood, Luxembourg. 1996. p.4 
7 This is amply documented in Dressier. pp.l31-147; also corroborative evidence from: Kirk, Peggy. 
Interview 14th Aug 1995, Camp bell, Ann e. Interview 12th Aug 1995 
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collective nature of life. A certain degree ofhomogenisation amongst the island~s 
residents had also occurred over the last 200 years as the decreasing population went 
hand in hand with decreasing opportunities and variety of work on the island. As 
described in Chapter 1, the independent trades had steadily been removed from the 
island over the 19th and 20th Centuries. Apart from the occasional fisherman and 
resident doctor, therefore men either worked on the croft or the estate, and women had 
just the flat choice between domestic service at home or in the lodge (if it were 
available).
9 
This meant that by 1975, there was a resoundingly common experience 
shared by the community, and one that was fundamentally bound more tightly than 
most by the natural isolation of island life. 
Having said this, the islanders were hardly all identical nor all from the same 
'pure and indigenous' island stock. Several such as Peggy Kirk and Dolly Ferguson 
had moved on to the island to marry and settle down. Like the preceding centuries, 
although the main trend was one of depopulation and the loss of people from Eigg, 
there had still remained a steady trickle ofincomers onto the island. Similarly, when 
describing the islanders in 197 5 as a community this is not denying there were 
different sub-groups or overlapping forms of identity present as well. For instance, 
religious divides had contributed greatly to the island's history, and although the 
resident ministers and priests had departed long ago, there remained two distinct 
congregations within the townships. 10 Nevertheless, the two congregations, like the 
assimilated incomers, were bound together in a community of common interest and 
shared perspective. Under the watchful eye of community leaders like the Small Isles 
GP Dr MacLean (himself an incomer), the Grazings Clerk Angus MacK.innon, and a 
tradition of powerful island women, they worked together to survive the winters, and 




10 Originally a Catholic island, the 19th Century saw the steady growth of a Protestant religion 
facilitated by island proprietors. From the post-war period onwards the island was roughly 'h Church of 
Scotland, 'h Catholic. See Dressier. pp. 131-147 




With the arrival of the Schellenbergs and their new approach to estate 
management, however, there came a profound break in the traditional demography 
and community life on the island. Indeed, Mr Schellenberg's arrival on the island was 
as sensational and eventful as his final departure was to be some twenty years later. 
Flying himself to the island in a small light aircraft, he landed the plane on Laig beach 
and left it in charge of a rather bewildered islander. Only one instruction was given: 
"Do not press this button". Inevitably, the button was pushed and the plane was a 
write-off.
12 
Far from letting this dampen his enthusiasm, the new proprietor 
immediately set to work rejuvenating the island's economy with a direct hands-on 
approach. Though little was proffered in traditional estate work, he employed many 
islanders in renovating the estate's 12 houses and setting up the various components 
of a tourist economy. He also gained support from the HIDB in restructuring the farm, 
and introducing East Coast cattle (preferred by mainland buyers) which were to be 
raised on Eigg and then fmished on his wife's Udny estate in Aberdeenshjre. 
Similarly 800 cheviot sheep were introduced to change over from the less profitable 
black face herd. Together with extensive drainage and fencing, this represented a 
massive turn-around in the island's fortunes and the frrst genuine improvement since 
the days of the Runcimans. 13 
More significant than the infrastructural projects, however, was the 
introduction of new people onto the island. For the frrst time in over two hundred 
years the island's population actually increased in size, with the Schellenbergs 
actively recruiting "independent, self reliant people to join our island venture". 14 In 
just a few short years they had succeeded in doubling the island's population, from 39 
in 1975 to over 80 by 1980. 15 Although Eigg was a relatively extreme case, this 
introduction of new residents to the island echoed the changing pattern of population 
of the Highlands and Islands in general during the 1970's. Between 1971 and 1981 
almost all of Scotland's rural districts witnessed a rapid reversal in the decline of 
population. Numbers started not only to level out, but actually increase, with the 
growth in rural populations continuing to the present day. 16 On Eigg the impact of 
12 Dressier. p.154 
13 ibid. p.155 
14 Helliwell, Simon. Interview, 13th November 1997. 
15 Citygate.p.3; Dressier p.156 
16 Scottish Office. Scottish Rural Life. Scottish Office, Edinburgh. 1992. p.23 
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new people was enormous, and as will be detailed further proved fundamental in 
determining the island's future relationship between owners and residents. 
Interviewing present day islanders shows that although "incomer issues" came to 
be latterly prominent in media coverage ofthe 1990's, the initial arrival of new 
residents in the mid 1970's did not generate any significant clashes or social splits on 
the island. In fact much the reverse, it was generally felt on all sides that they were 
positively salvaging an ageing community. Peggy Kirk herself an incomer from the 
Uists, married into the Kirk family in the 1950's and at the time ofSchellenberg's 
arrival was raising the principal young family on the island. She remembers the new 
estate workers being openly welcomed by the community: "We were all delighted to 
see more people. Things were getting pretty grim on the island with so few young folk 
around. Marie was the only one in school at one point". 17 For those coming to the 
island for the first time, this feeling of welcome was readily apparent. John Cormack, 
now the island's post-man recalls his early days on Eigg in 1979: the "older 
generation definitely welcomed us .... it was all great fun, and people were 
enthusiastic and friendly". 18 Asking any of those incomers now resident what they felt 
when they first arrived and you get the same basic response; that they felt warmly 
invited and part of the island's escalating social life. Ask any of elder generation of 
already resident islanders, and again you get a reciprocal reply that the community 
needed more people if it were to survive. 19 
The most obvious expression of how much new blood was needed on the 
island is demonstrated in the number of marriages that occurred between islanders and 
incomers in the first few years. For example, all ofPeggy and Donnie Kirk's five 
children eventually married incoming residents on the island. As Angus MacKinnon 
says, "It was either that or they had to marry each other!"20 Or perhaps more to the 
point leave the island, which is what he describes happened to most of his generation: 
"Just nothing left to do and no one left to marry, so we all went offthe island. You 
17 Kirk, Peggy. 
18 Connack, John. Interview 12th November 1997 
19 Good examples include interviews with: MacKinnon, Kirk, Peggy, Connack, Carr, Marie 20th 




had to leave the island if you wanted to get somewhere".21 With new young people 
around, and new levels of employment this situation had changed for the better. There 
were three island weddings in 1980 alone, and in the end a total of seven islanders 
were to marry incoming residents over the course ofSchellenbergs first ten years of 
ownership. 
22 
Their continued residence on the island, together with their healthy rates 
of reproduction was to ensure an invigorated school role and an expanding island 
community. 
The combination of population increase and a new expanding economy were 
powerful forces to be unleashed, and were reflected in a buoyant feeling on the island. 
This was especially felt amongst the younger islanders, for as Angus Kirk remarks: "It 
was brilliant, something was happening at last on the island, and it was a breath of 
fresh air. There was plenty of new machinery, lots of work to do. You didn't care how 
many hours you worked, if it was overtime or not, you were giving it your best 
because you felt you were part of something new and exciting." By the summer of 
1979 everything was in full swing with Kildonnan being run as a guesthouse and 
various estate properties and caravans being let as holiday houses. Moped, dingy, and 
bike rentals provided activities for the holiday makers together with courses in the 
new craft centre at Kildonnan that was opened by no less than the Chairman of the 
HIDB himsel£ "The crofters are delighted" reported the Press and Journal, "that after 
years of decline, new capital is being pumped into their island by the new laird".23 
At the Lodge, Schellenberg would spend a significant part of the summer with 
his family enjoying the life of a paternalistic land owner and indulging the number of 
tourists and visiting friends on the island in his love for sport. Constantly roping 
friends, islanders, and tourists into games of cricket and hockey on the beach, he 
extended his passions into the weeklong Eigg Games that he organised each summer. 
A kind of mini Highland games, it included all sorts of sporting events ending with a 
marathon, and sometimes a rather eccentric war game involving teams like the 
Hanoverians and Jacobites. The latter team being led one time by the members of the 
21 ibid 
22 The 7 couples being: Duncan and Eileen Fergusson, Donald and Morag MacKinnon, Charlie and 
Katherine MacKinnon, Marie and Collin Carr, Angus and Mairi Kirk, Mark and Fiona Cherry, and Sue 
and Alastair Kirk. The three weddings in I 980: Donald and Morag MacKinnon, Angus and Mairi 
Kirk, and John and Nat Cormack. 
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Clanranald family themselves, mounting a come back in their traditional territory. As 
the numerous Sunday magazine articles were to report, his family and friends spent 
halcyon summer days on the island: "Days which were raised from ordinary to 
magical because of the extraordinary generosity and eccentricity of the island's 
laird".
24 
In a setting "which would look entirely in place in a Somerset Maugham 
novel", they lived an idyllic life whilst islanders were seen busily employed in 
catering to the large number of paying tourists.25 
Strangely enough, Schellenberg's love for sport did not extend to the 
traditional landowning sport of shooting. Indeed, a devout vegetarian he stopped all 
shooting on the estate, and stood out as landowner that openly welcomed the 
attentions of the conservation movement. In the late 1970's this was quite remarkable, 
and the newly created SWT was delighted to be asked to consult on the management 
of three SSSI reserves that had been created on the island in 1964. With an agreement 
signed in 1978, he was one of a few estate owners to recognise the merits of what has 
later been termed "green tourism". 26 This entailed striking a balance between 
attracting enough tourists to generate income, whilst not endangering the island's 
wildlife and very character that attracted them in the first place. Unlike several 
landowners who were to rapidly over-develop islands, such as Iona, with extensive 
tourist facilities, Schellenberg had certainly struck an appropriate course of 
development on Eigg. He gloried in the success, and happily reflected in the new 
enthusiasm that had been unleashed in the community. After 3 or 4 years of 
ownership, he was not only glad to be identified as one who had successfully turned 
round a declining sporting estate, but he positively promoted it at every opportunity. 27 
Of course not all newly arriving workers for Schellenberg's tourist enterprises 
married islanders, and neither did many of them eventually stay for very long. There 
was a high turn-over of seasonal workers, and resident islanders obviously tended to 
differentiate between those who were transitory and those who were permanent and 
23 Nickson, John. "Balanced plan to rejuventate Eigg, Press & Journal, 7th August 1976. 
24 Barrowclough, A. ''The Laird and the Rebel Isle", Country Matters, The Mail on Sunday. 1995 
25 ibid. 
26 Wilcox, Neil. (SWT Reserves Manager) Conversation 2nd October 1997. 
27 A prime example being his island tourist brochure of 1979. The first two pages are a grand apology 





Except for a London couple who took over an abandoned croft, and two 
working fishing boats, all the people who came to the island were directly recruited 
by Schellenberg and employed on the estate. Mostly on short term contracts, informal 
business arrangements, or voluntary conservation work, the majority spent their 
summers renovating properties and catering to the large numbers oftourists.29 As 
such, almost all ofthem lived on the opposite side of the island from the crofting land 
and most of the island community. This obviously constituted a form of divide or 
partition between the islanders and the new estate workers. 30 However, as the young 
islanders gradually married and took over crofts, this pattern began to break as 
incomer spouses started to live in the crofting townships and become more integrated 
into the resident community. It also worked in the opposite manner, when islanders 
married and became resident in estate properties on the south-east side of the island. 
Marie, Peggy's eldest daughter for instance married a young shepherd named Colin 
Carr who was working for Schellenberg on the estate farm. Moving into Sandavore 
Farm House, Marie became heavily involved in both the tourist work for the estate 
and in facilitating the lively social life. "We must have had 25 Celidhs that first 
summer", she remembers, "I would phone Annabel and say to her: should we have a 
dance tonight? And she'd say yes, why not? And we would have a great time". 31 
Certainly there was a basic grouping then, of the short-term workers, the full-
time workers, and those who had married into the community, but still island life 
ensured a relative degree of integration. Both estate workers and crofters alike were 
always dependent on help and assistance at the pier when off-loading heavy supplies. 
In order to cater for the primary items of life like coaL bottled gas, and food supplies, 
you needed to work as a group to manage things and survive. The "island factor 
always engendered a sense of camaraderie", 32 and combined with plenty of 
employment and a bustling social life of Celidhs and weddings, it is hardly surprising 
that islanders have fond memories of the period. It represented a significant 
turnaround for them and the island's fortunes. The only problem being the slight 
feeling of over exposure to tourism that was felt amongst the older islanders. Both 
28 Connack. 
29 Helliwell, Simon. 
3° Connack. 
31 Dressier. p.l56 
32 Helliwell, Simon. 
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Angus MacKinnon and Peggy Kirk felt that there were too many tourists and 
activities on the island for comfort. Schellenberg had slightly overdone things they 
fe lt, and " had tourists staying in every possible property and running all over the 
island on bicycles and mopeds". 33 He also had a large number of personal guests over 
the summer at the lodge, who could nearly always be counted on for boisterous 
behaviour. It was a far cry from the island of Angus's childhood, and the quiet 
seasonal life of the Runciman proprietorship and the 1930's crofting community. 
Before Schellcnbcrg and the new arrivals on the island, Peggy and her young family 
spoke Gaelic at home. But with the children going to school and an ever-increasing 
number ofEnglish speakers coming to the island they eventually stopped.34 With just 
over a dozen Gaelic speakers left on the island, it is fair to say that whilst new people 
and new jobs had encouraged a social and numerical turnaround, the island's 
linguistic heritage and culture remained in decline. 
3.3 Divi ions on Eigg 
lJ Kirk, Pcggy; MacKinnon. 
34 Kirk. Pcggy. 
15 Morgan, Daniel. 
J. '. 
Figure 3.2: The island factor, the Loch Mor 
ds E. JJ Ferry pulls up towar 1gg. 
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By 1981 the great Eigg success story had started to experience a few problems. To 
begin with, the first six years of ownership revealed a very high turnover of staff in 
both seasonal and full-time employees. Obviously considering the variety of things he 
was doing on the estate, and the very casual styles of employment he preferred it is 
not surprising in itself that Schellenberg went through a number of staff. What was 
surprising however, was the number of people who either actively fell out with him, 
or he actively dismissed. There is a long history of people coming to odds with Keith 
Schellenberg and his business dealings on Eigg. However, it is hard to provide an 
authoritative list of these cases, since estate records are inaccessible, and most people 
did not feel the need to go public with their disagreements at the time. Unfortunately 
therefore, one is left with only anecdotal evidence of the various disputes and 
problems encountered on Schellenberg's Eigg estate. I will therefore provide just a 
few examples of how people fell into disagreement with their employer. 
The Devlin family were the first to experience trouble in their dealings with 
Schellenberg, and they were also the first to end up fighting legal battles over their 
employment and housing on the island. 36 Duncan Devlin was originally invited by 
Schellenberg, to give up his teaching job at Fraser Academy and move his young 
family to the island. There it was agreed he would set up a new craft centre, and run 
Kildonnan House as a guesthouse. He was promised £2,000 by Schellenberg to help 
start things up, and was assured with architectural plans of how the house would be 
renovated for him. After two weeks on the island, he was eventually told that cash 
was short and he would not be getting the money for start up costs. Worse still, 
Schellenberg informed him that the renovations on the house were also on hold. The 
winter weather soon set in, and the Devlins were increasingly feeling the cold. "I felt 
like I was going to be one ofthe team", he said in a newspaper article in 1992. "Team 
was one ofSchellenberg's favourite words but he was always the captain. Maybe it is 
because I'm a Glaswegian that I took a stand. The locals are used to generations of 
lairds". Making a stand was an uncomfortable thing to do on your own, however, 
especially on an island where the proprietor was so popular: 
"His people intimidated us. He was a great guy so you must be a rat for 
turning against him. That was the poison put about; when he needed 
36 Lindsay, Stuart. "Eigg's new laird runs into trouble", Glasgow Herald. June 3rd 1976. 
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someone you jumped. You felt like you weren't your own person. It seems 
dramatic but you felt defiled. On an island of 60 people, passing someone on 
the road without them saying hello, as if you weren't there, it was horrible 
and tense" .37 
After a couple of lengthy legal battles and 13 months in a house with polythene for 
windows, the Devlins fmally gave up and left the island. When questioned in 1992 
about the break down with the Devlins, Schellenberg could hardly remember them, 
and despite documented evidence, was sure he had never lost a court action against 
them. "He [Duncan Devlin] simply occupied somewhere which was needed for 
someone else. That's as far as it goes. Maybe because he was from Glasgow he 
couldn't cope with the life. He simply wasn't up to the job". 38 
Obviously it is problematic, as well as legally quite dangerous, to deduce too 
much from simply one story of a business deal gone wrong. As mentioned before, 
running an estate with as varied activities as Eigg did during the early years of 
Schellenberg' s ownership, there were bound to be upsets and disagreements. The 
problem was however that the Devlins were not an isolated case. Schellenberg fell 
into disagreement with a succession builders and assorted staff. Simon and Karen 
Helliwell experienced perhaps one of the typical and less flagrant falling outs with 
Schellenberg. Arriving in 1976, they too were directly recruited by him to work on the 
tourist side of the island operation. In return for work refitting cottages and running a 
ferry from the island during the summer, they were to be sold some land for a house 
and have the winters off to pursue their own crafts.39 Unfortunately, working 80 hour 
weeks almost all year round, there was little time for the crafts even in winter, and 
during the summer Simon had several altercations regarding the safety of the ferry 
service. Only licensed to carry 12 people, the boat Simon operated was often asked to 
take 15 to 20 people at a time. "Schellenberg would be sitting in his Aberdeen office, 
telling me that it was only a Force 3 on the weather forecast and the Sunart could 
easily get across but I knew it was a Force 6 on the forecast and could see it with my 
own eyes and I would refuse to go. That's how I blotted my copy book I suppose".40 
After 18 months, they had still not received any offer of land, and worse still, when 
37 Hennessey, Stewart. "Schellenberg gets his Eigg", Scotland on Sunday. June 12th 1992. 
38 ibid 
39 Helliwell, Simon. 
40 Dressier. p.l60 
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they had completed renovating the house they were living in, Brae Cottage, 
Schellenberg suggested they move into another derelict cottage and do that up for 
him. "He obviously thought it was a good idea for us to move from house to house 
until we had done them all up one by one. So we thought it would be better if we 
moved to the crofter's side and be independent. Dodie Campbell offered us an old 
croft house to rent and we decided to try the woodwork, but from then on, we were 
traitors to the cause". 41 
Even presuming no malice on his behalf, it is more than fair to say that 
Schellenberg had severe difficulties in managing people. He had a manner and a 
bearing that could rub people the wrong way, and a casualness in tense situations that 
could easily be interpreted as cavalier. As Angus MacKinnon describes, "He loved 
playing the laird, and he showed it whenever he was around". He "would spend all his 
time with his fancy cars and his sports", and yet at the same time "everything had to 
be done in a rush" on the estate.42 "Nothing was done the easy way", and projects and 
activities on the island invariably ended up with "arguments and [Schellenberg] 
changing his mind".43 Whether he intended it or not, Schellenberg obviously 
encouraged a vehemence in those he fell out with, and this was amplified by his 
outspoken views and his love of"playing the laird". He fell out particularly badly 
with an 'Island Manager' he hired in 1978 by the name oflan Carlton. Working on 
the island for a year, Carlton developed a particularly disdainful view of the estate 
management on Eigg: 
"Mr Schellenberg did not regard a laird's role as constituting a job at all, 
with work to be done with proper diligence, and sense of duty. Rather the 
laird was there to have fun, to enjoy his ego-trip whether driving vintage 
Bentleys, buying Victorian steam yachts, travelling the Orient express or 
bob-sleighing in Switzerland .... Very rapidly, I am afraid, I became aware 
of tens of thousands of pounds being frittered away on self indulgences, while 
development money was being sought from the HIDB, and we still had 
tenants in houses with rotten floors, no inside sanitation or adequate water 
supply. The Lodge with its almost cost free hydro-electric system was in stark 






build, lime to spread, but not apparently the resources to pay a decent wage 
or improve the saw mill". 44 
Like many subsequent grieves and managers on the island, Carlton did not last long 
on the job. Unlike most, however, he did make a stand in the press against what he 
saw and subsequently levelled harsh criticism against his former employer. In his 
1992 article for the West Highland Free Press, he concluded that "Eigg to Mr 
Schellenberg, was a plaything, a Meccano set or another vintage toy." He did not 
understand that he was playing with "flesh and bone, and peoples lives and families 
and homes". 
45 
Although these criticisms were being aired in Highland small talk and 
the minor regional press, the employment problems and falling-outs on Eigg were 
nevertheless seen as negligible and gossip at best. It certainly was not a community 
issue to speak of on the island, since Schellenberg remained a generous employer. 
"The wages were not exceptional, but they were not the worst either and they still 
allowed people to stay on the island".46 
Whilst Schellenberg's personnel problems on the island had only a minor 
impact within the community, his personal problems with his marriage to Margaret, 
on the other hand, were to precipitate enormous change. Trouble began in 1978 when 
Margaret became involved with a publisher by the name of Bill Williams. Separation 
soon followed, together with various revelations from Margaret's Udny estate 
manager, Mr Bruce. Since Mr Bruce had also "looked after Eigg" as well, he had a 
good idea of how the island was being run. As Bill Williams describes, one day Mr 
Bruce came to Maggie and said "Do you know what's happening ? Schellenberg is 
ripping you off".47 The island had originally been purchased with her money, that 
much she knew, but what she did not know was that "nearly all the payments for 
. setting up enterprises on Eigg" had also "come from Udny". There were allegedly 
hundreds ofUdny Estate cheque stubs for frivolous expenditures such as night clubs 
in London, and the purchasing of boats, cars, and even the running of an aeroplane. 
And these were then written up with a little "creative accounting" as "improvements 
on Eigg". 48 Precipitating even further acrimony in the ensuing divorce in 1981, the 
44 Carlton 
45 ibid 
46 Helliwell, Simon 




financial irregularities ensured that Margaret wanted as little to do with Eigg as 
possible. However, since the island was held in a limited partnership between the two, 
it was not divided or sold during the divorce. Instead, Eigg was to remain jointly 
owned and under the management of Schellenberg. Understandably, Margaret 
immediately closed off all connections and affiliations between her estate at Udny and 
the Eigg estate. This proved to be a serious blow for the island both materially and 
fmancially.
49 
In terms ofthe cattle enterprise, which involved the fattening of stock on 
the East Coast, this simply fmished off the business. The Udny office had been crucial 
in organising the transport and sale of stock. 5° On top ofthis the HIDB, which had 
ploughed some £120,000 into Schellenberg's projects on Eigg, now wanted to see 
some returns on the money spent. In more precise terms, they wanted to see some 
payments on the loan that the estate had been given to buy the cattle in the first place. 
Faced with a farm that was completely unprofitable, Schellenberg sold the cattle and 
decided to move solely into sheep. 51 A decision that, since sheep needed far less 
tending, meant he could also cut the wage bill by laying-off five farm workers. 
Unfortunately, since the five workers laid off included four young islanders 
this decision was not taken well in the community. 52 Indeed, the redundancies are 
cited by elder islanders as a crucial break in the community's relationship with 
Schellenberg. 53 Especially by those who looked towards a Runciman style estate that 
provided security and a job for life. As Peggy Kirk recalls, "That meant a lot that did, 
a steady and secure job, [and] five of them going on an island this small. There were 
some very upset people I can tell you". 54 One of the young workers, Donald 
MacKinnon, was so incensed that after a few remorseful drams he shouted at 
Schellenberg and took a swing at him down by the pier. Well versed in boxing at 
public school, Schellenberg neatly side-stepped the islander and knocked him down. 55 
It was not a good situation, nonetheless and after the redundancies, the vast majority 
of the island's residents no longer gave Schellenberg the benefit of doubt. Without the 
comparable personal wealth, nor the grand success story of private enterprise, 
49 Carlton. 
50 Dressier. p 162 
51 ibid p.163 
52 The five workers being: Duncan Fergusson, Angus Kirk, Alastair Kirk, Donald MacKinnon, and 
Wes Fyffe (an 'incomer'). 
53 MacKinnon; Kirk, Peggy 
54 Kirk, Peggy 
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Schellenberg's position as a Runciman-style employer was shot through. Fromthe 
summer of 1981 onwards islanders and the remaining estate workers alike, had the 
firm belief the estate was being managed on a shoestring budget. 56 
A division therefore began to develop on island from the early 1980's 
onwards, which ran frrmly along the lines of those who supported Schellenberg and 
those who were against him. People's position in this split was generated by whether 
they were either housed and employed by the estate, or were independent of the estate 
and living on the crofting land. If they were like Colin and Marie Carr, and were both 
employed and housed by the estate then they certainly supported Schellenberg. 
Schellenberg had the capacity for considerable charm and with Colin and Marie he 
rewarded their loyalty with friendship, confidence, and opportunity. 57 Colin became 
farm grieve in 1981 and working with the old Runciman shepherd Neil Macdonald, he 
was given new responsibilities and an enhanced position in the estate's management. 
The few remaining estate workers like Donald 'Craigard' (Campbell) the gardener, 
Anne Camp bell, and three other full time employees were in the same boat as the Carr 
family. They lived in tied houses as part of their employment and were consequently 
dependent on remaining in good favour if they wished to keep their job and live on 
the island: "Of course you defended him", says Anne Camp bell, "he owned the whole 
place, and he owned your house. You daren't say anything wrong about Schelley, or 
he'd get to hear about it and you'd be out on your ear. I never had a lease from him, 
not the whole time I've lived on Eigg. That's the way he had a hold ofyou".58 For 
those who lived in the crofting townships ofCleadale and Cuagach, however, this 
power of eviction did not hold. Schellenberg had little if any control over who lived 
on croft land, and this allowed much more critical opinions to be held about his 
ownership and management of the island. This was particularly so for those residents 
who were former employees of the estate, and though hostility was rarely ever shown 
towards Schellenberg himself, "people made sure he didn't feel too comfortable when 
he came over to the crofters' side of the island". 59 
55 MacKinnon. 






Unfortunately for Schellenberg, 'the crofter's side of the island' was not only 
"generally against him", but was numerically expanding as well. 60 Rather alarmingly 
the townships were now being predominantly settled with his ex-employees; the very 
independently minded and resourceful people he had recruited himself and then fallen 
out with. People like the Helliwells, who had fallen foul of his promise to provide 
land for a house, or the offer of an old estate house to buy or lease, instead started 
settling into Cleadale and Cuagach from the late 1970's onwards. They either took 
over abandoned crofts like Wes and Maggie Fyffe, or land was de-crofted and sold to 
them for housing like Simon and Karen Helliwell. Brian Greene and Camille Dressier 
were some of few who simply lived in caravans that were located on croft land. 
Whatever the case between 1978 and 1992 - eight new couples moved into Cleadale 
and Cuagach; all of them apart from one couple had first worked on the estate, and all 
ofthem apart from another couple were incomers to the community. 61 Their 
numerical impact was very significant. In 1975 the crofting population on Eigg 
accounted for 21 people out of an island population of39 [53%]. In 1992, the 
population resident on the crofting land had almost doubled to 41, out of an island 64 
[64%].62 New people brought new housing, and the crofting townships saw the steady 
renovation of old croft houses and the building of new homes. This was obviously 
increased and enhanced when Cleadale and Cuagach were designated as a Housing 
Action Area in 1988. The grants produced not only new homes, but circulated more 
money on the island, as well as providing employment independent of the estate. 
The steady infusion of disgruntled ex-estate employees over the course of the 
1980's into the crofting townships hardly alleviated the basic division on the island 
regarding Schellenberg. Indeed, for Schellenberg the crofting land was now 
increasingly a hot house of discontentment, and most frustrating of all, it was beyond 
his powers to directly control. With the Social Security system providing a safety net 
for people determined on staying, Schellenberg found it infuriating that the local 
council would be interested in helping people to build homes on the island. Objecting 
against the proposal of the Housing Action Area on Eigg in 1987, he was most 
60 MacKinnon 
61 These coupl~s were: Maggie & Wes Fyffe, Brian Greene &Camille Dressier, Trevor & Sue, John 
Cormack & Nat, Karen & Simon Helliwell, Mick & Jacki, Davy & Amber Robertson, Angus & Mairi 
Kirk. 
62 Numbers compiled in conversation with Marie Carr. 
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concerned with where it would all end if housing grants were given out. ''If you get 
several hundred people moving into caravans in Cleadale will you feel obliged to 
provide them all with houses even though they may have come from Birmingham, 
Ireland or France ?''63 The first of his many references to particular incomers (in this 
case Maggie & Wes Fyffe and Camille Dressier), Schellenberg was notably resentful 
of his ex-employees gaining independence on the island. lie was also no doubt highly 
frustrated by the fact that the crofters on Eigg had given out security of tenure to the 
very people he had refused. 64 He was against the Housing Action Area because in his 
view the wrong people would be gaining state aid. As he pointed out in his letter of 
objection: "I do not quite understand why my own house and quite a lot of the other 
holiday houses which are let out are not included in the housing Action Area".65 
.r. . if£" 66 Figure 3.3: The croJttng area o 1gg 
(In the photo the road passes through Cleadale - nearest- and then 
Cuagach before passing over the hill towards 
the middle ojtlfe island) 
"'3 Schellenberg, Keith. Proposed Isle of Eigg Housing Action Area Letter from Isle of Eigg Estate. to 
Andrew Jackson , Lochaber District Council. 200 July 1987. lEA 
64 ~xamples of those promised land for sale or a lease on a prop~ when they wer~ employed by 
Schellenbcrg- Simon & Karen llelliwell; Brian Greene & Cam tile Dressier; Magg1e & Wes F'yffe: 
John & Nat Cormack. 
bS ibid. 
66 Morgan, Daniel. 
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As for the resident islander's perception of the new families in Cleadale and 
Cuagach, it is clear that there were some perceived social differences. Angus 
MacKinnon, who was principal in securing many of the new residents places to live 
called them ''the hippie lot".
67 
Brian and Camille, Maggie and Wes, Sue and Trevor, 
and John and Nat were all associated together as a clique in the community. They 
generally fitted the stereotype of"hippie" since they mostly had long hair, and with 
their copies self-sufficiency manuals in hand, they were prime examples of the new 
types of settlers in the Highlands and Islands.68 Like many in the 1970's and 80's they 
were seeking an alternative lifestyle, and when they settled in Cleadale and Cuagach 
they believed they had found it. Arriving on the island at approximately the same 
time, the four couples naturally fitted together as a group. They developed a close 
friendship, which as all of them describe was bound together by each of them raising 
children of approximately the same age. 69 
Though this subgroup, or "social group" as John Cormack calls it, represented 
a form of division within the resident community, it was very much tempered by the 
closeness of island life. As Angus MacKinnon describes, "You have to be a part of 
things on Eigg, and if you don't get along with people, or you don't know how things 
really work, then you can die of loneliness". 70 The everyday communal activities of 
getting fuel and supplies from the mainland always encouraged a form of bonding 
amongst the island's inhabitants. This was very much the same in terms of the social 
life on the island. "You couldn't just stay in a wee little group", recalls Brian, "You 
lived in a place of just 60 odd people, and everyone got together for the celidhs and 
parties. It was a group necessity".71 The new couples were also very active, and 
particularly John and Nat Cormack were quickly involved in all aspects of island life. 
John became the ferryman in 1981, and in 1988 the island's postman as well, and this 
ensured a closeness with all the island's inhabitants. Likewise, as Peggy Kirk notes, 
others were accepted by the islanders for their tenacity and spirit: "They livened 
things up. And they were good at getting along, the ones that stayed. Worked hard 
too. Maggie and Wes were very good. They took up the croft, and Wes was out there 
67 MacKinnon. 
68 Dressier. p.l64 





on it every day, [and] apart from us [at Laig Farm] and Katie, they were the only ones 
left doing milk and cheese". 
72 
As Camille Dressier describes, the slow assimilation of 
newcomers into island life was also amply assisted by the "natural rounding of edges" 
that happens in small and isolated communities.73 It is a process well documented in 
Anthony Cohen's study ofWhalsay, whereby the inclination of folk in close 
communities is to allow a certain leeway in social relations. Very much the product of 
a social life from which escape and retreat are well nigh impossible, islanders tended 
to avoid open conflict and ensure a certain consistency and peace to island life. 74 In so 
doing newcomers were given chances to adjust and fit in to established ways of doing 
things, and as Angus says "if they didn't learn .... they were gone".75 
3.4 Organising the Community 
Many visitors to the island over the years commentated upon the fact that 
compared to mainland communities there was so little actively organised on Eigg. In 
part this was because of the convenience of small numbers, but mainly it was due to 
the historical dominance of the proprietor upon the island's economic and social 
life. 76 The Crofters' Grazings Committee had of course some function in co-
ordinating the agricultural life in the crofting townships. But by the 1980's, this was 
of little consequence, for though numbers of people living on the crofts had increased, 
there was little land actually being worked. Resident ministers and priests had also 
traditionally filled many aspects of social organisation on the island, yet with no full-
time resident clergy, the church too proved of little merit in the 1980's. The only body 
which islanders could use to co-ordinate and express their grievances was the Small 
Isles Community Council. Established in 1977, the Community Council primarily 
focussed on issues common to all four Small Isles. Whilst this had its functions, it met 
but only once a year and considering each island was so different, Eigg residents 
found it highly limited in scope and effect.77 This was especially felt amongst the new 
72 Kirk, Peggy. 
73 Dressier. p.l68 
74 Cohen, Anthony P. Whalsay : Symbol, segment and boundary in a Shetland island community. 
Manchester University Press, Manchester. 1987. pp.27-37 
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residents, who believed ''the shambles of the Community Council needed replacing 
with something that was more specific to the island's needs". 78 It was therefore 
decided in 1983 to establish an independent representative body: The Isle ofEigg 
Residents Association (IERA). 
Although Dressier declares that "the creation of the association was to mark a 
turning point in island life", the IERA was far from radical or revolutionary in its 
early years. 
79 
Reviewing the early hand written minutes shows very modest 
beginnings and activities in the fledgling organisation. A fairly typical example of one 
of the 2000 or so voluntary bodies in the Highlands and Islands, its initial meetings 
covered very menial issues such as co-ordinating fuel runs to the mainland, running a 
film club, and organising celidhs. 80 In short, it was a very basic event that remained 
mostly annual, at which around a third of the community would turn up to sort out 
communal necessities and social events. Some of the older islanders like Angus 
MacKinnon found it a bit of a ''talking shop", and to be the plaything of the 
newcomers to Eigg. 81 This is somewhat confrrmed by the dominance of the new 
young settlers in the IERA's minutes and elected positions. Nat Corrnack, Colin Carr 
and Simon Helliwell all took notable prominence as chairpersons and secretaries. 
Similarly those who contributed to meetings, and were recorded in the minutes, such 
as Marie Carr and Camille Dressier also tended to be from the younger and newcomer 
elements ofthe community. 
Reflecting a stereotypical characteristic of incomers to rural areas, it is clear that 
the newcomers to Eigg certainly felt more comfortable with speaking out and being 
involved in committees, meetings, and such like. As Jedrej and Nuttall note from their 
studies of other highland communities, however, this dominance of incomers in 
committees and positions of authority was not because they were simply more used to 
the procedure and formality. Neither was it indicative of their successful integration 
into local life and society. 82 It was a much more complex situation. One that 
obviously began with the desire of new arrivals to gain acceptance and position within 
78 Helliwell, Karen. Interview 6th February 1998 
79 Dressier. p. 165 
80 I ERA Minutes. February 26 1983. lEA. 
81 MacKinnon. 
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'the community', but which also was determined by a certain conservatism and 
exclusivity amongst the established residents. Firstly locals, or islanders, preferred to 
allow those less settled in the community to be the ones to try out anything new. 
Incomers had the least to lose, and consequently were the most expendable. In much 
the same vein, since incomers could also be judged as being both resident but not 
fully integrated into the community, they had a certain value in being almost objective 
in their concerns. Consequently in matters of common interest such as water, roads, 
and public services, incomers were often promoted into positions of authority 
precisely because they were not 'part of the community'. 83 
Since the IERA did not directly replace or overrule any established or 'traditional' 
forms of communal organisation, there was little if any controversy regarding its 
initial role on the island. "It was filling a void of sorts", 84 and with issues such as 
hostel provision for the island's school children on the mainland, and campaigning for 
the replacement of a resident doctor, the IERA began to establish a certain amount of 
credibility.85 By the mid to late 1980's, things had noticeably picked up with not only 
a greater range of topics being covered in meetings, but a much more confident 
approach being taken with the local council and outside bodies. 86 This was propelled 
in part by the developing confidence and knowledge of the IERA, but also by the 
growing intransigence of Schellenberg towards the crofting townships and the 
residents' wishes. The IERA began to investigate expanding the provision of services 
on the island, especially in terms of housing, caring for the elderly, and refuse 
disposal. Rubbish had long been a problem on the island, and one that was 
compounded by an ever-expanding rat population. Since Schellenberg rarely took the 
IERA seriously, their requests for a landfill site were frivolously answered with the 
suggestion of a plot in the middle of Cleadale. 87 Like the islanders, the Health and 
Safety Department of HRC refused to allow the site so close to residential housing. 88 
Although the refuse issue was never to be resolved, the problems of care for the 
elderly were somewhat answered by the setting up of a lunch club, sponsored by 
Shelter, and run on a voluntary basis by the island's women. These activities of the 
83 ibid. 
84 Kirk, Peggy. 
85 IERA Minutes. May 24th 1984. 
86 ibid. March 2nd 1985. 
87 Dressier. p.166 
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IERA caught the attention of the Social Work Department, who in turn recognised the 
lack of provision for the island's elderly. A home-help service was soon established, 
and it was not long before they donated an old mini-bus for transporting the elderly to 
and from the shop and their lunch club. 89 
The summer of 1986 saw the drafting of a new constitution and the registration of 
the association as a charitable body. This had been initiated by the ambitious plans to 
raise funds for a new community hall in Cleadale. Over the years problems had arisen 
with the community's use of the existing hall next to the Lodge. Although 
Schellenberg allowed access, there was no provision for repairs or electricity, and 
without any form of lease the IERA could not take advantage of financial assistance 
from outside agencies. Consequently the residents took aim at raising £15,000 
themselves and securing £87,000 of grants from the HRC, Scottish Education 
Department, and the HIDB.90 Schellenberg was noticeably keen on this project, and 
not only contributed some money himself, but his new wife Suki suggested using the 
entrance fees to that years Eigg Games. 91 A Steering Group was elected to co-ordinate 
the venture, and a year of raffies, celidhs and sponsored events followed in which 
almost every member of the community contributed. As Nat Cormack describes, "We 
found out the following Easter that we had made nearly £2,000, when the most we'd 
ever had was a hundred pounds or so for the children's Christmas p~ and the New 
Year whiskey, and this gave us all a tremendous feeling of achievement''. 92 
3.5 Brewing Opposition to Schellenberg 
New people arriving onto Eigg had brought new demands for opportunity and 
development independent of the estate. In doing so, they also brought new methods 
and confidence to the relationships between the island's residents and owner. Whilst 
the IERA had gained in strength and assurance, however, significant problems 
remained. Chief amongst these, was the continued lack of activity on the estate and on 
the behalf ofMr Schellenberg. Throughout the 1980's the estate remained on a 
88 IERA Minutes. Feb 261h 1983 and 12th Feb 1988 
89 Dressier. pp.l68-169 
90 IERA Minutes. July 4th 1986. 
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shoestring budget with Colin Carr undergoing ridiculous shortages in running the 
farm. Cash was so short at one time, that there was not even enough diesel: "I'd be in 
the middle of a feeding round and the tractor would run out of diesel. I'd have to walk 
back from Grulin or wherever I was to the pier, fill up a five gallon drum from the 
Ban Mora tanks and walk all the way back again because the estate manager would 
not allow me to buy any fuel". 
93 
The tourist trade was likewise suffering from a lack 
of investment and running repairs, with houses each year deteriorating and each year 
getting harder and harder to prepare for the coming season. 94 The only significant 
investment being made on the island was that of the 218.7 hectares of forestry 
plantation carried out in 1982 and 1983. This was planted under the Woodland Grant 
Scheme, and managed by Scottish Woodlands was a lucrative tax break for 
Schellenberg and his partners. 
Not only were the island's residents experiencing a noticeable decline in the 
estate's activities during the 1980's, but Schellenberg's ex-wife Margaret Williams 
had failed to receive any accounts or income from the property during the entire 
period since her divorce. The forestry plantation was a case in point, for although 
Schellenberg had assured Margaret that her share would be paid into their children's 
trust fund, "he never did, and he and his partner pocketed the lot". 95 Indeed on top of 
the lack of income, with the island held in a limited partnership Margaret was "still 
bound in an open ended agreement and was very exposed". When she decided 
therefore to have a look at the island for herself in the summer of 1987, Schellenberg 
prevented her from entering the house. As Bill Williams remarks, "When you are a 
full partner in a property and you are actually prevented from entering the building by 
your other partner- then things must be badly wrong". 96 Consequently on July 131h 
1988 she sued him for "mismanaging the island" and "devaluing" her half share. In so 
doing she demanded that the island be put up for sale immediately.97 Denying the 
claims of mismanagement, Schellenberg contested and began a series of legal 
proceedings that were to keep the decision in court for the next three and a half years. 
During this time, the island was left in limbo with Schellenberg unable to sign or 
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agree to any development on the island because of the contested nature of his 
proprietorship. On top of the generally stagnant nature of the estate anyway, this 
meant that there was absolutely no chance of the situation changing on the island. 
Schellenberg's general relationship with the island's residents therefore continued to 
decline. It was a decline that was only enhanced by the 1988 Eigg Games and his 
characteristically boisterous behaviour. 
The 1988 Eigg Games were the most ambitious to date and included teams flying 
in from the States and from St. Moritz. Various celebrities and socialites such as the 
Clanranalds and the German playboy Gunter Sachs were also to make appearances. 
Continuing from the Jacobite and Hanovarian theme of preceding years, Schellenberg 
based the games upon the Axis vs. the Allied powers. Islanders began to feel 
uncomfortable when Nazi flags were seen flying over the Lodge, and especially when 
Gunter Sachs arrived by helicopter in full Prussian military dress and flanked by 
attendants in flowing capes. 
98 TEA 
Figure 3.4 : Gunter Sachs (far left) inspects his 
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Troops on the Lodge lawn for the 1988 Eigg Games. 
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This caused much distaste amongst the islanders, especially the elder generation some 
of whom had fought during the war. The island was enveloped in an atmosphere of 
tension that was to eventually explode at the evening's celidh. Following suggestions 
from the last IERA meeting, islanders had decided to charge admission to the 
evening's dance.
99 
They were providing the "local colour" and since the island band 
was unpaid, the IERA felt it only fair to charge a small entrance fee to raise funds for 
the hall. Although guests paid, some were a little unsure, and eventually a furious 
Schellenberg arrived and demanded the money back. The band walked off the stage 
followed by most of the islanders: 
"A furious Captain of Clanranald pursued them outside, shouting insults 
in the dark: 'Scum of the earth, half baked socialists' whilst trying to box 
'the peasants ears'. Schellenberg was trotting behind him to point out 
that 'these people were not the real islanders, some of them were even 
foreigners !' 100 
Although the clash amounted to little more than a bit of shouting and bad 
taste, it was nevertheless precipitous in colouring the deteriorating relationship 
between Schellenberg and the island's residents. He had clashed with not just isolated 
members of the community this time, but instead had come up against the residents' 
own representative body, and in a particularly ugly and outlandish way as well. The 
two hundred odd pounds that he confiscated was never returned in the end, and his 
"over-the-top reaction" embarrassed his own guests to the point that some of them 
secretly gave the IERA money. 101 Considering that many of the residents involved 
had already experienced soured relations with Schellenberg, it is not surprising that 
the clash "made those disaffected with Schellenberg completely give up on ever 
trying to deal with him again". 102 
Disaffection with Schellenberg was by the late 1980's far from restricted to just 
the island's residents. From mid 1980's onwards, the IERA had continued to liase 
with HRC departments and other outside agencies over the issues of housing, 
sanitation, and refuse. In so doing, various authorities had been exposed to the 
99 IERA Minutes. February 12th 1988 
100 Dressier. p.l75 




situation on the island, and almost invariably run foul of Schellenberg. The essential 
problem being, that whilst the HRC was obliged to look after the health, welfare, and 
development of those resident on Eigg, Schellenberg was in disagreement over who 
exactly was entitled to live on the island, and what the course of development should 
be. Consequently whilst he would provide rent free accommodation and tied houses to 
what staff and favourites he had left on the island, he remained more than wary of 
giving people leases and security of tenure. This caused significant problems for local 
council services, for without any form of security of tenure a large number of 
residents were unable to take advantage of the various grants and loans available for 
home and civic improvements. Living in substandard housing, several elderly 
residents such as Dolly Ferguson were causing substantial anguish to council officials. 
Though she lived by grace and favour, Dolly's cottage for example, leaked so badly 
that she was reduced to living in one room; sleeping on a sofa, and occasionally being 
bitten by rats at night. Purpose built sheltered housing was the only real answer, yet 
with Schellenberg's legal actions over the management and sale ofEigg this was 
impossible to further. Consequently, as the Housing Action Area debate 
demonstrated, a stalemate had occurred whereby Schellenberg took any council 
involvement on the island as merely interference. For Dr Michael Foxley the local 
Small Isles Councillor, the situation was untenable especially considering the possible 
sale of Eigg and HRC' s planned investments on the island. As well as the plans for 
some £200,000 to be spent on sheltered housing, the HRC was also preparing to spend 
£750,000 on an extension to the island jetty, and a further £200,000 on a new water 
supply for Cleadale. As he stated in 1990: "Over £1.2 million of public funds are 
about to be spent on the island. I don't feel like putting that kind of money into the 
place so some offshore clown has a more valuable asset at the end ofthe day". 103 
Security of tenure also proved a significant bone of contention for others involved 
with Eigg, namely the SWT. The original agreements with Schellenberg had been 
highly productive with not only three SWT reserves being established, but a ranger by 
the name of John Chester being housed by the estate from 1986 onwards. However, 
tensions between the SWT and Schellenberg had already begun with the Sitka Spruce 
103 Crichton, Torcuil. "Weighing up the odds of taking Eigg into public ownership". West Highland 
Free Press~ 14th December. 1990 
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and Lodgepole Pine plantations in the early 1980's. 104 Unfortunately Schellenberg did 
not consult the SWT over the environmental impacts of the afforestation project, 
which in the end was to prove highly destructive to the Blar Dubh bog above Laig. 
"Easily the richest area ofbogland on Eigg for its plant and insect diversity", the mass 
plantations drained and acidified the SSSI bog into ordinary wet moorland. 105 
Nevertheless the resident warden was very successful in managing the designated 
reserves, and worked well with the island's crofters and the estate farm in co-
ordinating various environmental projects. It was a quiet and low key approach that 
was only hindered by the fact that Schellenberg refused to provide any form of lease 
for the warden's residence. The SWT would have happily paid a rent or bought a 
property to ensure their continued involvement on the island, but Schellenberg again 
preferred the casual arrangement. This was very problematic for the SWT, especially 
since the properties used to house the warden were only barely habitable. More 
importantly, however, with the potential sale of the island, it also meant that they had 
no foot hold on the island whatsoever. 106 Like various islanders in other estate 
properties, they were only present on the island by grace and favour alone. Over a 
decade of work and involvement accounted for very little without security of tenure. 
The prospect of the island's sale came ever more closer in July of 1989 when 
the Edinburgh Court of Session determined that Schellenberg must sell the island. A 
year previously, he had attempted to circumvent the sale by transferring his share of 
the island to his family firm, Cleveland and Island Holdings Ltd. In fact this 
transaction was the central cause for Schellenberg losing the case, since Lord Presser 
decided that in so doing he had forfeited his property rights over the island. 107 In 
characteristic fashion, Schellenberg immediately launched a flamboyant appeal. He 
told reporters outside the courthouse: 
"The effects of this judgement, would if implemented, be that I would be 
evicted from my own home of 15 years and thrown out of my job. I use 
these emotive words deliberately because they describe the reality. The 12 
people and 10 households who currently work with me,* earning their 
living and paying their taxes from the island farm's assets, as well as 
104 Wilcox. Conversation. 
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many others who a re connected or associated with us in one way or 
a nother , a re even more vulnera ble to a fo rced change of ownership". 108 
The irony of his remarks was no doubt hardly lost on the many employees who had 
already suffered a s imilar fate under his management of the island. Neither was it lost 
on Margaret, who had been "horrified at how Schellenberg was bullying people on the 
island". 
109 
Coming from traditional land owning aristocracy, where estate ownership 
incorporated much responsibility, Margaret was acutely uncomfortable with the way 
the island had become "a rich man's playground". "The Eigg Games were a complete 
embarrassment, ... and sent such an appalling message". In trying to rectify the 
damage done, therefore, during the final legal wrangling over the appeal and the sale 
of the island, Margaret worked with Schellenberg to provide some security for loyal 
islanders like Coll in and Marie Carr. A limited partnership was drawn up between the 
Carrs and the estate to manage Kildonnan. and when Col in and Marie added their 
names to the transactions they were glad to see that their loyalty and hara work had 
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This small piece of co-operation between Schellenberg and his former 2"d wife 
over the farms was quite remarkable considering that their fights in the courts and 
media continued in pace and vitriol. Both were well connected with media types and 
both had funds to pay for expensive legal actions. Of the two, however, Schellenberg 
was clearly the more adept at fmding writers and journalists to provide glowing 
renditions of his side of the story. Henry Porter was one such writer, who penned a 
particularly enthusiastic depiction of Schellenberg in the glossy society magazine 
Harpers and Oueen.
112 
Making much of his benevolence, Porter described 
Schellenberg 's sterling efforts towards the island's inhabitants and wildlife: "You 
know," Schellenberg is quoted as saying, "I simply wanted the people who have 
struggled to make a life there to have some security". Apparently, however, he had 
been "outwitted" and ''thoroughly trounced" by "the two sections of Scottish society 
that he likes the least- the disapproving Calvinist lawyers and the straight-laced 
dogmatists of the left". This was pointedly made apparent by various quips against 
Bill Williams, ''who Schellenberg claims is as left wing as his friend Brian Wilson 
MP". Indeed Brian Wilson, editor of the West Highland Free Press, was quoted as 
vehemently resenting Schellenberg's "improvements" on Eigg: "He set up this private 
kingdom on his second wife's money and has generally used the island as a vehicle 
for self-publicity and self-aggrandisement ... He is an arsehole". 113 
Though making Schellenberg out to be a little "sad", the article nevertheless 
pitted him in a heroic light battling against a co-ordinated conspiracy of "local 
socialists". "My ideas went against the grain" he explained, "You see a hell of a lot of 
islands are occupied by hippies, people who have no inner resources. These people 
expect and get hand-outs of various sorts ... But I wanted it to be a profitable 
business, so that instead of using taxpayers money, the islanders paid tax from their 
incomes". 114 Unfortunately, Schellenberg had not only forgot the extensive subsidies, 
grants, and loans he had himself gained from the state, but Henry Porter had also 
conveniently forgot to interview the Williams about the story. They consequently took 
action against the article and in December 1991 the Press Complaints Commission 
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upheld their protest against Harpers and Queen. 115 Nevertheless, Schellenberg had 
been able to get his side across, and despite the end result had managed to put one 
over on the Williams. It was a tenacious and belligerent approach that hardly endeared 
him to his former wife, the island's residents, or perhaps more importantly to the 
media. 
3.6 The Isle of Eigg Trust 
Though Schellenberg may have once stood as a Liberal Parliamentary 
candidate, he had obviously taken the Thatcherite ideology of the 1980's to heart. 
Private enterprise and above all private ownership were at the centre of his political 
beliefs and he rarely avoided plugging his own views on the matter. For others 
however, his views and his high profile activities on Eigg represented everything that 
was wrong with private land ownership in the Highlands and Islands. Tom Forsyth 
was one such individual, who after several visits to Eigg became increasingly 
frustrated by the unfulfilled potential of the island. Having formerly worked for the 
Iona Community, as well as initiating a highly successful resettlement of the Scoraig 
peninsular, Tom was very much aware of the possibilities for social and economic 
development on the island. Liz Lyon was another who had become disillusioned with 
Schellenberg's style of ownership, although her dissatisfaction came from more direct 
exposure to conditions on Eigg and the Schellenberg family. Not only a school friend 
of both Suld Schellenberg and Margaret Williams, Liz was also the former wife of 
Bill Williams. These remarkably close connections had led to her invitation to the 
island several times by Schellenberg. However, after taking time to befriend some of 
the islanders she found it "impossible to live the high life up at the Lodge, when 
elderly ladies like Dolly were rotting in derelict housing". 116 Teaming up with Tom in 
the spring of 1991, the two decided to try to do something about the situation and 
seconded the help of two community activists Bob Harris and Alastair Macintosh. 
With the island lurching towards an eventual sale, their solution was to establish a 
charitable trust and begin fundraising for a community buy-out. With Tom and Liz 
115 Wilson, Brian. "Brian Wilson Writes", West Highland Free Press. 6th December, 1991. 
116 Lyon, Elizabeth. Interview 12th May 1997 
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forking out the £1700 for legal fees, 117 the Isle ofEigg Trust was registered as a 
formal charitable body on July 18th 1991. 118 
The four trustees had very different motivations in creating the lET. For Tom 
and Liz there were deeply personal and spiritual reasons for becoming involved. The 
island elicited something special, both in its beauty, history, and people. For Bob and 
Alastair, however, there was a more practical and political edge to their concerns. 
Both had recently become aware of the problems of land ownership in the Highlands 
and Islands, and for Alastair in particular Eigg represented a perfect launching point 
for publicising the issues on a national scale. "Schellenberg had already created press 
interest in the island with all his antics, and the creation of the Trust was to simply 
pour a little more fuel on the fire. Basically, it was the ideal scenario for launching 
something different. Something that would make folk pay attention to the problems of 
land ownership in Scotland". 119 Hence, the decision was made to launch the lET in 
Edinburgh in the plush setting of the Balmoral Hotel. 
This was done on the 23 rd July 1991, and to guarantee media attendance they invited 
Schellenberg along as well. Making their bid for raising £3 million, the Trustees 
appealed for public donations and support for their plans. Plans which although rather 
sparse, included a "Life Centre" at the Lodge catering for "burned out businessmen" 
together with ideas of revitalising island's agricultural economy. They also looked 
towards the greater participation of islanders in the management of the estate, and the 
steady expansion ofthe island's population up to around 200. 120 Schellenberg, ''the 
beleaguered owner" provided a counter to their idealism, and the media keenly 
reported on the minor clashes involved. Generally, the lET was successful in gaining 
widespread attention. However, almost all papers initially took the lET as being a 
little off the wall, and the right wing broad-sheets were more than often hostile. The 
Daily Telegraph was notably antagonistic and carried the story under the by-line of 
"Urban dropouts' seek £3 million to buy Eigg". There was a distinct amount of shock 
117 ibid 
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expressed at the fact that ''the four initial trustees admit they would like to see the law 
on land ownership changed and the concept oflandlords abolished". 121 
Fig.3. 6: The Isle of Eigg Trust 
(From left to right: Bob Harrls, Tom Forsyth, Liz Lyon, and 
Alastair Macintosh) 
The battle for credibility was to be a defining feature of the lET's campaign 
for ownership over the next twelve months. Apart from the essential unlikelihood of 
raising the prescribed £3 million, credibility was chiefly sought because the lET's 
ideas of ownership and management appeared so far fetched. Firstly, their plans for 
development were sketchy to say the least. The 'life centre' attracted much attention, 
especially with the lET's notions that "bank managers would enrol to learn dry stone 
dyking, ad men would shear sheep, and lawyers to muck out the byre". 122 Secondly, 
the idea of expanding the island's population up to two hundred people was also 
questioned. Indeed, this point notably facilitated Schellenberg into comment: "All you 
121 Reid, Robert. "Urban dropouts' seek £3 million to buy Eigg", Daily Telegraph, 241h July 1991. 
122 Duncan, Raymond. "Trust aims to Raise £3m to buy Eigg", The Herald. 24dt July 1991. 
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will end up with", he said at the press launch, "would be a huge number of people 
living on social security".
123 
Thirdly, and most crucially considering their plans of 
community involvement and talk of"community ownership", was the fact that the 
lET had only the slightest of connections to the island. Apart from Liz Lyon, Tom 
Forsyth was the only Trustee with contacts on the island, and he had only talked to a 
few people about the lET's ideas. There had been no proper consultation undertaken, 
and certainly no mandate from the IERA. In fact, worse still Alastair Macintosh, who 
had already begun to dominate press coverage of the Trust, had never even set foot on 
the island. It was a problematic situation, to say the least, and the Trust had to begin 
gaining credibility the hard way - by presenting their proposals to the islanders. This 
they did by frrst sending a pamphlet to each islander in early October, 124 and then 
scheduling a meeting at the end of the month. 
The booklet, like Alastair's eventual address to the 40 or so islanders on the 
25th of October was full of hope and belief, but still very lacking in practical direction 
and content. 125 Essentially his presentation hammered home the simple point: that 
''the inhabitants ofEigg today, like those of so much of Scotland, have a legal status 
akin to only nuisance value in matters of 'real' estate ... " Whereas" .... should the 
Trust acquire ownership ofEigg, ... security of tenure would be offered to those who 
lack it". 126 In trying to put some meat on the bones of how the island would be 
managed, he also made clear that the Trustees would work in tandem with a 
"management committee representative of the community". 127 The meeting lasted 
three hours, and though the Trustees were hospitably welcomed and politely 
questioned, there were enormous doubts in most islanders' minds. To start with, as 
Kenneth Kean recalls, the main thought was: "Where did these people come from, 
and how did they get to this position without talking to any of us ?". 128 Some were 
even "pissed off', because the Trust had not only "formed themselves and arrived on 
the scene without a word to the Residents Association", but in the process they had 
123 Hetherington. 24th July 1991. 
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also "hijacked the name". 
129 
The "hippie" and "new age" aspects of the Trustees 
struck most islanders: even those branded as hippies themselves. As Brian Greene 
describes, his frrst impressions of the Trustees were that they were "very hairy" and 
"too far out for this place".
13° For John Cormack they appeared to be ')ust a bunch of 
old hippies chasing a pipe dream". 131 Nevertheless a Residents Association meeting 
was arranged for the following week on the gth of November in order to consider the 
Trust's proposals. 
A notably high turn out of residents appeared for the meeting, and significant 
debate was held over the exact nature of the IERA's relationship to the proposed 
Trust. People wanted more formalised acknowledgement of the community's rights in 
any new ownership scheme. Consequently, in the end it was agreed that any 'yes' 
vote would be on condition that the Trust's constitution was amended on two points. 
Firstly that the IERA should have at least 2 of its members elected as Trustees of the 
lET. Secondly that the IERA "should have the right to discuss and if necessary veto 
any policy decisions that are felt to have serious affect on the island or 
community". 132 There was also considerable debate regarding who was ''resident" on 
the island, and who had the right to vote on the issue. Though solved by the IERA 
constitutional definition of "ordinarily resident", as living on the island for six months 
or more, it was still felt that relatives should contact non-resident islanders and 
ascertain their wishes. With the constitutional provisos written on each ballot paper, 
the vote was held on the 11th of November. 
A hundred percent turnout of the island's 48 eligible voters produced 35 votes 
in favour of the Trust proposals. 133 For the Trustees this was the confirmation they 
needed, and from now on they would continue to flourish their 73% backing from the 
island's residents. For Alastair it was "defmitely a huge relief' and ''the vote certainly 
changed the whole temper of the campaign". It turned what for him ''was a big 
theatrical spectacle" into something ''that was slowly becoming real- very real 
129 Helliwell, Simon. 
130 Greene. 
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For the islanders however, there remained enormous caution. Obviously 
the vast majority had voted in favour, yet they had done so, only because they felt 
there was little other option. As both Sue Kirk and Simon Helliwell recall, ''the vote 
showed just how desperate we were". 135 Apart from the lET's ideas for expanding 
population numbers, and their notable lack of money, the main cause for concern on 
the island was the lET's campaigning on the wider front of land reform. This left 
many with the feeling that ''there was a hidden agenda", and that "Eigg was just a 
platform for them".
136 
Nevertheless, with the 'islanders vote of confidence', the lET 
had suddenly gained more attention for the island. The land reform angle being 
precisely what the news media needed; it gave a strong political edge to an otherwise 
minor human-interest feature. In particular lET's stand on land issues fired up the 
West Highland Free Press into actively supporting their bid for "community 
ownership". By the end ofNovember the radical local paper was eagerly asking, 
"Will Schellenberg be the last emperor ofEigg?''137 
Though the lET had finally elicited a tacit acceptance from the island's 
residents, they still lacked credibility in their plans for the island's economy. In fact in 
response to the escalating attention, Schellenberg had begun to firm up his criticism of 
the lET on precisely this front. He described their sketchy plans of development, as 
"romantic gobbledegook and a recipe for total chaos". Eigg he suggested could only 
support 3,000 ewes and only justified three working shepherds. The Trustees 
therefore had "no understanding of agri-economics", and he declared "I can't see 
anyone with a sense of responsibility putting substantial sums of money into the 
hands of this quartet". 138 It was a fair point, and the lET were in desperate need of a 
feasibility study to outline their proposals credibly. Approaching the Local Enterprise 
Company Locharber Ltd., they were lucky enough to fmd support in the shape of 
£7,000 for a survey and study of the island's economy. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, however, the resulting Eigg Feasibility Study did not really provide the 
confident backing they required. 139 Instead it prompted more questions than it asked, 
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and its figures and five year projections appeared to most people, especially islanders 
to be "picked out of the air".
140 
Jt was still better than nothing, and considering that 
Schellenberg finally put the island up for sale on the l41h May 1992, they were forced 
to release the study just 6 days later. 
Figure 3. 7: Cover of the Sal~s Brochure for Eigg 
lwud on Uth May 1992w 
Whilst the lET were apparently scaring away potential buyers from Eigg, 142 
others were also engaged in trying to mount some form of alternative bid for 
ownership of the island. Michael Fox.ley, the local Small Isles Councillor who had 
recently brought Ardnamuchan Point into public ownership, had been openly 
140 Helliwell, Simon 
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1~2 Maclntosh. lnterview. 
145 
Chapter Three 
contemplating some form of public ownership for Eigg since 1990. 143 Although 
generally supportive of the lET's motivations, he found their plans too ambitious and 
unrealistic. He therefore began to explore other avenues, and in early June circulated 
his basic outline for a public purchase of the island. He argued that protection of the 
Council's investment in the island and support for the local community demanded 
action on behalf of all the affiliated public agencies involved in the region. He also 
mapped out the basics of a management system that could integrate the islanders 
wishes with the interests of outside agencies; agencies which could include 
conservation bodies such as the SWT and the John Muir Trust who could naturally 
look after the wildlife aspects of the island. The purchase would chiefly be fmanced 
by the National heritage memorial Fund (NHMF), and start-up funding for projects on 
the island could come from extraordinary Grant Aid. 144 
Considering that the closing date for the sale was the 1st of July, it was more 
than ambitious to begin such a complicated scheme. Especially, since the lET had 
embarked on an alternative bid for 'community ownership' already. Also nothing like 
it had ever been attempted before, and to persuade the regional council to back the 
idea, Foxely had to put in enormous time lobbying council members rather than 
focusing on the media. The consequent result being a large amount of confusion, as 
there were now two competing but complimentary proposals for buying the island. It 
was not surprising therefore that the NHMF decided to reject applications from both 
schemes just four days before the deadline. 145 Foxely had viewed the ''NHMF 
fmancial input as essential" and in a classic understatement described the decision as 
"a major setback". Alastair Macintosh asserted that the NHMF's decision 
demonstrated how, "the establishment is under pressure from the landed interests not 
to encourage things which alter the pattern of land ownership in Scotland". 146 In any 
event time had run out and July 1st saw the unlikely event of Schellenberg himself 
having put the highest bid on the table. The West Highland Free Press led with the 
banner headline: "Paradise Lost: Eigg back in the hands ofEmperor Schellenberg". 147 
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Paying just under £1 million for the island, Schellenberg' s family company 
Cleveland and Island Holdings Ltd had beaten off four other offers. Since the lET had 
apparently scared off most bidders from putting an offer down, it could even be said 
that their activities had assisted Schellenberg in getting the island at a knockdown 
price. Whatever the case, he was naturally jubilant, and the lET was left only to 
declare themselves a "trust-in-waiting" and to publish an "Open Letter to Keith 
Schellenberg". Widely reported, the letter asked "Are you aware of what you have 
done ? Through wealth you may have re-won title to a little Scottish island. But you 
can never own an island's soul or that of the people who live there". 148 As for the 
people who lived there, the islanders themselves were ironically attending a funeral at 
the time the news was made public. They were unsurprisingly cautious in their public 
statements to the press. With Schellenberg back in charge it was "absolutely stupid to 
say anything against him". 149 
3. 7 The Returning Laird 
Considering the large-scale press interest in his purchase, Schellenberg made 
an uncharacteristically low-key return to Eigg. He arrived late one evening with only 
his dog for company. Since the lodge was in bad shape, he then spent his first night as 
the new owner reading by candlelight. 150 It was hardly triumphal, and contrasted 
heavily with his persona and presence in the media coverage that same week. "I could 
have made some cash from the sale and paid my lawyers" he had said. "But I couldn't 
sit back and watch Eigg become a sporting estate or worse still an example of 
collectivism". As he told the Scotsman journalist, "having survived a hellish 6 years" 
he was "pleased to get the chance to fight back". 151 Precisely how this fight back was 
to take shape worried people on the island, especially since it was widely believed he 
had spent most of his money in buying the island back. Marie Carr recalls that she 
felt more than a little anxious that same week when Schellenberg sat in her kitchen at 
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Kildonnan and said ''there are going to be a lot of changes around here and some 
people are not going to like them". 152 Although she and Colin were safe with the 
limited partnership over Kildonnan, she worried for the security and jobs of others on 
the island. Nevertheless, there was soon a community gathering up at the lodge, and 
Schellenberg was happily declaring that bygones were bygones and that a new start 
was needed by all. That Christmas, as Dressier notes, even ''the old enemies" were 
presented with seasonal hampers, which coming from him was very much a gesture of 
goodwill. 153 
After an initial surge of enthusiasm, however, Schellenberg rarely came up to 
the island and had little directly to do with its management. As far as the estate was 
concerned a new factor was appointed, Angus Cheap, and all estate business was 
conducted through him. 154 On the agricultural side Colin not only ran the new 
Kildonnan farm himself, but also the estate farm at Galmisdale through which he 
employed two ofhis brother-in-laws as shepherds. 155 On the tourist side, Sheena 
Kean, a former housekeeper at the Lodge, was appointed to run things and told to 
"make the best of what she could" from the stock of holiday homes. Considering that 
these were all now in grim repair, it was often impossible to provide people with the 
standards they were expecting. 156 In terms of leases, Schellenberg did prove a little 
more flexible, and he gave leases to both Kenneth and Sheena Kean for Pier Cottage, 
and Fiona Cherry (Marie's sister) to run the shop. Though the island was still showing 
signs of neglect, and Schellenberg was still being awkward to particular people, there 
was a slight feeling of things sorting themselves out. Just as in the mid 1980's those 
who were willing to work things ponderously through were able to get along with 
Schellenberg. Most of the islanders, however, tried as much as possible to avoid him 
and the old divide between those who were dependent on the estate and those who 
were independent remained in force. 157 
The resumption ofSchellenberg's ownership on Eigg was a far cry from 
events occurring late in 1992 on the Sutherland estate ofNorth Lochinver. Having 
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picked up on the lET's model of trust ownership, the Assynt crofters had adapted the 
same idea into another public appeal for community ownership, and this was launched 
during the height of the Eigg campaign in June. 158 Unlike the islanders ofEigg 
however, the Assynt crofters had two decided advantages. To begin with they were 
crofters, and though they were subject to the landlord's whim over many things they 
still all had security of tenure. Also, because they were crofters they had an extra 
angle in spoiling the market price of the estate. By threatening to all buy out their 
crofts if another private owner bought the estate, they dramatically reduced the 
interest in the estate. 159 This threat was highly successful in both scaring away 
potential buyers and in reducing the fmal price they had to pay. Indeed as Brian 
Wilson commented, their successful purchase indicated that "the free market in 
Highland land has been broken". 160• For Trustees of the lET and the islanders of 
Eigg, however, there was certainly a mixture of emotions. "It was so great to see them 
win, and it meant so much", describes Alastair Macintosh. "But then you just kept 
thinking why couldn't it have been us ? Why was it Schellenberg who had to win, and 
not the Eigg community ?". 161 
By 1994 the "uneasy truce" between Schellenberg and the community had 
begun to subside. 162 The slide began frrst with an IERA meeting where he proposed 
the idea of cutting the SWT from the island and setting up his own Eigg Wildlife 
Trust on Eigg. This he thought would be able to take the 30% funding the SWT 
gained from SNH each year and channel it directly on to the island. Naturally John 
Chester the resident warden immediately opposed the move in the meeting, pointing 
out that if he removed S WT from the island the other 70% of funds would be lost 
from the wildlife management of the island. 163 Although little was to be heard about 
this idea again, it began to make people question his motives and plans for the future 
management of the island. John Chester had worked on the island now for 8 years, 
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and he had gained much respect from the islanders. People did not like the way· 
Schellenberg was treating him and his organisation. Shortly afterwards, the cat was 
set amongst the pigeons as a who le new level of disagreement occurred between 
Schellenberg and, of all people, the loyal estate workers Colin and Marie Carr. 
In July Colin and Marie received a lawyers letter offering them a short-term 
lease on Kildonnan. They were shocked to say the least, "we had signed the limited 
partnership on the farm already", which "even had Maggie Williams' signature on as 
we11".
164 
Unfortunately, Schellenberg had apparently not signed the papers as well 
and was now demanding that they accept a simple short-term lease. For Colin and 
Marie this was totally unacceptable, especially when a rather embarrassed factor 
added that the lease would give them just enough time to get Laig farm up and 
running.
165 
This was apparently what Schellenberg was planning to do, to move them 
out ofKildonnan and into Marie's mother's house at Laig. Peggy, her mother, had 
always had disagreements with Schellenberg over the lease for Laig, which he 
declared never existed. Schellenberg was now exploiting that and hoping to force her 
into retirement, and the Carr family into Laig. The Carrs decided to make a stand, and 
fight their case not only for themselves but for Peggy as well. As Fiona, Marie's sister 
remembers: 
"It was if our mother never existed, as if Laig was not her home at all 
after 36 years there. It was typical of Schellenberg though, he was pulling 
all these strings to see which way people danced. He was playing his little 
power games, just like chess, moving people about when he felt like it" .166 
"We honestly don't know why he turned on us", says Marie, "we had always 
worked hard for him, and we really believed we had a sound relationship with 
him". 167 Nevertheless, the relationship worsened when Colin and Marie returned from 
a holiday in October to discover Schellenberg had sent people over to collect all of the 
estate lambs that had been reared that year. This was catastrophic for Colin because 
under their original agreement he was to pay the shepherds' wages out of half of the 
income from the lamb sales. Unfortunately, Colin never received the money and 
164 Carr. 





worse still just before Christmas he saw his job as the estate farm manager advertised 
in the local paper. Shortly afterwards, a letter dated Christmas Eve informed him not 
to go near any estate property, farm equipment, or stock. Colin was in an awful 
position since this meant he had to lay off the two shepherds, both of whom were 
close family members: "How do you tell that to your brothers-in-law, especially just 
after Christmas? Fiona was away having her new baby and Mark was with her, and 
Sue and Alastair had just taken a loan to do up their B&B on the strength of Alastair's 
job. I felt terrible, it was the worst Hogmanay ever". 168 
Events a few days later, however, were soon to compound Colin's problems 
and dramatically increase the level of tension on the island. On the evening of the 6th 
of January 1994, the orange glow in the sky above the pier was unfortunately not from 
just another glorious West Coast sunset. It was from the flames ofSchellenberg's 
burning storage barn; containing his1927 Rolls Royce Phantom, a 1925 Merryweather 
frrepump, as well as a few old dinghies and bicycles. All of which in typical fashion 
were uninsured. The burning of the Rolls Royce was the incident that above all others 
made Schellenberg's ownership ofEigg infamous. The event that put Eigg on the map 
of notoriety, and transformed the problems between landlord and residents from the 
mundane to the sensational. The press clearly viewed the burnt-out car as "the stark 
symbol of a war that has broken out between people living on a tiny Scottish island 
and their absentee landlord". 169 Both tabloids and broadsheets alike descended upon 
the island for almost two weeks and conducted a minor feeding frenzy over the story. 
Continually punning on the island's name and covering Schellenberg's verbal 
onslaughts upon the "drunken hippies and dropouts", 170 the story captured their 
imagination and ran for weeks. 
168 Dressier. p.l82 
169 Muir, Alan. "Fried Eigg", The Sun. IS'h January, 1994. 
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''Well, Sir, th<.·n.··-. "l'V('Il uf tht·m, and they suy Schcllcnbcrg 
paid them to 'clean up ' Eigg . . . " 
Fig 3. 7: The press enjoy the "island rebel/ion".171 
In the aftermath of the fire Schellenberg banned the use of the hall, offered a £500 
reward, and then began a series of attacks upon the "lawlessness" on the island. 172 
This was covered with some glee, especially as he spoke of not only "mob rule, 
cannabis growing and endemic drunkenness", 173 but also indicated a co-ordinated 
conspiracy against him. As The Independent reported: 
"One month earlier the tyres of his car were slashed, his boat drained of 
fuel the night before he was due to sail, and his dead mother's home burgled. 
Mr Schellenberg says he fears for his safety. "It is a very worrying climate. It 
was once the laird's factor who went about burning people out. Now it seems 
OK to burn out the laird himself". 174 
For the islanders themselves, as Brian Greene remembers "everyone was terrified of 
what he 'd do next". At the same time however, "you could see that he was wining in 
the press war, because we were all so paranoid about saying anything. 175 To this day 
people are still very wary of discussing the fire at all and will continue to affirm the 
belief that someone from off the island actually set the barn alight. The police 
170 Arlidge, John . '"Barmy' inhabitants force laird from Scottish isle", The Independent. 28th January 
1994. 
111 West Highland Free Press. 30th January, 1994. 
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suspected arson. but after interviewing the majority of the island's population came 
up with no leads. 




up in smoke 
.,_,_r=.~ 
3.8: One of the most moderate reports ofthejlre176 
Nevertheless, press interest was so strong that inevitably individuals began 
responding to the media about Schellenberg's ownership ofEigg. Until now even 
though most people had fallen out with Schellenberg, there had still been little if any 
direct statements to the press. "People weren't confident enough, and just weren't up 
to talking to the press". 177 Only Dr. MacLean and Trustees from the lET had made 
any straight accusations against Schellenberg, and even then they were very moderate. 
With the focus of press upon them, however, and the steady onslaught of 
Schellenberg's comments people eventually began to speak. out. The elder islanders 
spoke of the embarrassment the whole situation had caused: Angus MacKinnon was 
quoted as saying how the fire was "a great disappointment", and how it had "tarnished 
Eigg and its people". Above all he declared the fire had ''taken away from the sanctity 
of the island". 178 Dugald MacKinnon. then 82 drew more attention towards the state 
of the island and how Schellenberg "has let us all down badly". 179 Another who 
wished to remain nameless went as fur as saying, "We lost our trust in him and now 
that he has slandered us so badly following the fire, the best thing for him is to sell the 
176 Robertson, Alastair. ''Laird sees his island dreams go up in smoke", The Sunday Times Scotland. 






island and leave us alone. We want him out". 180 The younger and incomer set of 
residents focussed on the issue of leases, with Camille Dressier describing how "His 
policy of short term leases is not giving people a chance to make a go of things". 
Following on, she declared "We're now challenging his authority. We don't see why 
we should have to ask for permission for every act of our lives, which is maybe what 
he resents".
181 
When Sue Kirk was asked what she felt, she replied "I would like to 
see community ownership. "I think it would be hard to have a good relationship with 
any landlord at the moment". 182 
Schellenberg responded in late January with the announcement that he had had 
enough and was intending to sell. "People had over reacted", he said "to moves that 
only affected a handful ofpeople". 183 Reluctantly deciding it was no longer "worth 
the effort" to hang on to the island he indicated that he might first sell off individual 
properties on the island first. Combined with this announcement was another 
broadside against the incomers on Eigg who he believed had caused all the problems. 
They were all "hippies who lived off state funding" and were more interested in 
"acid-rock parties" than they were with traditional island life. 184 This latest news was 
met with some trepidation and fair amount of annoyance on the island. Schellenberg' s 
comments demanded that co-ordinated action was needed, and so on the 27th January 
an IERA meeting was called. Since the community hall was locked, 23 people 
crowded into Sue and Alastair's kitchen to resolve what action they would take. It 
was an effective and swift moving meeting, and one that showed a new confidence in 
both the IERA and the community's capabilities. First they discussed their 
relationship with Schellenberg and quickly concluded that communications had 
completely broken down and passed beyond the point of no return. Next they 
considered how to answer Schellenberg' s allegations in the press, and decided upon a 
spokesperson and a co-ordinated response, which if need be would include their own 
press statement. Then they began to consider the future sale of the island and requests 
were made to chase up Michael Foxley and his proposals for community ownership. 







any campaign again. Instead it was expressed that they could take control themselves, 
and that the lET could simply act in an advisory capacity. Finally, Dr Tiarks pointed 
out that the burnt out barn represented a health hazard with its bits of asbestos flying 
around and the meeting ended with demands for the Environmental Health 
Department to do something about the mess. 185 It was in short a dramatic difference 
from the residents' meetings just 12 months before, when the vote on the lET was 
discussed. 
In terms of the image presented to the press, it was also a world of difference 
having a co-ordinated voice for the community. Instead of various and disparate 
comments regarding Schellenberg, there was now a spokesperson who made 
statements with force and authority. This was made apparent from the end of January 
onwards as nearly all press commentary regarding the island now included quotes 
from a "community spokesperson". The January 21st edition of the Wes_lHighland 
Free Press was the frrst example of the new procedure working well, as a sympathetic 
paper was able maximise the response to Schellenberg's comments regarding the 
potential sale: 
"A spokesperson for the Eigg Residents Association was delighted at the 
prospect of Schellenberg selling, suggesting: 'If that was to happen I think 
there would be non-stop celidhs!' The spokesperson believed there would 
be 'lOO per cent apporval' for a buy-out by agencies, trusts, and the 
council that is already being discussed" .186 
Although it was highly unlikely that there was a 100% approval rating for a trust or 
community ownership at the time, it nevertheless sounded good The fact that there 
was 'the community', and the fact that it had a 'Spokesperson' naturally enhanced the 
appearance of the islanders being united and well organised. 
In the same article there was also a riposte to Schellenberg's multifarious 
comments regarding incomers on the island. Although this was organised outside of 
the formal residents' meeting it was still a milestone of sorts in the coming together of 
184 Allardyce, Jason. "Eigg's 'I'm a liability' laird set to relinquish his grip?'', West Highland Free 
Press. 21st January. 
183 lEA Minutes. 17th January 1994. lEA. 
186 Allardyce. "Eigg's 'I'm a liability' laird" 
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the community on Eigg. It was a formal letter from the indigenous islanders ofEigg 
answering Schellenberg' s accusations. Drafted by the younger islanders, it was signed 
by all the indigenous island households resident at the time and fully supported the 
involvement of incomers in the community's daily life. Considering the politics of 
incomers in general in West Coast communities it is a phenomenal document that 
clearly indicates the degree to which the island's community had integrated over the 
past 20 years of Schellenberg' s ownership. As such it also indicated the degree to 
which Schellenberg had over-stepped the mark in his reactions to the burning of the 
Rolls Royce. 
A message from the people ofEigg187 
We, who have been born and brought up on the Isle of Eigg would like to refute 
utterly the ludicrous allegations about the community here, made by Mr Keith Schellenberg. 
The island has a tiny but united population of local families and incomers who are 
between them struggling to develop a community with a long-term future against the apparent 
wishes of an owner who seems to want us to live in primitive conditions to satisfy his 
nostalgia of the 1920's. If the nature of the island has changed it could be said to have 
something to do with the fact that all the local men working for the estate during Mr 
Schellenberg's first years of ownership have left, taking their indigenous way of life with 
them. They and their families have found good jobs across the water. 
The incoming islanders have tried hard to adapt and continue a culture that was not 
their own. Contrary to Mr Schellenberg's accusations island celidh's are a family affair 
attended by everyone from senior citizens to babes in arms, where traditional music is played 
by local musicians, many of whom are incomers. 'Acid rock parties' whatever they are, are a 
figment of Mr Schellenberg 's imagination. 
The incoming islanders play an active, caring part in the community. They help run 
the senior citizens' lunch club and meals on wheels, they drive the community minibus to 
enable those without transport to get to the shop or attend church, and have organised a Gaelic 
playgroup so that their children have a chance of learning Gaelic in order to preserve the 
traditional culture of the island. 
It is hard to see what could be, can be, gained by painting such an inaccurate picture 



















In reviewing Schellenberg' s impact on Eigg and his 20-year relationship with 
the evolving community, it is hard not to be flippant and describe his whole time on 
the island as a highly successful experiment in community development. This is 
because not only did he select the perfect people to strengthen the island's ageing 
population, but then he also provided the ideal stimuli to foster their interdependence 
and communal working with the established community. First of all he whipped up 
enormous enthusiasm and built up the island's economy and population. Then as the 
island's enterprises began to founder, he slowly fell out with people one by one, and 
just as those people were beginning to settle into the crofting side of the island he 
aided their integration by becoming intransigent with all crofting tenants alike. On top 
of this, the poor housing and service provision, together with his stifling of 
development on the island simply had the effect of ensuring that the community 
started working together in order to foster development themselves. Of course, there 
were many other variables involved in the process, and many other personalities that 
were significant, but the point is sound, for in answering the question why did all this 
happen on Eigg? The answer invariably remains, "because ofSchellenberg". 
Having described how that process occurred, however, and how the incoming 
residents adapted to and strengthened the island's community, one is still left with the 
question of what exactly motivated Schellenberg's actions on Eigg. Obviously he was 
not an experimental social scientist with far-reaching ambitions, but then neither on 
the other-hand was he myopically stupid. When asked himself, Schellenberg 
invariably comes up with his vision of proving that the estate could "stand on it's own 
two feet" or some such allusion to private enterprise. Yet under close examination this 
appears to be nothing less than a smoke screen, since he originally purchased the 
estate with his 2"d wife's money, fmanced it through her estate, and then over the 
succeeding years reportedly gained some £230,000 in state aided funding: 188 hardly 
the successful example of private enterprise. Dressier, interestingly enough, reads 
Schellenberg' s continuous appeals to free market ideology as simply part and parcel 
of his love for sport. Through this she also explains most ofhis motivations regarding 
187 Allardyce. "Eigg's 'I'm a liability' laird" 
188 Allardyce. "Will Schellenberg be the last emperor of Eigg" 
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Eigg, for as Dressier believes his hatred of losing was his underlying motivating 
factor.
189 
As he said to Harpers and Queen, "All you can do is play life as hard as you 
can. I'm not worried if I don't win. I just don't want to lose". 190 This is why he bought 
the island back, and why he flaunted his victories so heavily in the press. Bill 
Williams backs this idea up because he believes Schellenberg's jealousy of him and 
Margaret was a prime motivator. 191 It is also why he fought so hard against the 
inevitable defeats in court and why ''until the final court decision, Maggie was sure he 
would win in the end". It was because, Williams describes, "He always won - as you 
ask anyone who has played a game with him- if ever he looks like losing, he literally 
does move the goal posts". 192 
The sporting analogy only goes so far, however, and does not tackle the more 
basic questions such as why did Schellenberg turn against Colin and Marie Carr: his 
most loyal employees: people whom he had slowly, groomed, promoted, and 
befriended over the years ? What was the victory in not signing their lease ? Or as 
later described in Chapter 4 sending them notices to quit ? Perhaps it could have been 
simply money, for it appeared he had clearly overextended himself in the purchase of 
the estate in 1992. If that is so and he only ever intended to re-sell the island when he 
bought it, then his motivations are clear. By declaring Colin and Marie had a lease 
before the sale in 1992 he was able to significantly reduce the price he had to pay for 
it. By then not honouring the lease afterwards, he essentially increased the estate's 
resale value. However, this again does not cover all the questions, for if money was 
the underlying cause, then he would have at least given more leases out on the derelict 
estate houses in order to benefit from the lucrative 90% grants for home 
improvements. 
No the answer is of course more complex, and no doubt involves a little of 
each explanation, but most overriding of all, is the most common owner motivation of 
all: power. West Coast estates are predominantly sporting estates, and though 
Schellenberg did not allow shooting on the island he nonetheless shared the same 
cause for owning a vast chunk of land. It was the prestige, social position, and 





unparalleled exercise of power that was his primary motivation. The fact that it was 
an island merely intensified the feeling and application of that power, and the fact that 
he became so infamous is part circumstance and part personal character. He was the 
self-proclaimed Laird of Eigg and he maintained his position and authority by 
ensuring that no one on the island felt safe to challenge him. Hence as soon as he felt 
Colin and Marie became too comfortable in their position, or began to expect 
independence, he then pulled the rug out from underneath them. Like the many 
casual employees who had fallen foul of him before, the Carrs were just another 
example of Schellenberg demonstrating who was the boss, who was the Laird. 
The chief problem, however, was as K.aren Helliwell aptly describes, 
Schellenberg recruited exactly the wrong type of people for this exercise of power. "If 
you had the type of personality he was looking for, then you were not likely to be at 
his beck and call as he demanded, you were inclined to either slam the door and leave, 
or dig your heels in stay". 193 This is what happened although on a personal, and then 
communal scale. If the estate had remained only peopled by the few remaining 
crofters from the 1960's then no doubt a very different story would have evolved. 
Instead, the incomers brought different expectations and greater degrees of confidence 
in handling the community's relationship with Schellenberg. The lET also brought 
new ideas and new exposure to the outside world of politics, campaigning, and civil 
action. This was all to prove formative in shaping the community's reactions to 
Schellenberg's increasingly outlandish displays of power. The fact that he brought the 
media onto the island as well meant he added just another uncertainty into the 
equation. Where once in the early years he could happily control the stories emulating 
from Eigg, by the end he had facilitated independent community spokespersons 
campaigning against him. The media were soon not coming to him for the story, but 
as we will see in the following chapters they were heading down the road to Cleadale 
to gain the next exclusive. 
192 ibid. 
193 Dressier. p.I64 
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Participation, Planning and the Isle of Eigg Heritage Trust 
Chapter t·our 
4.1 Introduction 
As detailed in Chapters One and Two, the residents and owner of Eigg were not 
unusual in falling into dispute. The development of feudal ownership and historical 
practice of estate management in the Highlands and Islands had engendered numerous 
contemporary conflicts between tenants and owners throughout the region. What was 
different with Eigg however, and what gave the islanders greater impetus in their 
dispute was firstly Keith Schellenberg and his inappropriate management, and 
secondly the degree of unity that this facilitated amongst the island's various 
residents. Bar two of the elder islanders, who still felt dependent on Schellenberg's 
good favour, by January of 1994 the entire adult population was in opposition to his 
continued ownership. As said before, this was a remarkable sociological feat, 
especially considering that most of the unity and self-development within the 
community was instigated by Schellenberg unintentionally. By 1994 however, the 
island's renown had begun to attract not just press interest, but the attention of groups 
and individuals expressly intending to foster increased activity and confidence within 
the community. People who were not just fmding "a challenge for their middle 
years", 1 but who had specific theoretical methods, and above all particular social and 
political outcomes in mind. With new and revised practices of development and 
community empowerment, therefore activists were to have a fundamental impact on 
the island's community throughout 1994. 
Of course, the lET had much the same impulses in their original pitch for 
alternative ownership in 1992. They too were seeking a new form of community 
development with their involvement on Eigg, and in particular a new vision of 
community ownership and management of the Highlands' natural resources.2 
However, the lET's approach and methods were very much determined by the 
political situation at the time. The Trust had sought to change conditions on Eigg by 
taking on the entire land ownership question in general. This, as Alastair Macintosh 
describes was precisely because "the case for community ownership or control had 
just not been heard of publicly, not alone accepted in Britain .... Our aim was to get 
the idea started. We therefore did not want to fall at the initial hurdle by not being 
1 Urquhart. p.l53 
2 lET. fugg, 
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able to convince the islanders in the first place".3 The lET's campaign was 
consequently directed much more towards the wider political implications of 
community ownership, than it was focussed on the island itself. There was little, if 
any proper consultation with the islanders before they launched their campaign and 
only one vote was ever held on the Trust's proposals for owning and managing the 
island. It is not surprising that this caused a little resentment and a distinct amount of 
scepticism amongst the weary islanders at the time. By 1994, however, the Assynt 
crofters buyout had already set a precedent, and though the political campaign for 
greater community ownership was still being battled, there was now greater room for 
activists to begin working within the island's community itself. 
The principle organisation involved with facilitating events on Eigg during 1994 
was a small Scottish NGO, Highlands and Islands Forum (HIF). Originally begun as a 
one year project by Vanessa Halhead and Frank Rennie, HIF had been generated by 
the acknowledgement of three key principles that were lacking in rural policy in the 
Highlands during the 1980's.4 Firstly that conservation and development must be 
integrated, sustainable, and above all participative. Secondly, that participation is not 
intuitive or innate but needs training, skills, and confidence. And thirdly, that the 
projects embarked upon be should ones that are orientated towards the community 
and above all generated by the community. These central pillars ofHIF were hardly 
unique on an international stage where development practice had utilised participative 
theory since the 1970's. For Scotland in the late 80's and early 90's, however, they 
were taken to be revolutionary. 5 
Combined with the activities ofHIF, the Eigg residents were also to attract the 
assistance of numerous individuals who found sympathy with their plight. In part 
these people were attracted by the notoriety of the island and the resident's situation, 
but mostly their support was generated from the welcoming nature of the islanders 
themselves. I am a prime example of this process as will be detailed further, for 
although my initial approach to the islanders was made on a formal academic level, I 
was swiftly to gain close friendships and an enthusiastic drive to assist their efforts of 
3 Macintosh. Interview 
4 Holboum, Isobel. "Introduction: In the Beginning", pp. 2-3. Highlands and Islands Forum. Highlands 
and Islands Forum Report 1986-1994. p.3 
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community ownership. This was derived not from a reformist's zeal, but from the 
sheer personable and open nature of the people I had encountered. This was not 
uncommon, and many reporters, activists, and people involved over the campaign 
were to make extraordinary efforts on behalf of the islanders for the simple reason 
that they found something intensely welcoming in the island's day-to-day life and 
people. Something that demanded that you should help if you could, and most of all 
ensured that you always kept in touch and returned. 
This Chapter will detail the role of these individuals and organisations that 
became involved in supporting and training the Eigg islanders. In so doing the 
Chapter focuses upon exactly how the islanders managed to move from their simple 
residents meetings to the complexities of planning and the negotiation of a partnership 
with the HRC and SWT. A process within which long and complicated decisions had 
to be made by a community, that although bound in opposition to Schell~nberg was 
comprised of markedly different individuals. Not only were social, linguistic, and 
political boundaries needed to be overcome, but most important of all a common 




4.2 Community Development on Eigg 
For external commentators and observers the burning of the Rolls Royce was 
the symbo lie turn in events that separated Eigg from the many other rural squabbles 
between owners and tenants in the Highlands and Islands.6 On the island, however, it 
was not taken as such an important landmark in the course of events. What was of 
more importance was the fact that Marie and Co lin Carr had come on side with the 
rest of the disaffected on the island. For the first time, there was an almost united 
front against Schellenberg, and as Maggie Fyffe described, "the fact that Schellenberg 
could no longer play one person off against another was incredibly liberating".7 
Where once he was a figure who constantly incited disagreement and controversy on 
the island, from 1994 onwards Schellenberg became the pole for everyone to react 
against. This was simply intensified over the succeeding year with almost every 
statement he made to the press, and with the absolute lack of activity on the island and 
estate. Confidence and a new feeling of solidarity within the community were strong 
forces to be sure, but they were easily frustrated by the fact that Schellenberg still 
remained the owner. "I suppose we all felt that things just couldn't go on the way they 
were", recalls Maggie, "but then we also knew how belligerent and stubborn he could 
be". 8 The trick was to begin preparing an alternative and to start channelling the 
community's frustration and anxiety into planning and organisation. 
This was conveniently spurred into life within weeks of the fire when Neil Wilcox 
from the SWT formerly met the IERA in the beginning of February. Like the 
residents, the SWT had been more than alarmed by Schellenberg's proposals in 
January to sell the island off in parcels. After 15 years of trying to work with 
Schellenberg in protecting the island's wildlife, this was the last straw. They had now 
decided to investigate the level of support amongst the residents for an SWT attempt 
at purchasing the island. The meeting on the gth of February naturally received a large 
turnout of residents at the School to hear the SWT representative and his ideas. Firmly 
stating that SWT wished to be the only conservation body involved in any purchase of 
the island Wilcox made clear that the SWT did not want to be an archetypal landlord. 
' 
6 Muir, Allan. "Fried Eigg!", The Sun. January 15th, 1994. 
7 Fyffe, Maggie. Interview, gth February 1998 
8 ibid 
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Although they would be the owners in name, they were primarily concerned with the 
wildlife aspects of the island. The management of the built environment, he proposed 
could be devolved down to the residents themselves. There was "general disbelief' 
shown amongst the residents that the SWT could "provide such a promising future, 
and the IERA requested a written statement of aims and objectives". 9 A week or so 
later the SWT provided the document, and confirmed their ideas in writing. 10 The 
proposals also pointed out that further negotiations needed a smaller forum within 
which to discuss the various issues at hand. A management committee of some sort 
was needed to represent the Eigg community in its dealings with the SWT. This was 
acted upon almost immediately, 11 for within a week five people were sitting down as 
elected members of a Steering Committee. Though, they did provide a strong cross-
section of island opinion that included not only Colin Carr but John Chester (the SWT 
resident warden) as well, the Committee still revealed the unease and caution of 
indigenous islanders. The five members were all of incomer origin. 12 
)11\.~('lb 
Speaking Out 
a:iiiz t_osley R1ddoch 
The Future 
forEigg? 
I-Iave you.r say. 
Friday 25th February1994 
Eigg Prin1r11y School 
Dtx)rs O}X'n 7.15pm-<lUd:cnce to b~ se~tcd by 7.J0pm 
For more details, please call: 
Linds.:1y Caddcn or Cary Chipping! on 
on C-1 1 330 ::!76S N ().~ 1 3JO 2326 
The initial spurt of organisation and 
debate induced by SWT's approach was 
highlighted by the return ofLeslie 
Riddoch and her Radio Scotland show 
"Speaking Ouf'. 13 One ofthe many who 
had already started forming close 
friendships on the island, Leslie had 
visited the year before with the show to 
cover the events surrounding the lET's 
bid for ownership. "The first time we 
did the program" recalls Leslie "not a 
soul felt comfortable talking about the 
situation. Apart from the old Doe 
[Hector Mac Lean] that is, everyone just 
clamed up- which is pretty ridiculous Fig 4.1 Poster on Shop Door 
9 IERA Minutes, gth February 1994 
10 Wilcox, Neil. SWT Draft Proposals. Isle ofEigg Archive. 16th February 1994. lEA 
11 I ERA Minutes J 7th February 1994 




when you considered what was going on". 14 The second visit showed how far things 
had progressed, however, and how much more confident the islanders were in 
speaking their minds. Accompanying Leslie was Allan McRae, the charismatic crofter 
from Assynt, who as soon as he stepped off the boat, was immediately hugged by one 
of the old island crofters for fully a minute. 15 This scene was to be followed by 
intense conversations and a "program that for the first time had the islanders 
expressing what they really felt". 16 For the residents this was a memorable and 
confidence building exercise, and for Leslie the successful program was a sign of just 
how far things were beginning to move on the island. She could "sense change in the 
air", and "after years behind a microphone tracking the constant decline of 
democracy, hope, and spirit, particularly among rural communities. This was an 
inspiring moment". 17 
The encouragement of directly speaking out against Keith Schellenberg was to 
be swiftly followed by members ofthe Steering Committee attending the 1994 HIF 
Conference, The People and The Land. In typical Eigg fashion, the weather set in the 
day before the conference and the Eigg delegates were only able to reach Inverness 
for the evening Celidh. 18 Nevertheless, they took full advantage, and the contacts they 
made with other communities and delegates proved to be very eye-opening. As one of 
the Eigg delegates remarked, "those who had attended the HIF conference wished that 
all members of the community had been able to share the experience, and to see that 
ordinary people can have an influence on their environment and future". 19 With 
Schellenberg still repeatedly declaring his wish to sell the island, the conference 
highlighted the fact that the residents needed to start taking the initiative. Obviously 
the same thoughts had been occurring to the SWT, who on the 1st of April publicly 
announced that they intended to join the residents in seeking to purchase the island 
from Schellenberg.2° Clearly defming the proposal as a partnership, Neil Wilcox took 
13 BBC Radio Scotland. Speaking Out. Recorded February 25th. Broadcast March 1 sr 7PM. 
14 Riddoch, Leslie. Interview, 7th November, 1997 
15 ibid. "Unity in the air as wind of change sweeps Eigg", The Scotsman. March 1st, 1994. p.11 
16 ibid. Interview. 
17 ibid. "Unity in the air ... " 
18 Helliwell, Karen. "HIF and the Isle of Eigg- a case history", Highlands and Islands Forum Report 
1986-1994. pp.S0-51 
19 ibid. 




pains to emphasise, "Anything that even remotely taints us with the landlord title 
would be unacceptable to us. Management of the island would be in the hands of the 
people who live on the island, as long as we can have influence on the nature of the 
island". 21 
"It felt like things were moving pretty fast by the spring and early summer", 
recalls Maggie, "especially when we started to take on control of the Trust as well". 22 
Like the SWT, the Trustees of the lET had recognised the importance of involving the 
residents as much as possible in any future buy-out attempt. According to Alastair 
Macintosh, "Handing over the Trust was the most logical thing to do at the time. The 
islanders had gained enormous confidence over the preceding year. They needed 
some form of independent vehicle, and it was clearly time for them to take control of 
the whole thing themselves". 23 The existing Trustees therefore resigned their posts 
and elections were held on the island for new Trustees to replace them. Significantly 
the voting revealed the residents' wishes for continued external involvement; of the 
eight Trustees elected, not only was Alastair Macintosh included, but so was Leslie 
Riddoch as well. On the 28th of April, therefore Tom Forsyth symbolically handed 
over the Trust to the new Trustees. 
Schellenberg who also attended the ceremony on the pier was notably 
subdued, most likely because he was working on plans himself. On the 23 rd of May he 
instructed an estate agent to put the Old Manse and Galmisdale House up for sale. In a 
press release that was widely reported, he declared his intention to fmd some new 
blood for the island, in order to break up the "conspiracy against him". Although he 
now asserted he would not sell the island, especially to the Trust, he would canvass 
previous holiday makers regarding the sale of other houses. "The soured atmosphere 
should not put people off', he insisted, "Since the crofting township is at the other end 
of the island, and they are far enough away not to be a nuisance". Islanders were 
naturally opposed to the sales and Colin Carr, now the spokesperson for the IERA 
emphasised that it was just another case of "asset stripping": "I doubt there is one 
person here who thinks that selling off parts of the estate is the right thing to do. There 
21 ibid. 
22 Fyffe. 
23 Macintosh. Interview 
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is a long tradition of it being an entity". 24 Thankfully, there did not appear to be an) 
immediate inquiries to Schellcnberg's advertisements, and in the end his antics merely 
accentuated how he had '1ust backed himself into a corner, with the whole community 
. h" " 25 agamst 1m . 
16 Fig: ~.2 Another brochure, another attempt at sale. 
14 Rowland. Tom. ''The Laird ofEigg's marketing Tactics upset island folk", The Daily Telegraph, 




Having the support of the SWT, and now having control of a registered 
charitable body were formidable tools for eventually building an alternative form of 
ownership and management. But on the ground this was all still very premature, for 
although the Steering Committee had launched themselves into the mechanics of 
dealing with conservation bodies and charitable law, there was still distinct 
uncertainty amongst the majority of residents. Community management was an ideal, 
and as Camille Dressier points out "most people were jumping at anYthing other than 
Schellenberg. When it came to actually talking about what would happen, people 
degenerated into their own ideas and squabbles". 27 What the residents needed was not 
the grand plans of Trusts and partnerships and so forth but the smaller and infmitely 
more difficult mechanisms of how to properly function as a group; how to make 
meetings work; and how to reach decisions based on consensus. Obviously they had 
come significantly far down the road of group decision making already, but 
circumstance and precedent had directed it all. There had been no real planning or 
open discussion of how to do things, or what community management really meant 
anyway.28 
This is exactly why the timing and activities ofHIF were so crucial in 
directing the residents' energies and frustrations. Three directors from HIF visited the 
island in late June to conduct a basic series of workshops on "Eigg and the future -
What do you Think?". The impact of their visit was enormous, and almost everyone I 
interviewed regarded the workshops as a key turning point in the community's 
development. 29 At the first gathering, the three introduced themselves as having all 
lived in similar communities and having experienced equivalent, though not exactly 
identical problems within their own communities. Two golden rules were established: 
1) everyone had to be positive and constructive, and 2) everyone had an equal say. 
With these formalities established the 20 odd residents were given basic instructions 
on "making meetings work" and "making your case".30 As Maggie describes, "It was 
all quite simple and common sense stuff, such as organising agendas, the proper 
26 Strutt & Parker. Sales Brochure for" Small Isles Manse and Galmisdale House, The Island of Eigg", 
22"d May 1994. 
27 Dressier, Camille. Interview, 3rd February, 1998 
28 Fyffe. 
29 See Summarised interview results, Appendix 4.1 




structuring of meetings, and encouraging people to talk". Some people took it as a 
little boring, but for the Steering Committee members it was ''very practical indeed, 
because until ~hen we were just flying in the dark about those kind of things". 31 The 
next day's workshops, however, were to have a universal impact on the island. 
This was because they were directed at not only trying to gather consensus 
within a group, but specifically to ensure that everyone's voice was heard in the 
process. This was achieved by gathering everyone together and randomly splitting 
them into four discussion groups, each with a HIF facilitator, and each in a room of 
their own. The groups then worked through a basic structure of an island management 
plan- forestry, agriculture, management structure, etc- generating ideas and voicing 
their concerns. The HIF facilitators recorded the points made on a flipchart, and at the 
end of the session each group prioritised the points they had made into an order. 
Whilst a coffee break ensued, the lllF members pinned up all the flipcharts from each 
group, and collated the priority lists. People were then invited to cast an extra ten 
votes each to the collated points, and eventually a final list was produced.32 Although 
when written up this sounds a tedious enterprise, the physical effect of the process 
was to ensure that everyone had equal say in the results. Results, that as many people, 
such as Mark and Fiona Cherry recalled "were amazing, because everyone had pretty 
similar ideas". 33 
The lllF workshops were a major turning point for not only did they give a 
point of departure from which to begin a management plan, but most of all they gave 
the community a method for dealing with complex and difficult issues. As Camille 
Dressier notes, "the workshops provided us with our first policy document, as well as 
a great mechanism for encouraging everyone to speak their mind. Especially those 
who never spoke in a large, crowded residents meeting". 34 This was to prove essential 
to the success of the next set of workshops that the residents organised themselves in 
late September. "We had a method that people were comfortable with, and we needed 
to expand the range of topics". 35 A separate evening was used to tackle each subject, 
31 Fyffe. 
32 ibid. 
33 Mark and Fiona Cherry. Interview, 4th February 1998. 




and the Steering Committee members acted as the facilitators for the individual 
groups. "The one thing you always knew when you went to those meetings", 
remarked Kenneth Kean, "was that at least your point would be heard, which is far 
more than can be said for the average residents meeting". 36 Even with the expansion 
of subject areas, the process also continued to amplify the basic issue that far more 
connected people in their ideas for the island than separated them. 37 As Maggie 
remarked, this was a "very empowering and confidence building notion, especially 
when you had been elected to represent everyone". 38 
In between the two sets of workshops, the new lET had decided to launch their 
own appeal for funds in August. It is a common precept in fund raising: in order to 
raise money you have to first spend money. If they were to properly pursue a buyout 
attempt, it was necessary to spend a fair amount of money in preparing the ground for 
public appeals, applications, surveys and so on. This consequently induced the launch 
of Fighting Fund Appeal on the 151h August in Glasgow, aiming to raise the sum of 
£15,000. (symbolically the amount the island was first sold for by Clanranald in 
1872). The campaign was to prove only a minor success with around £3,000 actually 
being raised, but nevertheless it was the first stab for the islanders and their elected 
representatives at press relations, publicity, and fundraising. As such it could be 
garnered as a significant success, simply because it increased the press interest in the 
story. To be sure the press revelled in the story with punning by-lines galore; "Eigg 
feud boils over",39 "Protesters Eigged on in island battle",40 and so on. Schellenberg 
himself even helpfully assisted the story by immediately parrying their appeal with 
claims that "islanders will never get rid ofme".41 Indeed, he continued his bombast 
against the residents calling them "childish and pathetic for even contemplating 
community ownership". Anyway he declared, he was "a stubborn old mule, and the 
more they shouted the more I will dig my heels in". 42 The press loved it. 
36 Kean, Kenneth. Interview 41h February 1998 
37 Kirk, Sue. Interview, 7th February 1998. 
38 Fyffe. 
39 The Independent, 16th August, 1994. p.2 
40 The Sun, 161h August, 1994. p.5 
41 Mallon, Margaret. "Islanders will never get rid of me!" Daily Record, 20th August, 1994. 
42 "Eigg Laird digs in as islanders raise fighting fund", The Scottish Farmer, 3rt! September, 1994. 
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Behind the scenes things were a little more complex, and indeed much the 
reverse of what Schellenberg was saying in public. To begin with from early in the 
summer he had been pressing the S WT to purchase the north end of the island, 
essentially the crofting area and Beinn Bhuidhe. This had caused significant strains in 
the burgeoning relationship between the SWT and the IERA, mainly because the 
IERA refused to back any deal that would divide the ownership of the island. 43 On the 
other hand the SWT were unable to publicly back the fundraising campaign launched 
by the lET, since this put them in an awkward situation with Schellenberg. During a 
five hour meeting with David Hughes Hallett, Schellenberg had made it amply clear 
that "he would not contemplate negotiating with any organisation that was going to 
involve the community in future management of the island".44 A stalemate had 
therefore ensued: one in which Schellenberg was asking for an offer, yet the SWT 
was unable to provide one. The situation was particularly frustrating because in 
private, Schellenberg admitted his position as owner was untenable, and this made 
everyone feel he had to sell at some point.45 The big question was when, and to 
whom. Only several years after the event was it made clear that during the very same 
month as he was boldly announcing "islanders will never get rid of me", Schellenberg 
was actually meeting with Farhed Vladdi and the next owner ofEigg, "Professor 
Maruma". According to the infamous island broker and estate agent, Vladdi, over an 
August weekend on Eigg, Schellenberg signed a sale agreement on the back of a 
serviette - selling the island to Maruma for £ 1. 5 Million. 46 
If this was to have been a quick sale it was swiftly thrown on hold as 
Schellenberg lurched again into yet another divorce proceeding, this time with his 
third wife Suki. With an embargo placed on all his assets in early October, 
Schellenberg had once more to resign himself to waiting for the Court's decision. It 
did not however, prevent him from issuing notices to quit to John Chester and the 
Carr family. 47 Informing a family of seven to vacate their property by New Years' 
Eve was in everyone's eyes "the last straw", particularly for indigeneous islanders 
since Marie herself was an island girl. To penalise the SWT as well in the same stroke 
43 IERA Steering Committee Minutes. 19th October, 1994 
44 ibid. 31 51 March 1994. 
45 ibid 
46 BBC Scotland, Euorpa, Broadcast 7th February 1998 
47 "Storm over owner's move to evict islanders", The Herald, 17th October 1994. 
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was as powerful an action as could be imagined. Again the press featured the story, 
and again Schellenberg' s actions and comments only intensified the islanders· 
feelings against him. This was particularly apparent when HRC Councillors arrived 
on the island to hold their own version of participative planning called "Planning for 
Real". A large scale map was placed in the hall and residents were invited to place 
cards on it indicating what developments they would like to see on the island. As part 
of gathering information for Subject Area Plans the process had been very successful 
in other highland locations. On Eigg, "the exercise was arguably the most lively to 
date". Amongst the numerous constructive cards asking for greater social services. 
refuse collection, and new housing, there were also a Large number of comments 
aimed at Schellenberg, such as ''No Bullying", "Security ofTenure", and "Remove 
the Present Owner".48 Schellenberg placed his own suggesting "A policeman", which 
was a little ironic since he had threatened the island's only acting constable. Colin 
Carr with eviction. 
I • 
( f'-- -
Fig 4.3: "Planning for Real Eigg Style". 4Y 
As such the cards and the planning process highlighted how just impotent the 
residents and their elected authorities like the HRC were in dealing with situations 
such as Eigg. lt was easy for the islanders to express their needs for a new pier. 




sheltered housing, a community hall, and such like, but it was another thing to. 
actually deliver them. Hence the demands for a "Schellenberg Free Zone". Shelter had 
assessed the need for new housing over ten years ago, but still elderly ladies lived in 
"grace and favour" cottages patching up holes in the roof and fighting off the rats at 
night. Similarly the community had been trying to gain a site for a community hall for 
the same length of time, and got nowhere. The same with rubbish disposal and the site 
for an island refuse dump. Schellenberg always justified his delaying tactics with 
reasons such as the divorce case, the island's sale, and "law and order difficulties", 
but in essence despite the residents' and Council's wishes he had been able to 
maintain the last word on just about everything. In many ways therefore, the 
"Planning for Real Exercise" despite being a success in participation, clearly 
demonstrated that participation without any genuine power meant absolutely nothing. 
Nevertheless, by the end of the year it was not hard to look back at a decisive 12 
months on the island. Although it is all too easy to imply a false linearity when 
detailing processes and events, for most of 1994 things had developed in a relatively 
straight line. Since the fire in January, the community's relationship with 
Schellenberg had gone from appalling to irreparable. He had begun the year by 
lambasting the entire island population as "rotten, dangerous, and totally barmy", and 
he had ended it by issuing notices to quit to eight of them, including his once-loyal 
staff and the SWT warden. Over the same period, the community had fmally found 
the confidence to speak out against Schellenberg and to begin forging alliances, 
outside contacts, and a burgeoning relationship with the press. Together with the 
assistance ofHIF the islanders had also moved on from simple residents meetings to 
participative workshops, Steering Committees, and the formation of basic policy 
documents. As for Schellenberg and the threats of eviction, it appeared he was simply 
dumbfounded by the attention they had received and as New Year came and went he 
argued that they were simply a "marker", and nothing else. He had "not been 
serious". 50 
This steady development, however, was to come to a dramatic halt in 1995 with 
events emphasising that despite their progress the residents were very much the 
50 Ross, David. Hebridean community voices anger after laird's eviction threat'', The Herald, 2"d 
November, 1994. 
175 
( IWJ)!Cr four 
hostages to fortune and the market place. By the early spring of 1995 rumours began 
circulating of the island ' s possible sale. By March 171h the rumours had taken the slow 
and rotund form of a strange German man wearing a beret. The man with the beret 
was Marlin Eckhart, (a.k.a. "Professor Maruma") a mysterious artist/fmancier, whose 
eighteen months of ownership were to clearly demonstrate that events on Eigg were 
far from occurring in a linear fashion, but were to repeat themselves all over again. 
Schellenberg's sale of the island to Maruma clearly exemplified everything that 
was and remains wrong with land sales in Scotland. Here you had a 7 Y2 thousand acre 
estate with a population of over sixty being privately sold between two shady 
characters; and no one able to lift a hand - not the Government, not the Local 
Council, and certainly not the islanders. Indeed, not only was the vendor in open 
conflict with the residents, but he had openly promised to never sell the island to any 
of its inhabitants. 51 This was 
the end of just a twenty-year 
period of ownership, during 
which time he had made 
himself and the island so 
infamous that the only person 
he could sell it to was an 
unsuspecting and utterly 
unknown mystic from 
Germany. A man who, 
himself was to simply continue Fig 4.4. Schellenberg departs. 52 
the downward spiral of under-investment and unfortunate management that had been 
established over the past 30 years. Just like all the previous owners, Schellenberg was 
to also make a considerable sum on the sale of the island, and indeed not only did he 
receive the largest profit to date, but he also took the most with him as well. The 
furniture, light fittings, wall plugs, and yes even the kitchen sink from the lodge were 
all removed when he quit the island in April. He had also intended to remove the 
William Bald map of 1805, but the residents reacted to this last piece of asset 
51 Close, Ajay. "Eigg on his face", Scotland on Sunday, 23rd October, 1994. 
52 Fraser, Doug las. "Former Laird sent packing'', The Scotsman, 51h April 1995 
176 
Chapter hn1r 
stripping by barricading the map in the craft shop where he had stored it.53 Furious, he 
left the map for a future legal victory and he finally sailed off on his barge of assorted 
junk. Some said that as the craft pulled away he mournfully called back "I only 
wanted to be one of you". Others are convinced he just said, "Sod you". 54 
4.2 The Maruma Diversion 
As Camille Dressier describes, the departure of Schellenberg and the arrival of the 
new owner openly demonstrated how "the community front and our decision making 
processes were actually very fragile". 55 To begin with, in his capacity as a new Eigg 
Trustee, Alastair Macintosh had made several statements to the press regarding how 
unwelcome the new owner would be made on the island. Understandably, the last 
thing the residents wanted was to get off to a bad start. Hence c;hris Tiarks- the lET's 
secretary- swiftly reversed this to "We are all prepared to work with the new owner 
for the benefit of the community".56 • On Maruma's side when he did eventually arrive 
on Eigg on April gth, he immediately rented Colin's van and toured the entire island, 
meeting people individually in their homes. No other landlord had ever done this 
before, and it certainly went down very well, especially with the elder members of the 
community. Not only did he take the time to visit everyone, but as Karen Helliwell 
also remembers, "He was either exceptionally well primed, or absolutely genuine 
because he had all the right answers, and showed a real feeling for the place". 57 This 
was all very much unexpected, and hence Maruma's promises of leases, development 
and fairness caught people off guard. Despite a few lingering doubts, even the 
sceptical Leslie Riddoch hailed him as the new saviour ofEigg. 58 
One thing Maruma insisted upon however was that he wanted no dealings with the 
lET. He said it was because it was too political, but what it amounted to was a 
preference for dealing with people individually. This point was repeatedly made in 
broken English at the meeting he had with the IERA on April I oth. Maggie requested 
several times how the IERA could assist Maruma with his "concepts" by undertaking 
53 Fraser, Douglas. "Former Laird sent packing", The Scotsman, 5th April 1995. 
54 MacLeod, Maxwell. Conversation. 6th March 1995. 
55 Dressier. Interview 3rd February 1998 
56 Watson, Craig. "Former Laird makes break from Eigg", The Herald, 4th April 1995. 
57 Helliwell, Karen. Interview 6th February 1998 
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skills surveys and business audits, but Maruma consistently affirmed that he wanted 
to deal with islanders on a one to one basis. 59 This approach was to continue for the 
next three or four months, where what little contact he had with the island was not 
through any of the established organisations, but on an individual level. "It was the 
perfect way to break apart the processes and confidence we had developed under 
Schellenberg" describes Camille. "He didn't want us working together, but just 
working for him when he needed it". 60 Others like Sue Kirk also noticed this tendency 
as slightly worrying, especially since Sue and her husband Alastair were away when 
Maruma first visited the island. "When we returned we couldn't quite believe how 
everyone's attitude had changed. One moment all the talk was for community 
ownership, making a stand and so on, and then the next Maruma's turned up and 
convinced everyone he's the best thing since sliced bread .... It really showed you 
how quickly things could fall apart".61 
Just like his predecessor Maruma was also full of grand schemes, or "concepts" he 
preferred to call them, for the redevelopment of Eigg. Kenneth Kean describes him as 
"almost a carbon copy of the early Schellenberg with lots of big ideas and brochures. 
He was even talking about buying a catamaran that cost over a million pounds. It was 
ludicrous". 62 The money aspect was certainly a key issue, for when he was initially 
challenged over his credentials and intentions for Eigg he responded. "You don't buy 
a Rolls Royce unless you have the money to run it".63 Indeed, a few days after the 
frrst meeting on Eigg he even talked of investing £15 millions in the island. Crofters 
were not quite discussing the respective merits ofF erraris and Maseratis, but there 
was still a sharp collective intake of breath on the island. What could it mean? 
Luxury pools and sauna's, indoor tennis courts? With limited hard evidence, wild 
theories were quickly circulatin, with one card on the island quipping - "it's very 
hard to separate fact from Maruma".64 
58 Riddoch, Leslie. Interview. 
59 IERA Minutes. 1Oth April 1995. 
60 Dressier. Interview, 3rd February, 1998 
61 Kirk, Sue. Interview 7th February, 1998 
62 Kean. Interview 4th February, 1998 




With hindsight it is perhaps difficult to believe how gullible people initially were. 
It was not as though the islanders fell for Maruma hook line and sinker, but they did 
nevertheless warm to him.
65 
It was part desperation, part hope, and part Maruma's 
approach. Considering what they had undergone with their last landlord it was also 
hardly surprising to have been a little beguiled; as one islander also noted, "anything 
would have been better than Schellenberg, even Lucifer hirnself'.66 However, 
Marurna' s honeymoon period was to prove relatively short, as doubts over his 
background and sincerity arose just days after his first visit to the island. Maruma 's 
title of Professor had been discovered as bogus, and this merely intensified the press 
interest in the mystic German. It was then three months before Maruma' s next visit to 
the island, during which time there was no movement on the leases, or any of the 
promises he had previously made. There was also only the most intermittent of 
contacts. 
Fig 4.5: The Press enjoy Maruma. 67 
ln the meantime the community was working up to its firstfeis - a Gaelic music, 
s t h d . arts and language festival held on the weekend of July 1 . Althoug very mo erate m 
size, maybe 40 or so pupils for classes. and around a hundred visitors, the event 
required much organising - with every household on the island being heavily 
involved. Despite having been warned about how busy people would be over the 
weekend, however, Maruma decided to make this the time for his next visit. Arriving 
65 Fyffe, Maggie. 
66 Kean . Interview 4th February, 1998 
67 West Highland Free Press, 31 51 March 1995 
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in the middle of the weekend he held court in the teashop eating whole cakes, chain-
smoking and talking to islanders when they had a chance. 
An IERA meeting was called for the next evening, where once again Maruma 
gave out all the right answers, and presenting a new "island manager", emphasised his 
desire to work with the islanders. 
68 Yet despite all the reassurances and promises, for 
many this visit was to be the beginning of Maruma's downfall. This was due to frrstly 
strong clashes over residents concerning the community hall, and his apathy in 
actually signing a lease. 
69 
Secondly, just as revelations ofMaruma's phoney title 
followed his previous visit to the island, more disturbing revelations began to follow 
on from his second. Stern magazine had conducted an investigation into Maruma's 
claims of selling his art work for upwards of $500,000 to collectors like Jean Paul 
Sartre, Marlon Brando, and Indira Ghandi. 70 None of them, nor their representatives 
had ever heard of him, just as no one in the art world had ever heard of his work. 
Similarly, no one knew of the architectural frrm supposedly in charge of renovating 
the buildings on Eigg. Indeed, once one started digging, so numerous were the 
falsifications floating around Maruma, that it was soon impossible to fmd anything 
credible about the man. Unsurprisingly, this concerned his fmancial situation as well -
investigations showed that not only did he have an appalling credit history, but at the 
time of purchasing Eigg he also had several debt collection agencies after him. 71 This 
immediately led to questions of how did he raise the £1.6 millions for Eigg ? No 
doubt even Schellenberg had wondered about that, especially since it appeared his 
deposit of£ 150,000 on the sale was paid in numerous small bank transactions from 
assorted different countries around the world. 72 By November, the various rumours, 
inconsistencies, and accusations regarding Maruma had solidified into formal 
investigations by the German Public Prosecutor for fraud. In particular for a £1.6 
million loan he had taken out on the island in August 1995.73 
68 IERA Minutes. 2"d July, 1995. 
69 Kirk, Sue. Interview, 7th February, 1998 








For the islanders used to even the absurd extremes of Schellenberg's legal 
floundering, this was too much. Especially since Maruma was almost impossible to 
get in touch with, and extremely evasive if ever reached. After numerous calls, faxes, 
and answer machine messages if you did manage to get in touch, he usually ended 
each conversation with the phrase "I am coming there in two weeks time, and we'll 
sort out everything then". Of course he never did, and in fact was never to return to 
the island at all. If he had actually held to his promises of signing for a hall site and 
granting a few leases, then no doubt he could have bought a significant amount of 
time. Indeed this was even noted by many residents, who repeatedly wondered why 
he did not just sign for the hall site. That would have appeased the majority of folk on 
the island, because all the grant money for the hall's construction had been agreed, 
and all that was needed was a secure site for the project to be underway. As such the 
building would have then employed the majority of the island's unemployed for a 
year, and certainly used up most of the community's time and energy. People were 
also extremely cautious about launching into yet another battle with their landlord, 
and any small token of sincerity from Maruma would have stopped the situation from 
deteriorating too far. "Everyone was just so worn out after Schellenberg, that nobody 
wanted to go through that nightmare again. If trouble could have been avoided", 
commented Karen, ''we were ironically the lot he could have appeased the easiest". 74 
The fact that Maruma did not sign for the hall site, nor a few months later for a 
lucrative Millennium Forest Application, tended to indicate something more sinister 
than simple intransigence; especially when you combined this with the fraud 
investigation being undertaken in Germany. It began to appear that he was yet another 
fraudulent con-artist at loose in the Highland land market. Either that or just one more 
individual playing the lucrative speculation game. For Eigg this was not an unusual 
situation since the island had had a disproportionate experience of frauds and 
eccentrics owning it, and all of them profiting handsomely from buying and selling 
the place. As such, Maruma was unquestionably the worst absentee owner to appear 
yet, and certainly the most eccentric. He was even more inappropriate and 
problematic than Schellenberg, who at least took an active interest in the island. 
Maruma on the other hand only appeared on the island twice, promised everything, 
74 Helliwell, Karen. interview, 6th February, 1998 
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and then did absolutely nothing. And a form of nothing that was positively neglectful 
as he let buildings go to rot, fields become infested with bracken, and grant 
applications slip by because of inaction. 
Having said all this, it must also be clearly understood that Maruma's ownership 
ofEigg was vital for the eventual success of the partnership buy-out. Just as 
Schellenberg 's proprietorship was central to unifying the residents into a co-ordinated 
body, so Maruma's ownership was integral to the formation of the partnership. As 
Mark and Fiona Cherry acknowledge, his very inactivity was perfect for focussing 
people's minds and galvanising opinion both on and off the island. "He was a 
diversion, but a very handy wee diversion, because he made everyone think why are 
we tolerating this ?". 75 Maggie clarifies the point by emphasising just how useful the 
Maruma period was for the community; "Since he wasn't here, and wasn't doing 
anything we started to run things on the island ourselves". The residents took over the 
running of the hall by default, and the tea and craft shops were simply continued by 
individuals totally independent of the estate. "It made us think why do we need a 
landlord anyway?" In other words, "It was an essential period because it gave people 
confidence and brought people together". Above all, "It also gave us the time to 
organise, consolidate and think more seriously about things than inl992". 76 
In terms of those off the island the Maruma diversion was equally as important in 
co-ordinating opinion, especially in the press. Where Schellenberg continued to fight 
his corner like a terrier, Maruma had no such tenacity of spirit. Indeed, he retreated 
with horror when faced with the full might of the tabloid press, consequently giving 
them free reign. Also since he was a foreigner, and a German to boot, he provided the 
perfect example of the inappropriate landowner. Indeed he represented everything that 
was wrong with land laws in Scotland; laws which could allow anyone to come along 
and purchase large chunks of the natural heritage without any checks or references to 
their character, fmances, or intentions. This point amongst many others in the land 
debate was exemplified by the Eigg situation. As a poll conducted by Scotland on 
Sunday in October also demonstrated, the groundswell of public opinion was clearly 





restrictions were needed in the Scottish land market. Highlighting the nationalist 
aspects. of the debate as well, 45 % believed that Scottish land should only owned by 
Scottish nationals. 
On Eigg these feelings were somewhat stronger as the end of 1995 saw Mamma 
failing to pay his staffs wages on the island - all two of them. By beginning of 
January 1996 the situation on Eigg had come full circle, with islanders fmally losing 
all faith in Maruma. On 30th of January a public ultimatum was issued by the IERA 
demanding that he fulfilled his promises for at least a hall site and a few leases by the 
end of the day. He failed to deliver, and on the 31st of January the IERA declared: 
"The community has now totally lost confidence in Maruma. He has failed to 
fulfil any of his initial promises and there has been a complete lack of 
response to any attempts at communication. It is intolerable in a small 
community like this that people's livelihoods can be put in jeopardy by a 
third party based in Edinburgh or Stuttgart. It is now clear that the only way 
forward is through a community-led buy-out".77 
4.4 Bridging the gap- a Participative Management Plan 
In fmally proclaiming their public desire for a community-led buy-out the 
islanders had reached a significant watershed. They had crossed into a new realm of 
publicity, planning, and organisation that was far beyond anything they had 
previously encountered. More worryingly, they were now also moving far beyond the 
support and assistance of their empowering facilitators like IllF. It was the classic 
example of a missing link in the chain of participatory development; 78 for whilst both 
HIF and "Planning for Real" had empowered the community with various tools and 
ideas, at the end of it all the islanders were left with very little they could do. Despite 
all his problems, and all their ideas, Mamma still owned the island, and in the 
contemporary political climate there was no chance of any Government intervention 
on the islanders' behalf Maruma had also demonstrated that even in the most 
77 Outterside. Nic. "Eigg Ultimatum to Maruma", The Scotsman, 31 51 January, 1998. 
78 For a good survey of this issue: Lane, Jaqueline. ''Non-governmental organisations and participatory 
development: the concept in theory versus the concept in practice", Nelson, Nici and Wright, Susan 




ludicrous situation there was apparently always some one prepared to pay the full 
market value. Except for the islanders' frustrations, a few moral arguments and little 
over £4,000 in the lET's account, there was not much to justify the islanders' claim to 
be better landlords themselves. Indeed there was a good 300 years of history that 
enforced the claim for external landlords to be the best proprietors: external landlords 
had traditionally been the "improvers" of West Highland estates, and they were nearly 
always the only ones with enough cash who could afford to buy them. 
Certainly they were now "empowered, and barring a few exceptions they 
were a united front as well. Through the various planning and participation exercises, 
the community had also shown their capabilities for running workshops and 
developing their own ideas. Yet unfortunately, there is a world of difference between 
the loose results of planning workshops, and the properly documented and credible 
proposals of the policy world. If they were to convince people that they could feasibly 
run the island, as well as justify their claim for fmancial support, then they needed to 
produce material on a who le new level. As many islanders pointed out, it was more 
than ironic that of all the people needed to justify their knowledge, capabilities, and 
fmancial responsibility for running the island, they were the ones who had to produce 
the most. Nevertheless credibility was once more the crucial issue, and they therefore 
needed to bridge the gap between empowerment and real power; between the ''wish 
list" of their workshop results and a cogent and strategically viable feasibility study. 
The previous feasibility study initiated by the lET in 1992 was the perfect 
example of how things should not be done. Although the author, Bob Harris was a 
competent consultant the methodology and end product were far removed from the 
community on Eigg. First and foremost, the author only spent a limited time on the 
island and the who le pitch of the study was made, organised, and developed from 
outside the island. Sure there was consultation with residents, but there was little if 
any consensus achieved with the fmal result. The projects detailed, such as the "Life 
Centre", were also totally inaccessible to the islanders, and the figures produced 
highly unrealistic. Indeed, not only was most of the study beyond the grasp of the 
community themselves, but it was also not backed nor accredited by any third parties. 
Hence, the entire procedure caused more damage than good for the Trust's cause, and 
considering the consultant charged over £4,000, it turned out to be a very expensive 
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own goal. What was needed this time round was obviously a study of much more 
relevance and accuracy; it needed to sell the idea of community ownership not only to 
outside world but most importantly to the residents themselves. Although the idea of 
community ownership was attractive in principle, and they had publicly declared their 
wish to pursue it, the idea was very much the last resort. Circumstances had pushed 
them into the situation, and for most people on the island the fmancial merits of the 
community ownership were far from clear. Like all West Coast estates, surrounding 
Eigg was the common notion that the estate could only be run and afforded as a rich 
mans toy; i.e. it could never sustain itself, and would always need fmancial input. 
In early 1995 my then assistant supervisor Alastair Macintosh asked me if I 
would be interested in drafting a new development study for the IERA and IET. 
Having studied participatory development and countryside management extensively 
within the Centre for Human Ecology in Edinburgh University, it was felt I would be 
a good and cheap alternative to another consultancy firm. With more than a little 
trepidation, I consequently approached the IERA and made the basic proposal of co-
ordinating a new feasibility study for them in exchange for lodgings on the island, and 
the permission to use Eigg as a case study for a PhD. I carefully pointed out that this 
would be a study utterly unlike the previous one, and would be founded on their 
involvement and their needs. What I wanted was an insight into the realities of 
community trust ownership and management. I had little idea what I was in store for 
when they accepted my offer. What began as a simple three month exercise resulted 
in a three year saga ! 
Although I could not fmd an exact methodology to follow, the feasibility study or 
Eigg Development Study as it became known as, was frrmly rooted in participative 
development theory. The methodology was generated from various works ofRobert 
Chambers and in particular his ground breaking Rural Development: Putting the Last 
First. 79 A seminal writer in the field of participatory theory, Chambers has developed 
the core theory for 'farmer-first' or 'people-frrst' development. Broadly speaking this 
entails a bottom-up approach to rural development issues that HIF has engendered in 
its work in Highland communities. The key to success depends on the outsider's (or 
79 Chambers, Robert. Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Longman, Harlow. 1989. 
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facilitator's) ability to avoid playing t.he expert, and to put aside personal ideas and 
training in favour of "handing over the stick". 80 Obviously my own training and 
expertise would come into the drafting of the development study, but to begin with 
my first priorities were to listen and understand the islanders' ideas. Fort~nately the 
timing of my arrival on the island was to play a significant part in shaping this process 
since I first began my studies in March of 1995; i.e. just before Maruma was to appear 
on the scene. 
Obviously with the initial developments, Mamma distracted me like everyone 
else, and at least for the first part of the summer I believed my job and research had 
been made redundant. Nonetheless, I spent most of 1995 on the island, staying with 
different islanders in their homes and starting the process of listening and gathering 
information. Since I was to use Eigg as my principle study I also began researching 
the island's social and ecological history as well. This no doubt proved vital in slowly 
gaining people's confidence, especially elder indigenous folk as they soon began to 
realise I was not just a typical outsider and consultant. I did have genuine interests in 
the island and in what they had to say. By talking about the past it also proved very 
useful in gathering peoples' opinions on present-day ideas of development. Initially 
older folk might defer from saying anything about Eigg's future, but would instead be 
more than happy discussing the market gardens, dairies, and such like of their 
childhood. After a while it was then not difficult to move onto to present -day 
possibilities and their own thoughts. 
Without the pressure of an impending deadline, I was therefore able to spend 
significant time in exploring almost everyone's opinion on the future development of 
the island. Obviously, the interviewing was a highly qualitative procedure, since I 
would either spend the night or have a meal with the family or individual I was 
questioning. Slowly as the evening progressed I directed conversation towards what 
they thought of the planning workshops, and then on to the particular areas of 
organisational structure, agriculture, forestry, tourism, and private enterprise. Because 
I wanted to hear what people really thought, I would also make it clear from the 
beginning that these conversations were in the strictest of confidence. I did not want 
8° Chambers, Robert. "Paradigm Shifts and the Practice of Participatory Research and Development", 
Power and Participatory Development. pp.30-42. p.32 
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to associate particular people with particular notions, but I was far more interested in 
areas of consensus and division. As tape machines invariably put people at unease, I 
quickly developed a practice of taking notes on paper, and then letting the 
interviewees read and correct them afterwards. 
Talking to people at home naturally produced a much-relaxed atmosphere where 
even the quietest of individuals would openly talk about their own ideas for the island. 
It was also of course a two-way process, as soon everyone on the island knew me, and 
had taken the measure of who I was and what I was up to. Because of how long I 
stayed and how often I visited, I also became heavily involved in the community's 
events, such as the summer feis, the common Celidhs, and general social gatherings. 
By the end of the summer I was taken as being frrmly "on-side", and although 
possessing the university background and training, I was nevertheless taken as being 
one who "understood the situation better than any consultant"81 • It also exemplified 
that I was not maintaining a neutral, nor objective course of study. In order to produce 
a Development Study that was accepted, I needed to clearly enter into the daily life of 
the island and show where my loyalties lay. I needed to be accepted, not as "one of 
them" but as some one who could be trusted and some one who had a sound grasp of 
the community and island's potential. 
By October of 1995, people were openly beginning to question the longevity of 
Maruma' s ownership - especially when he was indicted for fraud. I was consequently 
asked by the Steering Committee to begin work "properly", and to start the formal 
drafting of the Development Study. After my numerous conversations during the 
summer it was also clearly apparent to me that the degree of doubt that islanders had 
over community ownership was considerable. Indeed, as I tabulated my various 
interviews into a crude summary of points and numbers I was highly alarmed to 
discover that only 35o/o of the adult population felt the community was capable of 
managing the estate.82 Obviously, these results were just a snapshot in time, yet 
nevertheless there was distinct scepticism regarding community ownership and 
management. The two main causes of this were that frrstly over half the residents felt 
the estate could only be run at loss, and secondly over two thirds of the residents 
81 Mentioned several times during private conversations, and in Steering Committee meetings. 
82 Appendix. A.2 
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believed the community lacked the appropriate skills to manage the island. 83 If I was 
to have any success therefore, it was soundly imperative that the Development Study 
accommodated and answered these doubts. 
Central to Chambers' view of participative theory is the need for facilitators to 
reverse the standard assumptions of rural development. Since, this above all entails 
listening to people, and encouraging their own ideas for development, there could be a 
certain contradiction in what I was undertaking. That being drafting a business plan or 
feasibility study for them, which in effect was telling them what to do. This would 
have been a contradiction, if the study had been approached in such a manner. 
Instead, what I was producing was only to be a "first draft", and everything was to 
pass before the Steering Committee and residents before any final decisions were 
made. It was also made adamantly clear at a IERA meeting in November, that I was 
merely a glorified secretary who was following their wishes and instructions. My 
degrees and background were simply being used to present and cost the community's 
ideas in the best manner possible. Even the fmal Development Study itself, once 
discussed, vetted, and corrected by the community was simply a stepping stone in the 
process. It was not to be a fixed entity, but more a sales pitch to potential partners, 
funding agencies, and the outside world. My job was to prove that the island could be 
fmancially viable and that the community's ideas of development were sound. 
Nevertheless, in the very construction of the draft I would be naturally making 
judgements over which development projects to include in an overall study. My 
criteria for this were again generated from Chambers together with my own ideas 
gathered from interviews. These were as follows: 
Financially viable- The island had to be seen to pay for itself. 
2 Consensus orientated -Projects had to be able to satisfy the largest majority. 
3 Practical- Projects had to be appropriate for island conditions and skills. 
4 Si m pie - Everyone needed to understand the projects and the pitch. 




The main aim was obviously to show that the island could at least break even. 
Essential to this was uncovering what is known in estate circles as "the factoring cost" 
- i.e. the overheads of running an estate. Most islanders had no idea whatsoever as 
what this amounted to, and for many it represented the largest unknown aspect of 
community management or ownership. Having said this, fmancial concerns were not 
the overriding criterion since consensus was crucial. Hence projects such as a pub 
were to be put aside, not for fmancial reasons, as a pub would be a proverbial gold 
mine on Eigg, but simply because interview results showed that it was a highly 
contentious issue. Practicality and simplicity are obvious criteria for projects on an 
island where resources and access to support are scarce. They also represented 
another aspect of the study's accessibility for the islanders, for whatever 
developments were proposed needed to be easily understood, and comfortably 
managed by the islanders themselves. Finally and by no means least, was the criterion 
of community control. Control over daily life and surrounding resources had 
precipitated events up until this point, so it was essential to have this as a deciding 
criterion. Especially since inappropriate management, structure, or enterprise could 
easily still hand control over to other people. 
4.5 The Eigg Development Study 
In any feasibility study the necessity for itemising the assets, condition, and 
situation of the property in question is obvious. With Eigg, however, there was also a 
political edge, since there was an absolute need to show how bad conditions were 
under Maruma's proprietorship. In some circumstances this might have led to 
understandable exaggerations, yet the island was in such bad decline that there was 
little danger of misrepresentation. Indeed, there was much the reverse problem, since 
it was necessary not to demoralise residents and potential supporters by painting a 
completely bleak picture. The Appendix contains much of this frrst section of the 
Development Study, which was completed in February 1996, and then updated 
through the year up to October 1996. It includes all the relevant information on the 
island's population, services, ecology, Estate, and enterprises. In compiling this 
information enormous assistance and advice was gained from the residents, to the 
extent that it was very much a communal effort. The second section of the Study is 
reviewed below, but only in summarised form, since greater attention is paid here to 
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the deciding criteria and methodology of the fmal proposed scenario of development. 
As with all studies of this nature, there were many subsequent drafts and amendments, 
especially as this became the basis of an application for the NHMF. I have 
consequently stuck to the initial February 1996 draft that was first reviewed by the· 
Steering Committee, and then passed on to the SWT the HC, and the Crofters' Trust 
Advisory Service. 
As with most hard data concerning Eigg there was considerable difficulty when 
it first came to approximating the estate's operating balance under Maruma's 
management. Understandably, none of the estate's accounts were allowed to be 
viewed, and at frrst this proved to be somewhat daunting. However, it turned out to be 
very useful in ensuring that the residents began to investigate the 'factoring costs' of 
the estate themselves. The two estate workers, Neil Robertson (the gardener) and 
Donald MacFadyen (the estate shepherd) both provided detailed information on the 
basic maintenance costs of the Lodge, and the estate farm. Combined with insurance 
quotes, a list of Council Tax liabilities, and an approximation of legal and 
accountancy costs we were therefore able to piece together the fmal summary. As was 
pointed out in the Study, this was still only an approximation and presumed that 
Maruma would collect rents from at least 2 out of the 6 occupied estate houses. It also 
presumed that rents would be collected from the occupied farms (Kildonnan, Laig, 
and Howlin), and that the Estate would properly manage what was left of the Estate 
farm (Galmisdale). However, Maruma was not to collect rents in any form, either 
commercial or residential. 84 As for running the farm, he was to not pay a wage from 
December 1995 onwards, and in February 1996 he simply sold all the livestock to pay 
for his outstanding legal fees. 85 
The Estimated Financial Summary provided the first important step towards 
convincing people that the Estate could be viable. True, the fmal balance showed at 
least an £I 8,000 annual loss, but this was achieved from absolutely ridiculous 
84 The most plausible reason for this was Maruma's intention to minimise the amount of people who 
had any security of tenure. Paying a rent implies certain rights of occupation, and occupied property is 
worth less than unoccupied property. 




management of the Estate's assets. 86 This estimate, even if £20,000 out was still 
minimal when considering the Estate's properties, farmland, and potential. It also 
clearly demonstrated that factoring costs were not the evil ogre people imagined, and 
that if the Estate was actually run appropriately and not just into the ground, there 
were certainly opportunities for developing a highly sustainable portfolio of Estate 
enterprises. The other fortunate aspect of the Financial Summary was that it did not 
involve particularly large sums of money. Irrespective of the profit or loss, the 
numbers were not in the millions or hundreds of thousands of pounds, but well within 
reasonable conception and understanding of all people concerned. The Estate 
represented a sizeable enterprise, but an enterprise that could be comprehended 
nonetheless. As ever, however, the key questions were, how could the community go 
about managing it, and what could they do ? Initially, I had said that I would not be 
dealing with exact structures ofma.nagement, but when it came to drafting the study I 
needed to provide a crude framework upon which to hang the various projects. 
(i) Management Structure 
Fortunately the interviews and workshops provided a sound basis from which to 
organise a management structure. The workshop on "The relationship between the 
IERA and the new Isle ofEigg Trust", had proposed the formation of a Working 
Development Group composed of the 5 Steering Committee members from the IERA 
and 3 members of the lET. This new Working Development Group would assume the 
role of the Steering Committee and lead the negotiations over any future sale or 
buyout of the island. Enshrined in this structure was the proviso that whatever 
happened, the IERA must have at least a 51% controlling interest over any future 
structure and decisions. It was also decided that the residents' representatives on this 
body would be elected and stand for three years, and then stand down for a minimum 
of two years on a rotational basis. Although the new body would deal with the details 
of negotiations and planning, crucial decisions would always be deferred back to the 
IERA for a ballot. 87 Although seemingly a little complex, over 90% of the residents 
86 Appendix. A.6. 7 
87 Workshop Results, "The workshop on the relationship between the IERA and the lET", 9th 
September. 1994. lEA 
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were comfortable with the Working Development Group and as such this provided the 
perfect basic mechanism for a future management committee. 88 
The Development Study therefore proposed the island be owned by the lET, a 
charitable body, and then managed by a separate Management Committee (like The 
Working Development Group). If necessary this committee could constitute a holding 
company limited by guarantee which would prevent any trading losses being held 
against the actual ownership of the island. Like the Working Development Group, the 
Committee (or company) would also consist of at least 51% elected residents (on a 
rotational basis) and whatever outside parties were to be affiliated to the Trust. The 
Committee would then be responsible for the management strategy of the Estate and 
would meet at regular intervals throughout the year to decide business management. 
One essential point to this structure was not having a 'factor' involved in the 
day to day management of the Estate. The traditional idea of having one single person 
in charge of running the Estate was anathema to many islanders, and in private 
conversations many people had pointed out that this would have been an impossible 
position for any islander (or especially non-islander) to undertake. There was also the 
issue of parcelling out employment as much as possible and not concentrating funds 
into one high paid job. Consequently the Study proposed no single "island manager" 
as such, but that the Committee would employ different personnel (part-time where 
applicable) to manage each of the separate components of the Estate's portfolio. As 
detailed below, there were three separate enterprises proposed for the island's 
development: a new invigorated Estate farm, a holiday accommodation business, and 
a forestry scheme. All three were envisaged as stand-alone projects, which, if 
necessary could also be constituted as limited companies as well. A separate 
individual would then manage each project and be responsible for its running and 
accounts. Obviously the day to day management of the other aspects of the Estate, 
such as collecting rents, organising deliveries, processing grants, organising 
Committee meetings, and so forth also needed staff. Again to parcel out employment, 
the Study proposed two part-time secretarial helpers. 
88 Appendix A.2 
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The division of labour not only had democratic motives, but was also proposed 
to cover the issu'e of skills. No one on the island believed they had the ability to 
manage the whole enterprise of the Estate single-handedly, let alone the desire; hence 
the proposal of dividing the various duties into different aspects. There were several 
people on the island who would be willing to work as a secretary for the Estate or its 
enterprises, and several others who were prepared to take on one of the individual 
projects. In dividing jobs up, however, there would of course be smaller wages and 
predominantly part time employment. Yet this too was an advantage since in private 
conversations most people, especially crofting families, preferred the idea of part time 
work. 
(ii) Immediate matters of Estate 
On acquisition of the island, the first consideration of the Committee would be 
to conduct a full survey of the island, its properties, and fmancial situation. The Study 
proposed that this would be conducted by an appointed surveyor and accountant, who 
acting independently would also revue the Estate's rents and leases of properties. 
Though a delicate situation, the setting of rents and leases would closely follow the 
previous rental values and if any disputes arose between surveyors and tenants, the 
Management Committee would act as fmal arbiter. Leases would of course be long 
term and renewable, and the farmhouses would remain fixed to the farm tenancies. As 
several people had expressed a wish to purchase their houses, all tenants of Estate 
houses would also be offered the right to buy their houses from the Estate. The value 
being set by the independent assessors. Included in any sale, however, would also be 
the right of the Estate to make the first offer on any resale of properties purchased. 
Since the vast majority of residents found the workshops a useful tool in 
planning, the Study also proposed another series of workshops to be held on the future 
of the Estate after the survey was completed. However, as several commented on the 
independence of Committee members as facilitators, it was suggested that HIF were 
called in to host them. From the combination of workshops and the survey a final 
strategy could be then properly developed by the Committee and implemented. 
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(iii) Capital Projects 
In terms of particular projects the Management Committee could implement, the 
Development Study costed two new capital projects for consideration, and 
incorporated an existing project already under consideration. The latter was an 
application for the Millennium Forest Scheme being run by the National Lotteries 
Board. Originally suggested by a visitor to the island, Steve Sankey, the full 
application had been drafted by himself and the SWT in late 1995 under consultation 
with the then Steering Committee.89 The project sought to create a native West Coast 
forest encompassing approximately 15% of the island. Notably the project 
encompassed the creation of four full time jobs, including a manager, and was 
specifically aimed at making the island self-sufficient in its timber supplies. Already 
in the application stage by December of 1995, the project like the community hall, 
had stalled upon the agreement and signature ofMaruma. 90 
The two new projects proposed by the Development Study were set within a 
framework that struck a balance between private and community enterprise. In private 
conversations it was evident that there was considerable differences of opinion on the 
island over how that balance should be wrought. Some believed that the easiest and 
simplest scenario was to lease out as much enterprise and resources as possible to the 
private sector, whilst others felt the entire Estate should be run as a community 
business. The proposed scenario took a median position that was guided by the 
criterion for maintaining control over the island's resources, but which still provided 
ample opportunity for the private sector. In terms of funding for these two capital 
projects, the Study chose conservative approaches to development on the presumption 
that they would have to be financed by bank loans rather than grants. This was 
perhaps a little over-cautious since there were numerous grant-giving agencies such as 
Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) that would assist with start-up costs. 
Nevertheless, it was essential to keep proposals practical, and so the combined capital 
expenditure of the two new projects totalled £134,345- details in the Appendix. 91 
89 IERA Steering Committee Minutes. 27th November, 1995. 
90 ibid. 14th December 1995, 8th January 1998, 15th January, 29th January, 5th February. 
91 Development Study financial summary. Appendix, A.7 
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Property expenses in terms of rates and insurance on selected liable buildings 
represented at least £8,000 per annum in Estate expenditure. It was consequently 
necessary to begin covering those costs by utilising the vacant properties for at least a 
holiday letting business. Principle among these properties was of course the Lodge, 
and many debates had ensued as to its most appropriate development.92 The 
Development Study proposed a high-class self-catering hostel to initiate the Lodge's 
use for tourist accommodation. The main reason for not choosing to develop it as an 
upmarket hotel was chiefly to minimise capital outlay, but also to prevent major 
competition with the established B&B' s on the island. Significant market research 
went into the proposal together with careful costing for its renovations and furnishing 
-all amply assisted by islanders. Two part time staff were proposed to manage the 
business and maintain the property, running an annual season of32 weeks. The rates 
of occupancy and prices were garnered from a successful hostel based in Mallaig that 
many islanders used when travelling to the mainland. 
Combined with the hostel was the proposed running of self-catering holiday 
cottages. Of the nine other unoccupied Estate properties only three were economically 
viable for refurbishment and the holiday letting market. Even with a £7,000 budget 
for cosmetic refurbishing, they were nevertheless at the bottom end of the market and 
could not expect to generate significant profits. Nonetheless, as previous Estate 
management had shown if you left any property on the island unused it quickly 
deteriorates. Therefore profit or no profit, the simple use of the properties at least 
ensured they were heated for part of the year and at worst prevented from falling into 
greater disrepair. There was again a case for leasing them out to individuals to run as 
enterprises themselves, or perhaps the Committee borrowing more money to invest in 
their full refurbishment. Financial prudence, practicality, and the undercapitalised 
nature of the island population, however, indicated it was best to retain control, and at 
least defer the decision or debt to a future date. As such the cottages were to be 
incorporated into the hostel business and managed by its staff. The fmancial summary 
in the appendix provides details. 93 
92 Appendix. A.l.ll 
93 Appendix. A.7.1 
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The farm was the other obvious capital project to be considered. Again there 
was some debate as to whether it should just be leased out as a normal agricultural 
tenancy. 
94 
However, this was rejected since no one on the island would be able to take 
on the initial financial burdens. Especially since quotas as well as stock would need 
to be purchased, and most of the agricultural machinery was in need of replacement. 
The other option of course, was to break the farm up into two or three smallholdings, 
but whilst people were happy to suggest the idea, there were few who said they would 
take up the offer themselves. 95 Hence the study proposed that the farm should 
initially be run as a business under the Committee, at least for the short term anyway, 
with a farm manager responsible for its running, together with one part-time labourer. 
The fmancial projections were calculated from the 1996 Scottish Agricultural 
Handbook,96 and from the extensive assistance ofCollin Carr and Donald 
MacFadyen. 
(iv) Remaining Estate Management 
In enclosing the three projects within a development scenario, the remainder 
of the Estate management left a large amount of issues still open. In particular the 
private enterprises detailed in the Appendix such as the shops, B&B 's, and assorted 
other potential businesses. Obviously the study proposed that all commercial tenants 
would be offered a full lease if immediately required, mediated by the independent 
surveyor and accountant. However, beyond the properties already occupied no 
proposals were made. This was because of the lack of both capital and skills (or 
perhaps more accurately confidence) on the island emphasised the need for the estate 
to provide training courses for the residents beforehand. A budget of£ 1 ,000 a year 
from the Estate was proposed, which could at least be doubled, most likely trebled, 
with grant assistance, especially if the training provided was related to small business 
management. The importance of this training could not be over-estimated since it 
would provide the confidence and knowledge of grants, services, and strategy that 
was vital for anyone intending to take on a commercial enterprise on the island. The 
Study also pointed out, that if people were struggling to fmd the necessary capital to 
94 Appendix. A. 7.2 
95 Crude estimations worked outcome the agricultural income from each of the small-holdings would 
be approximately £6,000 
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rebuild premises such as the Shop, then there was also the potential of limited 
partnerships and the assistance of the Committee in channelling funds that could not 
be accessed otherwise. 
It was hoped that those already occupying commercial property would take the 
time to attend the training programs before any drastic decisions were taken. Above 
all it was believed that things should not be rushed into - and that everyone on the 
island was given a level playing field of information, skills, and time. The issue of 
phasing development projects, both Estate and private, also needed to be frrmly 
recognised, for it was logical to ensure the maximum island benefit from all the 
employment generated by refurbishment and building. Indeed, if all three capital 
investment projects were launched in year one that would immediately halve the 
unemployment rate with the creation of 4 new full time and 3 new part time jobs. That 
left only 5 or so people remaining to actually work on the refurbishme:r..t of Estate 
properties, which with their selling or leasing would release substantial grants and 
grant-aid for their rebuilding, not to mention any other private developments or 
enterprises as well. Without appropriate scheduling it would be therefore impossible 
to achieve everything at once without importing labour on to the island. This is not to 
say that residents were hostile to any new arrivals, but especially in short term, it 
would be foolish to give away employment that the islanders had fought so hard to 
gain themselves. 
All that is left to summarise is the Estate's other fmancial considerations 
which were the provision of funds for consultancy work and the costs of 
miscellaneous Estate issues. A total of£ 18,000 was allocated for the frrst year's legal 
and survey work, which then dropped down to £4,000 per annum for general auditing 
and legal work. This simply covered the Estate's direct accounts since each of the 
capital projects contained their own operating and accountancy provisions. The Estate 
also remained liable for all unoccupied properties which totalling around £4,600 was 
considerable but nevertheless manageable. The same was true of fmally dealing with 
the refuse disposal on the island, and though no site for the land fill was proposed, its 
operating expenses were calculated at £2,000 per annum, which represented a minor 
96 Scottish Agricultural College, The Scottish Agricultural Handbook 1996, SAC, Edinburgh. 1996 
197 
Chapter I· our 
part time contract for a islander. As for the expenses of the two part time Estate staff, 
their wages were costed into the budgets of the three capital projects, with primarily 
the Millennium Forestry scheme contributing the most. Obviously an Estate Office 
would be a logical proposition, and could easily be accommodated in the Lodge -
paying a rent to the hostel if necessary. 
(v) Consultation and eliciting support 
I had only provided the costing for a particular scenario of development. 
Admittedly, it had been generated from the workshop results and interviews, and 
constantly referred back to various islanders regarding particular points. However, the 
product was nevertheless my construction and needed due consideration, comments, 
and corrections by the IERA and Steering Committee. In late January 1996 draft 
copies were provided to each member of the Working Development Group, together 
with several copies being provided for circulation around the island. I also sent copies 
to Neil Wilcox at the SWT, and Michael Foxely the HRC Councillor. Feedback was 
quick and initially from all parties consisted of the corrections of minor errors and 
omissions. To my amazement, however, there were no significant criticisms of the 
basic structure of development. Certainly people had different viewpoints over the 
Lodge, and a few over the management structure (i.e. not having a factor) as was 
expected, but in terms of flat rejections or contradictions to any assertions within the 
document there was a remarkable absence. I had fully intended at the time to do 
another round of interviews and to exact a detailed review of people's feelings over 
the draft. However, by the middle of February 1996, time had swiftly become a 
valuable commodity, and I was soon put to work on drafting subsequent versions that 
updated the full involvement of the HC and the SWT in the potential buy-out. This 
very much emphasised how much my research had become fully integrated with the 
on-going situation, and rather than sacrifice its utility I was forced to drop the second 
round of interviews I had planned. 
The main consideration that the Steering Committee did express was to have the 
Development Study approved by outside agencies. The Crofters' Trust Advisory 
Service (CTAS) was one such body that provided the ideal opportunity since it had 
recently been set up by the SOAFD to deal with the devolution of SO estates to 
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community trusts. Collin Carr, Leslie Riddoch, and myself met the Chairman and 
representatives on February 2"d, and essentially asked for the Study to be reviewed. 
Unfortunately, since the proposal was not a purely crofting issue, they were unable to 
directly assist with money. However, they did provide contacts with the consultants 
who had been previously employed by Assynt - and by channelling a grant from the 
Highland Fund it was possible to for them to review the Study. 
4.6 Brokering a partnership 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, the partnership's eventual 
campaign success was very much related to the personalities involved and the genuine 
friendliness of the islanders. To visit Eigg means taking an often eventful boat ride 
from the mainland, staying the night with a family, and whatever your reason for 
going, getting to know people on the island directly. Of course the odd dram of 
whiskey would be involved, and soon you would feel very much at ease and at home. 
For the people representing HRC and SWT, not to mention the press and others 
involved with the island this was invariably an enjoyable exercise. It was also 
fundamental in facilitating the fmal partnership, for it encouraged all those involved 
to genuinely trust one another and feel confident in their undertakings. 
The Unofficial Friends ofEigg was a prime example of how the relationships 
individuals had built up on the island boiled over into practical and applied action. By 
December of 1995 there had already developed a group of"Eigg friends" in 
Edinburgh determined to facilitate the potential partnership between the SWT, HRC, 
and the IERA. Robustly chaired by Leslie Riddoch, the group consisted of Alastair 
Macintosh, Sir Maxwell MacLeod (the son ofGeorge MacLeod oflona and 
journalist), Andy Wightman (land reform activist and author), Andrew Raven (Vice 
Chairman of JMT), Neil Wilcox (SWT), and myself. Originally it began in early 
December 1995 as a spontaneous grouping of island friends and interested associates, 
and throughout the 12 months or so of meetings it remained frrmly informal. It did 
however, provide a neutral forum within which the examination and brokering of the 
future partnership could be fostered and encouraged. The group also provided advice, 
connections, and above all confidence to the individual partners concerned. This was 
achieved frrstly through the vetting, debating, and redrafting of the Development 
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Study and secondly through lobbying the NHMF. As such it also provided a debating 
ground for the sounding of potential ideas and strategies, as well as the oiling out of 
any possible conflicts between the three partners. 
Fig 4.6: Maxwe/1 MacLeod and Andy Wightma11 
Talking with Colli11 Carr 011 Eigg Pier. 9 ' 
When the Development Study was first discussed in a meeting on 31 51 of 
January, Neil Wilcox was "amazed to see how the islanders had come on by leaps and 
bounds".98 Both Andrew and Andy were also pleased with the initial st rategy, and 
together with Alastair were to assist in revising figures. approaches, and providing 
encouragement to SWT in pursuing the partnership. From then on each revis ion was 
vetted and contributed to by Nei l as well as debated within the group. Similarly with 
Alastair, Leslie, and visiting islanders representing Eigg, various issues were thrashed 
out such as the notion of not having a factor in charge of the Estate. Neil was at fJist 
very sceptical of the idea, citing that all S WT reserves or estates had a manager or 
factor in charge. Yet Alastair and I described the situation at Assynt where no factor 
""as employed, and where instead a committee and "helper" organised the estate's 
management.99 Like several other reservations. in the end Neil was convinced of the 
possible alternatives, and had the confidence to support the idea within SWT. The 
process worked both ways, as well, for another important issue that arose was the 
actual division of the Committee ofTrustees. The residents had asserted their 
posit ion of 5 I% controlling interest in any potential management structure, yet Neil 
(and Andrew) rightfu lly pointed out it could not be a true partnership ifthat was the 
97 Daniel Morgan. 




case. Also if the NHMF was the principle form of funding, then they would require a 
guarantee that the natural heritage would be protected. 51 o/o community control would 
not satisfy that requirement. Intense discussions were resolved by the suggestion of 
equal representation, but with an independent chairman who had strong community 
interests, such as Bill Ritchie from the Assynt Crofters' Trust (who was also an SNH 
representative). 100 As with all meetings this was minuted back to Eigg for the 
Working Development Group to assess. Eventually a crofting lawyer who was a 
school friend of Alastair's, Simon Fraser was given the brief to work out a potential 
compromise, together with the exact legal structure needed to own and operate the 
island. The SWT and the lET divided the costs. 101 
In terms of the NHMF, the group very quickly began facilitating contacts with 
people on the board. Andrew had several Scottish contacts, and so did Leslie who one 
December evening found herself invited to a meal with a few other journalists and of 
all people, Lord Rothschild the NHMF Chairman. He had invited them to discuss how 
the Lottery could get a better reputation in the press, and much to everyone's 
astonishment asked what projects they thought the NHMF should support. There was 
a slightly bemused silence, before Leslie launched into a full Eigg promotion exercise. 
To her amazement Rothschild liked the idea enormously, and ended up giving his 
informal support to a partnership buy-out. Of course, Rothschild' s approach to the 
press, and Leslie' s apparent success in persuading him of Eigg' s merits, epitomised 
how the "old -boy" network as such continued to operate. For it was only by fortune 
that Leslie had become involved with the campaign, and it was only through her 
connections that she had been able to lobby the head of the NHMF directly. Much like 
Schellenberg and his predecessors, it could easily be said that the Eigg Partnership 
were using an unfair advantage to pursue their own interests. Before any formal 
application had been made, it suddenly appeared there was already a green light from 
the top of the primary funding agency for support of their project. The irony of the 
situation was hardly lost on any of the participants, yet nevertheless there was little 
unease with the situation; for once it appeared as if processes of inside knowledge and 
advantage were going to provide the right results. 
100 ibid; Unofficial Friends ofEigg Minutes, 21st January 1996. lEA 
101 Simon Fraser did the legal work for Assynt Crofters' Trust, and the proposed take over of crofting 
estates belonging to OAFS on Skye in the early 1990's. 
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Naturally, as the news ofLeslie's encounter with Rothschild spread within the 
partnership, everyone was extremely enthused, and following his advice an initial 
NllMF application was swiftly filled out in order to get a case number registered, and 
a case oflicer to assist with the full application and business plan. This was done 
under the name of the lET, not because any formal decisions had yet been made. but 
because a charitable body was needed to lodge the application. 102 
The SWT were the first to officially commit themselves to a partnership buy-
out with the !ERA back in December. just after the Friend's first meeting. This was a 
relatively simple exercise since, as Neil remarked at the time "Like everyone else we 
had given up on achieving anything with Maruma, and after getting our fingers burnt 
with Schellenberg the SWT knew that a buy-out in conjunction with the community 
was the only real solution. What we hadn't realised, was just how prepared people 
were on the island". 103 An SWT directors' meeting on the l31h of December gave 
permission to proceed with formal consultations. 
Fig 4. 7: The First stage of application to the NH M F. 1tu 
HRC on other hand were very much aware of what was happening on the 
island. but were much more limited with what they could officially do. Dr. Michael 
102 ibid. 
103 Wilcox, Neil. Conversation. 191h December 1995. 
104 Daniel Morgan 
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Foxley the Local Councillor since 1986, had retained strong contacts on the island, 
and since the previous attempt at a buy-out had been officiously been preparing the 
ground for the next opportunity. In 1994 he had begun a consultation exercise within 
Council departments and agencies to formulate a potential strategy for community 
purchase of the island. Within this he proposed the establishment of a common trust 
model to be applied to Eigg, and similar estates, when community purchase became 
an option. Essentially this would consist of 50% local residents, elected and rotated, 
with the other half being constituted by the main public and voluntary agencies 
wishing to be involved. 105 It was very much the structure the SWT and IERA were 
working towards in their discussions, with all parties understanding the need to fulfil 
NHMF criteria for charitable status, and guarantees to protect the natural heritage. 
One problem facing the HRC in 1996, however, was both to delay and in fact 
allow formal preparation to go-ahead. This was the massive Scottish I .ocal 
Government reorganisation and hand over to unitary authorities on April 1st 1996. For 
Council employees it was a nerve-wracking process of firing and re-hiring that 
obviously caused enormous upheaval, distraction, and delays within the council 
organisations. Indeed Michael Foxley even saw the boundary changes remove Eigg 
and the Small Isles from his constituency. Nevertheless, Char lie King the Councillor 
to replace him as the islands' representative was equally minded and keen to promote 
a potential partnership and buy-out on Eigg. Crucially the new centralised authorities 
were also to work under a quasi-parliamentary structure that consisted of powerful 
Select Committees responsible for formulating and vetting Highland Council (HC) 
policy. These had been set up before the official hand over to unitary authorities, and 
the new Land and Environment Select Committee chaired by Michael was to prove an 
essential vehicle for co-ordinating and promot'ing the HC's eventual support for the 
partnership. On the 22"d of February the Select Committee considered the 
Development Study and a request for assistance from the IERA. It proved to be a 
momentous meeting as the Committee agreed to help the islanders in promoting their 
partnership. 106 Within a month of investigations and visits by Councillors and officials 
the formal partnership proposal was put before the full Council and approved on the 
105 Foxley, Michael. "1992 Highland Land Sales- The Lessons for Community Purchase of the Isle of 
Eigg 1994", Private correspondence. 21 51 July 1994. lEA 
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29th March. Before it had even officially taken over as a unitary authority, the new HC 
was now a committed member of the partnership and ready to ba~k a £1 million 
appeal to purchase the island. The outspoken Councillor Christina Cunningham was 
quoted as saying they had to back the islanders: "It was a culture shock to me to visit 
Eigg. They should be able to enjoy the same rights as the rest of us, without a landlord 
treating them like scum. We should certainly not allow this in the Highlands and 
Islands". 107 
With all three partners now in broad agreement, it was then a case of tying the 
various strands together into a sealed package ready for the island's presumed 
eventual sale. By April, the consultants arranged by CT AS fmally produced their 
report concerning the updated Development Study, which essentially stated that the 
plan was well balanced and provided a perfect point of departure for an NHMF 
application. It did however, need to be formalised and specifically tailored to the 
application procedure, a process that required further work and professional advice. 1 ~8 
After due consideration by all partners it was agreed to let the consultants (Graeme 
Scott and Steve Westbrook) proceed with the work, providing that I was used to liase 
and assist with the research and drafting. 109 For the residents this meant that they had 
the assurance that I would be involved in the drafting, and would provide a 
knowledgeable check to any external pressures and ideas. For the consultants I also 
provided a mechanism to thoroughly investigate residents opinions to particular 
revisions and ideas. This I did through constantly visiting the island and discussing 
issues with residents informally, and through regular formal briefmgs with the 
Steering Committee, whose meetings I often attended when on the island. The process 
was to continue throughout the next 7 months during which time the same essential 
projects proposed in the Development Study were incorporated into a business plan 
that exactly fulfilled the NHMF criteria for funding. This entailed a greater emphasis 
on protecting and providing access to the natural heritage, together with detailed 
proposals of partnership funding from other agencies. A specific requirement that was 
106 Ross, John. "Council considers fund for buy-outs", The Scotsman, 23rd February, 1996; Ross, 
David. "Council cash pledge on Eigg buy-out", The HeraiQ, 23rd February, 1996. 
107 Ross, John. "Eigg Appeal approved", The Scotsman, 30th March 1996. 
108 Scott, Graeme. Response to the Isle of Eigg Development Study, 4th April, 1996. lEA 
109 Scott, Graeme. Production of Isle of Eigg Business Plan, I Oth May, 1996. lEA 
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needed since the NHMF would only consider 80% funding of the purchase and start-
up costs for the projects entailed. 
Of course the remaining 20o/o of funding for the purchase and development of 
the island was to come from an orchestrated public campaign. This was sketched out 
when a formal meeting was held on Eigg between HC representatives and the 
Working Development Group in early May. 110 The campaign, which will be detailed 
in Chapter 5, was to be assisted by extensive HC support, and at the meeting the 
representatives were brimming with ideas, enthusiasm, and encouragement. Indeed, 
for the island representatives and those of us present, the meeting emphasised how 
much effort and weight the HC was planning to put behind the venture, as well as 
how much of a political risk they were taking. Several other plans were made such as 
finding a fundraising specialist, as well as securing European Leader funds and LEC 
grants for the fmal business plan and legal study. Whilst interest was also expressed 
over the actual longevity ofMaruma's ownership, it was unanimously agreed to have 
the full partnership, business plan, and NHMF application prepared before any formal 
weight was put on him to sell. 111 
Even after four months of extensiye work and preparations there was still 
absolute alarm when a helicopter was seen hovering around the island in early July 
with a photographer hanging out the side. Sure enough before the end of the month, 
the estate agents Knight Frank and Rutly, in conjunction with Vladdi Island 
Enterprises fmally put the island on the market on July 25th 1996. The business plan 
and lottery application were still to be completed, and although the Steering 
Committee had negotiated this far in the partnership, they had yet to get a fmal and 
formal backing from the IERA. "Leading up to the Residents' Meeting", Maggie 
Fyffe confrrmed "I had slight misgivings because we knew we had a few 
dissenters". 112 These were a small minority of indigenous islanders, and absentee 
crofters living on the mainland, who were still uncertain of the lET's plans and future; 
110 Those present: John Hutchison (Area Manager HC), Or Michael Foxley (Chair of Land & 
Environment Committee), Gavin Scott-Moncrief (Vice Chairman), Nick Reiter (Head of Policy), Dot 
Ferguson (Economic Development Manager), Margaret Paterson (Councillor), and Charlie King 
( Coun ci 11 or). 




two of whom had declined from participating in the formation ofthe Development 
Study, and who had continued to oppose the idea of a buy-out from the very 
beginning.
113 
At the IERA meeting that was called on the night ofthe island's 
announced sale, Karen Helliwell described the structure for the partnership that had 
fmally been negotiated. A new trust body would be set up to own and manage the 
island, in which 4 of the directors would be elected from the island (on a rotational 
basis), 2 would be nominated by the SWT, and 2 from the HC. "This should give the 
Residents an equal representation" she affirmed, and in order to appease any worries 
it would also "ensure no particular clique on the island has an undue say in the 
running of the island". When a vote was finally called, it registered 21 for a 
partnership buy-out and 3 against: the motion was carried with an 86% majority. 114 
The islanders were now members of a unique partnership between local residents, the 
SWT, and the HC, and they were now on course for a momentous campaign . 
4. 7 Conclusions 
•.. : ,· 
·i 
lt's believed to be the only 
painting Maruma ever did on 
the island ... 
Fig 4.8: West Highland Free Press115 
The eventual partnership struck to form the IEHT set a groundbreaking 
precedent in local politics and land ownership in Scotland. It represe!lted the first time 
ever that these three groups of interest, often at conflict throughout the Highlands and 
Islands, had come together and formed a grass roots alliance to further the aims of 
113 this is discussed further in Chapter 5 
114 Turnout was just under 50o/o- which appears low, but must be understood as quite normal since 
usually only one member of each household attends the meetings. 
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sustainable development. All three partners wished to see a new course of 
development on the island, but one that integrated the wishes of the local community, 
the need for economic regeneration, and the necessities of protecting the national 
heritage. Since traditional forms of private ownership had quite spectacularly 
prevented this from happening, a new strategy had to be developed. One that still by 
definition was private, but was also democratic in structure and conducive to the 
wishes and restraints of the wider public in general. However many people later tried 
to interpret the IEHT model of proprietorship as a form of public ownership, it was 
not. It was a new and enlightened course for private ownership, and a possible answer 
to many of the problems three hundred years of private estate ownership in Scotland 
had created. 
Of course Eigg had provided the fertile ground for the partnership because of 
its extreme situation and condition. Representing the worst that could happen under 
private ownership, the partnership had been engendered by the very lack of 
regulations and accountability that the Highland land market required. For the 
community in particular it brought notoriety and assistance from activists, NGO's, 
and supporters. People and organisations that warmed to the genuine nature of the 
islanders themselves, and who sought to promote the community's development and 
empowerment in the face of its disregard by owners and central government alike. 
These friends and facilitators were to provide the much-needed skills and training for 
island's residents, and in so doing enabled them to organise, plan, and promote their 
desire for the island's development. 
The Development Study that was produced from the workshops, planning 
exercises and consultation was both a consensus-building document for the island 
community as well as crucial policy document in the brokering of the partnership. The 
central items for debate in the negotiations between the three partners principally 
covered the just the structure of the future Trust. There were only minor discussions 
and alterations over the course of development scenario envisaged. This is because 
the Development Study answered any fears that the external partners had about the 
residents' notions of development. Perhaps more importantly however, it also assured 
115 28th July 1996 
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the residents themselves that they had direct control over the future partnerships' 
decisions on the ground. It was their Development Study, their business plan, and the 
IERA Steering Committee was the body strictly in charge of its production and 
organisation. Though I had played a significant part in its research and drafting there 
was no doubt who was responsible for its fmal presentation; even within the 
partnership, it was the IERA who was directing physical realities of the Trust's 
development projects. It was the IERA who took the Development Study to CTAS for 
accreditation, and it was the IERA who organised the consultants to begin drafting the 
NI-IMF application. (Incidentally, it was also the IERA and lET who first paid for the 
consultants until money eventually appeared form other sources). 
As such this control gave them significant bargaining power, especially over 
related issues such as whether or not to have a factor or island manager. Both SWT 
and HC would have much preferred the traditional structure of hierarchical 
management on the island. Yet this approach to estate management was part and 
parcel of what the community was reacting against. The Development Study therefore 
appeased their cautions, and demonstrated that a factor was not essential to proper 
management. Above all the IERA control over the Development Study and business 
plan gave them the frrm and assured confidence to answer any criticisms within the 
press. A prime example being just days after the announcement on the 261h of July 
1996, when unsurprisingly Schellenberg threw criticism into the ring. Seeing "nothing 
but disaster if the islanders prevailed", he declared their success "would only lead to 
more squabbling": 
"But Maggie Fyffe, secretary to the Isle of Eigg Trust, said the islanders 
were well placed to take over. A business plan aimed at revitalising the 
island's infrastructure and endorsed by a number of potential backers, 
had been carefully formulated over a year, she added: "The question of 
whether we can manage our own island is apt to make me a little angry 
considering we have already been doing that for years" .116 
116 McCann, Annette. "Former Laird criticises Eigg buy-out plan", The Scotsman, 30th July, 1998. 
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Fig 4.9: Press arrive for the launch of the Eigg Campaign. w 
117 Daniel Morgan. 
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Selling Eigg: The Campaign for Ownership 
5.1 Introduction 
The most obvious and most often raised question regarding the Eigg Appeal is just 
how exactly did 64 Hebridean islanders raise £1.6 m in 8 months, the most successful 
public appeal in the Highlands and Islands to date? None of the islanders were 
professional fundraisers, few had any significant educational backgrounds, and the 
island they lived upon had only the scantiest of resources - which did not even 
include mains electricity. The Assynt Crofters appeal, which inspired so many, had 
over the same period only managed to raise £300,000, and that was with the support 
of two prominent Government Ministers. 1 The Eigg Appeal, however, was in a totally 
different league and looking at an asking price of some £2 m, with unfortunately a 
corresponding lack of such open Government support. 
The first and foremost answer lies in the preceding chapters and the fact that the 
islanders were certainly not alone. The IERA had worked upon the short-comings of 
the lET's previous bid for ownership in 1992 and brokered a partnership with the HC 
and SWT. This not only gave credibility and coherence to their plans for managing 
the island, but also as this chapter details provided immediate support and expertise in 
launching the appeal. Secondly the islanders were hardly new to the game themselves. 
The past five years of public exposure had provided a significant foretaste of what the 
appeal would be like. As such Schellenberg, the lET, and Maruma had all provided a 
superb training program for the islanders' fmal and successful attempt at press 
relations and fundraising. Again as covered in preceding chapters, part and parcel of 
this process was obviously the gradual development of the islanders' own 
organisation of their community. Thirdly and most importantly in regards to the 
fundraising campaign, they had the weight of public opinion behind them. The plight 
ofEigg coalesced with a national political upheaval and a public mood swing that was 
to erupt in the success ofthe Labour Party in the 1997 General Election, and the 
trouncing of Tory representation in Scotland. Eigg became a symbol of the new 
confidence within the Highlands and Islands, and as an example of the traditional 
Scottish underdog their cause was adopted by the bastions of the Scottish Press. Both 
the Herald and Scotsman took the Eigg campaign to heart and assisted in the vigorous 
1 Ross, David. "The Assynt Crofters". p.38 
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pursuit of the island story on a national level. Where once the islanders were simply 
the focus of the tabloids and the relatively minor West Highland Free Press- they 
were now supported by most of the national media. With only a few conservative 
papers holding out against the IEHT, the Eigg Appeal enjoyed an exceptional breadth 
of media support that spread far beyond Britain into Europe, Canada, and United 
States. Indeed the partnership's eventual victory even made the front page of the 
Sydney Herald, in Australia. 
Finally many would also point out that the donation of £I m by a single 
mystery benefactor answers almost two thirds of the question of how the IEHT 
managed to raise such a significant sum. Yet as detailed below, this donation was very 
much created from the campaign's unique character, pitch, and enthusiasm. Dwelling 
too much upon this single principle donation also tends to negate the significance of 
the other £600,000 that was raised. Especially when that sum in. itself seemed such an 
impossible figure to the islanders and their partners in the IEHT when the campaign 
was initially launched. This Chapter therefore seeks to explain how the combination 
of experience, enthusiasm, and planning were combined into a highly successful 
campaign. One that sought to sell the idea of community trust ownership to the public 
and the establishment. And one that succeeded in selling the islanders as rightful 
partners in the ownership and management of their own destinies. 
Since I became centrally involved in the campaign itself, much of what is 
discussed was gained from first hand experience. Originally, this was not intended to 
be part of my research, but simply evolved from my original work on the island, and 
my own commitment to the success of the project. At the time it seemed the next 
logical step from my studies of the island, and my assistance with the community's 
management plans and the formation of the partnership. In the end it turned out to be 
the most invigorating and entertaining aspect of my research, and one that assisted in 
my understanding of the island and its people immeasurably. 
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5.2 Launching the Eigg Appeal 
The escalating public exposure of the island and media coverage ofMaruma's 
ownership obviously provided a sound base from which to launch the Eigg Appeal. 
Indeed, Maruma' s outlandish mismanagement was so bad that even the Scottish 
Landowners Federation (SLF) came out in support of the partnership's bid for 
ownership. An absolute frrst in the SLF's history, they both named and criticised 
Maruma as a bad owner, as then asserted that "In Scotland's outlying areas 
community ownership can often be the best and most appropriate option".2 Though 
highly indicative of the broad background of support for the IEHT's bid, however, the 
SLF's statement also injected distinct caution. Not only did they believe that the 
·islanders would be unable to raise the necessary funds, but that "Even if they did get 
the asking price together, it is likely that the estate will lose money from year to 
year".
3 
Very much echoing the criticisms associated with the previous attempt at 
purchase by the lET, this emphasised the two essential points that had to be 
hammered home throughout the Eigg Appeal. Firstly, that the IEHT had to 
demonstrate a profound belief and confidence in the realistic success of the 
fundraising campaign. And secondly, that the IEHT still had to justify the credibility 
of their potential ownership and their ability to manage the island successfully. Over 
the period of campaigning this was successfully achieved through careful and 
strategic co-ordination between the three partners. It was not however, accomplished 
in the manner initially envisaged. 
Discussions and preliminary planning of the campaign began months before 
the actual announcement of the sale by Knight Frank & Rutly in July 1996. On May 
4th the HC had its first formal meeting with the IERA Steering Committee and lET 
Trustees, at which a basic outline was prepared. Pivotal to this was the establishment 
of a central co-ordinator, or project officer, for running the campaign and liasing with 
funding bodies and the NHMF. All parties felt this a necessity especially considering 
that with three separate partners involved, problems could all too easily arise if there 
2 Privately Duncan Thomas (legal advisor to the SLF) even went so far as to send the IEHT legal 
advice on the powers for compulsory purchase of the Secretary of State for Scotland over landlords 
who neglect their estates. IERA Steering Committee Minutes, 22"d April 1996. 
3 Thoq)e, Nick and Burke, Gerard. "Eigg Appeal collects its first donation", The Scotsman, 27th July 
1996. 
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was not one person in charge. Various possibilities for funding the post were 
suggested, and Nick Reider (Head of Policy for HC) agreed to assemble a task force 
ofHC staff suitable for assisting the nominated co-ordinator.4 Unfortunately, by the 
time of the sale's announcement, funding options for the co-ordinator were not so 
forthcoming as previously envisaged, and more worryingly disagreements had broken 
out between the partners as to who was exactly suitable for such a post. Indeed, the 
more one thought about it, the more difficult the assignment seemed to be.5 
Essentially, the primary concern in choosing a project officer was in 
presenting the best image possible to the press and potential funding agencies. 
Certainly the wily bunch of maverick crofters appealed to the public and press, but the 
image hardly suited potential corporate sponsors nor the large grant-giving agencies 
that also needed to be approached. Consequently, the post holder would have to be of 
very high calibre, with notable fundraising experience and with an admirable list of 
contacts to boot. Conversely, they would also have to be down to earth enough to liase 
with the islanders and deal with the more mundane aspects of the campaign. Not to 
mention having strong Scottish roots in order to sympathise with the 'Brave heart' 
image so much of the press was using to cover the island story. In short though 
discussions were to continue for most of the 8 month campaign the post was never 
created nor filled, partially because of disagreements between the partners, but mostly 
because no one was able nor willing to fulfil the requirements of the job. Instead the 
campaign fell into being run just as the island would be run in the future, and that was 
by a partnership between the three organisations. 
Through a de facto process, two to three people from each partnering group 
began to control the campaign within their own organisations, and jointly within the 
IEHT itself. These were: 
{ 
• Nick Reider General co-ordination, lobbying and liasing with 
grant-giving agencies. 
HC 
• Gordon Fyfe Publicity Officer and lead press relations eo-
ordinator for the appeal. 
4 IERA Steering Committee Minutes. 4th May 1996. 
5 ibid. I 51 August 1996. 
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These are only very crude approximations of peoples' roles within the campaign, and 
taken as such deny much of the interaction and shared responsibility that inevitably 
took place. This also of course, does not include the degree to which others were 
involved in management, especially the numerous members of staff in the HC and 
SWT who participated, together with islanders, friends and the other members of the 
IERA Steering Committee who were also involved. 
As the debates over the project officer clearly exemplified, it would be 
misleading to say that any clear marketing strategy had been fully developed by the 
launch date of the Eigg Appeal. In fact, just like its management, the campaign's 
strategy was to have distinctly organic characteristics, evolving as circumstances, 
people, and time dictated. Nevertheless, from May 1996 onwards, discussions 
between the prospective IEHT partners had laid out the bare bones of a campaign 
strategy, and a meeting on August 2nd between the HC, SWT, and IERA Steering 
Committee was to firm these up into a basic plan. It was a meeting that was also to 
demonstrate the heartening enthusiasm and commitment of the HC in general. For not 
only did they bring along Bill Ritchie from the Assynt Crofters, who provided the 
only real experience of a similar campaign, but perhaps more importantly they also 
brought along much needed fmancial and organisational support. This included 
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seconded staff such as Nick Reider and Gordon Fyfe (HC Head of Publicity), as well 
as the promise of financial support for the initial launch and production of campaign 
material. 
Considering the appeal's initial lack of funds and the uncertainty over a 
closing date for the sale, this support was more than needed. By early August, there 
had still been no mention of a closing date by Knight Frank & Rutley, and the 
uncertainty over how long the campaign would have to raise funds meant that the 
appeal needed to be launched as soon as possible. In terms of strategy Bill Ritchie 
discussed how Assynt had based their campaign on preventing the sale of their estate 
to anyone else. This had been done through various market spoiling activities, as well 
as by their threats of buying out all the crofts. Eigg was a different story, however, 
and did not have such a large percentage of crofting land on the island. Therefore it 
was generally assumed that despite the ample opportunities for market spoiling, the 
IEHT must simply focus on being in a position to make a fair market bid for the 
island. This meant both a detailed application to the NHMF, and a massive public 
appeal- both of which had to achieve at least £800,000 each. Very daunting and 
formidable totals, to be sure, but ones that were buoyed up by a strong enthusiasm, 
and above all by a common belief in the success of the lottery application. Most 
people felt that the application was very strong, and though a little behind schedule it 
would nevertheless be perfect for approval. This in turn gave the planning of the 
public appeal an added sparkle, simply because of the belief that it was not the first 
£800,000 being raised but it was the last £800,000. 
By the end of their August 2nd meeting the IEHT had formed a core program 
and pitch to their publicity campaign, that was going to emphasise the potential 
strength of the Lottery application, as well as generate fmancial support from a public 
appeal. Essential to this was emphasising the element of public access and concern for 
the island that was now under potential threat from the unpredictable Scottish land 
market. Insecurity of tenure was the underlying motivator for the islanders and the 
partnership, and insecurity of tenure in a wider sense was to be the motivator for 
public concern. The success of the appeal did not just mean security for the islanders 
and the local economy, but security for island's wildlife, heritage, and culture as well. 
As such the Eigg campaign was to be sold very much as a symbol of what could 
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happen in the Highlands and Islands if the local people were just given enough 
support. Consequently, though it represented severe logistical problems in 
transportation and press coverage, the launch for campaign had to be made on Eigg. 
The island and the people were going to sell this story and the press had to be given a 
frrst hand opportunity to publicise them. A date at the end of August was 
provisionally set, the HC given the lead role, and a list of tasks was drawn up to be 
accomplished before the launch-day. A list that clearly revealed how much 
groundwork still had to be covered: 
1. Name the interim directors of the Trust 
2. Name the target amount and the account name for donations; until 
the new company has charitable status lET and SWT accounts will 
have to be used 
3. The formal agreement and formation ofthe Legal Partnership. 
4. Valuation of the island- HC district valuer 
5. Finalising of the Development plan for NHMF - HC and LEC to 
make comments. 
6. A professional guarantor to be recruited to underwrite the pledges. 
7. Design and print leaflets; other supporting material; press packs; 
hats; T -shirts; bumper stickers. 
8. Liase with the press 
9. Spokesperson to be chosen 
10. Phone lines to be set up 
11. Likely questions and answers to be studied 
12. Catering to be arranged 
13. Boat charter with Shearwater to be agreed. 
14. Select right day of the week- Monday or Tuesday to catch the local 
and national press. 
15. Give at least two weeks notice of the launch 
16. Time the appeal to coincide with release of the sales brochure.6 
Gordon Fyfe and Nick Reider proved good choices for publicity and strategy 
within HC~ and through constant contact with the IERA and SWT they swiftly 
produced the frrst appeal leaflet. Printed on recycled paper and very modest in its 
design, it provided a succinct summation of the campaign for ownership, together 
with a cut-out section for donating to the appeal. The bold outline of saving the island 
"once and for all from the vagaries of the landlord system", was matched with an 
affirmation of how the IEHT would "protect and enhance the natural heritage of the 
6 IERA Steering Committee Minutes. 1st August 1996. 
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island and facilitate public access". These claims being backed up by description of 
the partnership's application to the NHMF, and reference to a management plan that 
included the "regeneration of the natural woodlands as part of a Millennium Forest 
Project".
7 
Combined with the 20,000 leaflets printed, were also campaign T-shirts and 
bumper stickers bearing the logo "lets crack it". For the press launch itself, which was 
set for 2ih of August, Gordon Fyfe prepared detailed press packs of information on 
the island, and combined with support from Stan Blackley, the SWT Publicity Officer, 
gave two weeks notice to all the press contacts possible. On the island, preparations 
for the launch included arranging transport to and around the island for the 50 or so 
expected press, and preparing the hall and more importantly Steering Committee 
members for the actual press conference itself. 
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The night before the launch was very tense on the island partially because of 
worries over how the press conference would go, but mostly because residents had a 
fair idea of what they in for. "Over the years we had all experienced what the media 
could do", recalls Karen Helliwell: 
"We knew that once we opened everything up, the press would just not leave 
us alone. Constant attention was obviously what we needed for the appeal, 
but it also meant cameras, press, and questions for however long the 
campaign would last. And on island like Eigg, that means feeling like you're 
in a goldfish bowl with the whole world looking at you- warts and all". 9 
However, whilst a certain lull before storm was being felt on the island, in the 
Arisaig pub on the mainland the majority of the press were already happily swaying in 
support of the appeal. Most of them had journeyed from Inverness, Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, and were staying in Arisaig for the night enjoying familiar West Coast 
hospitality. Colin Carr, a formidable islander in any bar, was sent over to keep them 
entertained and briefed, and more importantly to make sure they were all on the 
chartered boat the next morning. It was certainly a jolly evening, and apart from a few 
9 Helliwell, Karen. Interview, 6th February 1998. 
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suffering souls at the back of the boat the next day, the majority of the press were in a 
jocular mood when they arrived. As David Ross (the Herald correspondent) 
commented on the day, this was because most of them viewed Eigg as a good story to 
cover. "The Eigg appeal is just perfect for us because it's a positive story from the 
Highlands- which is just so rare- and it involves great people, and great place. What 
other stories involve a dram or two, a wee holiday, and some catching up with your 
friends?" 
11-=:.~T'S CRA~K ~~- ~ 
~ B~CK THE EIGG APPEAL IJ 
Fig 5.2: Campaign bumper sticker and logo 
The Eigg factor certainly played its part well for the launch day. ~'\perfect 
Hebridean summer shone down upon the proceedings, and the island and residents 
were illuminated with a clear and pristine light. Their photogenic nature only bringing 
into sharper reliefthe obvious decay ofthe island's infrastructure, and the massive 
pile of scrap iron that Maruma had asked to be collec.ted, and then never paid to be 
removed. An island wag had labelled it with a notice "The Maruma Centre", which 
the press enjoyed thoroughly. They also enjoyed the mixed collection of tractors, 
trailers, and assorted MOT-less vehicles that were used to give them a whistle-stop 
tour of the island. In each vehicle an islander or representative of the IEHT gave an 
account of the problems that Eigg faced and the reasons for public support in the 
appeal. After the island tour, the press were then taken to the community hall for a 
formal press conference with the IEHT trustees. Like the coverage the story was to 
receive that evening and the following day, this session reflected an immense support 
from the media in general. Despite the previous night's fears, their questions were 
neither difficult nor misleading, and the IEHT came across as very knowledgeable and 
above all confident. The confidence was astutely pitched to dispel the only area of 
criticism explored, that being a general disbelief in the IEHT's ability to raise the 
money. 
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Fig 5.3: Press Conference of August 211r (from/eft to right: Karen He//iwe/1, Maggie Fyffe, 
John Chester, Co/in Carr, John Cormack, Michae/ Foxley, Kenny Toy/or, and Nick 
Reider).10 
5.3 Targeting the Appeal 
Of course raising £800,000 in a public appeal takes more than simply a few 
drams in the Arisaig pub and a good day out for the press. It requires immense 
orchestration and specific targeting of market groups that would be interested in 
supporting and furthering the IEI IT project. As already indicated. in an ideal world 
this would have been carefully choreographed long before the launch, but time and 
money had prevented much of this from taking place. Instead strategy began to be set 
in place for the various market segments as each became identified and considered. 
1 his took about a month or so of planning and implementation by the loosely 
structured campaign team. during which time 4 basic target groups emerged. 
Although these were to overlap in many ways, they nevertheless were to have their 
own particular pitch for supporting the appeal. and each were to be approached 
through their own appropriate methods. 
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5.3.1 National and International Public 
This frrst and widest target group was principally the only one considered 
during the planning for the launch day. This was because all aspects of the appeal 
were utterly dependent upon media coverage in general, and as such all effort was put 
into gaining the widest possible publicity from the very start. As mentioned before, 
the islanders themselves were the central focus here, simply to take advantage of 
previous media coverage and to provide the public and media with an historical link 
and perspective to the campaign. Consequently, as the appeal leaflet exemplified, 
feudal land law and the practices of the highland land market were very much pitched 
as threatening the community and public access to the island. Within this general 
theme, the story of the Carr family was significantly covered as being an exemplar of 
how hard working, honest folk had been harshly treated by proprietors and the 
landownership system in general. 
The media strategy naturally did not simply entail the launch, and both Gordon 
Fyfe and Stan Blackley took considerable effort to plan and slowly release 
information to the press in orde'" to keep the Eigg story bubbling. Everything of any 
potential merit that would enhance the image of the campaign or add to the story was 
written up into a standardised press release and faxed to all news centres. This 
continued throughout the 8 months of the appeal, with subjects ranging from 
fundraising totals and sponsored events, to particular rebuttals and details of the 
IEHT' s management plans. In many ways this was hardly needed because as the 
islanders feared the press interest in the campaign was unrelenting, especially in terms 
of the human angle with both Maggie Fyffe and Karen Helliwell being notably 
represented as secretaries of the IERA and IEHT respectively. 
The national exposure of the campaign was also notably enhanced by 
sponsored events and charity auctions throughout the country. In the main these were 
organised by the many friends of Eigg, with music and the arts especially being a 
focus for fundraising. At least half a dozen benefit concerts and Celidhs were held 
throughout Scotland as well as Ireland, with one in Edinburgh being notably 
10 Morgan, Daniel. 
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successful. This was organised by my partner Claire Bachellerie, who like myself had 
become subsumed within the fundraising drive. Named Not the Landowners Ball the 
' 
Edinburgh concert featured several renowned Scottish artists and groups such as Dick 
Gaughan, Michael Marra, Capercaillie, and Shooglenifty. All of whom like the venue, 
technicians, and staff generously donated their time and effort to the concert which in 
' 
the end raised some £4,000. 
On the political front the campaign team had decided not to openly court such 
popular support. This was primarily because of advice from Bill Ritchie and Nick 
Reider who had both pointed out that it would be foolish to side with any one party, 
especially in the heated lead up to a general election. Consequently the appeal 
stridently asserted an apolitical stance whilst simultaneously giving behind scenes 
assistance to politicians and parties who tried to further support within the House. 
Indeed, Eigg was raised repeatedly in Parliament over the course of the appeal and as 
will be discussed further was subject to an Early Day Motion and the feature of an 
Adjournment Debate on the Land Reform. Not surprisingly whilst Brian Wilson MP 
at the West Highland Free Press was the most vociferous in individual support for the 
campaign, although it was the SNP who were the most adept at making political 
mileage from the Eigg story. They were also the most accurate and well briefed in 
their comments as well. In terms of the Government, no one in the campaign team felt 
there was any hope of positive comment. However, Michael Forsyth had already 
demonstrated himself to be rather a loose cannon, and in relation to the NHMF 
application, it was felt that any support at all from him would be beneficial. 
Consequently, it is more than ironic Michael Forsyth was the only politician actually 
received on the island by the IEHT during the course of the campaign. 
Of course in true Eigg fashion this was not done through open channels, but by 
classic Hebridean initiative and cunning. Completely by chance Maggie Fyffe 
happened to telephone friends on Rhum and found out that he was making a secret 
over-night trip that evening to discuss issues with SNH staff. A few more calls and a 
fax was lying on his pillow when he went to bed, inviting him to breakfast the next 
morning on Eigg. To absolute surprise around 1 am his Personal Private Secretary 
telephoned Maggie to say that the Secretary of State would land at Kildonnan and 
would have around 15 minutes to meet island representatives. This was to be at 7.40 
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am. The occupants of Kildonnan, however, Marie and Collin Carr, were already 
asleep after returning from a Celidh, and did not hear the phone ringing to alert them 
of their early morning guest. But fortunately their 11 year old daughter did, who not 
only cleaned the kitchen, but also left a note on her parents bed-side table: "A man 
called Michael Forsyth is coming for breakfast at 7.40". To say they were slightly 
shocked when they awoke is an understatement, even more so when they bolted 
downstairs to fmd a spotless kitchen and a beaming child. In the end Forsyth stayed 
for over half an hour, and though more than amiable in conversation, he only gave the 
most moderate of supporting statements to the press. It was nevertheless a memorable 
occasion, and certainly a morale booster when his comments were covered quite 
positively in the Daily Telegraph. Peter Peacock the HC convener was quoted as 
saying: "The success of the residents in getting Mr Forsyth on to Eigg is 
commendable. It clearly demonstrates their determination to succeed in this bid to 
own the island". 11 
Whilst publicity was working well on a national level, in terms of expanding 
the appeal on an international basis significant effort was put in by Gordon Fyfe to 
encourage foreign correspondents on to the island. This achieved some notable 
successes in coverage, particularly from French and North American 
correspondents. 12 However, the intention offundraising from expatriate Scots did not 
bring in any major donations. Instead it was therefore decided to elicit potential 
international support through more direct avenues such as the many international clan 
and Gaelic societies. This was done by contacting their Scottish bases and asking for 
coverage and advertisements of the appeal to be placed within their newsmagazines 
and circulars. As with all attempts at courting national coverage, these advertisements 
and appeal stories included information on the campaign's credit card hot line (run by 
SWT) and a newly established island web-site. A web-site that not only included 
detailed information about the island and appeal, but that also contained the frrst 
dedicated Internet donation system. This was provided by Pipex-Dial, an Internet 
11 "Forsyth lends moral support to Eigg", The Daily Telegraph, September 28th, 1996. 
12 Pogatchnik, Shawn. "Let the buyer beware", Hong Kong Standard, 30th August 1996; Pogatchnik, 
Shawn. "Tiny Scottish Isle on the Block, But millionaires should beware", San Francisco Chronicle, 
29th August, 1996; Glauber, Bill. "Foggy future for sheltered isle", Baltimore Sun, 15th September, 
1996. 
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service provider, who approached the IEHT soon after the campaign was launched 
and offered to set up and run the system for free. 13 
5.3.2 Highlands and Islands & friends and family of Eigg 
Just before and after the campaign had been launched the only other specific 
attention paid to target groups was that of supporters from the neighbouring 
Highlands and Islands and friends and family ofEigg. As Bill Ritchie had pointed out 
in relation to the Assynt campaign, this immediate market segment had in fact proved 
to be their most profitable source of funds. They had set fundraising targets for each 
family to achieve, and through the slight competition this invoked remarkable funds 
had been accumulated. The exact method however, did not really appeal to the 
Steering Committee members at the time, and instead a more communal effort was 
decided upon. Several ideas were thrown around, and one of nominalJy selling square 
meters of the island was distinctly considered. 14 In the end, time and organisational 
constraints prevented this idea from taking off and instead all effort went into the 
distribution of the 20,000 leaflets that had been printed by the HC. 
To begin with Nick Reider and Gordon Fyfe utilised the HC organisation to 
ensure that leaflets were placed in every HC building, office, and local service 
provider, such as libraries, information centres and so forth. In terms of the friends 
and family ofEigg, the IERA collected names and addresses from each island 
household. These were combined with every visitor that had left an address with 
B&B's on the island and in the old estate records, and compiled into a mailing 
database. After three weeks, just under a thousand names were gathered, and each was 
sent an HC leaflet, together with a letter from the IERA detailing a more personal 
appeal for support to the campaign. Again this focussed on the plight of the 
community and its democratic wishes to provide security of tenure to those at risk, as 
well as a long-term future for the island. The mailing costs were borne by funds from 
the old lET, which still had a few thousand pounds left in its account from the 
previous fundraising drive in 1995. 
13 MacPhail, Neil. "Eigg surfs the Net in £800,000 appeal", Daily Mail, 28th August, 1996. 
14 IERA Steering Committee Minutes, Isle of Eigg Archive, I st August, 1996 
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5.3.3 Conservation and wildlife supporters. 
Whilst the HC and IERA members of the partnership were heavily occupied 
with organising the HC leaflets and mailing, the SWT began to focus upon the 
conservation and wildlife angle of the public appeal. All of the management team felt 
this had to be the potentially most profitable aspect of the campaign, especially 
considering that the SWT not only had its own membership to elicit support from, but 
had the potential for fundraising from all their affiliated 47 other wildlife trusts and 50 
urban trusts around Britain. Of course, this required a very different tack in 
fundraising strategy, and instead of focussing upon the human aspects of the appeal, 
conservation support required a detailed pitch for the wildlife merits of the island. 
This was not particularly hard to do, since SWT had fifteen years of experience on the 
island, and the island itself boasted a significant diversity ofhabitats, with numerous 
endangered flora and fauna. As part of a unique partnership, the S WT also stood out 
as a conservation body that was prepared to work together with resident communities, 
rather than in opposition. And as such, they provided a unique alternative to the 
bastions of traditional conservation like the RSPB and NTS, who had over the years 
suffered several well-publicised altercations with rural communities in Scotland. 15 
Experience from previous appeals had engendered S WT staff with the 
necessities for carefully worked and attractive presentation of appeal literature. 
Consequently, though "The HC designed leaflet was great for the launch and the 
general public", as Kenny Taylor SWT District Officer noted, "For the conservation 
side of the appeal, a much more slick and glossy approach was needed". 16 The new 
leaflet then clearly had to be in colour, and a few dramatic aerial photographs of the 
island provided much of the of the leaflet's backdrop. These were combined with 
shots of a Golden Eagle, an orchid, and members of the partnership on the back cover; 
all of which, were integrated with a copy that emphasised the island's rich 
15 The prime example with respect to the RSPB was its handling oflocal families on the Isle of Martin; 
also for other contemporary examples see Wightman, Andy. "Do we want Scotland's finest landscape 
controlled by a benign dictatorship?", Scotland on Sunday, Feb 23rd, 1997. 
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biodiversity and natural heritage. Following on from the overriding appeal st rategy, 
the island's "storehouse of natural variety" was underlined with the perceived threats 
of the Highland land market. This meant that donating to the appeal would work 
towards protecting the island's 480 species of flowering plants and 186 species of 
birds. 
Fig 5.4: SWT Leaflet. 17 
It also meant however. protecting the community as well. For as KciUlY Taylor 
acknowledged, ·1hough we wished to sell the wildlife as cause enough for the island's 
purchase, we had a greater opportunity for emphasising the project as something 
dramatically new and different in conservation ownership and management. In short 
the wildl ife was there because of generat ions of low-impact farming, and the wildlife 
was as dependent on the community. as the community was on the security of 
tenure·'. 18 Therefore, whilst the appeal leaflet bad a ll the trademarks of a typical 
conservation appeaL it a lso detailed the problems induced by the historical "exclusion 
16 Taylor, Kenny. Conversation. 30'b September 1996 
17 WT, Eigg: Island of heritage: Window of opportunity, 5th November, 1996. lEA 
18 ibid. 
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of the community from forward planning''. The appeal for funds, therefore. direct)} 
played on the potential for the partnership to '·rescue the island'' from the dangers of 
another inappropriate owner, and to build upon the existing understanding of wildlife 
in the island community and the SWT: 
"Never before in Britain has there been such an alliance. It has a fertile 
local seedbed . For to the Isle of Eigg community, wildlife and wider 
heritage is not a quaint add-on, to take or leave. It is part of the very 
fabric of life and part of the islander's hope for the new millennium. But 
to realise this vision, people from the Eigg community, the Highla nd 
Council a nd the Scottish Wildlife Trust must gain control of the island ' s 
destiny" .19 
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FiR 5.5: lttner spread of the SWT leaj1et.1(1 
As Neil Wi lcox. reserves Manager at SWf also described. "The involvement of the 
community in the partnership buyout gave us a moral backbone to the appeal". The 
protection of wildlife was obviously the swrs main concern on the island. but with 




support. "It was not just some reserve that was being bought or leased. it was a whole 
cultural package as well, and SWf were desperate to make it work because it was just 
db eak. d " 21 so groun r mg an new . 
Once draft copies of the leaflets had been vetted and produced, in mid October 
the SWT contacted all the associated wildlife and urban trusts. asking for support and 
assistance in the IEIIT appeal. Apart from a few exceptions and queries. this elicited a 
very positive response, and within a few weeks the Eigg appeal became the first 
national project to be supported by all the independent trusts together. As such it was 
also to be the largest appea l run by the SWT with over 200,000 leaflets and letters 
produced to cover all the members of the national wildlife trusts? 2 Extra staff such as 
Christ ine Thornton were hired to administer the appeal, and almost everyone within 
Cramond House (SWf headquarters) were rapidly involved in the campaign. Ut ilising 
the structure of the independent trusts, leaflets were mailed out directly by swr to 
their own members, and packages of leaflets were then also sent to the individual 
trusts around the country to distribute 
themselves. All mailing costs being 
covered by the income already 
generated from the existing campaign 
funds. The winter issue ofNatural 
World, the Wildlife Trusts magazine. 
also made a feature of the Eigg 
Appeal. Notably this used all the tricks 
of conservationist marketing. and 
made particular use of what is 
called in the trade charismatic 
megafauna~ that is the large and 
dramatic anin1als that appeal to the 
public the most. Hence there were 
particularly attractive photographs of 
Golden Eagles. Comcrakes, and Red 
Throated Divers and a distinctly sweet 
21 Wilcox, Neil. Conversation, 2'wl M~y 1997 . m 
22 "Wildlife trust extend Eigg appeal , West Htghland Free Press. 8 November. 1996. 
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Fig 5.6: The otter photo from the Natural Wor/d. 23 picture of an otter. Kenny Taylor 
again combined this overtly wildlife appeal with a script that accentuated the island's 
cultural heritage, and the importance of the IEHT partnership in fostering a new and 
integrated approach to conservation management. 24 
5.3.4 Private donations and grant giving trusts 
Whilst the potential revenue from the conservation side of the campaign was felt 
to be the most lucrative side of the public appeal, there was also notable interest in 
finding support from wealthy private individuals, businesses, and grant giving trusts. 
Indeed, this had been one of the main motivations for employing a professional 
fundraiser or project administrator; someone who would already have knowledge of 
potential donors and grant aiding bodies and who would ensure that the most 
appropriate image of the IEHT was put forward. However, as debate~ over whom 
would be the most appropriate candidate for the post continued over the course of the 
campaign, anxiety soon began to initiate action being taken by the appeal co-
ordinators themselves. 
First and foremost in consideration was the fact that if there was not going to be a 
smooth-talking fundraiser presenting the project to potential donors, then the 
presentation was very much dependent on the image of the partnership and islanders 
themselves. This meant, therefore, that the maverick side of the islanders' characters 
had to be curtailed, and the more acceptable side of the IEHT needed to be 
emphasised through the respective roles of the HC and SWT. Nick Reider took 
particular pains to accentuate to the IERA Steering Committee the necessities of 
toning down the drinking and partying on the island. 25 This was not because the Eigg 
islanders were any different to other communities in the Highlands and Islands, but 
that with the degree of press exposure, bad publicity and stereotypes could all to 
easily destroy the IEHT's credibility. In the same line of ensuring the right image, 
David Hughes Hallett (the SWT Chair) was chosen to be the most prominent figure in 
approaching and liasing with potential corporate and grant-giving bodies. As 
23 ibid. 
24 Taylor, Kenny. "Saving Eigg- Let's crack it!", Natural World, Winter, 1996. pp.l4-17 
25 IERA Steering Committee Minutes. 1st August, 1996. 
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discussed later, he also played the central role in the IEHT's negotiations with the 
NHMF. 
In terms of actually establishing contacts with wealthy donors and charities, this 
was done through brainstorming, personal contacts, and the SCVO database of grant-
giving charities. The latter being clearly the most useful resource imaginable for 
identifying the many small and unknown charitable bodies who would be interested in 
supporting the IEHT. Each body that had any possibility of donating funds was 
identified and individually written to, with leaflets and supporting material included 
where necessary. With regards to individual private donors, this proved to be 
considerably harder - not so much in terms of identifying particular people - but in 
trying to actually make contact with them. Several came easily like Sir Paul 
McCartney and Phil Collins because they already owned property in the Highlands 
and Islands, and their addresses were held by the HC. Others however, had to be 
tracked down through more cunning means such as contacting various entertainment 
agents and managing to convince them to supply addresses. Press coverage of the 
appeal to wealthy donors also assisted, and Gordon Fyfe again made this into yet 
another press release to keep the Eigg story continuing in the press. 26 
5.4 Reactions to the Appeal 
It is all too easy to paint a rosy picture of eager press coverage, especially 
when one is researching or focussed upon a single story. A certain myopia can readily 
prevent you from comprehending the actual context and proportion of coverage. 
Nevertheless, without doubt the large amount of coverage safely attests that the press 
had a defmite affection for the Eigg story, and the Scottish media in general made a 
point of supporting the IEHT appeal. This was not just because journalists simply 
enjoyed their visits to the island, but that Eigg was very easily adopted as a symbol for 
the strong Scottish resurgence in culture and politics that was prefiguring the 1997 
general election. In particular the Eigg saga of the preceding 20 years exemplified the 
problems associated with Scottish rural policy and landownership, and notably 
26 Illingworth, Lynne. "Rich are targeted by Eigg residents", Press and Journal, 18th November 1996. 
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highlighted all that was wrong with the Conservative presumption of the voluntary 
principle. This combined with the island's historical significance and the strong and 
idiosyncratic character of the Eigg residents made the campaign story all the more 
appealing. Of course the strength of a symbol lies in its semi-translucent nature, and 
the fact that the same features and qualities can mean different things to different 
people. Consequently whilst the SNP, Brian Wilson MP, and the majority of the 
Scottish press took the Eigg campaign as being a positive symbol of the new 
confidence in rural Scotland, for others the campaign and Eigg itself symbolised a 
much more sinister situation. The initial positive wash of press exposure was to be 
followed by a very defmite right wing backlash. 
Unsurprisingly Keith Schellenberg made the first negative comments about the 
public appeal. Labelling the islanders as "just a bunch of chancers and communists", 
he lambasted: "I could not think of a less worthy cause. Asking for money to buy the 
island will be like an extension of social security" .27 This was a point that was equally 
made by Alan Clark in his prestigious News of World column, who questioned why 
the islanders should get "a fat cheque to acquire their freehold". 28 Though both having 
history of absentee landownership in Scotland, Clark and Schellenberg each 
profoundly questioned the suitability of the residents in owning the island, and 
particularly laid into the fact that many of the islanders were not 'native'. Clark, 
"Britain's wittiest and grittiest columnist" pointed out that none of the "complainants 
had a Scottish accent. In fact they looked, and sounded like a bunch of refugees from 
the Socialist Workers Party in Walsall".29 Schellenberg of course went one stage 
further and declared that "I brought those people there and none of them is a true 
Hebridean. The are squashing the true Hebridean out like the grey squirrel is getting 
rid of the native red". 30 It was an analogy that neatly forgot that unlike red and grey 
squirrels, the newcomers to Eigg had over successive decades successfully bred with 
indigenous folk. 
27 English, Shirley. "Old laird lays into "chancers" in £2m chicken or Eigg row", The Times, 29th 
August 1996. 
28 Clark, Alan. "Eigg on their faces", News of the World, 8th September, 1996 
29 ibid. 
30 English, Shirley. 
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The IEHT responded to these accusations with basic rebuttals, and asserted 
that "Schellenberg is totally irrelevant. He is part of the unhappy past, and we are not 
looking at the past, we are looking at the future". 31 Considering that neither 
Schellenberg nor Clark made any mention of the other partners in the IEHT, Nick 
Reider also made a point of saying "Is he [Schellenberg] suggesting that Highland 
Council and the Scottish Wildlife Trust are chancers as well ?"32 Nevertheless, the 
initial questions about incomers and "true Hebrideans" began to plague press 
coverage, and journalists who were looking for the flip side of the happy island story 
began to dig a little deeper. The Times correspondent Allan Brown took a notably 
critical line and followed on from the "chancers" comments to paint a portrait of 
"indulgent dropouts, crazed on bathtub gin, and jazz cigarettes". 33 Picking up on the 
incomer element as taking over the island with an "unrepentant hedonist hippyism", 
he concluded, "Eigg's problems, in reality, lie with its people". This he backed up 
with one of the three islanders who voted against the community buy-out: 
"Katie Mckinnon, 78, is a life-long resident of the island and argues it is 
now overrun by ideological bullies: 'I wouldn't mind community 
ownership but not the community that is here at the moment', she says. 
"The original islanders didn't want to sit on the dole so they left, unlike 
the present lot. Now the incomers are starting to interfere with the 
original islanders. One proper islander wanted to site a few caravans on 
his own land but the incomers organised a petition. 
Reporters come here but they only hear the side of the incomers, who try 
to stop the originals from getting their say. They claim there are only 
three dissenters, but it's more like ten and that doesn't include their 
offspring who no longer live here".34 
It would be convenient to say that the incomer criticisms just came from 
people like Schellenberg or Clark, with a particular axe to grind, and were simply 
utilising a language and argument of convenience. However, as Katie's comments 
belie the situation was far more complex. To begin with her remarks over the "one 
proper islander" were generated from an individual who was making the most of out 
the archetypal divide for personal reasons. Ian Camp bell, the islander in question had 
recently fallen into dispute over plans for a caravan park in Cleadale. Several 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid. 
33 Brown, Allan. "Siren Song", The Sunday Times Ecosse, I st September, 1996. 
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neighbouring crofters and residents had made objections to his planning application 
because they felt the substantial development was both inappropriate and threatening 
to the water supply for surrounding houses. Unfortunately, with planning permission 
being turned down, Ian Camp bell took the objections as a personal affront and 
developed a notable resentment to those who had opposed his plans. Only one of the 
protesting families was actually comprised of incomers, but this nonetheless provided 
a language and focus for his resentment which was only fuelled by resident crofters 
criticising his 20 years of absentee crofting. In reality it was a relatively minor 
dispute, but with such large issues at stake during the campaign and a hungry press 
eager to pounce, the bickering became overblown and coloured by unrelated issues. 
Katie's criticisms of the modern day community, however, derived from much 
deeper anxieties over the changes in social mores and behaviour she had witnessed 
over the course of her life on Eigg. Like any elderly person she looked back in 
fondness to days gone by, and on Eigg that meant the halcyon days of the benevolent 
Runcimans, when every croft was worked, every household attended church and not a 
dram was allowed inside the Celidh Hall. Those who left the island were also 
generally seen as going off to better themselves, and there was a natural suspicion of 
laziness towards anyone who stayed on the island, especially if they did not have a 
steady estate job. This was a far cry from the Eigg of the 1990's, and understandably 
she was critical of the modern generation both islander and incomer alike. 35 
Conversely she had also signed the open letter of support for the non-indigenous 
islanders not two years previously, become an Isle ofEigg Trustee in 1994, and like 
her husband had openly welcomed the newcomers in the 1970's before that. The fact 
that she combined all of this into an incomer vs. islander divide simply highlighted 
how easily complex situations can be reduced into black and white, especially when 
one is being secretly recorded by a journalist looking for a sensational angle. 36 
With regards to her remarks over the level of dissension on the island, these 
were certainly exaggerated simply because all the full-time residents who did oppose 
34 ibid. 
35 Conversation with Katie and Dug old McKinnon 1oth October 1996. (Neither wished to be directly 
quoted regarding the 'incomer debate'). 
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the partnership and buy-out voted against the motion at the IERA meeting in August. 
As Donald McKinnon, one of the three, declared this was because they preferred "to 
see a landlord take over, a landlord who would not treat the island as a toy but return 
it to what it was". 
37 
However, as Katie emphasised, there were several islanders now 
resident on the mainland who did oppose the IEHT, and certainly did not agree with 
the IERA's definition of full-time resident.38 Of these Ian Campbell was by far th~ 
most vociferous, and made the most of the incomer label to discredit the democratic 
process. Indeed, his opposition to the IEHT quickly extended to letters to Maruma 
asking him not to sell the island to the partnership, to courting the press with stories of 
an island split, and to establishing a group called the "Hebridean People ofEigg". 39 
This incensed Duncan Ferguson, himself an indigenous islander, who like Ian had 
also been forced to move to the mainland some 20 years previously, but who also 
supported the IEHT. Writing a letter to the West Highland Free Press he declared, "I 
deplore the term incomers, it is an insult to the many people who have chosen to make 
their lives on many a Scottish island, and offer a valuable contribution to the 
continuity of island communities".40 Similarly the Helliwell family who I an 
Campbell had particularly focussed upon due to their objections to his planning 
application wrote their own letter to the Sunday Times, making two fundamental 
points: "Firstly, the community has from the outset sought to do nothing without the 
majority view. Secondly, to make the distinction between 'incomers' and 'Hebridean 
persons' is dangerously close to being racist".41 Ian's replies to both letters ensured a 
minor debate continued in the press, and above all heightened tensions on the island 
itself. 
"'We had decided the Trust [IEHT] should not get involved in the incomer 
debate", recalls Maggie Fyffe, "simply because if it did, it would give the incomer 
36 Both Katie and Dougald assured me that Brown did not tape-record their interview. Whether this was 
the case or not, he did surreptitiously record me, and reported an "off the record" conversion that I had 
with him, verbatim. 
37 ibid. 
38 The IERA definition of ordinarily resident at the time of voting was "anyone living on the island for 
more than six months for two consecutive years"; exceptions being made for any returning islander, 
where only one period of six months validated their voting rights. 
39 Swanson, Brian. "The Eigg dream is cracking up", Daily Express, 5th September, 1996. pp.20-21 
4° Ferguson, Duncan. "Eigg: One 'True' local who is right behind the Buyout", West Highland Free 
Press, 181h October 1996. 
41 Helliwell, Simon and Karen. "Dangerous distinction between Hebrideans and lncomers", Sunday 
Times, 21 51 October 1996. 
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criticisms credibility. But then on the other hand Ian, Schellenberg, and the rest were 
making things really uncomfortable on the island, and we all knew that something had 
to be done to try and alleviate the tension".42 This was certainly true, not so much 
because oflan's personal campaign per se, but combined with the community's 
continuing exposure to the press and lack of any certainty in the future, it was all 
becoming distinctly overwhelming. As Marie Carr remarked at the time, "Everything 
is happening on paper, on the news, and in countless meetings, but nothing has 
happened on the ground for years. We have been waiting for some form of security 
for almost three years now, and things just seem to be getting worse and worse". 43 
There was also criticism of the Steering Committee slowly brewing in the background 
of being too secretive and withholding information from the rest of the island. Mostly 
this was generated by the IEHT's desire to keep a tight reign on publicity and control 
of what information was passed on to the press at what time. Both Gordon Fyfe and 
Nick Reider had instilled a necessary caution within the Steering Committee to be 
more than careful in their statements to press, and to avoid any unnecessary leaks. 
However, the caution had the appearance of unneeded secrecy, and was also 
combined with a feeling amongst islanders that the Steering Committee was taking on 
more than they could actually handle. In particular, concern was expressed over the 
two key women involved Maggie Fyffe and Karen Helliwell. "Anyone who knew 
Maggie of old", remembers Camille, "knew she was overdoing herself at the time, 
and like Karen beginning to crack under strain of trying to do everything at once and 
on her own". 44 
It was decided that the consequent solution to these developing problems was 
to ask HIF to come in once more and conduct a new series of workshops to tackle the 
incomer issues, the management of the campaign, and the IEHT itself Organised by 
Isabel Holden, HIF Convener, the workshops were specifically targeted at giving 
those who were sceptical and cautious of the IEHT a forum to not only air their 
grievances, but to work towards possible solutions. The actual format was to be the 
same as the previous HIF workshops, which everyone felt to be successful and above 
all conducive to those nervous about talking in large groups. Ian Camp bell, Katie 
42 Fyffe, Maggie. Interview. 81" February, 1998. 
43 Carr, Marie. Conversation. 20th September 1996 
44 Dressier, Camille. Interview. 3rd February, 1998. 
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McKinnon, and the few others who had expressed their problems were invited by 
lsabel, first by letter, then phone, and finally with a house call to those resident on the 
island. Overtly she made clear that the workshops were to be chaired by independent 
HIF personnel, and that they would be entirely open in structure to allow the 
maximum input from those who were uncomfortable with the IEHT. Unfortunately, 
however, none of the disaffected appeared at the workshops on the 23rd of September, 
and despite being asked again the next day, none appeared on the 24th either. For most 
people this answered any real doubts they had about the incomer debate in the press, 
and as Marie Carr said over the weekend, "I think it's pretty clear how constructive 
their comments really are when they can't even turn up to talk about them". 45 
Consequently, though disappointing for the HIF facilitators, the offer of an open hand 
had been made, and in front of the whole community- incomer and islander alike- it 
had been flatly turned down. 
Nonetheless, the workshops were far from a failure, since significant 
discussions were held over the role of the Steering Committee and its relationship to 
the residents. Those who had problems with the secrecy of the campaign management 
aired their views, and avenues were explored of exactly how to alleviate the tensions 
this provoked. One important issue was that of managing the enormous amount of 
mail that was appearing at Maggie's door each ferry day. Up to then Maggie, her 
daughter, John Cormack and Karen had been the only ones to sort through the pledges 
and donations. During which time they had gained significant support and feedback 
from the letters and notes of encouragement that often accompanied the donations. 
However, the sheer scale of the mail and campaign had prevented both Maggie and 
Karen from passing on this feedback and really being able to talk to people about how 
the fundraising was going. The solution therefore, very much depended on devolving 
down the workload of the mail sorting, together with setting up minor steering groups 
to tackle different aspects of the campaign that Maggie, Karen, and the rest of the 
Steering Committee did not have time to organise themselves. 46 "The workshops were 
very useful and allayed peoples worries a lot", remarked Sue Kirk, "and when you 
think about the amount mail that had to be dealt with over the next few months they 
45 Carr. Marie. Conversation. 23rd September 1996 
46 Eigg Workshop Results, Highlands and Islands Forum, September. 1996. lEA 
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were an absolute necessity. There was no way it could have been managed the way it 
had been. We all had to work together".47 
Whilst there still remained a certain scepticism about exactly how necessary 
the secrecy over press relations really was, the devolution of the mail sorting was 
crucial in dispersing the feedback from the public around the island. Mail would 
arrive on the ferry and be carted over to Maggie 's where a variety of people would 
then sort the donations and pledges into different piles of value and origin. These 
would then be distributed to half a dozen people around the island who would then 
record and list the donations and pledges into an order that could then be passed on to 
those compiling the computer database. Thank you letters would then be organised for 
the donors who wished acknowledgement, and donors who gave over £250 were also 
sent a Gift Aid form, to fill out for charitable tax relief In all, over 20 islanders 
became involved in the processing of the mail, and stories would swiftly circulate 
around the island regarding different notes of encouragement or support, and any 
notably large donation that was received that day. It was above all an enthusing and 
exciting feeling to be part of mail sorting, and even those who did not have time to 
take part would put their head around Maggie's door just to see how the daily total 
was doing. Indeed, even the ever-present press were often seconded into the 
processing, and there is many a journalist who has tales of opening campaign mail in 
Cleadale. 
The large influx of mail was more than reassuring considering that in mid October 
Knight Frank and Rutly had finally decided on a closing date for the island's sale -
the 28th of November. This severely limited the time funds necessary to raise the 
targeted funds. 48 Especially when the total raised by the end October was just 
£75,000 in donations and pledges; a significant sum in itself, but nonetheless certainly 
well short of the £500,000 probably needed, and defmitely far from the £800,000 
target originally set for the public appeal. However, the £75,000 did not include the 
SWT leaflets and other Wildlife Trusts donations, which began to arrive from first 
week of November onwards. And when they did arrive they absolutely poured in, 
with the last two and half weeks of November showing just over £200,000 arriving in 
47 Kirk, Sue. Interview. 7th February, 1998. 
48 Helliwell, Karen. Interview. 6th February, 1998. 
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pledges and donations. The last week before the deadline, an average of £30,000 a 
day was being processed on Maggie' s kitchen table, making the combined total just 
before the November 28th deadline around £270,000. (Of which £130,000 was in cash 
and a further £140,000 was in pledges.)49 As many commentators were to point out 
this was still somewhat short, even if the NHMF were to support the project. yet 
nevertheless the IEHT spokespersons remained confident, and emphasised that the 
appeal would remain open until the very end. 
The confidence expressed by IEHT spokespersons was not simply bravado and 
high hopes. Indeed, events early on in the campaign had injected a profound 
conviction of success when a solicitor telephoned Maggie in the beginning of August 
expressing the wishes of an anonymous client to donate a large sum of money to the 
appeal. The benefactor had not been contacted directly by campaign organisers, and 
neither had they been attracted through the drive to recruit sponsorship from wealthy 
individuals or corporate bodies. Ironically, their interest had been generated from very 
much the reverse, and from an image painted of the island by the Guardian that had 
profoundly worried the campaign organisers at the time of publication. Ruaridh 
Nicoll's article was one of several that gave in reality a fair depiction of the 
community and the campaign. Since he was late for the initial press launch, he did not 
get the choreographed performance put on for the other journalists, and instead 
arrived a few days later when most of the island was on its way to Muck for a funeral. 
Now funerals in the Hebrides are usually not the glum affairs one expects, and can 
easily turn into quite lively Celidhs, which is exactly what happened on the trip to 
Muck. Hence whilst, Nicoll provided a sound account of the island's problems of 
landowners, he also described a lively evening and a Celidh that continued until 9 am 
the next morning when the boat returned to Eigg. The article memorably concluded, 
"A fiddler played on the back of a truck and Fyffe, lay in the middle of the road, 
asleep with a can ofExport beside her head". 5° 
When the article came out Nick Reider was immediately on the phone to Maggie, 
"I just couldn't believe they'd do that in front of a journalist", Nick remarked, "after 
all we said about trying to keep a good image of the island in the press. They have a 
49 IEHT Financial Records. 
50 Nicoll, Ruaridh. ''Scrambled Eigg", The Guardian, July 31 51, 1996. 
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big party and invite the press along -to be honest I thought it was about as self-
destructive as you can get, because it absolutely clashed with the image we were 
trying to maintain". 
51 
Maggie herself was particularly sheepish, if not a little hung-
over, and maintained a very low profile. Until of course the solicitor phoned 
expressing his client's interest in donating, as well as off-handedly mentioning that 
the donor had been attracted by the very same article in the Guardian. "That was more 
than ironic", says Maggie, "and certainly showed that all the best laid plans can be 
misplaced, because the donor liked the fact that we were not just squeaky clean and 
perfect, but real, with warts and everything". 52 Nonetheless, for some time there was 
considerable doubts over how serious the donor was, but after several conversations 
with Maggie and the IEHT's solicitor, Simon Fraser, it all appeared to be serious and 
above board. They wished to contribute some £500,000, which including tax relief 
meant somewhere near £750,000. Even when this was established, knowledge of the 
donation was kept tightly within the co-ordinating group, and apart from the Steering 
Committee no one else on the island knew. In part this was to protect the identity of 
the donor (in the end only Maggie and Simon Fraser ever knew), but mainly to ensure 
the maximum could be gained from the public appeal and above all the NHMF 
application. In essence, ''we viewed the anonymous donation as funds for topping up 
what we achieved in the appeal and to allow us some money towards renovating the 
island once it was purchased". 53 
5.5 The Politics of the NHMF 
The confidence gained from the anonymous donation was combined with a 
growing belief in the success of Lottery support. Whilst the campaign was being 
launched and run, Graham Scott, Steve Westbrook, SWT staff and myself had been 
busily compiling and drafting the NI-IMF application. Consisting of a basic 
examination of the island's potential running costs and profitability, our business 
plans clearly showed the island estate was capable of sustaining itself without major 
investment. Yet in the hope of achieving extra support for development costs, several 
proposals were generated from the Eigg Development Study - such as an estate farm 
51 Reider, Nick. Conversation. 11 1h June, 1997. 
52 Fyffe, Maggie. Conversation. 8th August, 1996. 
53 Reider, Nick. ibid. 
240 
Chapter l·i\c 
and a hostel enterprise at the lodge - which were also included within the 
application. 
54 
Combined with all the work on visitor access, conservation, forestry, 
and sustainable agriculture that SWT added to the application, all of us felt that we 
had more than fulfilled the criteria expected for Lottery support. Indeed, the inside 
word from other successful agencies led us to believe it was almost an ideal 
application. 
What the IEHT partners were unsure of however, was the amount of political 
will within the NHMF to support the project. Consequently, it was decided to make 
the decision as easy as possible for the NHMF, with SWT being chosen to be the lead 
in talking to NHMF staff, and David Hughes Hallett in particular spending enormous 
time and effort in lobbying on the IEHT's behalf The worries over the IEHT's image 
were of course mostly generated from wishing to put the best face forward to the 
NHMF, and the co-ordinated lobbying behind the scenes and within the press, was 
designed to provide Lottery board members with every justification possible to 
support the application for funds. Hence, from the very beginning of his press 
campaign, Gordon Fyfe had clearly indicated the IEHT's need for Lottery support on 
almost all press statements. This was then followed up with various stories that 
emphasised the credibility and strength of the IEHT's proposals, such as detailing the 
5 year plan being put forward to the NHMF, or how the IEHT's management schemes 
were being vetted and checked by the HC, or how associated bodies such as HIE and 
Lochaber Ltd were giving support. 55 Once the full application was handed in on the 
30111 of October, and all potential publicity angles had been covered, the only other 
aspect to cover was to try and limit the interest of the island to other bidders. In part 
this had been achieved somewhat by the continuous publicity surrounding the island 
and the IEHT' s public appeal. Indeed, on the international front this had been the 
principle angle covered by correspondents with papers in North America and even 
Hong Kong declaring "let the buyer beware".56 Nevertheless, despite not wishing to 
go fully down the road of open market spoiling, the HC chief Peter Peacock made a 
54 IEHT. NHMF Application. November. 1996 
55 Ross. John. "Eigg buy-out group draws up five-year renewal plan", The Scotsman, 30th October 
1996; "Eigg residents launch blueprint for island's future", Press and Journal, 30th October 1996. 
56 Pogatchnik, Shawn. "Let the buyer beware", Hong Kong Standard, 30th August 1996; Pogatchnik, 
Shawn. "Tiny Scottish Isle on the Block, But millionaires sho_uld bewar~", San Franc~co Chronicle, 
29th August, 1996; Glauber, Bill. "Foggy future for sheltered tsle", Baltimore Sun, 15 September, 
1996. 
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final plea for bidders to step aside a few days before the sale's closing date: "The 
partnershi~ of residents, the council and the wildlife trust is a fmger tip away from 
presenting a bid for the island. If there is anyone in the wings ready to make a bid I 
would therefore urge them seriously to consider stepping aside". 57 
The decision day for the NHMF board to decide the IEHT's application was 
on the 20th ofNovember, and therefore nail-bitingly close to the closing date for bids 
on the 29
1
h. Consequently whilst the_ island was being inundated at the same time with 
the SWT appeal returns, the Steering Committee was dealing with mounting tensions 
over the mechanics and amounts that they would bid once Lottery support was 
secured. Not only was there the 'simple' question over how much to bid, but there 
was also considerable questioning over whether the lottery would contribute enough 
money for an open market bid, or just give 75% of the District Valuer's £1.2 m 
assessment. Tough questions to be sure, and certainly not helped by the sudden and 
particularly unhelpful contribution to the appeal by the island's local Liberal MP 
Russell Johnston. After months of inaction, he tabled an Early Day Motion (EDM) in 
the House, demanding that the Government buy the island and give it to the National 
Trust. This was completely out of the blue for the IEHT, who although having kept 
Johnston informed, had not been consulted in any manner over his decision to table 
the EDM. Neither had the NTS been informed of his ideas either, and their 
spokesperson denied any knowledge of the EDM as well. In short it was a highly 
uninformed, and distinctly problematic offering, which only had the affect of 
confusing the careful lobbying of the Lottery of past several months. 58 
Johnston's reference to the NTS taking over Eigg, however, was soon to have 
more direct relevance when the NHMF fmally faxed its verdict to the eagerly awaiting 
IEHT. Essentially they gave an amber light to funding the buy-out providing certain 
changes were made to the structure of the IEHT. Primarily they were concerned about 
the presence of the community in the ownership and management of the island, and 
""about the possible conflicts of interest the acquisition could raise between the private 
benefits of the residents of Eigg and the wider public benefits". 59 The bottom line 
57 Ross, John. "Plea for bidders to step aside", The Scotsman, 22"d November, 1996. 
58 "Confusion surrounds Eigg support motion", Press and Journal, 26th November, 1996. 
59 NHMF statement to the IEHT, 20th November, 1996. lEA 
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being; the NHMF wanted to see the community's presence in the IEHT reduced to the 
barest minimum, and the conservation component respectively increased to dominate 
the partnership. In private discussions with IEHT co-ordinators, NI-IMF personnel 
suggested that even another conservation body become involved such the NTS. This 
particularly raised hackles when it was heard from inside sources that a board member 
from the NTS had even been invited along to the NHMF meeting to discuss the Eigg 
application. 
Consequently with just days to go, the IEHT directors met to discuss not only the 
amount to be bid, but the very existence and make-up of the IEHT itself. For the 
islanders part the Steering Committee concluded in a midnight meeting that the 
NHMF terms were untenable, especially considering that the money already raised 
was on the back of a community partnership; a partnership that by defmition gave 
equal control to the community and outside interests. Also the Steering Committee 
itself had a mandate from the IERA only to further a partnership buy-out, and 
certainly not to hand over the island and their fmancial support to conservation 
ownership. The HC were equally minded, and did not consider the suggestion of the 
NTS involvement as particularly constructive at all. As for the SWT, in a stand that 
clearly showed their loyalty to the IEHT and to the island community, they refused to 
be tempted with the offer of control over the island. As Neil Wilcox also pointed out, 
"Even if everybody agreed to the idea of SWT ownership and management, we 
wouldn't, simply because we have never wanted to take on that level of responsibility 
-either fmancially or morally".60 
Despite the absolute refusal to succumb to the NHMF conditions, there was also a 
profound need to tactically manage the bid and further negotiations with the NHMF. 
As Nick Re id er pointed out, "On top of the worries over the Lottery decision, we also 
had to think about our tactics of bidding, and ensuring that as many people as possible 
felt we were serious contenders, if not the most serious. We still didn't know how 
many others were interested, and whether they believed the island was worth the £2 
million being asked". 61 Also whilst the NHMF's communication to the IEHT had 
detailed their conditions to the IEHT, the general press release which they circulated 
60 Wilcox. Conversation. 2"d May, 1997. 
61 Reider. ibid. 
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had not, and the press viewed the amber light as being far more positive than it really 
was. The NHMF spokesperson had also made clear that whilst there were conditions 
on the Lottery support, "the Trustees would not still be involved in discussions if they 
h h 
0 0 62 thoug t t e Issues were Insurmountable". Consequently, most people saw the 
decision as being profoundly in favour of support for the buy-out, and though 
confrrmation was not complete before the deadline, there was a general assumption 
that the Lottery would pull through in the end.63 
"I suppose we thought there could be some way round appeasing their conditions 
as well", recalls Nick, "and the suggestions of an independent chairman and more 
carefully stated objectives would bring them on-side. But in the end they stuck to their 
guns and we stuck to ours, which just before the deadline boiled down to us realising 
that we probably did not have Lottery support and were on our own".64 Of course this 
was certainly not communicated to the press, who were eagerly trying to establish 
how much was being bid by the IEHT.65 
In the end the IEHT bid £1.2 m for the island, a bid that was based upon the 
District Valuer's assessment. It was not however what the IEHT had in the bank, and 
even combined with the anonymous donation of £750,000- the IEHT's appeal fund 
was notably short. It was therefore more than an anxious wait for the estate agent's 
announcement, which fmally came on the evening of December 2"d: "None of the 
offers have proved acceptable to the owner of the island. However, Mr Maruma has 
agreed to leave the island on the market to enable those who offered, the time to raise 
the necessary funds to meet the asking price of £2 million". The island was back on 
the market once more, and the IEHT was still very much in the fundraising game. A 
hopeful Col in Carr said to waiting journalist, "It is a disappointment, but at least no 
one else has come up with the £2 million and it does give us a bit more time. It gives 
the partnership the time they would have wanted to examine the wide range of 
funding options". 66 
62 Ross, John. "Lottery backing boosts Eigg buy-out hopes", The Scotsman, 21st November, 1996. 
63 Ross, David. "Fund pledges support to Eigg", The HeraiQ, 21 51 November, 1996. 
64 Reider. ibid. . th 
65 Walker, Gynis. "All quiet over Eigg purchase proposals", Oban Tunes, 28 November, 1996. 
66 Jones, Ken. "Eigg laird snubs offer- he wants £2 million", Press and Journal, 3rd December, 1996. 
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'The wide range of funding options' however, was notably reduced when news 
broke the next day of the IEHT's clashes with the Lottery's conditions for support. 
Going public with their dissatisfaction of the NHMF's requirements, all three partners 
pushed the same point of not wishing to dilute the community's representation in the 
consortium. David Hughes Hallett was particularly outspoken: 
"Our aim is to get the best possible deal for wildlife conservation on the 
island. We think the best way to do that is with the community and to spread 
the burden of power and responsibility. In the end the wildlife's future will be 
determined by the people that live and work there ... We have got this far 
without support from the lottery. We hope to persuade them that what we 
have sorted out is the best way forward. If they do not accept that we will just 
have to look for alternative funding".67 
Leslie Riddoch was less polite in her condemnation of the Lottery conditions in her 
weekly opinion column. Detailing her private conversations with NHMF Chair, Lord 
Rothschild, she questioned what was wrong about such a straightforward bid for 
Lottery assistance: "The cynical will imagine that the Heritage Board would feel 
happier if its recipients had double-barrelled names and had run a charity, a quango, 
or a government department. Sadly for them, happily for everyone else, the people of 
Eigg have no track record in trying to persuade quango's to release cash. Their cause 
is pure and simple. They want security oftenure".68 
Brian Wilson MP was also full of comment regarding the failure of the IEHT's 
bid. However, his opinion was directed more towards instigating compulsory 
purchase orders rather than the merits of the Lottery's backing. Likening the situation 
on Eigg to that of Raasay some twenty years previously, he urged that "lllE and 
Highland Council should now look closely and urgently at the case for initiating 
compulsory purchase proceedings. It is the only language that walking horror shows 
like Dr Green and Mr Maruma understand and Eigg, like Raasay before it, has waited 
too long for the gloves to be taken off''. 69 This was picked up by Michael Foxely, who 
pondered upon the merits of compulsorily purchasing, if not the whole island, just 
selective parts of it to deter any other buyers. However, lllE were very quick to deny 
67 Bradshaw, Andy. "Eigg mistrust of lottery cash condition backed", Press and Journal, lOth December 
1996. 
68 Riddoch, Leslie. "Lack offaith in islander's fight for justice", The Scotsman, 6th December, 1996. 
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any possibility of this happening, asserting that their powers only extended to small 
sites for specific economic reasons, not for any wider merits. 70 
With all the publicity surrounding the Eigg bid, and the negative comments 
regarding the Lottery's conditions for support, it was hoped that the NHMF board 
would be steered into accepting the IEHT's partnership as it stood. So on the 21 51 of 
January when the NHMF met once more to decide the Eigg application, hopes were 
still quite high. However, they were to be profoundly dashed again when the NHMF 
decided that after further consideration, it would not back the IEHT' s bid. This was 
because they felt there were still "conflicts of interest" between the community's 
representation in the partnership and "the wider public benefits". Since news had 
already started to leak of a wealthy anonymous backer to the IEHT's last bid, they 
went on to say: "Furthermore the trustees noted that the amount already raised by the 
IEHT' s appeal is sufficient to allow it to make an offer to purchase Eigg at around the 
amount which the district valuer suggests is the open market value of the isle". 71 
The rejection was taken by the IEHT bitterly, especially considering that the 
partnership had already put in an offer based on the District Valuer's assessment, only 
to have it flatly turned down by Maruma. If there was no hope of compulsory 
purchase, and no intervention from the State, then what was needed was at least 
support from the NHMF. When that too was turned down, it was not surprising that 
Peter Peacock remarked: "You get the impression the lottery are under huge pressure 
behind the scenes from certain establishment figures not to give money as it might set 
a dangerous precedent in landownership patterns in Scotland". 72 Amongst the IEHT 
partners this seemed the only apparent reason, for as David Hughes Hallett 
commented the application seemed "absolutely ideal" for Lottery funding: "To buy 
back a Scottish island from its absentee owner and generate and protect it for future 
generations to come would seem to me a perfect heritage project".73 The only problem 
being of course, that unlike the 16 other estate purchases funded by the NHMF since 
69 Wilson, Brian. "Brian Wilson Writes", West Highland Free Press, 6th December 1996. 
70 MacDonald, Angus. "Forced purchase of Eigg ruled out", The Scotsman, 7th December, 1996. "Eigg 
may be split up to put off private buyers", Press and Journal, 7th December, 1996. 
71 Ross, John. "Anger as Eigg fails to win lottery cash", The Scotsman, 23rd January, 1997. 
72 ibid. Also Scotsman's "quote ofthe week" 
73 ibid. 
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1982, this one actually included the community resident upon the estate.74 Maggie 
Fyffe wryly noted, "If the little guy asks for something, it's a hand-out, but when it's 
the big guy, it's a subsidy, a set-aside, or a tax exemption. We'll just have to battle on 
with the fundraising". 75 
5.6 Final Bids and Appeal Results 
The appeal remained open and with knowledge of a mystery donor stepping in 
to replace the NHMF, both islanders and public alike were assured that at least 
another reasonable bid could be tendered when necessary. This was an immense relief 
for the islanders, who had not learnt of the mystery backer until the Lottery's 
decision. In many ways it confrrmed that the Steering Committee had been keeping 
things very secret indeed, and on a small island secrets are rare and often viewed with 
suspicion. Nevertheless, the doubts over why such secrets were bein!! held from the 
community were alleviated somewhat when people found out the scale of the 
donation kept under wraps. "I suppose it just showed what kind of level we were 
playing on", said Camille Dressier, "and though there were distinct problems with 
things being kept from the rest of the island, the Steering Committee were walking a 
very delicate line. They were playing a game that involved all our futures, and when it 
came down to it, we just had to trust them and their judgement". 76 
In terms of keeping the publicity still going after the anti-climax of the failed 
bid and NHMF application, the IEHT were assured of one fmal bizarre twist. In 
January a German consultant, Dr Kals approached the HC with ideas of setting up a 
musical centre of excellence on Eigg under the tutelage of none other than the great 
Pavarotti himself Kals's plans for the development involved bringing in some 3,000 
classical and operatic students, leading to what one paper noted would be 5000o/o 
increase in the island's population. For a few unnerving days it appeared that Mamma 
was backing out of the sale, and meeting with his financial backers and Pavarotti as 
well to discuss the details. Dr Kals even had formal meetings with the HC, who 
swiftly pointed out that Eigg did not have anywhere near the facilities to cope with 
74 Foxley. "1992 Highland Land Sales" 
75 Dressler.lli.gg. p.l90 
76 Dressier. Interview. 3rd February, 1998. 
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such a development, not to mention that they were also involved with a community 
buy-out themselves. Unsurprisingly, the proposals collapsed with more than a hint of 
a swindle being mustered, especially when it appeared that Pavarotti had not even 
heard ofEigg, Maruma, nor the proposals for a Pavarotti Foundation. 77 
Nonetheless, the controversies over the Pavarotti Foundation and the NHMF's 
assurance that the island was not worth more than £1.2m finally triggered one of 
Maruma's backers to call a halt to the farce, and demand repayment of his £300,000 
loan. The IEHT had kept Maruma's main fmancial backer, Hong Kong based Hans 
Rainer Erhardt, informed throughout the campaign of their intentions and the 
prevailing problems ofMaruma's proprietorship on the island. They had even been 
tempted to acquire Maruma's loan itself, for as Andy Wightman had pointed out 
"that's they way the big boys do it, they buy the loans then foreclose on them, and sell 
the island to themselves". 78 It was a great idea, but far too much of a gamble for the 
IEHT, and especially with someone as slippery as Maruma. Instead they tabled a 
renewed bid of £1.5m on March 61h, and waited for events to proceed themselves, 
which they did as one week later, when Erhardt fmally took Maruma's holding 
company, Eigg Island Ltd, to Court in Fort William for default on the loan. Since the 
loan constituted a first ranking Standard Security on the island, the court declared that 
unless Maruma could pay off his debt in 28 days the island would have to be sold to 
appease his creditors. Fortunately, Maruma was unable to raise the funds, and 
therefore Erdhardt took over control of the island's sale. "This was the hardest 
moment of all", recalled Maggie. "We knew that Erhardt had expressed an interest in 
our bid, but there was always the risk of a higher bid or that Maruma would pay off 
his loan! I think it was my three-year old grandson who kept me sane during the last 
stage of the negotiations. The phone never stopped ringing, but whenever it would get 
too much, we'd send him to answer it".79 
On April41h, after immense anticipation and anxiety within the IEHT 
campaign staff, Erhardt's solicitors at last accepted their bid. News spread quickly 
throughout the island and a young Ruiridh Kirk's birthday party soon turned into a 
77 Ross, David. "Pavarotti link 'out of tune with Eigg"', The Scotsman, 24th January, 1997. 
78 Conversation between Leslie Riddoch and Andy Wightman. March lOth 1997. 
79 Dressier. .fugg. p.191 
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very emotional affair with islanders embracing one another in disbelief. Katie 
McKinnon said "Well done", and her husband Dougald declared "I want a golden 
crown". 
80 
Nearly all the nationals gave front-page coverage, with a photograph of 
Nick Reider, Colin Carr, and Simon Fraser drinking Champagne in Edinburgh being 
prominent in most. Leslie Riddoch's feature in the Scotsman began, "So, this is what 
success feels like. Bright and full of possibilities. Just as 17 years of ownership by 
absentee landlords was dull and full of limitations". The Eigg story was ending in 
success, and as she rightly pointed out the attraction of story and the delight in its 
success was generated by the euphoria of seeing the 'small guys' win: 
"The IEHT was not a partnership of famous people, superheroes, 
millionaires, landed gentry, or the great and the good. It is a partnership 
between completely ordinary islanders, a perfectly straightforward 
council, and an entirely normal wildlife group. All of whom are feeling 
their way with this project and all of whom have risked criticism and 
failure to do together what they knew could they could not do alone".81 
Looking at the fundraising for March 1997, however, the celebrations were 
also a distinct case of counting chickens before eggs had hatched since the IEHT's 
account had only some £307,000 to its credit at the time of making the bid. The 
anonymous donor had offered to increase her* donation when the Lottery decision 
was announced, yet there was still no actual deposit. Similarly there was also over 
£150,000 to be collected from pledges, as well as a fmal sum to be agreed and given 
by HIE. In many ways therefore the fundraising remained in its infancy, and an 
enormous amount of work had yet to be done before the island was officially handed 
over. To begin with, Maggie contacted the anonymous donor and confirmed the exact 
amount and mechanics of the tax relief, and together with a team of islanders began 
chasing the pledges that had been made. The next 2 months were to prove frantic as 
the partnership began to rapidly amass the funds necessary for purchase. 
80 ibid. 
81 Riddoch, Leslie. ''New dawn breaks for Eigg", The Scotsman, 5th April, 1997. 
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Total Funds Raised by the Public Appeal as of March 1997 
Incomes 
Miscellaneous 




Gift Aid Claims 
Cash & Cheque Donations 
Donations via SWT 
Donations via lET 
Total Income 
·Expenditure 
Campaign Costs to date 
Total Cash Funds 
Pledges 
Pledges via SWT 
Pledges via lET 





















The actual mechanics ofiEHT ownership similarly had to be put in place as 
well. This entailed not only establishing new bank accounts and formalised 
accounting procedures, but actually electing the members of the IEHT' s committee. 
Until April members of the Steering Committee had acted as IEHT directors, but with 
the bid being accepted these people stood down for a secret ballot to elect the proper 
island representatives. On April 20th the result of the elections showed the confidence 
the islanders had in the Steering Committee remained steadfast, as three of four 
elected were familiar faces: Colin Carr, Maggie Fyffe, and Karen Helliwell. The other 
was Donald MacLean, the son of the island's old Doctor Hector, who had been 
brought up on the island, and after serving in the military, had returned to raise his 
family. Though the SWT and HC representatives were already nominated, the other 
• Maggie let slip only one identifying remark about the donor, which was that the benefactor was 
female. 
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issue at hand was to decide upon an independent chairperson for the IEHT. The new 
board of trustees did this on May 141h, when a unanimous decision elected Simon 
Fraser as Chairman. Not only had Simon shown his commitment to the project with 
countless hours of unpaid work in setting up the IEHT, but as a crofting lawyer born 
and raised on Lewis, he had gained the respect of the community in his many visits to 
the island. 
As the elections and nominations were being undertaken, pledge returns and 
donations were swamping the campaign co-ordinators. With Christine Thomton 
compiling and collecting donations at SWT headquarters, Nick Reider and Simon 
Fraser undertaking the legal work and negotiations with HIE, and the team of 
islanders hard at work on Eigg there was little time to savour any feelings of elation. 
In fact there were more than a few anxieties over how many people would actually 
honour their pledges, but Bill Ritchie gave assurances that with Assynt the pledges 
had actually increased when eventually called upon. This was indeed the case with the 
Eigg appeal as well, with the income from returned pledges bringing in over £23,000 
more than originally pledged. 83 As for the fmal results of campaign these were as 
follows: 84 
Fund raising Totals for the Eigg Appeal as of July 1st 1997 
Anonymous Donation 
Public Appeal 
Wildlife & Conservation Donors 
SWT Leaflets 
Natural World Feature 
Newspaper Advertisement 
HC Leaflet & Eigg Friends and Family 
International Donations 
Total Public Appeal 
HIE Grant 
Total 
83 See Appendix 














J n the end there was a total 8,806 donations to the public appeal, that ranged 
from a child sending in 50p of pocket money. to a grant-giving trust giving £20.000. 
There was also of course the£ I m from the mystery donor, which in effect had 
replaced the capital sum expected from the lottery. Nevertheless, by early May there 
was still a shortfall in the total sum required, and this proved a substantial stumbling 
block especially when ErhardCs soJjcitors offered a discount if the payment was 
sett led earlier than June 12'h. Consequently HIE fulfilled their promise of a last brick 
in the wall of fund ing by giving £17,500.17, and allowing the partnership to acquire 
the island one month earlier than expected. By mid May, Eigg was in the hands of the 
IEHT with a final payment of £1,482,540 being made to Erhardt. This was one last 
secret that the Steering Committee, now IEHT Committee, had to keep quite from the 
press and the islanders, as they did not want the victory celebrations to be 
overshadowed by the premature leaking of the story. 
1% 
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Fig 5.8 : Percentage breakdown of appeal funds 
5.7 Victory and Celebration 
I wo MacAskill brothers from Eigg had established the TaJjsker whiskey 
distillery on kye, and in honour of this and the victory. the company generously 
donated ninety bottles of25-year-old malt to lubricate the celebrations. These were 
planned with feverish excitement on the island and with some distinct trepidation as 
well. For it would no doubt be the largest and certainly the most important event on 
the island for centuries. and there was notable pride at stake to ensure the festivities 
went well. The island was now theirs and its appearance was all the more important. 
Consequently the community hall, craft shop, and tearoom were all cleaned and given 
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fresh coats o f paint. In order to physically mark the occasion. Dougald MacKinnon 
remembered a 1 0 ft stone pillar which had been neglected in the bracken beside 
Sandavore Farm. Originally cut some 5,000 years previously, the stone seemed the 
perfect symbol to connect the island's history with its new and exciting future. A 
group of island men therefore happily carted the stone down to a plateau beside the 
pier and erected it together with a small plaque to commemorate the victory. A 
marquee was erected beside the hall, on of all things Schellenberg's much neglected 
tenn is court. And to wash the Talisker down a bar was organised for the night, and 
delivered a few days beforehand on the Shearwater. Ronnie, the boars skipper. 
quipped at the time that it was the most important delivery he had ever made to the 
island. It was certainly one of the largest. 
Fig 5. 9: Unloading the bar from the M. V. Shearwater.
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Afler the final minutes of June 11th passed. a beacon was lit on the island to 
signal the historic change of ownership. The following day saw hundreds of people 
• arrive to mark the occasion. including MP's, councillors, wild life stafl: friends, and of 
course journalists. Climbing up to the stone. they all watched as Dolly Ferguson and 
Dougald MacKinnon - the island· s two eldest inhabitants - unveiled the plaque. 
Afterwards a piper led the assembled congregation up to the marquee to hear speeches 
!Tom Brian Wilson (the now Minister for the Highlands and Islands), and members of 
the IEIJT. Wilson was notably in jovial form, and after years of personally battling 
against Sehellenberg in the West HigWand Free Press. he declared that it was 
certainly "Game, set, and match to the islanders". He also made the occasion an 
opportunity to further the role of community trusts in the region. and "instructed HIE 
to establish a support unit to assist initiatives aimed at achieving community 
ownership of the land".86 Colin Carr then gave an emotional vote of thanks to the 
thousands of people who had supported the campaign. A strong and ~turdy man. he 
was moved to tears in explaining what the buy-out meant to the people of Eigg, and in 
the process moved most of the assembled to tears with his heartfelt thanks. Maggie 
followed, and in turn paid tribute to the staff of both SWT and HC, and the many 
fTiends and islanders who had assisted in campaign. finally, proceedings were closed 
with a short hymn and a blessing, and as the VIP's ate their sandwiches and left for 
the boat, the rest began to dance the night away. It was a Celidh to end all Celidhs, 
which not surprisingly lasted more than just one night. 
0 8-
Fig 5.10: The 5,000 year standing stone res11rrected to commemorate the Island b11y-o11t. 
R6 Rodd, David. " Island buy-out leads way'', The Herald. I 31h June, I 997. 
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5.8 Conclusions 
Much has been made ofEigg's mystery benefactor, and whilst the donation 
represented the largest single financial contribution to the appeal, it did not represent 
the most important aspect. By far the most significant characteristic of the campaign 
was the enthusiasm and hope generated by the islanders and IEHT partners 
themselves. Indeed, without their drive and character the campaign would have no 
doubt faltered at the first hurdle, and certainly without their idiosyncratic appeal, the 
£1 million donation would never have been made in the first place. If anything the 
story of the campaign emphasises the point that when given the democratic chance, 
and the appropriate training and facilitation local communities can move mountains -
or in the case of Eigg save islands. 
As Leslie Riddoch' s remarks on the 5th of April demonstrated, the success of 
the appeal was founded upon a partnership of interest between perfectly normal 
people. Like many townships in the Highlands and Islands, the Isle of Eigg 
community was made up of a mixture of nationalities and language, and was not by 
any standards remarkable in terms of its education nor resources. But as with the other 
partners of the IEHT, the community had been forced into a situation of no return. 
They had suffered the extremes of change induced by the highland land market, and 
had encountered a series of owners that had ensured notable instability in the island's 
long-term future. Twenty years of Schellenberg ownership, eighteen months of 
Maruma, and five years of campaigning for the island and community's self-
determination, had given them the experience for the fmal assault on its history of 
absentee ownership. For the SWT and HC it had been a similar path towards success, 
with failed attempts at working with the island's notorious owners steering them into 
an alliance with the community. For all the rhetoric of land reform surrounding the 
campaign, in the end the solution was not public ownership, nor conservation 
ownership, but an enlightened form of private ownership that gave control to the 
people who had the greatest interests in the island's future. 
87 Morgan, Daniel. 
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In terms of the fundraising campaign itself, the success was hardly a fluke. but 
was won through immense hard work and organisation. As this chapter shows, 
however, much of the planning was made on the run, with the ideas of central co-
ordination and professional expert ise remaining mostly that, simply ideas. In the final 
analysis, the campaign remained firmly the responsibility of those who were planning 
to take over control of the island's future. With regards to understanding the origins of 
the public appeal's financial support, it was only one year later, at the time of writing, 
that a database of donors was fmally compiled. This clearly revealed that as expected 
conservation and wildlife donors had provided the monetary backbone to the public 
appeal. Indeed of the 8,806 donations, some 7221 had come from people respondjng 
to either the SWT leaflets, the Natural World article, or an advert placed in the 
Guardian. 
69% 
D SWT Leaflets 
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Fig 5.11 : Public Appeal by do11or motivati011 (excluding tile £I m donatio11).1111 
Ilcncc in terms of public concern and attention to the Eigg campaign, it 
appears that the publicity surrounding the insecurity of tenure for the island's wildlife 
elicited the most donations. Having said this of course. one cannot simply presume 
that the threat to ~ildlife itself was the sole motivation for these people to donate to 
the campaign. As the Wf literature emphasised, the Eigg Appeal was uruque in its 
attempt to involve the local community in the conservation and reclamation of the 
island's natural heritage. As such, Eigg was not just another wildlife appeal being 
mounted by a conservation body. The SWT were a partner in the IEl lT. and the 
purchase of the island had moral and democratic objectives that fundamentally 
88 1 El IT Donor Database 
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informed the conservation appeal. Also it must be noted that whilst the IlRC leaflets 
were distributed amongst the wider public, through libraries and friends and 
associates of the island, the SWT leaflets were onJy sent out to people already on their 
databases and hence proven donators to worthy causes. Consequently, it is hardly 
surpris ing that they made up the vast majority of the accounted donations. 
Obviously, without questioning all the donors individually, it is problematic to 
make general assumptions regarding their specific motivations for supporting Eigg. 
However, it is nonetheless very revealing that so much support came from England. 
Despite the Scottish nationalist angle played upon in the media with countless 
Braveheart references. the island's plight primarily attracted the traditional middle 





Fig 5.12: Public Appeal by donor origin (excluding the £1 m donation). 89 
Almost three quarters of the donors came from in and around the outh ofEngland, 
and considering that these people generally represent a large proportion of the 
conservation support in general throughout the UK. then it is safe to assume that their 
interest in Eigg was primarily focussed upon the wildlife appeal oft he island. If so 
one could conclude that there might be a conflict of opinion between the SWT's 
actual supporters of the campaign and the SWT's practical role within IEIIT: 
especia lly considering that the SWT only represent 2 people out of8 on the managing 
89 ibid. 
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board of the IEHT. However, whatever conflict there may be must be weighed against 
the practical impossibility of the SWT having taken over the island on their own, and 
also as mentioned in Chapter 2 the increasing practice of conservation bodies 
undertaking management agreements over land at risk rather than outright ownership. 
Since the charter of the IEHT was drawn up with the understanding of preserving and 
reclaiming the island's natural heritage, there is always the assurance that whatever 
happens in the future, the successful management of the island's wildlife will remain 
in the forefront of decision making. It is also worth noting that on a purely monetary 
sense, that the tourist economy is vital to the sustainable development of the island 
~d both the IERA and the HRC are more than aware of the importance maintaining 
Eigg's wildlife merits. This is underlined as well by the fact that much of the funding 
options available to the IEHT are to be gained from the practice of appropriate 
conservation management, and from the successful application of the SWT's interests 
in the island's long term future. Therefore, if there may be have beet: a gap of 
understanding between the SWT's supporters of the project, and SWT's actual direct 
role within the island's management, there are enough checks and balances to ensure 
that the English middle class conservationists will not be unduly disappointed by the 




One year on from the success of the 1997 Eigg appeal, momentous changes 
have occurred both on and off the island. Firstly on the island, the estate farm has 
been divided into three smallholdings with new leases in the process of being 
organised for all estate tenants. Conservation and reclamation plans are also under 
consideration, and a new pier centre has been built. Funded by the local LEC, the pier 
building comprises of a shop, post office, tourist information resource, and a licensed 
restaurant. Built by the islanders themselves, it is the frrst palpable sign of an 
invigorated local economy, and one that has already seen the return of three young 
islanders and an indigenous Eigg family. Intense negotiations are also underway 
regarding a new pier and ferry provision for the island, which although being strongly 
criticised by the IEHT, is still being discussed with the islanders directly, instead of 
just through the absentee owner. Financially the Trust are also in a healthy financial 
situation with no debts or outstanding mortgages to pay, and as of June lt11 this year, 
income b~ing generated from the new residential leases and farm lets. Another 
application is being drafted for NHMF funding, to help fmance various conservation 
and heritage projects on the island, together with numerous other applications to 
European and domestic grant-giving agencies. This is being done by a newly 
employed Project Development Officer and through the IEHT Committee liasing with 
the three partnering bodies. In short therefore, it has been a momentous and 
productive year on the island, with the first steps being made in the IEHT's 
consolidation of ownership. 
Off the island, changes have been no less dramatic, with the new Labour 
Government frrmly setting land reform as a central policy objective for the 
forthcoming Scottish Parliament. In October 1997, Lord Sewel, the SO Minister for 
Agriculture, the Environment and Fisheries, announced the formation of a Land 
Reform Policy Group (LRFG). Under his chair, this group has swiftly begun the 
consultative processes of policy formation, with the desired goal ofhaving a land 
reform agenda ready for the year 2000. March 1998 saw the LRPG publish its first 
consultative paper, 1 which was both loudly applauded and notably criticised at a land 
reform conference held two weeks later by the Unit for the Study of Government in 
1 Land Reform Policy Group, Identifying the Problems, Scottish Office, Edinburgh, 1998. 
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Scotland at Edinburgh University. 2 Lord Sewel and the LRPG were warmly 
congratulated by all speakers for so swiftly and decisively embarking upon the 
formation of a land reform agenda. For many present it was the culmination of a 
lifetime's work and campaigning, and to physically have a Government Minister 
present, openly discussing what had mostly been unmentionable in policy circles for 
so long, emphasised just how tangible reform had become. However, the speed at 
which the consultation had been commenced, and the style in which it was being 
carried out led several speakers to criticise the direction of policy formation. Chief 
amongst these was Andy Wightman, who highlighted the fact that unlike other policy 
areas such as housing, health, and transport, land reform is a relatively unknown 
commodity for the general public. Hence, whilst the LRPG's tenacity was laudable, 
its speed and methods of consultation were highly problematic: 
"As one of the commentators whose work appears to have been drawn 
upon,, I am seriously concerned at how the arguments have been presented ... 
To selectively pick out things which "some commentators" have argued and 
to use this as the basis for a government consultation paper .... is very 
unsophisticated and I would go so far as to say an irresponsible way of going 
about things. 
Most government papers are backed up by fairly extensive research and 
evidence. This one dives in at the deep end with directly lifted quotes from 
work which certainly in my case has been poorly resourced, inadequately 
researched and which was intended to stimulate and provoke further 
research, analysis and debate not to form the basis of hard proposals". 3 
In defence of the LRPG, their first consultation paper was, as titled, simply 
"Identifying the Problems". Therefore one can understand a certain limited nature in 
the paper's proposals and questions. Nevertheless the language and the leading way in 
which the problems and questions were framed, promotes more than a little anxiety 
over the potential reforms that will be manifested. Perhaps more importantly, the style 
of the consultation also raises questions as to how those reforms will be actually 
implemented. For as the case study ofEigg attests, the success of instigating real 
reform on the ground is a very complex process that relies upon both new 
methodologies of development as well as new vehicles of ownership. 
2 Callander, R. & Wightman, A. Understanding Land Reform in Scotland- Report of the Conference 
of 6 March 1998, Edinburgh, 1998. 
3 Wightman, A. "The Wider Land Reform Agenda", Understanding Land Reform, pp.15-26. p.21 
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Eigg was far from a simple and spontaneous out-pouring of confidence and 
empowerment. Indeed, the motivations for change on Eigg, like the Scottish land 
debate in general, were deep rooted and born out of a long historical experience. 
Indeed, the contemporary will and ideas for community management itself took over 
a twenty-year period to develop, during which time the island community was forced 
into little other option. As many islanders pointed out- even after the horrors of 
Schellenberg and the campaign of the first lET - if Mamma had even been partially 
acceptable, the islanders would have much preferred to continue with a landlord than 
jump into the exposure of community ownership and management.4 As described in 
the early Chapters, the reasons for this reluctance and conservatism, were the 
ingrained effects of a tenurial system that from its outset in 13th Century sought to 
enclose the Highlands and Islands' natural resources from resident populations. 
Combined with the development of the market economy, this process saw the 
promotion of the individual's rights over landownership being asserted at the expense 
of the collective rights of local communities and the wider public interest.5 Though by 
the late 19th and 20th centuries crofting had at least preserved some collective rights 
and maintained people on the land, communities like Eigg were still frrmly enclosed 
from the land and resources that were not held under crofting tenure. As such, the pre-
buyout Eigg community was like most crofting townships shielded from the 
responsibilities that come from the exercise of real power and involvement in 
management decisions. That is not to say that Grazings Committees and the 
communal nature of crofting life did not encourage any form of self-determination, 
for they clearly did. But to move from the parochial nature of the crofting and local 
community world, into the wider and much more uncertain and complex realms of 
estate ownership and resource management was an enormous step. With the case of 
Eigg, however, the dramatic influx of incomers notably changed the social dynamics 
on the island and the community's eventual relationship with the island's absentee 
owners. This proved to be a fundamental determinant in reversing the lack of 
confidence within the community, and together with the extreme problems associated 
4 Helliwell, Karen. Interview. 
5 Hunter, J. "The Defining Issue: Land Reform And Rural Betterment in the Highlands and Islands", 
Understanding Land Reform. pp.33-44. p.35 
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with Schellenberg and Maruma, very much pushed the community into taking the 
initiative. 
Of course what was true for the island's residents was also true for the HC and 
SWT. Having tried unsuccessfully throughout the 1980's and 1990's to work through 
traditional channels with the island's owners, both organisations were forced into the 
position of siding with the Eigg community. It was hardly the ideal situation, and like 
many islanders at the time, the HC and SWT felt they were treading on unknown and 
notably treacherous ground. For elected Councillors like Michael Foxley, it was a 
bold and politically risky commitment, especially considering the political climate of 
the early 1990's. However, exceptional circumstances had propelled the situation, and 
combined with the proactive involvement of the lET, HIF and others, the two 
organisations provided essential support for the Eigg islanders. Immense effort went 
into encouraging and fostering the community's discontent into practi~al avenues and 
alternatives. As described in Chapters 3 and 4, the careful facilitation and preparation 
of the community was achieved through specific workshop activities and the 
concerted assistance of political and social activists. In terms of my own involvement 
this entailed the production of a highly participative management plan. Any 'regular' 
land use consultant would have no doubt constructed a far more profitable course of 
development for the island, but that would have merely continued the processes of 
external control and management policy. Instead the exhaustive drafting and research 
of the Eigg Development Study relied upon the active participation of the community 
at all stages, and above all the firm belief in the development opportunities being 
generated from the islanders' own ideas and abilities. 
Having said that of course, my own involvement was also highly active in shaping 
the direction of the eventual development plan. This was done, however, with the 
expressed objective of bridging the gap between the world of community 
empowerment, and the outside world of policy development and management 
consultancy. The islanders' ideas were sound, and indeed the most appropriate for 
their own management ofEigg, but what they lacked were the language, style, and 
presentation of those ideas in a form that was credible to both potential partners and 
supporters. This was achieved with the Eigg Development Study, and then later the 
NHMF application. Both of which the islanders felt to be their own construction, 
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despite being actually drafted and written by myself and outside consultants. In 
essence, therefore, the strength of confidence that the islanders and the IEHT 
exhibited by 1996/1997 was carefully crafted over a long period oftime.lt was far 
from being spontaneous, but was the result of long drawn out events, the support of 
partnering bodies, and the overtly participatory approach of external facilitators. 
The confidence generated by HIF workshops, management plans, and the 
formation of the IEHT partnership was also central to the fundraising campaign; a 
campaign that again continued to foster increased organisation and development 
within the community itself. The expertise of the HC and especially the SWT in 
managing to sell the idea of community trust ownership was crucial. Without the likes 
of Gordon Fyfe, Nick Reider, Christine Thomton, Alastair Somerville and the many 
others who assisted in the campaign it is highly doubtful that the appeal would have 
succeeded. Proactive fmance was also similarly essential for both the development of 
the community itself, and the success of the fundraising campaign. The many small 
grants gained by the islanders through the 1990's, for events like the annual Feis, to 
business training courses and consultancy work, were necessary components in the 
fostering ofthe community's skills and self-confidence. In terms ofthe public appeal, 
it took over £18,000 of investment from the IEHT partners to actually raise the fmal 
sum. 6 A small amount in comparison to the £1.5m total, but still a frightening figure 
to the islanders at the time of launching the campaign. Beyond fmance and expertise, 
however, the HC, SWT, and various "friends ofEigg" gave support and advice to the 
islanders during their times of need, and especially during the latter stages of the 
campaign when lobbying, negotiating, and bidding were producing notable anxieties. 
The success of the appeal also highlighted the fact that despite the social and 
nationalist rhetoric of land reform surrounding the island in the media, the most 
evident motivation for donors was the protection of the island's wildlife. Obviously, 
the way in which the campaign was pitched emphasised that the threat to island's 
wildlife came from the highland land market, and that its protection lay in 
simultaneously securing the future of both the local community and the natural 
heritage. Nonetheless commentators and policy makers alike cannot take Eigg as 
6 IEHT Financial Accounts 
264 
Conci us ion 
simply an example of the desire for the Scottish people to see land reform. Indeed, if 
one just measured the desire for land reform in monetary terms, English 
conservationists from the Home Counties actually provided the most important 
backing. They are the ones who provided the majority of fmancial support for the 
Eigg appeal, and who have continued to fund the expanding portfolio of conservation-
owned estates throughout the past decade. It is a fact that emphasises just how 
important the issues of conservation and sustainable development are in the formation 
of Scottish land reform policy. If not only in terms of public desires for natural 
heritage protection, but for economic reasons as well, for recreation and tourism are 
cornerstones of the modern rural economy. The Highlands and Islands region alone 
attracts over half a million climbers and walkers each year, who generate over £34m 
in income and support some 4,000 jobs.7 In the case ofEigg, like most remote areas 
of the Highlands and Islands, this economy is swiftly overtaking the traditional 
industries of agriculture and fishing. 
In returning to the point of departure for this study, and what specifically Eigg can 
contribute to future land reform policy, it is best to begin with these issues of 
sustainable development and environmental reclamation in mind. This is because, as 
many commentators have pointed out, Eigg like the rest of the Highlands and Islands 
region is an ideal location to further a pioneering model of sustainability. Unlike the 
rest of the Britain, there is a very tangible history of pre-clearance and pre-
industrialised society. This is both reflected in the old lazy bed rows and run-rig 
patterns on the hillsides, as well as in the continued survival of the crofting system. 
The region also has an abundant natural heritage, which despite being deeply scarred 
by exploitation and inappropriate management, is still one of the most scenic and 
ecologically diverse areas ofEurope. Crofting has played a significant part in 
maintaining that diversity of the flora and fauna, and especially in the more remote 
areas such has Eigg, has allowed a notable population to remain on the land. This in 
turn has assisted in the remarkable economic and demographic improvements to the 
region over the past 20 years, which have also been accompanied by the rise in public 
concern for the Highlands and Islands environmental protection and appreciation. In 
essence, therefore, the region has both the natural resources for development and 
7 ibid. p.43 
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reclamation, as well as an expanding population and economic base. Combined with 
the model of small-scale, community based crofting tenure, and the political will for 
facilitating its development, there is enormous potential for establishing a leading 
example of sustainable rural development. This applies not just to the inhabited areas 
of the Highlands and Islands, but also to the vast tracts of land that have been cleared 
of their populations. For only by the active resettlement of communities on deserted 
estates can the social, economic, and ecological improvements be successfully spread 
throughout the region. As such a model of sustainability, Eigg is now obviously a 
precedent in the search for alternative development scenarios in the Highlands and 
Islands. Based upon a partnership of interest in its structure and management, the 
IEHT has integrated the social and economic development of the island with the 
protection, reclamation, and improved accessibility ofthe island's natural heritage. 
The IEHT was achieved by successfully combining external fmanc.ial and political 
suppott with local enterprise, knowledge, and participation. It is this, which is the 
most significant and pertinent lesson to be learnt from Eigg. For the IEHT's creation 
and development was underpinned by a fundamental devolution of power to the local 
community. Within the new ownership structure, local residents gained both greater 
collective rights over the development and management of the island as well as 
greater individual rights over security of tenure and employment. This does not 
represent complete control over the island, of course, as the HC and SWT represent 
the wider public interests in the IEHT, which together with the regulatory planning 
framework and legislation governing land management, provide a conditional 
counterbalance to the residents' empowerment. Nevertheless, the rights·gained by the 
local community are substantial, and on Eigg this required a revolutionary overthrow 
of the traditional estate model. It also required an overthrow of the traditional top-
down approach of development planning and policy, for like Assynt before it, the 
initial momentum for action on Eigg came not from government bodies or 
development agencies, but from the community itself. This was obviously guided and 
assisted by external support and encouragement, but nonetheless it was a situation in 
which the islanders had the upper hand in all stages of policy development, planning, 
and implementation. Eigg succeeded, therefore, because the community took hold of 
the reigns of power. 
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Hence, even if the devolution of land use and land management decisions are 
furthered in forthcoming land reform policy, they will not be successful unless they 
are accompanied by a similar devolution of policy formation itsel£ For only by 
involving resident communities in the initial stages of development will any real 
power be handed over, and more importantly accepted. The history of crofting and 
Scottish land reform over the past I 00 years is littered with countless examples of 
failed policy initiatives that have foundered on the very lack of proper participation at 
ground level. They have correspondingly also been characterised by a fundamental 
lack of understanding for the immense amount of variety and difference within the 
Highlands and Islands region. Geography, climate, ecology, demography, and 
economy are all dependent on the individual nature of specific locations and 
communities. Hence no one panacea can solve all of the region's varied problems and 
demands, just as no one solution can be derived from a single case study in the 
Highlands and Islands and applied to the rest of Scotland. Rather than one Bill or 
policy' initiative being handed down to answer the demand for reform, a much deeper 
change is required at the heart of government. Previous attempts at land reform, rural 
planning, and development have been far too paternalistic and even colonial in their 
formation and implementation. They have consequently denied the difference within 
the Highland region, restricted the participation of the local communities, and 
subsequently failed to tackle the problematique of landownership and land use that 
Frank Fraser Darling so clearly described in his West Highland Survey half a century 
ago. That is why land reform in Scotland has been so clearly linked with nationalism, 
devolution, and regional self-determination, for only by making a profound break 
with the centralised nature of governance in Scotland can any real reform be 
manifested. Indeed, it actually goes deeper still, for real power over decision making 
needs to be devolved not just to Edinburgh and a new Scottish Parliament, but to each 
individual township, community, and household in Scotland. 
It sounds sweeping and radical, because land reform is precisely that- it is by 
nature revolutionary. Control over land is power, and if the collective rights 
demanded by the Eigg community and the general public over Scotland's natural 
heritag~ are to be fulfilled, then power must be transferred from the hands of the few 
to those of the many. As the case ofEigg demonstrates, however, if community trusts 
are to be one of the vehicles for that transfer, there needs to be substantial preparation 
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and education at the ground level beforehand. In more specific terms, the work of 
NGO's like HIF need to be fully recognised and funded in a far more vigorous 
fashion. They also need to be expanded to not only initiate the self-determination of 
local communities, but more importantly to bridge the gap between empowerment and 
the formation of appropriate management schemes and development scenarios. 
Participatory development has been accepted on the international stage as the most 
viable and cost-effective methodology for appropriate development. It has been 
studied, utilised, and funded by the British Government throughout the world. That 
knowledge now needs to be brought home and applied on our own shores, and in 
relation to land reform, must be recognised as the most pertinent methodology of 
policy implementation. For only then will general policy be dynamic enough to adapt 
to the varied topography and demands of specific locations and situations. 
Tackling the land problematique in Scotland requires policy initiatives on all 
fronts' at the same time, only then can the vicious circle of external control, 
disempowerment, and inappropriate land use be broken. Participation at grass roots 
level is the essential component for the successful development and application of 
those policies. Hence, the criticisms directed at the LRPG by Andy Wightman and 
others in the March land reform conference were based upon the need for both local 
communities and the wider public to become radically more involved in the 
contemporary formation of land reform policy for the Scottish Parliament. At the time 
of writing, despite the anxieties of Wightman and others, there is notable hope of the 
corner being turned in rural policy and its development. Together with the LRPG's 
second consultation paper, we are awaiting 3 other reviews on the future of Scotland's 
designation ofSSSI's, laws of public access, and the formation ofNational Parks. A 
root and branch reform of rural society, economy, and ecology is already underway, 
and the political will for its implementation is stronger and broader than ever before. 
It is above all, however, a process, and as Professor Donald Macleod from the Free 
Church of Scotland College aptly concluded at the land reform conference in March, 
it will not fmish with the present deliberations over a land reform Act for the year 
2000. Appealing to the ecclesiastical principle of Sempa Reformanda- that the church 
needs constant and ongoing reformation- he stressed: 
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There can be no one-off solution. The campaign for land reform is 
driven by ideals: by a desire to curtail the powerful and to empower the 
disempowered; by a concern for stewardship and community; by a 
passion for freedom and justice. No one Bill is going to deliver on these 
ideals; and until the ideals are delivered the campaign will continue, if 
necessary through Bill after Bill, because we are driven by the most 
irresistible of all forces: the divine spark of discontent.8 
































Ice sheets of the Pleistone Period retract from Scotland. 
Earliest evidence of human settlement in the Small Isles 
Arrow head, axe, and other remains found on Eigg 
St Co lumba founds Iona Monastry 
Donann and his Monks are massacred on Eigg 
Viking domination of the Highlands and Islands 
Eigg and Rhum feudal charters granted to the MacDonalds by 
Robert the Bruce 
John MacDonald names himself Dominus Insularum- Lord of 
the Isles 
Lordship of the Isles abolished 
The cave Massacre - Dressier's date 
The cave Massacre- Urqhart and Wade Martins' date 
Maclean ofDuart massacres the island's population 
The Statutes of Iona 
Captain of Clanranald receives a Royal Charter for his land 
(including Eigg) from James IV 
Kildonnan Chapel constructed 
Massacre of the MacDonalds at GlenCoe 
Famine years on Eigg 
Martin Martin writes Description of the Western Isles of 
Scotland 
Union of the Crowns 
First Jacobite Rebellion 
First recorded potato planted in the Hebrides 
Second Jacobite Rebellion 
3 8 islanders deported in reprisals after Culloden 
Clanranald employs an "improving" factor 
New commercial leases drawn up for island tacksmen 
First evictions on Eigg as Cleadale tenants are cleared 


























17 Crofts established at Cleadale with the removal ofiltaig and 
Cleadale townships 
Kelp prices begin to collapse 
Rhum is cleared of its fmal 300 people for a sheep farm 
Reginald Macdonald sells Eigg to Hugh Macpherson for 
£15,000 
Eigg schoolhouse built 
Highest recorded population: 546 
Potato blight hits Scotland 
Eviction of Lower and Upper Grulin, shipped to Nova Scotia 
Presbyterian Church built on Eigg 
Post Offcie established at Galmisdale 
Laig, Sandavore, and Kildonnan farms all tenanted by non-
indigenous islander 
Napier Commission begins investigations into the regional 
unrest 
Crofters Holding Act 
Macphereson family sell Eigg to Robert Thompson 
Last forced eviction on Eigg, 49 people moved from 
Galmisdale to Cleadale 
Thompson dies, and Eigg is sold to William Peterson 
10 Eigg men lost during the First World War 
Land Settlement Act 
Extension of the common Grazings for Chugach crofts 
Peterson sells Eigg to Sir W alter Runciman 
Eigg Lodge built 
Last resident clergyman leaves the island 
The Runciman family sells Eigg to Captain Robert Evans for 
£71,000 
Evans sells Eigg to the Anglyn Trust and 'Commander' 
Farnham Smith for £120,000 
lllDB Table their bid for Eigg 
Margaret and Keith Schellenberg purchase Eigg for £274,000 
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Sept 3 Two resident Benedictine Monks evicted from Howlin, and the 
Devlin family face eviction from Kildonnan 
Small Isles Community Council established 
1978 Sept Agreement signed between Schellenbergs and SWT to manage 
three reserves that overlap the SSSI's 
1979 July I-llDB Chairman opens a new craft centre at Kildonnan 
1980 Three weddings on the island in one year 
1981 Margaret and Keith Schellenberg are divorced 
Schellenberg makes five estate farm workers redundant 
1982 IERA established 
Eigg estate extends its forestry, with grant aid fmancing 91.2 
acres of conifer plantation 
1986 SWT employ part-time resident warden (John Chester) 
July IERA initiate plans for a new community hall 
1988 July 13 Schellenberg is sued for his mismanangement of Eigg by his 
former wife Margaret Williams 
Aug Residents clash with Schellenberg over the Eigg Games Celidh 
Sept Schellenberg transfers ownership to Cleveland and Island 
Holdings Ltd. 
1989 July 14 
1990 Dec 




1992 May 14 
May20 
June 11 
Edinburgh Court of Session determines Schellenberg must sell 
the island. He appeals the ruling. 
Schellenberg pays for Marie and Colin Carr's eldest son Donny 
to attend Gordonstoun 
SWT tentatively offer to buy out Mrs William's half share of 
the island 
lET formed By Liz Lyon, Tom Forsyth, Bob Harris, and 
Alastair Mclntosh 
Launch of the lET- aiming to raise £3 Million 
lET Trustees address the IERA 
Eigg Residents vote with a majority of 78% to back the lET 
Schellenberg formerly puts Eigg up for sale 
Eigg Feasibility Study of Trust ownership completed for lET 




1993 Feb 3 
Nov 












Schellenberg's bid is accepted for the island 
Assynt crofter's bid for North Lochinver estate accepted 
The Assynt Crofters take formal ownership of their estate 
Farm manager, Coli in Carr sees his job advertised in the paper 
and is shortly afterwards by instructed by letter to not go near 
the livestock or farm machinery 
The Rolls Royce and barn bum down 
Schellenberg proposes to sell the island off in parcels 
SWT representative Niel Wilcox formerly meets the IERA 
IERA elect Steering Committee to represent Eigg community 
in its dealings with S WT and any potential purchase of the 
island 
"Speaking Out" with Leslie Riddoch 
IERA members attend 1994 HIF conference on land reform 
SWT announce desire to work with Eigg residents 
lET is formerly handed over to the island's residents, 2 non-
islanders are included Alastair Macintosh and Leslie Riddoch 
Manse and Galmisdale House put up for sale 
HIF /ERA run workshops on "Eigg and the Future - What do 
you Think ?" 
lET launches 15 K fighting fund in Glasgow 
"Islanders will never get rid of me" says Schellenberg - Daily 
Record 
Aug Maruma visits the island for 48 hours, during which he signs a 
deal with Schellenberg on a serviette for the sale of Eigg 
Sept IREA begins holding community workshops on future 
management of the island 
Oct Schellenberg privately asks the SWT to make an offer for the 




Evictions notices are issued to the Carr family and John Chester 
the S WT warden 
Schellenberg's 3rd wife, Suki sues him for divorce and places 
an embargo on the sale of the island 























Stone Eagle visits 
Schellenberg sends out questionable Christmas cards 
Author first visits the island to discuss a new 
management plan 
Rumours of a £1.5 Million offer on the island, Schellenberg 
still denies the island is for sale 
Rumours solidifying into Professor Maruma 
Schellenberg is prevented from retrieving William Bald's Map 
ofthe island 
Professor Maruma visits the island for the first time as owner 
Mamma meets the IERA 
First questions raised about the new owner's credentials 
Mamma declares intention to invest £ 15m on the island 
First island Feis 
Maruma's second visit to the island and meeting with IERA 
Appointment of Peter Barz as island manager 
Maruma borrows £1.6m from Volksbank in Plochingen near 
Stuttgart 
Scotland on Sunday publishes a public poll that heavily backs 
land sale restrictions in Scotland. 
German Public Prosecutor launches formal investigation into 
Mamma's fmancial activities 
SWT Council meeting agrees to basic proposals of a 
partnership with the Eigg residents 
IERA send a statement of intent to purchase to Thompson, 
Mamma's solicitor. 
IERA decide to apply for a Millennium Forrest grant 
Millennium Forest Application is initially accepted- yet 
waiting for Maruma' s signature. 
Deadline for Millennium Forest Application passes and without 
Mamma's support the grant is lost. 
IERA give ultimatum to Maruma for co-operation and 
resolution of outstanding differences. 
Local MP Russell Johnston proposes that the 
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Scottish Office purchase the island 
Maruma fails to contact the community regarding their 
ultimatum. 
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Feb 2 CTAS takes on the Eigg Development Study and channel funds 
form the Highland Fund for consultants to evaluate and edit 
Maruma cleared of :fraud in Germany. 














Maruma's bailiffs unsuccessfully try to pay off the artist's 
debts with an auction of his artwork 
Highland Council's Land and the Environment Committee 
approves funds and assistance to Eigg residents in pursuing an 
island buyout. 
The last of the Estate's cattle are shipped off the island and sold 
to pay for the estate-workers wages. 
Highland Councillors agreed to help set up a public appeal for 
£I m in order to buy Eigg in partnership with the community. 
Local Government restructuring in Scotland and the official 
hand-over to the new Unitary Authorities. 
MP Sir Russell Johnston tables and Adjournment debate on 
Eigg. George Kynoch, Scottish Industry Minister, refuses to 
back Johnston's call for Government assistance for any 
purchase or intervention on Eigg. 
HC staff and Councillors hold official meeting with the 
IERAIIET on Eigg to begin planning the campaign and 
structure of the partnership. 
IERA, SWT, and HC announce their intention to apply for 
Lottery support in any future buy-out. 
Eigg Fe is 
Knight Frank & Rutly and Vladdi Island Enterprises put Eigg 
up for sale at £2m- no closing date is announced. 
IERA meeting overwhelmingly votes for a buy-out. 
Public appeal announced 














SLF announce support for the Eigg buyout. 
Ruaridh Nicoll's article in the Guardian attracts the attention of 
the mystery donor. 
Disagreement between partners over a central co-ordinator for 
the ca~paign and grant application. 
Formation of a new Trust, limited by guarantee and consisting 
of 8 directors -the IEHT - is formerly agreed by the partners. 
Gordon Fyffe (head of HC public relations) is appointed press 
officer for the IEHT. 
A database of targeted donors is begun on the island, including 
friends, extended families and previous visitors to the island. 
Schellenberg goes to Court over the Channel 4 documentary 
Filthy Rich : "An Honorary Scot ". 
Knight Frank & Rutly announce that Eigg sales brochures will 
be sold at £10 each and profits donated to the Countryside 
Movement (A pro-hunting lobby) 
HIE reject possibility of compulsory purchase- but offer 
support and the "last brick in the funding wall". 
IEHT launch £800,000 public appeal on Eigg. 
20,000 appeal leaflets designed and printed by HC are started 
to be distributed. Car stickers and appeal T -shirts also released. 
Schellenberg attacks the buy-out plans in the press - "islanders 
are just a bunch of chancers" 
Press begins to cover stories of splits on the island between 
indigenous islanders and incomers. 
The last Millennium Forest Application deadline is missed due 
to no signature from Maruma. 
Decision is made to apply for development costs over and 
above the simple purchase of the island in the NHMF 
application for grant aid. 
HC donate a computer for Maggie to use. 
Sept 23-24 HIF hold another series of workshops. 
Sept 25 Scottish Secretary Micheal Forsyth visits the island for 40 mins 



















1997 Jan 21 
NHMF receives formal application for grant aid 
Ian Campbell, absentee crofter, forms the Hebridean People of 
Eigg Group and publicly asks Mamma not to sell the island to 
the IEHT 
Five-year business plan is submitted to the NI-IMF- briefly 
outlined for the press. 
Not the Landowners Ball held in Assembly Rooms Edinburgh. 
SWT launch appeal to the 47 other wildlife trusts 
SNP demand radical reform of feudal land laws in an 
adjournment debate. 
Donald McFadyen begins legal action against Maruma for 
unpaid wages (dating back to July 26) 
Sir Russell Johnston tables an Early Day Motion asking for the 
Government to buy Eigg and give it to the National Trust. 
NI-IMF meeting regarding the funding proposals for Eigg. 
NI-IMF announce support for the buy-out in principle, subject 
to conditions over the future management being met. 
Peter Peacock, HC Convener, publicly asks other bidders for 
Eigg to step aside. 
The District Valuer, valuing the island on behalf of the Lottery, 
reaches a value of £1.25 to £1.55 m. 
First deadline for island sale :Trustees table bid£ 1.2 m 
(without Lottery support). 
Mamma rejects all bids as too low. 
Press begins to circulate news ofthe IEHT's clashes with the 
NHMF- and the potential removal of Lottery support. 
After compulsory purchase had been ruled out once more by 
HIE and HC, Brian Wilson MP proposes the selective 
purchasing of parts of the island in order to deter any other 
buyers - ''to make Eigg unmarketable". 
SWT take the lead in announcing that the IEHT is not willing 
to change its constitution in order appease the NI-IMF. 
NI-IMF meet again to decide on Eigg application and reject the 


















The two remaining Eigg Estate staff are paid their back wages 
and dismissed. 
Luciano Pavarotti allegedly in talks with Maruma about 
establishing a college for 3,000 students on Eigg. 
Formal approach by Dr. Heinz Dieter Kals is made to HC to 
further the Pavarotti idea- HC refuse the offer of a partnership 
and the proposed development as inappropriate. 
Schellenberg wins court action over the William Bald Map due 
to Maruma failing to defend the case. 
IERA meeting unanimously rejects the Pavarotti development 
idea. 
Mary Scanlon, prospective Tory MP raises questions about 
HC's involvement with Eigg. 
Renewed bid of£1.5 m tabled by IEHT. 
Hong Kong based fmancier of Maruma, Hans Rainer Ehrhardt 
wins court order to enforce the sale of the island. 
Bid from IEHT is accepted. 
News breaks that a deal has been struck. 
IERA constitution is altered and voting rights are given to those 
"ordinarily resident"- i.e. six months residency per year over 
two consecutive years. 
4 island directors of the IEHT are elected by secret ballot: 
Collin Carr, Maggie Fyffe, Donald McLean, and Karen 
Helliwell. 
Simon Fraser appointed Chairman to IEHT. 
Hand over celebrations begin with a beacon lit at midnight. 
Official ceremony and celebrations 
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A.2 Summarised interview results 
The following data was gathered from 41 interviews conducted on the island between 
the 14th March to 3rd September 1995. These interviews were conducted primarily 
within peoples' own homes, and took the form of directed conversations with the 
following key questions being asked. Whilst discussing these points, references were 
also made to the workshop results to compare and contrast with individuals' answers. 
Interviewees were assured that their answers were to remain anonymous. Bar 2 
people, all adults over the age of 18 were interviewed (although not all were 
interviewed separately as many households were interviewed together). The 2 people 
not covered declined to be interviewed because they felt it was unnecessary and or 
inappropriate to answer questions on a feasibility study concerning community 
ownership/ management. Especially when the island was already owned by a private 
landlord. I tried to approach them after relations had broken down with Maruma, yet 
by that stage they had frrmly sided against the IEHT bid for ownership. 
A.2.1 What was thought of the management workshops run by the IERA ? 
Generally felt to be a good idea and process by everyone/ even those who didn't 
attend felt them to be useful 
25 said they were better than residents' meetings 
All stated that they were impressed by the level of agreement 
28 people believed the small group procedure should be used for all complex 
decisions 
8 people expressed problems over the Steering Committee members "directing 
results too much" 
4 people said they would not attend them again- i.e. they'd served their use 
A.2.2 What is thought of the present Steering Committee/ Working 
Development Group and their mandate ? (Their mandate being to "investigate 
the possibilities for community ownership, and to negotiate on behalf of the 
community with outside interests".) 
4 people "had no idea what they were doing" 
12 people were "unsure" of their mandate and needed it explaining to them 
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39 people, when asked specifically, believed that the Steering Committee/ 
Working Development Group was competent for negotiating with Mai'l:lma and 
other outside bodies. 
6 people felt it should be done by all the residents together. 
21 people emphasised the value of rotating the membership 
14 people believed that the Steering Committee should be more open 
A.2.3 How viable is community management on the island at present ? 
14 people said yes immediately 
11 people said no immediately- "you need an owner" 
16 people said no with reservations: 
23 people believed it was fmancially impossible to run the estate without 
making a loss 
Other main reservation being the need for skills and outside assistance/ '~we 
couldn't do it alone"/ need outside bodies for mediating conflicts on the island 
29 people believed an outside partner was needed, such as SWT and/or HRC I 
although distinctly more favouring ofHRC than SWT 
Almost everyone expressed the need for entering into the process slowly/ had to 
be talked about more as a group/ 
24 people said more workshops were necessary to work out the mechanics 
A.2.4 What position do you see for the lET ? 
26 people saw no future for the trust at present/ primarily because there was now a 
new owner/ should be kept on the back burner/ just in case 
8 people suggested it needed to become more involved with the community I 
channelling grants etc./ i.e. should give the land reform/community ownership 
angle 
13 thought it should be disbanded 
5 "didn't care" 
A.2.5 What do you think about a community bank ? 
28 people very interested in the idea I 11 needed the idea explained 
Many suggested that this could be the new role for the lET 
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Several of the older islanders described a credit union that was functioning under 
the Runcimans/ also said it would be a good idea for Maruma to provide start up 
funds as an act of good faith- like the Runcimans 
7 dismissed the idea/ people would take advantage/ just create a new layer of debt. 
A.2.6 What do you think of the farming/crofting on the island ? 
36 people thought it was in a bad state/ or in decline 
All8 indigenous pensioners described present farming/crofting in negative terms I 
many cited this as central problem of decline 
16 people said this was inevitable I i.e. general decline everywhere 
Most people blamed Schellenberg for ruining the estate farms/ taking all the 
quotas etc . 
.I 2 people said too much of the croft land was under the control of just one crofter 
A.2.7 Presuming Community input in management: How would you organise 
farming/crofting ? 
26 people wanted to see the estate farm divided into small holding units/ or more 
crofts. 
18 people wanted to see a community farm enterprise I wanting to generate more 
employment on the island 
22 people wanted more cattle to replace the number of sheep 
Widespread opinion on the possibilities of a market garden/ and or organic food 
production -though 18 people very keen on organic production/ meat and veg 
Several mentioned fish farming/ shell-fish farming 
A.2.8 Presuming Community input in management: How should forestry be 
organised? 
general belief that there wasn't much opportunity in forestry on the island/ 
although older islanders tended to believe there was 
28 people believed there should be more planting/ not conifers though ! 
23 people said they would sell wood to islanders and pay some one to cut I plant 
fro m the proceeds 




9 people mentioned crofter forestry 
11 people thought wood should be freely available 
A.2.9 What are your feelings about tourism on the island ? 
32 people believed it to be the primary industry for the island/ the majority did not 
want to see the levels of early Schellenberg era reached again- overexposed 
19 believed there needed to be more for people to do on the island if you were 
going to attract them. 
17 people emphasised "green tourism" and the need to balance development with 
what attracts people here in the first place. 
8 people said they didn't want any tourists/ "only a nuisance" 
New pier facilities/ shop absolutely vital 
All of those running B&B (official3, unofficial3) believed there should be a co-
ordinated booking service. 
A.2.10 What alternatives for employment can you see apart from fishing, 
forestry, farming, and tourism ? 
22 people couldn't see anything else apart from what was here already/ just 
expanded if possible 
14 people said security of tenure would change everything/ business grants/ more 
building/ more money on the island etc 
12 people mentioned computers/ internet access - although only 5 could 
adequately explain what that entailed 
18 people suggested arts &crafts I 
Most people cited fuel/freight costs as the principle problem- anything produced 
on the island immediately had its price increased 
If the island had its own boat/ or Calmac reduced costs then it would encourage 
greater ingenuity 
A.2.11 Presuming Community input in management: What should happen to the 
lodge? 
7 people said it should be knocked down ! 
16 people suggested a self-catering/ perhaps hostel accommodation for groups 
13 people suggested high class hotel 
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4 people suggested selling it to the highest bidder/ maybe splitting it up to sell 
Assorted other ideas: Gaelic College, Music School, Outward Bound Centre, Pub/ 
Restaurant/ Games centre, Centre for Alternative Technology. 
A.2.12 What do you think about establishing a pub on the island? 
17 said no emphatically 
13 said yes emphatically ! 
6 said yes with resel!'ations (main one being it had to be run by some one off the 
island) 
7 believed it would be impossible anyway because you needed a police presence 
(They still stuck to this even when it was pointed out that this was not the case.) 
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A.3.2 Employment statistics 



















5 • Eigg School 
0 Off-island 
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• Under 5 
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Strongly identified by residents and visitors alike as the chief resource and 
a llure ofthe island, the wild life and scenic features are abundant. The SWf have been 
involved on the island for 20 years and have employed a part-time warden since 1986. 
Golden eagles and Sea Eagles are both present, with the former breeding on the 
island. and other birds of prey including the Hen llarrier, Peregrine Falcon, and 
Merlin. Other nesting birds include Manx Shearwaters, Ravens, Red Throated Divers, 
Comcrakes. and Great kuas. Marine Otters breed on the island. and a variety of 
Porpoise and Dolphin can be seen in the surrounding waters. Rare mammals include 
the unique Eigg Vole. 
A number of residents casually assist the warden in maintaining an annual 
record of the flora and fauna. and aJthough some pamphlets and guided walks are 
available to visitors, there is enormous scope for improving and facil itating a greater 
understanding of the island's scenic and conservation heritage. In particular greater 
informat ion needs to be gathered and detailed regarding the island's wide diversity of 
rare and threatened habitats. which include: heather, woodlands, peat bog, grassland 
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and meadows, hay meadows, heathland, coastal habits, marsh and reedbed habitats 
' 
hazel and willow scrub, inland cliffs, lochans and the rich surrounding coastal waters. 
The island is also rich in archaeological and cultural sites. The same problems 
of research and detailing however, persist for although 28 archaeological sites have 
been recorded, few of these structures have been specifically maintained or 
interpreted. 
A.4.1 Sites of Special Scientific Interest. 
Eigg lies within the National Scenic Area of the Small Isles, and there are three Sites 
of Special Scientific Interest on the island (see Maps for locations): 
(i) Cleadale SSSI 
Area: 93.2 hectares (230.3 acres) 
First notified in 1964 as part ofEigg SSSI 
The steep slopes above the Crofting Townships of Cleadale and Cuagach are 
designated, with the dominant interest being the Hazel Scrub Woodland below the 
cliff that also contains Wychelm, Rowan, Aspen, and Blackthorn. Manx Shearwaters 
nest on the upper slopes, and the grasslands on the lower slopes contain a wide variety 
of grasses herbs and numerous rare orchids in the pasture. There is also a separate 
patch below Howlin again containing orchids and rare flora. 
(ii) An Sgurr & Gleann Charadail SSSI 
Area: 968.1 hectares (2,392.1 acres) 
First notified in 1964 as part ofEigg SSSI 
This is a Geological Conservation Review Site of national importance, which includes 
a range of habitats from exposed rocky coasts and cliffs to an extensive upland area. 
The primary interest lies in the unique mass of columnar pitchstone that builds An 
Sgurr, the largest occurrence of this rock type in the British Isles. The site also 
contains the largest area of natural willow scrub in Locharber, which provides 
important habit for native songbirds. 
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(iii) Laig to Kildonnan SSSI 
Area: 377.1 hectares (931.8 acres) 
Notified as part ofEigg SSSI in 1964, 1974 and 1981 
Another Geological Conservation Review Site of national importance, this includes 
Hugh Miller's famous reptile bed: the best known British site for Middle Jurasic 
marine crustaceous fossils. Other features of interest are the scrub woodland, and the 
outstanding range of western crustaceanic epiphytic lichens that abound on the slopes 
of the coastal grass lands. There is also a small separate strip of cliff and gully to the 
west ofKildonnan. 
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A.5 Infrastructure and services 
A.5.1 Access and communication 
An all-year ferry service is operated by Caledonian MacBrayne from Mallaig, which 
services 5 runs per week and is the principal conveyor of people, cargo and goods. It 
is state-subsidised, and presently costs £7 .I 0 per person return. A private ferry, the 
Shearwater is operated from Arisaig, and mainly carries tourists six times a week 
during the summer season. It presently cost £14-80 per person return. Both ferries are 
expected to continue for the foreseeable future, although there are plans for the 
Mallaig ferry to be upgraded to a roll-on/roll-off service in 1998, and the Shearwater 
will need to be replaced at some point. 
Fo~ especially large cargoes, such as building materials and livestock, a landing craft 
called the Spanish John is hired from Knoydart Estate. The service continues to be in 
doubt as the Estate itself remains in uncertainty. In all cases freight costs are 
prohibitively hire and impose considerable costs on island business and living costs. 
An island-run boat remains the only realistic solution. 
The island has a telephone microwave relay station for telephone reception. This is 
serviced and maintained by an islander, and is powered by diesel generators. 
A.5.2 Essential infrastructure 
The Highland Council owns the pier and roads, and an islander under contract 
maintains these in basic order. All water supply has been private and untreated, 
although a new supply will be incorporated into the Sheltered Housing development 
at Cleadale (see below). The previous water and sewage authority, HRC, twice 
removed septic tank waste from the island, yet it is unlikely that the new body 
responsible, the North of Scotland Water Authority will do this. The lack of a refuse 
dump on the island has long been a problem, and since there is no rubbish collection 
service residents have had to deal with their own wastes themselves. This has led to 
numerous small unofficial dumps of non-burnable items, and a severe rat problem. 
Recent campaigning, however, has led to a recycling program starting in which 
recyclable wastes are collected and shipped off the island on a contract basis. 
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There is no mains electricity or gas on the island. All gas is transported to the island in 
cylinders, and small household generators provide most of the electricity. There are 
also three small hydro generators ( 1.5 kW in total), and a 1 0 kW windmill which 
supplies the school. 
A.5.3 Housing 
In the Spring and Summer of 1996, four new houses will be built and an existing 
property rehabilitated for local people, particularly the elderly, by Locharber Housing 
Association, together with a new day care centre. The project is supported by the 
Highland Council and Scottish Homes and represents a significant improvement in 
the island's rented accommodation. 
A Housing Action Area covers Eigg and over the past nine years a total contract value 
of over £380,000 has been contributed through improvement grants. 14 homes have 
been renovated on the island over the past 20 years, and barring a few minor 
exceptions non-estate property is in generally sound condition. 
A.5.4 Education 
Eigg has a primary school that presently has a roll of 12. The head teacher resides in 
the Schoolhouse, which is in very good condition and is well equipped. After the age 
of 12 children have to travel off the island to Portree, Mallaig, or Fort William for 
' 
secondary education. There are no adult education facilities, although residents do 
organise self-help groups. 
A.5.5 Health care 
A resident Doctor services the Small Isles from Eigg, where there is a well-equipped 
surgery. There are strong doubts as to how long this will be maintained. 
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A.6 Estate Assets 
A.6.1 Summary of Estate properties 
The Isle of Eigg Estate comprises: 
Almost the entire Island, including Castle Island (7 ,400 acres in total) 
Eigg Lodge, with outbuildings and sub-tropical garden 
Estate Recreation Hall 
Galmisdale Harbour, with buildings including resturant/store and shop/office 
14 houses and cottages 
The island shop leased 
Galmisdale Farm at Sandavore with associated buildings 
Howlin Farm 
Kildonnan Farm, House and Steading 
Laig Farm, House and Steading 
16 Registered Crofts at Cleadale and Cuagach 
Aprcndi.\ 
Miscellaneous lettings (Coastguard Station, Roman Catholic Presbytery and Church) 
Forestry 465 acres 
The following properties are owned independently of the Estate : 
House site at No 3 Cuagach 
House site at No 2 Cleadale 
House site at No 3 Cleadale 
House site at No 4 Cleadale 
House site at No 5 Cleadale 
House site at No 7 Cleadale 
House site at No 9 Cleadale 
House site at No 13 Cleadale 
House site at No 14 Cleadale 
House site at No 15 Cleadale 
2 areas of ground at No 1 and No 14 Cleadale 
2 areas of ground at No 4 Cuagach 
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Post Office exchange 
Shore Cottage and adjoining ground 
Th School and Schoolhouse 
The jetty and two areas of ground at Galmisdale point 
The Doctor's house and surgery 
The Roman Catholic and adjoining Presbyterian burial ground 
The lighthouse beacon on Castle Island 
The former Presbyterian Manse, outbuildings, and ground 
The Glebe House 
The Presbyterian Church and adjoining ground 
The area sold for widening at Cleadale 
Grulin Bothy 
A.6.2 Estate property- tenancy and conditions 
(i) The Lodge 
;\ppcndi:.: 
The Lodge was built in 1925 and designed as the feature property of the island. It 
comprises 10 bedrooms, 3 reception rooms, 4 bathrooms, and kitchen. It has a terrace 
that looks onto the surrounding gardens of rhododendrons, azaleas, and palm trees. 
The Lodge has rarely been used in recent years and until recently was in acceptable 
condition, although requiring some general repair and painting. The building, 
however, is currently suffering from an outbreak of dry rot that will require urgent 
attention. This is compounded by the fact that a survey commissioned in July 1996 
has uncovered asbestos lining to the heating conduits. The electrical wiring needs 
attention, as does the kitchen and a few of the bedrooms. It is unfurnished. 
A salaried estate worker and part-time employee, both of whom have horticultural 
diplomas from Edinburgh Botanics, currently maintain the house and garden. The 
gardens could be extensively improved if more time was allocated; the employees 




The house once boasted the most advanced hydroelectric scheme in the Highlands and 
Islands, however, this was allowed to fall into disrepair within the last 15 years and an 
aged 4.5 kW diesel generator provides the electricity. Replacing the hydro scheme 
will cost approximately £30,000, and could provide around 7 kW of power. 
(ii) Domestic properties 
The Estate has 18 other domestic properties, although two of these (Kildonnan and 
Laig Farmhouses) are rented in conjunction with agricultural holdings, and Kelpie 
Wood Bothies are just simple cedar cabins. Except for four of the houses, all 
properties require significant attention and refurbishment. 
Two of these houses are tied to Estate jobs, and residents are presently occupying 
fodr properties. Two of the houses had rental agreements under Schellenberg, yet 
these leases do not appear to be active under the present landlord. The other two 
properties in appalling condition are occupied under grace and favour by an elderly 
lady and by the SWT warden. Maruma has offered to sell all these properties to their 
occupants, however no offers have been made. Pre-existing rents netted an 
approximate sum of £2,400 for the Estate. 
Many of the houses have been used for holiday lets in the past but only the Crow's 
Nest, Brae Cottage and Craigard Cottage could be rented in the short term, following 
remedial repairs and furnishing. 
(ii) Domestic property condition 
The following summary was compiled by myself and the local builder assessing each 
of the houses on location. It is only an approximation and no repair costs of repairs 
could be properly generated without complete structural surveys. The Map reference 
relates to ? and the location of the property on the island. 
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A Brae Cottage Unoccupied Fair 
B Craigard Cottage Unoccupied Fair 
c Crow's Nest Unoccupied Good 
D Galmisdale House Unoccupied Very Poor 
E Garden Cottage Tied Poor 
F Gamekeepers Cottage Tied Fair 
G Hill Cottage Informal Let Fair 
H Howlin Farm House Unoccupied Very Poor 
I Kelpie Wood Bothies (2) Unoccupied Very Poor 
J Kildonnan Farmhouse Combined with farm let Good 
K Laig Farm House Combined with farm let Fair 
L The Mill Unoccupied Very Poor 
M Millers Cottage Informal Let Poor 
N Pier Cottage Informal Let Excellent 
0 Sandavore Bothy Unoccupied Very Poor 
p SandavoreFarmhouse Unoccupied Very Poor 
Q Snithy Bothy Informal Let Fair 
Excellent =no work, Poor = substantial oventaul 
Good = requiring some attention, Very Poor = complete rebuilding 
Fair= major repairs 
(iv) Commercial properties 
There are only three commercial properties, The Shop, The Tea Shop, and The Craft 
Shop. They all fail Health and Safety guidelines, all in need of complete rebuilding, 
and all the businesses they contain struggling to survive. The Shop consists of a 
simple corrugated iron building, and the other two buildings were originally built as 
boat sheds by the pier. The Shop is the only premises which has had a formal lease, 
and when that was active the Estate saw £100 pounds in rent per annum. 
A.6.3 Estate farms 
There are four conventional farms on the island: Galmisdale at Sandavore, 
Kildonnan, Laig, and Howlin. The Estate runs Galmisdale Farm, and rents the other 
three to island residents. All farm lets remain in dispute since Mr Schellenberg's 
proprietorship and have not been resolved by the new owner. The combined rent per 
annum of let farms and steadings currently totals £10,900. 
296 
l\ppcndi.\ 
(i) Galmisdale Farm at Sandavore- 3,260 acres 
The Estate farm has suffered particularly badly over the past few years. Buildings 
(comprising sheep-shed, barn, and assorted out-buildings) and agricultural machinery 
are to varying degrees in poor condition and require investment to be brought up to 
accept ab le standards. 
Bracken has spread extensively, fencing is in bad repair, and access tracks are in need 
of drainage. In terms of stock and quotas, the farm in the recent past has successfully 
worked 1000 ewes and 30-40 cattle, providing a good wage for 1-2 farm workers and 
a healthy profit of some £20,000 to £30,000 for the estate. The ownership transactions 
between Mr Schellenberg and Maruma, however, have led to the removal of all sheep 
and their quotas to Mr Schellenberg's new estate. In February 1996 Maruma also sold 
all the Estate's cattle and cattle quotas. There is one shepherd presently employed by 
the Estate, who resides in a tied house (Gamekeepers Cottage), although Sandavore 
Farmhouse has traditionally been the farm's residence. The shepherd's current wage 
is £11,000 (including NI etc) per annum. 
(ii) Kildonnan Farm - 1,870 acres 
The farm, farmhouse, and steadings are rented to Mr Collin Carr. It is stocked with 
1000 ewes and 9 cattle, and Mrs Collin Carr runs the farmhouse as a successful B&B. 
The farm employs one full-time shepherd. The steadings are in fair condition, 
although could be considerably improved. The fencing is generally functional. Present 
rental income to the estate is £10,000 per annum. 
(iii) Laig Farm - 80 acres 
This is rented to Mrs Peggy Kirk, who lives in the farmhouse, and allows the land and 
steadings to be used by Mr Collin Carr. The land is currently stocked with 11 cattle, 
the fencing functional and the steadings in need of complete rebuilding. Present rental 
income to the estate is £900 per annum. 
(iv) Howlin Farm - 500 acres 
This consists of rough hill grazing and is presently rented in conjunction with 




The crofting area on Eigg is confined to Cuagach and Cleadale at the Northwest end 
of the island. There are 16 registered crofts covering a total of 1,200 acres, including 
Common Grazings. Some 4 crofts owner occupied 4 officially sublet, and 4 absentee 
crofters. The Cleadale crofts have approximately 2-6 acres of arable ground, with 12 
acres of outrun and a share in 110 acres of Common Grazings. The crofts at Cuagach 
are slightly larger at 7-16 acres of arable per croft, and a share each in 130 acres of 
Common Grazings. Only 7 of the 16 crofts are actively worked, and the majority of 
these by just one crofter. However, new crofters are beginning to take a much keener 
interest in working the land and plans are presently in progress for fencing the 
Common Grazings, and applying for a Crofter Forestry Grant. The total rental income 
for all the crofts is £80 per annum. 
A.6.5 Forestry 
Within living memory the island was self-sufficient in all its wood, for building, 
fencing, and fuel. However, inappropriate management and the complete decline of 
the processing of timber within the past thirty years has led to only wood being cut for 
fuel. As such the past three years has seen residents help themselves to a large pile of 
cut timber left over from previous harvesting. There is consequently significant scope 
for the development of forestry on the island. 
The climate and soils provide a sound environment for tree growth, though inadequate 
fencing, salt spray, and most significantly, wind are potent constraints. An informal 
report by Bob Dunsmore of the Forestry Commission in 1992 detailed three types of 
woodland. 
(i) Policy Woodlands 
Established around the Lodge at the South-eastern end between last century and the 
frrst half of this century. They comprise very attractive mixed woodland containing a 
wide diversity of herb species and are fully open to the public. The Manse woods are 
mostly deciduous and are of great wildlife and amenity value. 
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(ii) Conifer Plantations 
A 456 acre block was planted under the Forestry Grant Scheme during 1981, 
principally with sitka spruce, lodgepole pine, and Japanese larch, together with some 
hard woods and including an area of willow scrub and open ground for conservation 
purposes. There are also peripheral blocks, planted at the same time, which are 
suffering from windblow. 
(iii) Semi-Natural Woodland 
Several fragments of semi-natural woodland are included on the Ancient Woodland 
Inventory, of which a large portion is included within an SSSI. Such sites may well 
have been continuously wooded for the past 400 years or longer, and as such be 
classed as Ancient and Semi-Natural Woodland. 
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A.6.6 Map of Estate Properties 
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A.6. 7 Estimated financial summary of Eigg Estate management 1995-96 
Expenditures £'s Subtotals £'s Totals Notes 
The Lodge 
Insurance 1,000.00 Quoted 
Council Tax 12,500.00 Including NI etc. 
1.5 Staff 754.00 Including tied cottage 
Administration 250.00 
Fuel 300.00 14,804.00 Including transport 
Estate Farm 
Insurance 2,000.00 Quoted 
Council Tax 700.00 
1 Staff & Dog 11,000.00 Including NI etc. 
Feeds 5,000.00 Including transport 
Vet Expenses 300.00 
Fuel 500.00 Including transport 
Freight Costs 250.00 Taking cattle to market 
Administration 300.00 20,050.00 
Estate Exeenses 
Insurance on properties 2000.00 Estimated 
Council Tax on properties 1672.00 5 properties not on err roll 





Kildonnan & Howlin 10,000.00 
Laig 900.00 
The Shop 100.00 11,000.00 
House Rents 
Pier Cottage 1,992.00 
Hill Cottage 400.00 2,392.00 
Croft Rents 
12 Crofts @ £6 each 72.00 
Farm Incomes 
24 Suckler Cows @ £350 8,400.00 Presumed 90% calving rate, 
2 Cows@ £400 800.00 9,200.00 at 1996 market value, with no 
premiums & no quotas 
Estimated Total 
Income 22,564.00 
Estimated Balance -17,962.00 
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A.6.8 Private enterprise 
The island contains minimal private enterprise since there has been little in the way of 
stability, and little security of tenure upon which to qualify for commercial loans or 
grants. Tourism obviously represents the island's largest potential for enterprise, but 
the past 15 years has seen a precipitous decline in the Estate's services and attractions. 
Even so, an estimated 5000-6000 visitors climb off the two ferries each year, and 
what few businesses there are provide accommodation for those who stay on the 
island. Whilst there are two B&B 'son the island, there are also several informal lets 
of private houses and caravans. 
A.6.8.1 Bed and Breakfast 
Two B&B' s are operated throughout the year by Mrs Carr at Kildonnan, and by Mrs 
Kirk who also rents out part of family crofthouse in Cuagach as a self catering 
cottage. They cater for approximately 12-14 people at maximum capacity and are 
almost completely booked up over the 4-5 months of the season. One part-time staff is 
employed by each enterprise during peak season (July and August). 
A.6.8.2 The Shop 
Run by Mrs Cherry and located in the centre of the island, the Shop provides an 
essential social service for islanders and tourists alike. Since it has no electricity or 
running water, has a leaking roof, and is infested with rats it is hardly surprising that 
the business is hampered by its current p~emises. High freight charges and the 
sporadic nature of supplies, which often wait on wet quays ides, also restrict its 
profitability. 
A.6.8.3 Tea Shop & Craft Shop 
The same applies for the Tea Shop and Craft Shop which cater for day trippers by the 
pier. Inappropriate facilities and lack of tenure have prevented islanders from taking 
advantage of a potentially lucrative location and trade. At present two islanders run 
the businesses on a seasonal and informal manner. 
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A.6.8.4 Cleadale Arts & Crafts 
Teas and various arts and crafts are supplied in the crofthouse ofMr and Mrs Fyffe in 
Cleadale. Small and informal, it produces locally produced products for the craft shop 
as well. 
A.6.8.5 Simon Helliwell Building Contractor 
Mr Helliwell has been responsible for most of the private properties built and 
refurbished on the island for the past 20 years. As such he has provided a vital source 
of employment on the island and has ensured that whenever possible labour is locally 
sourced. He is fmishing the rebuilding of one crofthouse, and will shortly begin work 
on another although he is currently employing no extra staff. 
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178,816 185,722 156,502 161,940 167,531 
31,584 52,805 19,521 20,886 21,978 
All treated @ 5% 
inflation 
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A.7.1 Development Study Lodge Proposal 
Capital Expenditure 
Lodge 
General Repairs 5,000 
Electrical Upgrade 2,000 
Fire Regulation Provision 12,000 
Kitchen Refurbishment 3,000 
Furnishings 4,000 
Office Equipment 2,000 28,000 
Power Su~~~~ 
7 kW Hydro Scheme 30,000 
Replacement Generator 3,000 33,000 
Holida~ Cottage Upgrades 
Crow's Nest 1,000 
Brae Cottage 3,000 
Craigard Cottage 3,000 7,000 
Total Capital Expenditure 68,000 







Fuel 400 5,000 5,250 5,512 5,788 6,077 
Holida~ Cottages 
Insurance 1,500 
Rates 800 2,300 2,415 2,536 2,663 2,796 
Staff 
1 Part-time Groundsman 4,000 
1 Full-time for 8 months 7,000 
NI and Pension etc 2,000 13,000 13,650 14,332 15,049 15,801 
Total Revenue Expenditure 20,300 21,315 22,380 23,500 24,674 
Income Inflation @ 5% 
Lodge 
21 shared Units @ £8 
2 Double Units@ £15 
At Full Capacity generates £1386/wk 
Maximum Sales/ weeks 32 32 32 32 32 
Rate of Sales 0 0 1 1 1 
Total 17,740 19,958 22,176 24,393 26,611 
Holida~ Cottages 
Combined £350/ week 
Maxim urn Sales/ week 16 
Rate of Sales 0 1 1 1 1 
Total 840 2,800 3,360 3,640 3,920 
Total Income 18,580 22,758 25,536 28,033 30,531 
Balance -1,720 1,443 3,156 4,533 5,857 
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A.7.2 Development Study Estate Farm Proposal 
: • .:0·::, ·~·"' n=·o~~:"~~:z-~:·":&"'"" ..... ,,;,.,,~·2····-·~·---,- .Yeef'S---··; ____ . ···Vear4"· ·-··Y.ear-5 ,., .... ,··Notes'·""·' 
. -£·~Subtotal · · £'s Total £'s Total £'s T~tal £'s Total £'s Total 
Capital Expenditure 
Quotas 
1000 Sheep @ £25 
29 Beef@ £55 
Stock 
1000 Ewes @ £30 
25 Tups @ £170 
Remedial Repairs 
Machinery and Fencing 
Building repairs 
Office equipment 





Vetinary and Health Care 







1.5 Staff & Dog expenses 
NI & Pension etc. 
Auditing & Financial Advice 
Total Revenue Expenditure 
Incomes 
Sheep Sales ~800 total sold} 
Lambs 600 @ £28 
Ewes 150 @ £20 
Ewes 50@ £15 
Wool Sales 25 bags @ £100 
Sheep Annual Premium 
Hill Compensatory Allowances 
Beef Sales {26 sold} 
24 Calves @ £290 
2Cows@£400 
Suckler CaN Premium 




































13,130 13,786 14,475 15,199 15,959 inflation@ 5% 
26,100 27,405 28,n5 30,214 31,725 inflation @ 5% 
39,230 41,191 43,250 45,413 47,684 
80% lambing 
20,550 21,5n 22,872 24,017 25,218 5% increase in 
stock quality 
23,100 24,255 25,468 26,741 28,078 inflation@ 5% 
7,760 8,226 8,720 9,243 9,798 6% increase in 
stock quality 
4,656 4,656 4,656 4,656 4,656 
56,066 58,714 61,716 64,657 67,750 
16,836 17,523 18,466 19,244 20,066 
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A.7.3 Development Study Remainder Estate Expenditures and Incomes 
Capital Expenditure 
New Storage Barn by Pier 













First Year Provisions 
Management Survey 
Legal Expenses 




































4,906 5,347 5,614 6,119 
5,775 6,064 6,367 6,685 
4,200 4,410 4,630 4,861 
14,881 15,821 16,611 17,665 
35,000 
13,720 13,720 13,720 13,720 
48,640 13,720 13,720 13,720 
33,759 -2,101 -2,891 -3,945 
inflation @ 5% 
Staff accounted for 
in other projects 
I house sold for 
1st 2 years 
Assumed no 
increase in rent 
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